


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Edited by Kenneth J. Andrius

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Edited by Vojtech Mastny

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Foreword

For many years, the research reports issued by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have been indispensable resources for everyone with a serious interest in Soviet and East European affairs. Yet many of us have also recognized the need for a distillation of the best of RFE/RL research, published in book form and organized so as to make it more readily accessible to specialists and general readers alike. My personal interest in meeting this need led to a series of conversations with Dick Rowson, director of Duke University Press, in which we discussed how such a book could serve in identifying and providing timely, well-researched assessments of the critical trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

This volume, the first of a series to be published by Duke University Press, fulfills this need admirably. It is notable for its breadth, balance, and analytical soundness, as well as for the unique insights it offers into recent Soviet and East European affairs. Selected and edited by Professor Vojtech Mastny, distinguished scholar of East European affairs, noted for his original research and incisive analysis, the papers testify to the consistent excellence of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty research. More than that, the organization of the book conveys the dynamics of change on which the future of East-West relations so clearly hinges. The volume is a signal contribution to our understanding not only of a vital area of the world but also of key issues affecting the entire global community.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
January 1985

Publisher's Foreword

Duke University Press is publishing this book for the benefit of those interested in keeping abreast of current developments in the Soviet Union and East Europe. We do so because of the wide interest in the subject covered by this material.

This volume makes available in book form what has been disseminated to date only in ephemeral research papers issued periodically in mimeographed form. In so doing Duke Press does not, of course, take a position either on the policy positions espoused by RFE/RE or on the accuracy of these documents. We are further encouraged in this endeavor by RFE/RL's enlistment of an outstanding scholar as editor who has produced a volume that speaks, in form and substance, to the needs of the academic community including students, as well as to policymakers, professional groups, and general readers.

We look forward to the continuation of this venture as an annual publishing event updating trends and developments in this part of the world. Duke Press expresses its appreciation to the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, Paris, Washington, D.C., and New York whose work made this book possible.

Richard C. Rowson
December 1984

Editor's Acknowledgments

In the seemingly overwhelming task of preparing for publication what amounts to little more than a tenth of the annual research output of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, I could hardly have succeeded without being able to draw on the consistent competence of the many professionals that give this remarkable institution its special distinction.

To Eva Segert, doctoral candidate at the University of California at Los Angeles, I owe the most for her expert help in the substantive editing of the whole complicated manuscript during her summer internship in Munich. Ellen Gerb and John Clegg supplied organizational, logistical, and technical assistance indispensable to expedite the manuscript during its preparatory stages. Nika Herus, an undergraduate at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and Kathi Kehoe, my secretary at the Center for International Relations at Boston University, were the efficient and patient typists without whose dedication the often impossibly tight deadlines could not have been met. Thanks also to Evan A. Raynes of the Kennan Institute, Washington, D.C., for indexing this volume.

Unswerving support by Senator James L. Buckley, president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, provided abiding inspiration for the project. Robert L. Hutchings, special assistant to the President, and William A. Buell, vice president for U.S. operations, proved the good friends ever ready to help when needed. In Munich, Keith Bush and Herbert Reed, directors of research for Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe respectively, as well as Vladimir Kusin, deputy director of RFE research and analysis, greatly facilitated the Editor's task by their understanding of his queries, their spirit of cooperation, and their willingness to offer timely advice.

Without the essential encouragement from Richard C. Rowson, di-

rector of Duke University Press, the project would have neither started nor been completed.

To my children, John and Katja, belong my thanks for sharing with me the many joys and occasional frustrations of a summer in Munich.

Vojtech Mastny
Boston and Washington, D.C.
November 1984

Transition Without Direction

Introduction
Vojtech Mastny

More than at any previous time, the year that ended in June 1984 was a period of transition in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. At last the irresistible issue of reform was addressed in Moscow's profoundly conservative empire—but by what proved to be a short-lived leadership. Never before had the Kremlin's ability to act been tested so severely as when Party General Secretary Iuri Andropov became incapacitated and eventually died, only to be succeeded by another ailing leader, Konstantin Chernenko. This coincidence of an atrophy of power with a particular need for its application to a growing agenda of unresolved problems gave the period its peculiar distinction.

Andropov's Legacy

During his brief tenure in office Andropov, as the former security chief presumably the best-informed man in the land and hence also the one most aware of its real problems, cast himself in the mold of a reformer. He associated his name with well-publicized drives against corruption and for work discipline—both unsettling infusions of egalitarianism in a system steeped in privilege. He abetted an experiment in the decentralization of industrial management to enhance efficiency. But how serious were these efforts at rejuvenation that relied more on administrative measures by the existing bureaucratic apparatus than on economic or moral incentives?

The answer was implicit in the remarkable confidential paper that was prepared in the Novosibirsk branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences for discussion at the highest levels. Its author candidly admitted that the nation's economy suffered from too much regimentation and too little confidence in the judgment of the individual worker. The system, designed to maximize obedience, served the entrenched bureaucratic interests but stifled innovation. The paper argued that substantive application of market

mechanisms and encouragement of individual initiative to stimulate productivity were both necessary and improbable because of the obstacles inherent in the system. The fate of Andropov's decentralization experiment, which faltered as soon as he disappeared from the scene, tended to support this conclusion.

But even if Andropov had had the time it is doubtful whether he also had the faith necessary to make reform succeed. Herein was a crucial difference between this coolly rational administrator and his ebullient predecessor Nikita Khrushchev, the genuine reformer of the post-Stalin times. Representing no change of priorities, Andropov's innovations failed conspicuously to generate that groundswell of hope which had been the hallmark of the Khrushchev era.

The Korean Airliner Incident

Nothing highlighted the perils of rigidity more vividly than the manner in which the Andropov regime handled the accidental but symptomatic tragedy of the South Korean civilian airliner shot down by the Soviet air force on September 1, 1983, with the loss of 269 lives. At the origins were the inflexible rules of engagement which inhibited the commanders on the spot from exercising the right judgment that easily could have avoided the catastrophe. Once the disaster occurred, the inability of the system to manage the consequences in the best interests of the Soviet state compounded the damage. While Andropov himself may have already been too ill to act effectively, the absence of institutional machinery to expedite decisions in an emergency situation was disconcerting.

While millions of Soviet citizens sought information about the incident from Western broadcasts, Moscow attempted first to conceal the facts and then to distort them through reinterpretation. Finally it let the military, in the person of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, provide the unsatisfactory official explanation that denied any Soviet responsibility for the tragedy. As a result, the Soviet government emerged in the worst possible light—as reckless and cynical but also inefficient and indecisive. Its international reputation plummeted at a time when the very opposite was needed to help avert other crises looming in the background.

Western Missiles and Peace Movements

Foremost among these crises was the Soviet failure to dissuade West Germany from proceeding with the deployment of NATO's Pershing II and

cruise missiles to offset hundreds of Soviet ss-20 intermediate-range missiles already targeted at Western Europe. The destruction of the airliner tarnished badly the peaceful image Moscow needed to project in exploiting for its purposes the West European "peace" movements which, despite occasional material support, it never effectively controlled. Its use of the pacifists became a double-edged sword when some of those participating in the Soviet-sponsored peace rally in Prague in August 1983 offered encouragement to local dissidents. Moreover, the West German antiwar movement prompted imitation in East Germany, the member of the Warsaw pact most susceptible to the trappings of militarism. Despite the limited numbers involved, activists protected by the Protestant churches voiced there more criticism of Moscow's military policy than was heard in any other part of the Soviet bloc.

When the Bonn parliament on November 21-22, 1983, approved the stationing of the Euromissiles on West German territory, the Soviet Union was caught unprepared. So confident had it been in its expectation that the deployments could somehow be prevented that it failed to follow up by any other initiatives its decision to suspend all arms control talks with the United States. The suspension became unavoidable once Moscow, during its unsuccessful campaign against the Western missiles, had unwisely staked its credibility on the implementation of this particular threat. Beyond that, no coherent policy could be discerned in the violent anti-American campaign the Soviet media subsequently launched with the ostensible purpose of creating a war scare. If this was to prod the Soviet people to close ranks behind their government the actual effects were different. Among a populace to which the authorities could hardly offer any reassuring proof of their ability to master the allegedly menacing situation, the alarm raised created more anxiety than resolve.

Moscow's insistence that any increase in American military might could be readily matched by its own was not convincingly backed by its actions. The much-advertised "counter-deployments" in Eastern Europe actually continued previous programs rather than heralding the onset of any new ones. But they sufficed to prompt a new sense of uneasiness in the countries that they were supposedly designed to protect. In the fall of 1983, East Germany and even Czechoslovakia publicized their citizens' concern about the Western and Soviet deployments alike. And the following January, East German party chief Erich Honecker put on record his hope for an early resumption of the suspended arms control talks at the very time the Soviet Union was assiduously discouraging any such hope unless the United States made unilateral concessions first.

Arms Control

With the conversion of its accumulated military assets into commensurate political advantages becoming ever more difficult, the Soviet Union was bound to be troubled by the prospect of a further acceleration of the already inordinately expensive arms race. Despite its breakup of the arms control talks, it therefore did not rule out other negotiations. In January 1984 it joined the European disarmament conference convened in Stockholm and soon thereafter agreed also to a resumption of the Vienna talks on the limitation of conventional armaments in Central Europe. But Moscow's willingness—or ability—to negotiate seriously remained in doubt. Serious negotiations would have presupposed the acceptance of the unpleasant reality of diminishing Soviet military advantage and only could have been justified by reasoning that a substantive compromise would reverse the trend or at least cut Soviet losses. For so agonizing a decision no one in the Kremlin seemed capable either of assuming exclusive responsibility or of masterminding a necessary consensus in the ruling group.

Although the Soviet Union had strongly desired and had been campaigning actively for the disarmament conference, it did not in fact submit any proposals at Stockholm that were indicative of any real belief in their practicability. Both NATO and neutral delegates therefore tended to view the assorted Warsaw Pact proposals—renunciation of force, no-first-use of nuclear weapons, freeze on military expenditures, ban on chemical weapons in Europe, nuclear-free zones—as mere propaganda ploys. After two rounds of sometimes acrimonious discussions, the Stockholm talks remained notably devoid of results.

Before and during the conference, Romania undertook separate initiatives whose motives were somewhat less transparent than those of the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact. President Nicolae Ceaușescu's favorite schemes—a nuclear freeze in Europe and a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans—were certainly closer to the Soviet than to the Western positions. Therefore, since they envisaged much greater sacrifices from NATO than from the Warsaw Pact they met with a cool reception in the West. But in the unlikely case of their implementation, the Romanian proposals would have at least partly restricted Moscow's overwhelming presence in Eastern Europe, thus providing some relief to the countries that, like Romania, had been living under the Soviet shadow—the probable reason why the Soviet Union also showed no enthusiasm for the Ceaușescu schemes. Their futility raised justified doubts about the substance and value of Romania's semiautonomous foreign policy despite two decades of effort to demonstrate otherwise.

Chernenko Succeeds Andropov

The Stockholm conference was in session when, on February 13, 1984, Chernenko succeeded Andropov as the new general secretary. Coming a mere four days after the death of the incumbent, this was the smoothest transfer of power in the Kremlin ever. But if, unlike on previous occasions, there were few hints of a power struggle, there were indications of a possible power devolution—a momentous development in a political system designed for a strong leader. Ill fitting such a description, Chernenko was an unlikely person to preside over decisions that require such a leader. He was widely regarded as another transitional figure, perhaps to be followed soon by a more vigorous successor with a reformist bent. Speculation centered on Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, at fifty-three the youngest member of the Politburo.

The Kremlin leadership seemed inhibited not so much by irreconcilable conflict of opinion about what ought to be done as by a paucity of any vigorous expression of opinion on policy issues by aging members of an otherwise cohesive oligarchy, apparently now faced with tasks beyond its capabilities. Projecting an image of constancy and caution that camouflaged immobility and indecision, the Chernenko regime implied in its domestic policies continuity with the Brezhnev era and rejection of the abortive reform experiments of the Andropov interlude. But as far as foreign policy was concerned, the dynamism characteristic of most of that earlier era contrasted vividly with the restraint evident in Soviet behavior since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the double succession notwithstanding.

A Stagnant Foreign Policy

During his brief tenure, Andropov did not even attempt to break new ground in foreign policy. In most parts of the world, Moscow shunned additional involvements, seldom cashing in on opportunities and avoiding commitments threatening unpredictable consequences. It wisely stayed out of the civil war in Chad, brought to a head by Libyan intervention, and also failed to move forcefully in the Middle East where it could have taken greater advantage of the American fiasco in Lebanon. Taking heed of the resolve that the United States demonstrated in Central America by its successful intervention in Grenada, the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxies kept strict limits on provocations against American interests in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In southern Africa, Moscow reluctantly acquiesced in the setbacks administered to its clients in Angola and Mozambique by South Africa's power diplomacy. But the price of prudence was the scant progress

6 Transition Without Direction

it could realize in areas more critical to Soviet interests, such as relations with China. At the beginning of 1984, the announcement, and then unexplained cancellation, of a forthcoming visit to Beijing of the highest-ranking Soviet official in years highlighted the self-imposed obstacles to change.

The pattern persisted under Chernenko despite the emergence of Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, rightly reputed to be one of the most experienced diplomats of his time, as a prominent figure in the new leadership. However, Gromyko had acquired his reputation as a skillful manager rather than an imaginative designer of foreign policies. Moreover, nothing was known about his aptitude, if any, to operate the domestic consensus on which effective foreign policy rests; his very ability to avoid excessive involvement in the successive rounds of Kremlin infighting accounted for his exceptional political longevity. And much the same applied to Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, another protagonist of the Chernenko regime, whose main career had been in the even narrower field of military procurement.

Afghanistan

The Soviet Union gave no clear indication of how it intended to dispose of the burden of the Afghanistan war that Brezhnev had bequeathed to his successors. The military investment in the country had already cost too much to be abandoned easily. At the same time, no political solution seemed to be in sight. But neither did Moscow show an inclination to expand its involvement on a scale that would make it possible to force a military solution. In that uncertain situation, the tragedy of Afghanistan evolved more by military than by any political logic.

Apparently unencumbered by political inhibitions, the Soviet military were left to conduct the war their way: as a campaign calculated to deprive the bulk of the civilian population, supportive of the guerrillas, of the material base of its livelihood. Testimonies by Soviet deserters and prisoners of war described a campaign reminiscent of the worst excesses of nineteenth-century imperialism or even of the Nazi conduct in occupied Russia during World War II. Yet in the Soviet Union itself, the little attention most people paid to this unpopular but largely invisible war scarcely generated domestic pressure for its termination. Nor was international pressure ever sufficient to undo Moscow's belief that despite continued Afghan resistance time might be on the Soviet side after all.

Poland

No such belief could be entertained seriously in Poland, unlike Afghanistan a country crucial to Soviet security. Although open conflict there had subsided, evidence of genuine stabilization was yet to be seen. Even after the termination of the martial law in July 1983, the Soviet-backed military regime in Warsaw revealed no strategy for political reconciliation or economic recovery. Content with the enforcement of public order in a narrow sense, it did not attempt to reinvigorate the demoralized Polish Communist party. Scorned by an overwhelming majority of the population, it nevertheless managed to maintain itself firmly in power less by direct Soviet intervention than by its appeal to a small but not negligible minority of those with a vested interest in the preservation of their individual privileges.

The cleavage within the country defined the mediating role of the Catholic Church as an independent force capable of influencing both the people and the authorities. Personified more by the consistently popular Pope John Paul II than by the recurrently controversial primate Cardinal Józef Glemp, the Church as an institution retained unswerving loyalty of the people and grudging respect of the regime as well. It used its unique position to promote under its auspices programs of social self-help to salvage as much of the accomplishments of the outlawed Solidarity labor union as possible. But any mediation effort suffered not only from the deep popular mistrust of the government's intentions but also from the government's unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to offer timely concessions or at least avoid provocative language.

Despite occasional instances of arbitrary repression, the Poles nevertheless remained in important ways freer from coercion than other peoples of the Soviet bloc. The underground press continued to flourish and the political diversification of the opposition signified not its demise but the reality of vigorous political debate which alone addressed the nation's predicament with the candor it deserved. Once again the Polish body politic gave proof of its extraordinary vitality outside the official institutions of the state, which were deemed irrelevant to the society's true needs. Whether justified or not, the Poles' reluctance to acknowledge the finality of their defeat distinguished their mood from that prevailing in other Eastern European countries in the aftermath of earlier repressions.

Hungary's New Stance

Among those countries, Hungary had managed to recover from its abortive 1956 revolution by pursuing conciliation at home while following faithfully Moscow's lead in foreign policy. The right mixture of relative freedom and relative prosperity enjoyed by its people earned the Hungarian regime the highest degree of popular acceptance anywhere in the Soviet bloc, and Moscow's confidence as well. But by 1983, the continuity of this pattern of development became increasingly open to doubt for several reasons.

The extensive introduction of market incentives into the Hungarian economy raised disturbing questions about the consequences of an infusion of capitalist spirit into communist form. A new class of affluent entrepreneurs emerged, reminiscent more of the early days of laissez-faire capitalism than of any kind of socialism. The resulting contrast between the extremes of wealth and poverty led to a rapid rise in social tensions. At the same time the orientation of its exports to Western markets made Hungary particularly vulnerable to external economic disturbances beyond its control. Its burden of hard-currency debt was surpassed only by that of the nearly bankrupt Poland and Romania. Compared with these countries, Hungary still remained quite stable and prosperous but its accomplishment, so dependent on the dexterity of aging Party Secretary János Kádár, became more precarious than ever.

Hungary's domestic difficulties did not preclude a further expansion of its Western links. In fact, whether because of its stake in Western trade or, more likely, because of a lack of any clear Soviet directive to the contrary, Budapest made itself a champion of the notion that especially at the time of high tension between the two superpowers smaller states of Europe have a crucial role to play in keeping détente alive. This brought to the Hungarian capital a steady stream of high-ranking Western visitors, from U.S. Vice President George Bush to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

In the most portentous theoretical statement to emanate from Eastern Europe in the course of the year, Central Committee Secretary in charge of foreign relations Mátyás Szűrös defended his country's posture by positing precedence of national interests over the interests of the socialist bloc as a whole, except in extraordinary circumstances. This implied that a paramount task of Hungarian foreign policy was the avoidance of situations that Moscow might invoke as extraordinary in order to justify interference in the affairs of its allies. Szűrös further insisted that the pursuit of particularly close links with Western countries, especially those with whom

Hungary enjoyed geographical proximity and historical ties, was both natural and beneficial for all concerned.

East Germany on a New Road?

The favorable publicity that Szürös's theses immediately received in East Berlin, and the outcry they produced in Prague, highlighted their deeper significance for an incipient realignment within the Soviet bloc. That common perception of national interests should draw so staunchly orthodox a Soviet ally as East Germany toward the free-wheeling Hungary, thus forsaking traditional affinities between East Berlin and Prague, reconfirmed Eastern Europe's undiminished propensity for unexpected twists and turns. The national interest that the East Germans were so eager to cultivate concerned their special relationship with West Germany. At issue were not only the substantial economic benefits, which included in 1983 and 1984 two advantageous credit deals arranged by Bavaria's conservative Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, but also Bonn's growing disposition to treat the GDR as an authentic German state rather than a mere satrapy of Moscow. The East German authorities reciprocated by relaxing somewhat the stringent currency exchange requirements they had imposed on West German visitors. More important, they allowed over thirty thousand of their own disgruntled citizens to emigrate to the West, thus sanctioning the largest legal exodus from the country since the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Whether these and other concessions were tangible enough from the Western point of view was debatable; that they were tangible enough for Moscow to arouse its apprehension was not.

In earlier times the Soviet Union described gradual rapprochement between the two German states as the proper path to the solution of the German question. More recently, it had been encouraging this rapprochement better to exploit Bonn's economic largesse and also to encourage West German resistance to missile deployments. But once rapprochement began to grow, the economic and other contacts that had led to ever increasing intimacy between the German interlocutors assumed for Moscow potentially alarming dimensions. The alarm produced an interesting result: the Soviet Union publicly attributed to *West* German machinations what were originally *East* German concepts of the two German states' "special responsibility" for peace and of their joint commitment to "damage limitation" in view of the accelerated arms race.

The Soviet Union failed to respond promptly and forcefully to this subtle new challenge to its interests. Its response was made all the more

difficult by the fact that the interests of the various parties were in flux. In publicly defending their positions, the East Germans and Hungarians were able to cite earlier and sometimes even current Soviet statements. Rather than to challenge Moscow openly, their new assertiveness amounted to a bid for a more true partnership in place of mere subordination. It occurred at the moment when strong, secure, and experienced leadership was more readily available in some of the East European capitals than in the Kremlin.

As these developments continued to evolve, their potential for a substantive transformation of Soviet-East European relations was difficult to estimate. Whether the pursuit of national interests as defined by the ruling groups would also benefit the people remained uncertain although the popularity of the new policies in both East Germany and Hungary suggested that it might. More predictable was further erosion of Moscow's influence in a strategically critical part of Europe—enough reason for the United States to warm up its traditionally chilly relationship with East Berlin following the visit there by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt in early 1984. By the summer, the Soviet Union finally stiffened its resistance to the new trend by invoking the need for vigilance against the old specter of West German "revanchism." But despite temporary setbacks, continued devolution seemed far more probable in Eastern Europe than its permanent reversal.

The Balkans

Devolution had long been the rule in the southern part of the region where Soviet allies, members of NATO, and nonaligned states (as different as Yugoslavia and Albania) coexisted in relative peace. By previous Balkan standards, international relations had been remarkably stable there. The ancient ethnic rivalries, while still very much an integral part of the scene, were no longer the uncontrollable explosive force that they used to be. Yugoslavia, that microcosm of the Balkans, was a case in point.

Defying the prophets of doom, post-Tito Yugoslavia did not succumb to the nationalist passions of its many ethnic groups. Rather, four years after Tito's death, foremost on the agenda was the question of how to adapt the country's authoritarian system of government to the more wide-ranging political and economic aspirations of its pluralistic society. The near-bankruptcy of its economy, the swollen bureaucracies of its component republics, and the increased proclivity for the suppression of dissent presented formidable obstacles to change. But need for radical change was nevertheless extensively discussed with a candor that had long distinguished

the Yugoslav brand of communism from the Soviet variety. The persistence of vigorous public debate kept hope for orderly rather than disorderly change alive.

New sources of international instability, albeit quite different from each other, appeared in Greece and Albania. In Athens, the socialist government of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou toyed with departures from Greece's traditional pro-Western orientation by pursuing rapprochement with the communist nations farther north while nurturing at the same time the popular but futile feud with fellow NATO member, Turkey. But, disruptive though it was, Papandreou's personal diplomacy was less likely to have a lasting impact than were more impersonal forces at work in Albania. These included not only its soaring birth rate, by far the highest in Europe, but also related irredentist claims to parts of Yugoslavia; not reassuring was the absence of any clear indication of the direction the country might take after the impending demise of its xenophobic leader, Enver Hoxha, believed to be seriously ill.

New Economic Problems

By 1983, having reached a higher level of complexity and sophistication, the countries of Eastern Europe found it increasingly difficult to respond to the complex problems they faced at this new level of development. At issue was the difficulty of their Soviet-style command economies in meeting the new challenge. The problem was compounded by the considerable extent to which these relatively weak economies had become intertwined with the more advanced Western ones which, however, were themselves experiencing the strains of a recession. Although the economic crisis in the Soviet Union and that in Eastern Europe were similar, their severity was difficult to compare because of a disproportion in size. Sheer size may have been the decisive factor that spared the Soviet Union an economic breakdown of the magnitude encountered in Poland or Yugoslavia.

The most commonly cited ailments—declining growth rates, low productivity, labor shortages, poor distribution, environmental deterioration—were not really new but neither were they being alleviated. Endemic rather than acute, their solution called for a new, long-term strategy. The paucity of any such strategy in countries accustomed to regard central planning as the key to economic success gave the measure of the intractability of the problems. In June 1984 the long-delayed summit meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet bloc's supreme economic agency, ended without giving substance to its allegedly "comprehensive" plan of action.

Ethnic and Social Tensions

In another area where problems were endemic rather than acute, the Soviet Union postulated a long-term solution to its nationality problem by envisaging a gradual "merger" of its different ethnic groups. However, this postulate was not easy to reconcile with demographic realities that saw the numerical growth of the nationalities to be merged, mainly those of Moslem Central Asia, far outpacing that of the Russian nationality into which they were supposed to merge. In Eastern Europe, the condition of Hungarian and Albanian minorities bred tension. The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and especially in Romania resented being subjected to regimes more oppressive than that in their country of origin. The reverse applied to the Albanians in Yugoslav Kosovo whose resentment rather stemmed from the relative backwardness of this province despite its impressive rate of development and from the remaining limitations of their otherwise quite generous home rule. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Serbian-speaking Moslems enjoyed the status of a separate nationality, Islamic militancy emerged as a new though not nearly as severe problem.

Throughout the Soviet orbit, the fading prospect of a better society under communism led to growing polarization between the privileged and the underprivileged, with increased corruption permeating all social strata. Although the extent of these social ills differed considerably from country to country, everywhere it contrasted with the relative egalitarianism and puritanism of the earlier years of communist rule, suggesting similarities not so much with the industrialized West as with some of the developing countries of the Third World. In other respects, to be sure, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe shared the signs of decay common to most of the industrialized world—from alienation of the youth to rising crime rate—but without offering their people the redeeming rewards that political freedom and material well-being provided the citizens of the Western democracies.

As was customary in the past, most of the regimes tended to respond to dissent by repression rather than by conciliation. But only in the Soviet Union was there a partial reversion to Stalinist practices albeit in more refined forms. These included resentencing of political prisoners upon the expiration of their original terms, their torture by fellow inmates (common criminals commissioned by the authorities), and continued abuse of psychiatric treatment as legally sanctioned punishment. The disappearance from public sight of the best-known Soviet dissident, Nobel Prize winner Andrei Sakharov, may have been symptomatic of a trend toward more ar-

bitrary exercise of power by the security apparatus at a time of weak political leadership.

A Religious Revival

Throughout the Soviet bloc, the typical reaction to the harsher times was retreat to privacy. Although more people than possibly anywhere else in the world remained politically alert, partly because of an avid attentiveness to Western radio and television broadcasts, few were willing to be politically active. With the notable exception of Poland, dissent survived against a background of fundamental indifference on the part of a majority of the population. But this did not prevent the onset of a religious revival which, while consistent with the withdrawal from the official polity and its questionable values, was also symptomatic of a quest for new group identification and more meaningful values. Again apart from the special case of Poland, where religion had always been a potent political force, the revival was conspicuous in the most militantly atheistic countries: Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the Soviet Union itself. As if uncertain about the significance of the phenomenon, which defied standard Marxist analysis, the authorities tended to prefer harassment to systematic repression.

The End of an Era

By mid-1984 the widening range of open-ended developments added uncertainty to the direction which the process of transition in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe might be taking. With rare exceptions, the ability of the men in power to master the challenges they faced was declining as impersonal forces beyond their control were on the rise. The symptoms were those of the end of an era rather than a new beginning.

II Andropov: Legacy of a Reformer?

1

Soviet Economic Policy under Andropov

Philip Hanson

The Soviet economy was in acute difficulties when Iurii Andropov took over as general secretary of the CPSU in November 1982. The general deceleration of Soviet economic growth since the late 1950s and the especially marked slowdown since the mid-1970s were widely discussed.¹ Demographic and geographical factors beyond the control of authorities, such as declining growth of the labor force and rising costs of energy and of raw material extraction and transport, inhibited the exploitation of natural resources. After 1978 the weather had also been unhelpful for four successive years, contributing to a decline of per capita domestic output of major foodstuffs.²

The official Soviet figures and the CIA calculations of Soviet GNP and industrial output showed a slowdown rather than stagnation or decline. But a number of academic analysts argued that the true picture in 1979–1982 was one of stagnation in real investment, in real per capita GNP, or in per capita consumption.³ And the CIA analysts acknowledged that their estimates of real investment growth might have been exaggerated.⁴

Not surprisingly, Western correspondents reported that Soviet officials were strongly concerned about the economy. In one report, a senior manager in the coal-mining industry was quoted as saying, apparently for attribution: "Do you know what I think is the fundamental thing wrong with this country? The absence of competition."⁵ Worker and manager morale seemed to have been low for some time, leading more people—including senior staff—to believe that drastic institutional changes were needed. Only in external trade and finance was it possible to say that the Soviet economic situation in 1982 was strong, and even here its position was jeopardized by falling energy prices and by the external financial difficulties of the smaller Comecon countries.

The new leadership's efforts at improvement could be divided into five sections:

First, authoritative statements about the need to alter the economic mechanism to give enterprises more autonomy. There were also signs of preparation for such a change. Admittedly, much of this had occurred before. But at least there was a certain freshness of style when Andropov said at the plenum of the Central Committee in November that it was time to start doing something about enterprise autonomy instead of just talking about it.⁶

After that, Andropov neither did much nor even mentioned enterprise autonomy much in public.⁷ He did say that stronger discipline was a necessary but not sufficient source of economic improvement.⁸ Academician Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, stated that a special interdepartmental council, headed by the chairman of the USSR Gosplan, the central planning agency, was surveying the experience of Eastern European countries as a guide to possible organizational change in the USSR.⁹ In April 1983 he said that this council had been in existence for sixteen months.¹⁰ Elected to the Academy before Andropov's elevation to the party leadership, he had been a member of the group of Central Committee consultants who had worked with Andropov in the 1960s. Addressing the USSR Supreme Soviet session on June 17, Geidar Aliev, a first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, also said that measures to create autonomy for enterprises were being implemented.¹¹

The second development concerned agriculture, where the Politburo gave its backing to the "group contract" system (*kollektivnyi podriad*) on Soviet farms.¹² The concept was reminiscent of the once controversial "normless link" (*beznariadnoe zveno*) whereby a small group of workers was assigned by the sovkhoz or kolkhoz a certain area of land, some equipment, and output targets, perhaps for one particular crop. In return, they were guaranteed payment according to the results seemingly on the basis of a voluntary contract between themselves and the farm. Such an arrangement did not fit easily into a society where voluntary activities tended to be viewed with suspicion. Indeed, in conformity with Soviet practice, official instructions to negotiate "voluntary" contracts with "voluntarily" formed work groups were likely to dilute a useful grass-roots idea into a mere exercise in reporting implementation of the campaign.¹³

Andropov and his colleagues were apparently supplementing rather than replacing the food program inaugurated under Brezhnev. In his speech to the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in November 1982, Andropov made it clear that Brezhnev's food program remained

in effect. Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev repeated this in February 1983.¹⁴ The new leadership apparently decided that Brezhnev's policy of indiscriminate spending in agriculture was not enough but that it was not possible to dispense with it. Rather, it was to be reinforced by potentially radical changes in incentives, as in the collective contract scheme, and by considerably less radical organizational changes. These were exemplified by the decree on production and development work in the agricultural-equipment industry and by the Politburo's sanction of new planning and supply arrangements in the "agroindustrial complex" as a whole.¹⁵ The new planning arrangements were intended to make plans for industrial supplies to agriculture dependent on orders from farms, following a review by the local agroindustrial associations.

The third policy initiative was Andropov's well-publicized personal drive against slackness and corruption—the "discipline campaign." It amounted to an egalitarian form of bullying. In a speech at the Ordzhonikidze works, Andropov stressed that it was not merely a question of the bosses getting tougher with their subordinates: "The question of discipline does not apply only to workers and technicians. It applies to everyone, beginning with the ministers."¹⁶ In campaigning against corruption and slackness in high places, Andropov acted shrewdly. Only the sight of managers and ministry officials also being required to mend their ways could have possibly reconciled Soviet workers to the prospect of cutting their time for drinking, shopping, and gossiping. Certainly coercion and intimidation were apt to increase output wherever there were organizational slacks in the production process. But the nature of the increase meant that it was likely to be temporary, without the potential of creating the base for a sustained growth of output.

The fourth development was the new law on labor collectives, published in draft form in April 1983,¹⁷ extensively discussed in the Soviet press and at public meetings, and finally enacted by the Supreme Soviet in June.¹⁸ Its legislation followed the requirements of the constitution of 1977 and probably did little more than codify already existing practices.¹⁹ On the other hand, the presentation of this law was notable for its emphasis on rebutting "ideological opponents" and demonstrating that Soviet society was allegedly becoming more democratic. Introducing the new law to the Supreme Soviet, Aliev said that it widened the circle of questions that the working collective was empowered to discuss and gave the collective some rights to decide and to supervise the implementation of decisions.²⁰ He described it as promoting the principle of "self-management," though he hastened to add that this did not mean the "anarchosyndicalist" idea that went under the same name—presumably in Yugoslavia.

Stress on the importance of "further developing the democratic foundations of socialist society" was also apparent in Bogomolov's article. Aliiev described the new law on collectives as a means to assist the proper functioning of enterprises after they had been given greater autonomy. Evidently the leadership was concerned about workers' apathy and alienation and was attempting to forestall developments akin to the rise of "Solidarity" in Poland.²¹

The final noteworthy "action" was the formation of a new top-level party team responsible for economic policy. Gorbachev's responsibilities were expanded beyond agriculture to include general oversight of economic policy. At fifty-two, Gorbachev was among the youngest members of the Politburo. Working with him as supervisors of industrial policy apparently were Vladimir Dolgikh and Nikolai Ryzhkov, both secretaries of the Central Committee. This was neither an elderly nor an inexperienced team, and Dolgikh's past performance as an industrial manager was considered outstanding.²² The promotion of Grigorii Romanov, the first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee, to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU possibly entailed his membership in the team as the party overseer for defense production.²³ He had in the past advocated both a greater role for regional planning and further development of production and scientific-production associations.²⁴

In total, the list did not contribute to any great change in the economic policy. However, dramatic decisions could not be expected in the event that Andropov had not yet consolidated his position or was cautiously feeling his way.²⁵ At least there was a certain consistency about the measures implemented or suggested with respect to their attempt to strengthen discipline, incentives, and morale, and together they hinted that a significant devolution of initiative would occur later.

But no less significant were some of the steps that the new leadership had not taken. Obligatory enterprise targets and centralized supply allocation had not been removed, as they had been in the Hungarian reforms of 1968.²⁶ Neither did the Andropov leadership change top personnel in Gosplan, the Central Statistical Administration, or other central bodies in the state economic hierarchy. Such changes were needed if major reform was to be implemented.

There had also been no significant shift of priorities among the main end-use components of final output: investment, consumption, and defense. A number of decrees tended to emphasize consumer interest, particularly in housing construction, the service sector, agricultural machinery, and consumer goods.²⁷ But Andropov's and Gorbachev's speeches stressed instead the continuing importance of the engineering industry.

Experiment in Industrial Management Reform

Keith Bush

On July 26, 1983, the Soviet central press carried a summary of a joint decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Additional Measures for Expanding the Rights of Industrial Production Associations/Enterprises in Planning and Economic Activity, and for Strengthening Their Responsibility for the Results of Their Work."¹

The principal stated aims of the experiment, in their presumed order of importance, were: to reduce the number of centrally determined success indicators for each enterprise, and rearrange the order of priority accorded to the remaining indicators; stabilize success indicators for the duration of the five-year plan period; give management more say in the planning process and require more responsibility from managers for fulfilling plans; gradually promote Shchekino-type schemes—named after a reform plan whereby the work force was to be reduced, while the remaining staff members were to be paid more for higher productivity; leave a greater share of generated profits at the disposal of management and give it greater freedom in allocating these retained profits; provide for wide differentials in basic wage scales as a way of rewarding higher qualifications and encouraging higher productivity; tie the level of premiums more closely to results and exact penalties for nonfulfillment of the plan; allow management to transfer unspent balances into their incentive funds; tighten contract discipline; encourage management to introduce new technology by compensating for losses incurred while installing new processes; and encourage the output of industrial goods of world market quality.

The relatively small scale² and the experimental status of the program accorded with Andropov's statement at the November 1982 plenum that: ". . . it is necessary to act with circumspection; carry out, if necessary, experiments; weigh and take into account the experience of fraternal countries."³ Despite its circumspect provisions, the wording of the decree left little doubt that the experiment constituted Andropov's main contribution to the improvement (no word of "reform") of industrial management. In a phrase characteristic of Andropov's style, the relevant ministers were also warned that they bore personal responsibility for organizing the preparations and carrying out the experiment.

No authoritative explanation was offered for the choice of the five particular ministries chosen to implement the experiment, and an outside

observer could only surmise.⁴ They included the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry, the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine-Building, the Belorussian Ministry of Light Industry, the Lithuanian Ministry of Local Industry, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Food Industry.

The Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry had been a testing ground for successive waves of experiments, primarily in the fields of research and development, management, and technological innovation ever since 1968. The reform of July 1979 had been billed partly as an extension of an experiment that had been under way there since the early 1970s. Thus, the ministry had been at the forefront in testing new methods. Second, Aleksei Antonov had headed this ministry from 1965 until 1980, when he was promoted to deputy prime minister. It seemed quite likely, therefore, that he was to supervise the entire experiment and therefore work closely with his old ministry. Third, the ministry was responsible for producing power plant equipment subsequently assembled and operated by the Ministry of Power and Electrification. That responsibility included nuclear power plant construction—an area of particular concern to the new leadership.⁵

The Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine-Building was headed by Sergei Afanasev, former minister of General Machine-Building, an industry engaged, in many observers' opinion, primarily in defense production. Afanasev's experience in high-priority defense industry was apparently tapped for the new experiment. Besides, transport was regarded as a crisis sector by the new leadership.

The three republic-level ministries chosen for the experiment had served as testing grounds for a series of limited pilot reforms in the 1960s and early 1970s. The appallingly low supply of consumer goods, with its inevitable impact on incentives and morale, must have been a major consideration. An improvement in productivity and quality in this area that would not demand the allocation of further resources was imperative. As for the choice of the Belorussian Ministry of Light Industry, the Communist party of this republic was headed by Nikolai Sliunkov, a former deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan.

Virtually all of the provisions of the July 1983 experiment had been contained in the September 1965 reform of industrial planning and management. The earlier decree, however, had been far more comprehensive. For instance, it restored the branch ministries; authorized a major price reform; instituted a charge for capital; and centralized the material-technical supply system.⁶

Crucial to the September 1965 reform, to the follow-up measures of

July 1979, and to the experiment unveiled in July 1983, was the modification of the system of success indicators, described as: ". . . the measures of enterprise performance which are used to determine management bonuses in Soviet enterprises and production associations. They strongly influence the behavior of Soviet enterprises with respect to cost, output, product mix, inputs, and quality."⁷ In contrast to the September 1965 reform decree, the July 1983 measure did not spell out the details of the success indicators that were to be established by the respective ministries, but they apparently included fulfillment of product delivery contracts, the product mix, the quality of output, growth of labor productivity, the lowering of prime costs, and the use of fixed capital.

The experiment was to be introduced at a relatively small number of enterprises in January 1984. Its provisions were much more limited in scope than those of the September 1965 decree, which constituted the main attempt at industrial reform during the Brezhnev administration. The July 1983 measure did not, for instance, provide for any change in the central planning mechanism, nor did it foresee any alteration in price formation or in the administrative allocation (rationing) of producer goods. It sought greater autonomy for enterprise management at the expense of the ever-burgeoning powers of the intermediate bureaucracy in the ministries and central administrative bureaus.

The limited scope of the July 1983 measure and the built-in constraints made it likely that the measure would suffer the fate of the September 1965 reform program. The experimental enterprises would be destined to remain small islands in a sea of ministries, central administrative bureaus, state committees, and agencies working under the traditional system. The *modus operandi* of these isolated enterprises would have been rigorously constrained by the straitjacket of rationed producer goods and inflexible, administered prices. Even if the experimental enterprises retained a greater share of their own profits, they would have found it difficult to spend these additional funds on new plant and equipment, improvements to the canteen, or workers' housing since under the prevailing conditions of chronic excess demand alternative suppliers, unrationed producer goods, and construction materials were unavailable.

In view of the brevity of Andropov's tenure in office, the fact that he had to operate with his leadership and *apparatus* as he found it, and the political hazards of any rigorous reform of economic planning and management, it seems understandable that he settled for a gradual, cautious, and piecemeal program. But the limited nature of his proposed measures did not augur well for any meaningful improvement in the economic system.

The Novosibirsk Paper

Philip Hanson

In early August a confidential paper on Soviet economic problems came into the possession of Dusko Doder, the Moscow correspondent of the *Washington Post*.¹ Subsequently Radio Liberty's *Arkhiv samizdata* made the full Russian text of the paper available with annotations.²

Exactly how and why the paper was placed in the public domain is unknown. It was said to have been a confidential paper—"for official use"—presented in April at a closed seminar organized by economic departments of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and USSR Gosplan. A number of points in the text made it unlikely to be published in its entirety in the Soviet Union. It reportedly existed officially in just seventy numbered copies.

Attributed to Professor Tatiana Zaslavskaiia, full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and head of the section dealing with social problems at the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Division of the Academy, the paper revealed some of the economic reform ideas that could be discussed among senior specialists in or close to the policy-making elite but that were considered too advanced for public display.

Zaslavskaiia argued that the present economic system changed little in fifty years, was no longer appropriate, and was the main cause of declining Soviet economic performance. She implied that a shift to market instead of administrative allocation of resources was desirable. She called for an analysis of the social forces that resist change in the system, and emphasized both the social and the economic unsuitability of the present system and its damaging effects on people's moral attitudes, initiative, and readiness to work.

The author's implicit support for a decentralized system³ was among the more familiar features of the paper. Although explicit calls for a market-socialist system had not been allowed in Soviet publications, the recommendation that enterprises should no longer be given targets from above and should select their own suppliers and customers—as in the Hungarian system—had been quite common.⁴ It was apparently the prevailing view of economists in the USSR Academy of Sciences' Central Institute for Mathematical Economics (TSEMI), though not in the more orthodox Institute of Economics. As Zaslavskaiia's paper suggested, revisionist views

also had a strong base at the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk, headed by Academician Abel Aganbegian.

Opposition to these views was widely evident.⁵ An article in *Kommunist* attacked value indicators, calling for a return to physical indicators—measurement of performance in quantitative units.⁶ The Central Institute for Mathematical Economics was specifically criticized by Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in June.⁷

Zaslavskaiia's paper was concerned with the reasons why the existing system retarded growth and with the sociology and political economy of change. In Marxian terms, Zaslavskaiia accounted for the slowdown by the "lagging of the system of production relations behind the development of productive forces." In the same vein, she argued that official doctrine needed to be amended. Accordingly, she asked for doctrinal modification⁸ to allow more scope for market relations under socialism and for the existence of antagonistic social groups. These were revisionist requests indeed, and the later reference to "class groups" (*klassovye gruppy*) under socialism also was not orthodox.

The paper attributed the "lagging of the system of production relations" to two developments. One was the growing complexity of the economy which presumably made its management from one center impossible because of the large number of data involved. But the same may have been true even fifty years earlier; therefore, the change might have been in the acceptability of chaos resulting from information overload rather than its extent.

One factor considered responsible for the retardation was, according to Zaslavskaiia, the system of instructions from above, applicable to an obedient, passive, poorly educated labor force but not to a better educated and materially more secure labor force whose individual rights and sense of justice (*pravosoznanie*) had increased.⁹ She implied that the Stalinist economic system could work during a reign of terror, but not otherwise.

Zaslavskaiia contended that social consequences of the economic system were damaging to economic performance: excessive reliance on an impractical control from above allegedly generated laziness, neglect of quality, low morality, social inertia, and a propensity to "departmentalism."¹⁰ "The social mechanism of economic development at present operating in the USSR does not insure satisfactory results. The social type of worker formed by it [the social mechanism] fails to correspond not only to the strategic aims of a developed socialist society but also to the technological requirements of production."¹¹ This remarkable statement recalled Aleks-

andr Zinovev's aphorisms that communist society is successful in forging the "new man" because it is good at making bad things, and that "Communist society is a society of people who work badly."¹²

The observation that workers' efforts and morale tend to be poor in the USSR today was familiar enough. So was the perception that the economic system fosters shoddy work, idleness, and dishonesty. But Zaslavskaiia's alleged presentation of this view at a meeting attended by Central Committee and Gosplan officials suggested a pervasive concern with the whole present system of planning and management.¹³

In discussing opposition to economic reform, Zaslavskaiia pleaded for doctrinal change. In her opinion, present doctrine did not allow for the possibility of deep, socially antagonistic conflict within Soviet society.¹⁴ This did not permit would-be reformers to consider opposition to reform, the latter arising from social interests that would be damaged by it.¹⁵ A sociological analysis of these sources of opposition was needed to devise a strategy for overcoming the resistance.¹⁶

Zaslavskaiia located the opposition to reform primarily in the middle level of economic administration, especially among branch ministry officials. The intermediate organizations had grown "like mushrooms in recent decades." Their staff occupied "numerous 'cozy niches' with ill-defined responsibilities . . . but thoroughly agreeable salaries."¹⁷ By comparison, both the central authorities and enterprise managers had lost power.¹⁸ But opposition to radical change also came from those members of these last two groups who feared their new responsibilities under a reformed system.¹⁹

The "Novosibirsk paper" was equally notable for its omissions. It never specifically spelled out that market relations among enterprises were preferable though it almost implied that much. Zaslavskaiia criticized the doctrine postulating "the unconditional domination of social production over all kinds of unformalized personal and group labor"²⁰ but ignored the possible role of private and cooperative enterprise. And her discussion of the opposition to reform omitted all mention of the military, regional party officials, and the top party leadership.

A thorough economic reform could hardly be prepared without public—rather than confidential—discussion as evidenced in the public debate in Hungary since the 1960s. Zaslavskaiia's paper was suggestive of progress toward more open and wide-ranging debate in the Soviet Union. But it gave no indication that papers as radical as hers would receive publicity outside closed seminars for many years to come.²¹

Tightening Work Discipline

Elizabeth Teague

Andropov's smooth succession in November 1982 raised hopes that an economic reform might be in the offing, by means of which the USSR's chronic problems of low labor productivity, shoddy workmanship, and poor work discipline might be overcome. But his moves toward change amounted to little more than upgrading experiments that had already been in progress under Brezhnev and were not expected to lead to any substantial improvements. In the absence of a consensus about genuine economic reform, the leadership tended to keep the system intact while trying to make it perform more efficiently by bullying and cajoling the workers into working harder. Having chosen discipline as his byword, Andropov may or may not have intended to launch some kind of reform, but law and order, discipline, and a drive against corruption proved to be characteristic of his term in office.

The campaign for better discipline began in December 1982. The following month saw the introduction of "Operation Trawl," with teams of vigilantes in Moscow and other large cities conducting raids on stores, cinemas, and bathhouses to weed out "loafers" and "slackers" who should have been at work.

The initial shock of the campaign on the workers may have contributed to the improvement of industrial production in early 1983. The official figure for gross industrial production in the first nine months of 1983 was up 4.1 percent from that for the same period of 1982, compared with a rise of only 2.8 percent for the whole of 1982 over 1981. But soon workers went back to slipping out of work to wait in line for the goods they needed. The introduction in the summer of 1983 of new legal provisions on labor discipline indicated that the campaign had already lost momentum. Before the new measures were adopted, a mass campaign in the media invited, indeed orchestrated, popular participation in a discussion of what might be done to tighten up labor discipline. Many of the suggestions, ostensibly by the workers themselves, were much sterner than the measures ultimately adopted. They included the suggestion that details of a person's work record be entered in his or her internal passport (which cannot be so conveniently "lost" as a work book because of the difficulty of getting a replacement) and that in future workers be allowed to change their jobs only with the permission of their workmates. In any event,

neither of these suggestions was adopted. Moreover, once legislation was decided upon and adopted, the purpose of public discussion disappeared and the campaign lost its saliency in the public imagination.

The new legal provisions, published in August 1983, reinforced significantly the existing legislation but also reflected a degree of compromise between harder and more conciliatory approaches to labor policy. They could not be compared with Stalin's draconian measures, under which even minor workplace infractions were regarded as felonies. The main changes announced included:

- higher financial penalties, and loss of vacation, for persistent drunkards and shirkers—fines having been made easier for management to levy;
- increased sanctions against absenteeism;
- dismissal, transfer to lower-paid work, or demotion for up to three months as a punishment for shoddy work¹;
- deprivation of a worker's right to terminate employment during the three-month period of demotion;
- provision to raise notice of termination of employment by a worker from one month to two months;
- reduction by half for the first three to six months in a new job of any monthly production bonus entitlement for workers dismissed from their previous jobs for slacking or drunkenness.

However, one obstacle to the application of these measures was the chronic shortage of labor, especially manual labor.² This was a result of an economic system that encourages enterprises to hoard rather than save labor. The enforcement of disciplinary measures thus placed an additional burden on managers who already had enough problems trying to meet plan targets. In August, Gosplan Chairman Nikolai Baibakov reaffirmed that the Soviet leadership was not prepared to tolerate the introduction of unemployment. Yet, as long as the system required that a new job be found for a dismissed worker, no final sanction existed to frighten unwilling workers into working harder. Many observers considered job security the basic cause of low labor productivity in the Soviet Union.

The Andropov leadership also attempted to make managers more accountable. A number of top officials and regional party leaders were sacked or publicly rebuked for shortcomings, inefficiency, or corruption. On August 28 *Pravda* announced a new decree that made managers of plants that turned out poor-quality goods, fell behind plan schedules, or failed to meet production targets liable to the loss of "at least" 25 percent of their bonuses; cash benefits over and above those already in existence were, however, offered to enterprises that performed well.

Meanwhile, a number of articles in the media suggested that managers should be required to pay compensation out of their own pockets if their enterprises failed to fulfill their delivery obligations. An article in *Komsomolskaia pravda* on April 27 asked "why should the state have to pay for breakages, stoppages, failure to prevent pilfering or to meet plan targets? Why can't our economic mechanism make the director himself pay for his 'ignorance' and his 'kindness' to thieves and pilferers?" In *Kommunist*, an economist repeated the call for "stricter measures" to insure that managers, rather than enterprises, be held "personally and financially" responsible for missed plan targets. He wrote that such a system was already in operation in "several socialist countries" and cited Hungary as an example.³

Effective January 1, 1984, an experiment in certain industries and regions attempted to stimulate initiative and high-quality production by allowing factory managers greater independence in apportioning labor, materials, and financial resources, and by offering them material incentives for efficiency. Managers were to be given the freedom to lay off excess workers and factories were to be permitted to retain funds saved by efficient use of labor for higher pay to their staffs.

This approach to the problem of full employment highlighted the old problem of ambivalent relations between the Soviet leadership and the population. It is likely that the rulers had seldom felt confident of popular support and the rise of "Solidarity" in Poland clearly made them apprehensive lest its example spread to the Soviet Union itself. The leadership first adopted a number of short-term, stopgap measures to ward off the possibility of infection. But once the immediate danger had passed, longer-term measures, such as tightening control over dissent, corruption, and labor discipline, were adopted to prevent the occurrence of events similar to those in Poland. Accordingly, the choice of Andropov as Brezhnev's successor may have been the result, rather than the cause, of the adoption of tougher policies. Former *кзб* chief Andropov may have been selected by his colleagues as the toughest and therefore the most suitable candidate to implement the harder-line policies on which they had decided.

The new emphasis on "personal material responsibility" was highlighted by a disagreement in spring 1983 between Andropov and his presumed chief rival, Konstantin Chernenko, over the degree of maturity of the USSR's "mature socialism."⁴ Andropov argued that the USSR was only in an early stage of developed socialism, while Chernenko held that it was further along the path toward full communism. Chernenko appeared to be championing the cause of conservatives in the party and state bureaucracies, claiming that the system was developing well and needed but minor improvement. Hence greater equality among the population was

desirable. (Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy holds that under full communism a spirit of altruism will eliminate the need for both coercion and material incentives.) Otherwise, Chernenko warned, the result might be worker dissatisfaction comparable with that in Poland. In other words, the tacit agreement between rulers and ruled that "they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work" could collapse. Andropov, on the other hand, argued that the consciousness of the Soviet work force was still relatively low, necessitating the maintenance of coercive measures and income differentials. Perhaps Andropov also considered the need for economic reform to be greater than Chernenko did. Although Andropov's view won the day, the weight of opposition apparently blocked changes of any significance. Thus the only policy on which the leaders had been able to agree was that the workers should be made to work harder.

On August 1 a new law on work collectives and their role in the management of their enterprises came into force. It promised workers the right to participate—that is, to be consulted by management—when decisions were taken, yet gave them no legal means to check the implementation of their decisions or to require that management observe their recommendations.⁵

In the periods between the semiannual meetings of the work collectives, their powers devolved not onto representatives of the workers but onto the management acting in conjunction with the party, trade-union, and Komsomol organizations. In only one area was this not the case: the rights of work collectives, as described in Article 5 of the new law, included the right to consider draft decisions of the local soviets, to nominate candidates to local soviets, and to elect members of people's courts. On matters that concerned the running of the enterprise, however, the party and the management were able to fulfill the responsibilities of the work collectives between meetings. These matters were likely to include the most important decisions affecting the workers' living and working conditions.

Western commentators saw the law as increasing official control over the work force by making the work collectives police the workers themselves. Even the Moscow correspondent of the French Communist party daily *l'Humanité* commented wryly: "There is no shortage of progressive legislation in the Soviet Union . . . but whether it is observed or not is another matter."⁶

The attempts of the Andropov leadership to cajole or force the workers to work harder, evidently in the hope of avoiding risky economic reform that would threaten the vested interests of the bureaucracy, were implicitly deplored in the confidential "Novosibirsk paper" report leaked early in 1983.⁷ According to the paper, the underlying causes of Soviet economic

problems were systemic. In the absence of a radical reform, the labor policies of the Andropov leadership could therefore yield nothing but marginal results.

5

The Problem of Economic Reform

Allan Kroncher

The Andropov Puzzle: Reformer or Reactionary? The words and deeds of Soviet leaders tend to be incompatible. While talking about the necessity of reforms, criticizing the shortcomings of their own system, and discussing the experience of the East European countries, mainly with respect to the Hungarian and Bulgarian economic models, the Andropov leadership implemented the campaign to strengthen discipline,¹ frequently by police methods: the law on labor collectives,² which could be regarded not so much as an expansion of workers' rights as an extension of the discipline campaign, and the decree "On Additional Measures to Expand the Right of Production Associations."³ This last measure represented a cautious and limited experiment in the spirit of the reform of 1965 and of the subsequent steps taken to improve the economy.

Like all his predecessors in the post-Stalin era, Andropov seems to have been aware of the necessity to act in order to improve the Soviet economic situation. However, there were no indications that he had any program apart from his campaign to strengthen discipline, apparently a police rather than economic measure. There had not been any signs of a desire to draft a broad program of serious economic measures until the autumn of 1983. References to the Bulgarian and Hungarian economic models against a background of police roundups in barbershops and movie theaters, as well as stern rebukes to ministers, seemed to be a diversionary tactic designed to create the impression that in spite of the repressive actions the highest leadership was discussing the possibility of liberal economic reforms.

Western observers drew their conclusions about Andropov's intentions from three main sources: his speech to a meeting of party veterans;⁴ a press conference with Gosplan Chairman Nikolai Baibakov;⁵ and the so-called Novosibirsk document.⁶ Andropov seemed intent on a serious reorganization but he was encountering resistance from the top bureaucrats in the economic apparatus.⁷ It was even suggested that he was one of the allies

of the radical Siberian economists.⁸ Thus to the widespread portrait of him as a "closet liberal" the features of a "solitary reformer" were added.

What Did Andropov Tell the Party Veterans? Andropov's address to the veterans, interpreted by some Western sources as a call for profound economic reforms, implied that:

- there was a need to raise substantially the effectiveness of the economy and to turn it into a smoothly operating, well-adjusted mechanism;
- the rate at which the economy was being switched to intensive development was inadequate, possibly because solutions to new problems had not been sought out with sufficient energy and too often half measures had been taken;
- it was thus necessary to compensate for omissions, which required changes in planning, management, and the economic mechanism, "in order to go into the new five-year plan well armed" but "doubly cautious."

All this could also be gleaned from Brezhnev's reports. The difference between Brezhnev and Andropov was that in his speeches Brezhnev had demonstrated a much more thorough knowledge and understanding of the Soviet economic problems. Andropov was repeating Brezhnev's words when he spoke of the need to go into the next five-year plan "well armed."⁹ However, Brezhnev had been referring to plans for a new economic management structure for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981–1985), whereas Andropov set the same goal for the five-year plan about to begin.

In Andropov's speech to the old Bolsheviks, it was not possible to find any statements about the need for profound changes, but only vague remarks about the need for action to improve the economic situation. Moreover, the speech could be interpreted to mean that the "obsolete structures" of economic management were to continue stumbling from one five-year plan to the next, the country's leadership lacking a clear idea of the change needed.

The essence of Andropov's speech was in his insistence that changes had to be introduced cautiously and gradually. He stressed the need "to be doubly cautious," to make "a scrupulous study of each question," and "to act calmly and without haste." None of this indicated a bold innovator. This was, however, hardly surprising in a speech to one of the most conservative and orthodox groups in Soviet society. It is doubtful that Andropov would have chosen such listeners if he had meant serious reforms.

Baibakov and Others The highly unusual press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on "questions of improving the economic mechanism and strengthening socialist labor discipline" indicated that its initiators saw elucidation of the latest economic measures imperative. The eluci-

dators, USSR Gosplan Chairman Nikolai Baibakov, Deputy Chairman of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council V. Prokhorov, and USSR Minister of Justice V. Terebilov, suggested that, apart from the extension of the rights of enterprises, the economy was to be improved mainly by strengthening workers' discipline. According to Baibakov, the extension of the rights of enterprises was not intended to relax but to improve centralized management of the economy. In this regard he pleaded for "circumspection" but did not use the same word in connection with the strengthening of discipline. Prokhorov and Terebilov then explained that the measures to enforce discipline were none too harsh because they were "people's laws," presumably adopted on the initiative of the population itself.

The remarks about the need for caution in carrying out reforms and the policy of strengthening centralized planning may be regarded as a warning to both foreign and domestic audiences against the expectations of major changes in the economy. Or, they may have been designed to assuage conservative circles disturbed by continuing discussion of reforms of the Hungarian and Bulgarian type. If the latter hypothesis is correct, it may explain the reasons behind Andropov's speech to the party veterans: rather than announcing forthcoming reforms, Andropov was putting his listeners' minds at rest with respect to the nature of his experiments, perhaps to unite the ranks for implementing his campaign to strengthen work discipline. Conceivably, the discussions of the Bulgarian and Hungarian experiments were primarily intended for Western and liberal Soviet audiences to nourish deceptive hopes of far-reaching transformations to improve the Soviet economy. In any case, Gosplan Deputy Chairman Nikolai Lebedinskii confirmed that new reforms were not needed and that it was sufficient to implement the existing decisions of the party and government.¹⁰

Andropov's position did not seem to contradict the speeches by Baibakov and others at the press conference. It is true that Andropov had at least twice spoken of the need for changes in the Soviet economy: at the plenum in November 1982 he expressed the desire to "speed up work on improving the entire sphere of economic leadership," and in front of the party veterans, he indicated that this would require "changes in planning, in management, and in the economic mechanism."¹¹ These statements were, however, very vague. Baibakov's speech explained how they should have been understood: as indications of measures designed to strengthen the system of centralized planning. Rather than being the bureaucrats' "mutiny" against Andropov's intent to reform, the conference was mainly aimed to allay any adverse impressions created by the new labor legislation. This

interpretation, however, does not preclude friction between Andropov and economic leaders or the existence of groups interested in major economic reforms.¹²

The "Novosibirsk Paper" The document reportedly presented by Tatiana Zaslavskaia at a closed seminar in April 1983 contained harsh criticism of the system of economic management, an analysis of its defects, and a call for important policy changes. Surpassing anything hitherto published or known to have been voiced in official discussions, the paper was nevertheless permitted to reach the West. This led to suspicion that it might have been planted to generate there the belief that the Soviet leaders were seriously concerned about the situation in their country and ready to carry out far-reaching liberal reforms. Previously Khrushchev's reputation as a fighter against Stalinism had rested largely on his confidential report on the personality cult, which in fact exceeded his intentions.

In a revolutionary statement the Novosibirsk paper alluded to "the exhaustion of the possibilities of centralized administrative management of the economy" and the need "to use 'automatic' regulators linked with the development of market relations." The system impeded economic development because of its inability to guarantee effective control of the socioeconomic behavior of the population.

In a devastating critique of the Soviet practices, the document distinguished between two types of worker—one who fits in with the existing economic system and the other who does not. The first was, in the writer's opinion, suited for the administrative system of management: he had a poorly developed sense of his rights, did not aspire to participation in management, set material interests above social or spiritual ones, and was afraid of losing his job. The second type, which had emerged only recently and had come into conflict with the system, was educated, cultured, and well informed. Having achieved a higher level of social and legal awareness, he was able to critically evaluate the performance of the leaders, define his own self-interest, and defend it. Zaslavskaia wrote that, "geared to a relatively low level of development of the workers, this system is proving incapable of regulating the behavior of economically liberated workers with better developed personalities and of insuring sufficiently effective utilization of their working and intellectual potential."

Zaslavskaia implied that difficulties in Soviet industry arose primarily as a result of the emergence of the new breed of worker with initiative who could only be managed by methods more subtle than direct administrative pressure. This meant that the system had failed to produce the kind of "Soviet man" it required. Zaslavskaia seemed to propose that the system

should be saved by creating an easily manageable worker; but such a worker would inevitably belong to the passive type, because the second type was not amenable to being managed. Whatever the methods employed—administrative, economic, or psychological—the result would thus be either passive workers or workers in conflict with the system.¹³

An Alliance of Technocrats against Bureaucrats? Zaslavskaja concluded that the failure of recent attempts to reorganize the management of the economy could be attributed to disregard of different group interests. Periodically the Soviet leadership had found itself constrained to campaign against its own creation, the bureaucracy. Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev had not risked open conflict with the economic bureaucracy.¹⁴ Andropov's attitude, however, was markedly different.¹⁵

In his campaign to strengthen discipline, Andropov quickly shifted his sights from slackers and absentees in the workplace to a higher level, mainly ministries. This naturally aroused the resentment of officials upbraided for playing the only role open to them within the existing system—that of bureaucrats. They were being held responsible for the defects of the system. However, Andropov needed as allies leading executives of industrial enterprises and associations whose rights would have been extended as a result of "economic methods of management." Also the rank-and-file workers—laborers, technicians, and engineers—could have made better use of their individual abilities and earned more money. These groups had the greatest stake in stricter adherence to plan and economic discipline. The "Novosibirsk paper" appealed to these political allies and also indicated the common enemies. These were officials of ministries, for whom reorganization would have meant fewer rights, decrease of economic influence, and possibly even the loss of their posts "with an ill-defined range of duties but a very handsome salary."

Opponents of reform, however, could be found in any group. Some industrial executives, workers, and engineers may have feared expanded duties and more work stress. Some officials of central managerial organizations (above all, Gosplan) may have harbored similar fears although the changes would have enhanced their role. Zaslavskaja noted their frequent but unfounded assertions that innovation might weaken central planning. Baibakov and his deputy therefore presumably aimed their explanations of reforms at this group. But it is also possible, though less likely, that his remarks about the retention of centralized planning were intended to serve notice to Andropov about this group's disquiet. It is scarcely conceivable, however, that Andropov could have envisioned any significant relaxation of central management of the economy. In all probability, the leadership

was flirting with liberal circles expecting or possibly even demanding reform while at the same time trying to placate conservative circles, which feared that any economic reforms would be too liberal.

Conclusion Andropov's economic policy was reminiscent of the economic reform of 1965, which had changed nothing and resolved none of the basic problems. However, as the Novosibirsk document especially suggested, a new economic system rather than a new economic reform was needed. The appropriate type of worker already had appeared; and only reforms heralding the transition to a system capable of employing him would have any chance of success.

In these circumstances, the conservative leadership had no option but to strengthen discipline, reintroduce reforms and experiments tried out already in the past, and attempt to win over experts in the hope that they could find new, scientific methods of patching up the system.¹⁶ At the same time the leadership sought to gain the confidence of the more active section of the population by hinting at the prospect of greater rights and an opportunity to work more productively.

If the energetic group of workers so vividly described in the "Novosibirsk paper" really existed, this was bound to cause the managerial bureaucracy considerable discomfort and pose a serious problem for the political leaders as well. So were industrial executives and scientists with a vested interest in reform. The "Novosibirsk paper" provided the most persuasive evidence so far of the depth of the concern about the economy and the desire to find a remedy.

6

The Fate of the Management Experiment

David Dyker

The succession on February 13, 1984, of Konstantin V. Chernenko as party secretary raised questions about the fate of the planning experiment that had gone into operation on January 1, 1984. While the Soviet press gave the subject a definitely low-key coverage, such a dynamic figure in the leadership as Mikhail Gorbachev seemed to be still closely identified with the experiment. Nikolai Tikhonov characterized the experiment as a "broad, perhaps the broadest ever, search for and elaboration of the most effective principles and methods of planned socialist management of the economy."¹

At the same time he revealed that the party had decided to press forward with a "program for the complex perfecting of the management mechanism." This sounded as though it were a project that would have upstaged the industrial planning experiment, but Tikhonov stressed that ministers and managers did not have to sit and wait for the new program. They had quite enough independence, he said, to marshal their resources efficiently under the experimental system. Did the brief life of the actual experiment lend support to such a claim?

When the decree promulgating the experimental system was published in the summer of 1983, it had the following three main weaknesses:

1. The transfer of some planning functions from ministries to associations or enterprises did not really touch the problem of overcentralization in the Soviet planning system, because it did not modify the work burden of the central planners. The new system of success indicators, involving sales and deliveries, new technology, quality, growth of labor productivity, and cost reduction or increase in profits, was highly complex, and would have been a nightmare for anyone who had to decide on bonus payouts.

2. The reiterated commitment to table norms was not likely to persist, because overworked central planners could find no alternative to "planning the achieved level." The rule that no bonuses should be paid unless delivery contracts were met was bound to strengthen the pressure on managers to conceal capacity and therefore increase the dependence of the central planners on the *rashet* principle.

3. The renewed attempt to increase enterprise autonomy in the disposition of enterprise funds, particularly decentralized investment funds, was apt to run into the same problems it had run into under the planning decree of 1965—namely, that the centralized planning system could not comfortably accommodate the required flexibility in supply arrangements.

The director and party secretary of an enterprise involved in the planning experiment complained about terms of the planning regime imposed on them: production of one line was to be increased by 26.7 percent, but without corresponding increase in production capacity or planned supply of new equipment. The production plan also called for a sharp increase in the production of one medium-quality line, while positing zero growth for another line that had been awarded the State Mark of Quality, thus contradicting a key provision in the new success indicator system.² While demand factors may have accounted for such dramatic turnabouts, they illustrated a simple point about the Soviet planning system: If a state attempts to plan the production of 15,000 commodity groups centrally, it will never succeed—even with the help of computers—in reconciling all the equations.

Whatever its faults, the traditional Soviet emphasis on the gross out-

put as an indicator of success to the virtual exclusion of all other indicators had the merit of simplicity. Under the experimental system,

Planned deductions into the material incentive fund are calculated on the basis of rates of reduction costs. For every percentage point of cost-reduction this year, the planned base-year size of the material incentive fund increased by 5 percent. In addition, a stable norm for deductions from accounting profit is established. In case of nonfulfillment of the cost-reduction plan, the planned level of profit will not be achieved, and this will reduce the rate of deduction into incentive funds.³

What happened when quality, productivity, and innovation, not to mention deliveries, entered the picture?

The continued reluctance of the Soviet leadership to deal with the problem of overcentralization could perhaps be explained by the fairly good record of the traditional system in the area of military priorities, by the vested interest of the party apparatus in the system, and by sheer conservatism. But the planners' problem became worse by the return to the Stalinist rule that bonuses were not to be paid unless sales delivery targets were met. Moreover, the ultra-Stalinist rule that top bonuses should be paid for overfulfillment rather than just fulfillment of the plan was reestablished.⁴ The Soviet leadership must have been extremely nervous about falling growth rates—only that could have explained the substantial reintroduction of crude growth-maximizing tactics in the experimental planning system. By reinforcing the premium on getting an easy plan, however, these tactics not only made it more difficult for the planners to get away from the *raschet* principle, but may have also actually reduced medium-term growth. It had been admitted in an editorial in *Pravda* of March 10, 1984, that many organizations involved in the experiment were adopting play-safe tactics, and one minister's reaction to this was: "Just because we've given enterprise managers greater rights doesn't mean they can do what they like."⁵

Much of the tenor of the experimental planning decree—the emphasis on deliveries, quality, and innovation—was directly connected with the view common to Soviet and Western economists alike that in a complex industrial economy, quality and precision should be conditions of, rather than alternatives to, rapid economic growth and that political pressures could not be a substitute for genuine incentives. But *apparatchiki* under pressure seemed quite incapable of comprehending this point, while the academic economists were criticized for not becoming sufficiently involved with "generalizing the results of the planning experiment."⁶

Lithuania's minister of local industry, whose organization was one of those involved in the experiment, suggested that the ministry should allow enterprises and associations to sell overplan production on the basis of direct agreements without allocation certificates.⁷ A decree permitting that was published in 1968. Whether it remained on the statute book was unclear; however, the experimental decree was ultracautious with respect to the issue of "direct links." While early reports singled out overburdened supply-planning bodies and lateness in confirmation of supply plan as the key difficulties,⁸ there was a marked reluctance to introduce even marginal modifications in the traditional material-supply system. Thus the management of one enterprise wanted to know why enterprises could not be permitted to procure the materials without having to go through the whole Gosplan-Gossnab system in instances when they were conceded the right to fix temporary prices on new consumer goods.⁹ From the customer's point of view, according to the director of another enterprise, the failure to move toward direct links between the producer and consumer meant that suppliers who skimmed on quality did not have to face the consequences. A customer-goods enterprise apparently could not sue a supplier if, under the pressure of its plan, it made use of a substandard consignment.¹⁰ Moreover, an enterprise with formal power of decentralized disposition over investment funds could not be expected to concretize them unless it was permitted to negotiate flexibly with suppliers.

One of the areas where the experimental planning decree granted substantial rights to managers was that of manpower and wage fund planning. This was plainly aimed at facilitating a further extension of the Shchekino system, whereby directors were permitted to release workers and use a proportion of the funds thus saved to pay higher bonuses to those that remained. Within the limited area where it had been applied, the Shchekino system had shown good results in terms of productivity. In the last days of the Andropov era the media were again pressing for its extension.¹¹ Nothing suggested that the Chernenko leadership wanted to return to the extreme caution of the Brezhnev era with respect to the whole question of redeployment of workers. Enthusiasm for the Shchekino system on the part of enterprise managers could not be expected as long as an inflexible supply planning system put a premium on retaining surplus labor for the eventuality that it might be needed.

In a sense the biggest problem with the industrial planning experiment was that it operated only in a limited area of the economy. Presumably the members of the Politburo and the Council of Ministers might have remembered the problems that this circumstance created for the famous Bolshevichka-Mayak experiment in 1963 and 1964. One director

asked how experimental enterprises could have been expected to place first priority on fulfilling contracts if the same did not hold for the unreformed enterprises.¹² Another suggested that the system could hardly be expected to work as long as local supply organizations were not yet part of a system whereby bonuses were strictly conditional on deliveries.¹³

The Soviet press had been full of complaints about the ministries' delays with respect to the reform and about the failure of enterprises to brief their workers properly about it.¹⁴ As one veteran manager put it, "when we get some kind of feedback from the experiment, then we'll talk about it. But I don't know right now what it's going to give us. We've only had suggestions, and there's nothing hard to go on."¹⁵

III The Korean Airliner Incident

7

Evolution of the Soviet Response

Elizabeth Teague

The shock and revulsion felt throughout the world at the Soviet destruction on September 1, 1983, of an unarmed South Korean civilian jetliner that had strayed over Soviet territory caused a drastic deterioration in East-West relations. International tensions were further exacerbated by the behavior of the Soviet authorities in the aftermath of the tragedy. The Soviet leadership was clearly resolved to ride out the diplomatic storm and not to disown the actions of the military, however adverse their effects for Soviet foreign policy.

A striking feature of the way the KAL crisis was handled by Moscow was the leading role played by military spokesmen. Early statements relating to the event had been made almost exclusively by military or government agencies. It appeared likely that Andropov himself was already incapacitated by sickness at the time of the crisis,¹ and this may explain why he made no comment about it until September 28. Initially, Soviet silence seemed to reflect Moscow's confusion and uncertainty about how best to deal with the crisis. It took the leadership six days before it even admitted the USSR's responsibility for the destruction of the jumbo jet.

It was at first suggested by some observers in the West that Moscow kept silent in the hope of putting the blame on a military decision made at local level. This was not borne out by later developments. Moscow, while eventually expressing regret at the loss of life, remained unrepentant and unapologetic over what it claimed was its sovereign right to defend its territory from intruders, however innocent they might be. Moreover, it showed no intention of revising its standard operating procedures in order to avoid a similar catastrophe at some future date.

An alternate hypothesis suggested that the decision to destroy the South Korean airliner had been taken in Moscow at the highest level but

that, faced with a worldwide outcry, the Soviet leaders sought to deny their responsibility. It seems, however, unlikely that the political leadership would have sanctioned an action likely to bring such obviously damaging consequences in the international sphere. For the political leadership, indeed, the airline disaster could hardly have come at a worse moment. Negotiations on both European missiles and strategic arms reduction were about to be reconvened; Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was about to meet Secretary of State George Shultz in Madrid; and the UN General Assembly was due to open. Most important, both superpowers had been making conciliatory gestures shortly before the incident and there was the hope of a slight thaw in Soviet-American relations.

A few days were enough for an abrupt reversal of the political climate. Given the potentially disastrous consequences of the airliner's destruction for many of the Andropov leadership's foreign policy initiatives, it seemed likely that in fact the final decision to down the jumbo had been taken, as Soviet spokesmen had claimed, at the local military level.

According to Western intelligence sources, a major reorganization of the Soviet air defense forces—a separate service arm within the Soviet military—had taken place within the previous few years. The effects of this restructuring first became evident in 1980, but it seems likely that the decision to establish more flexible procedures dated back to 1978. In that year another South Korean airliner flew off course about one thousand miles into Soviet airspace before it was intercepted and forced to land in northern Russia. According to American intelligence sources, this incident was seen by the Soviet military leaders as a humiliating revelation of inefficient interception procedures complicated by duplication of responsibilities between overlapping military districts and air defense districts. It was even reported that after the incident in 1978, some officers had been court-martialed, executed, or otherwise punished.²

This resulted in a reorganization of Soviet air defenses into five theater commands. Air defense, frontal aviation, and perhaps also long-range aviation units were subordinated to the theater command. More authority and greater capabilities for independent decision-making appear to have devolved to the military district commanders, giving them increased flexibility to react quickly to events in their own areas.

The Soviet Far Eastern theater of military operations was one of these five theater commands. It was headed at the time of the incident by Commander of Far Eastern Troops Army General Vladimir Govorov. He was the son of the World War II general Leonid Govorov, celebrated for lifting the blockade of Leningrad in 1944. Based in Chita, Govorov was in

command of all Soviet troops in the Far East—that is, the two military districts of Transbaikal and the Far East. The commander of the latter district, in which the KAL incident took place, was Army General Ivan Tretiak, based in Khabarovsk.

Numerous Soviet statements asserted that the decision in response to the intrusion of the KAL jumbo into Soviet airspace was taken at Govorov's level. For instance, the Soviet government statement issued by TASS on September 6 averred: "The interceptor-fighter plane of the anti-aircraft defenses fulfilled the order of the command post to stop the flight."³

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was quoted by Spain's foreign minister after a private meeting in Madrid on September 8 as having indicated that the decision to shoot down the Korean jet was taken not in Moscow but at "local level."⁴ Finally, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff and first deputy minister of defense, said at a news conference on September 9 that there was a "strict system" of command authority in such contingencies and that the decision to shoot down the jetliner was taken by "the regional air defense command." Ogarkov side-stepped questions from Western newsmen about the involvement of the central Moscow military and political authorities, saying that the higher military command in Moscow was informed "at the appropriate time."⁵

It was left unclear in Ogarkov's statement whether Moscow had been informed of the downing of the airliner before or after the event. Since the airliner had been tracked for some two and a half hours as it entered and reentered Soviet airspace, it seemed unlikely that Moscow would not have been informed about it. In that time, Govorov was likely to have referred the matter to Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr Koldunov, commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces, formerly a World War II ace pilot and a deputy minister of defense. If so, it is probable that Moscow gave instructions to have the intruding plane intercepted and forced to land on Soviet territory. The Korean pilot did not, however, respond to Soviet orders to land, and as the jumbo was just about to leave Soviet airspace over Sakhalin, the Soviet ground command may have panicked and ordered that it be shot down.

The impression that the decision to destroy the civilian airliner was taken at the local military level was reinforced by a long article published in the newspaper of the Ministry of Defense, *Krasnaia zvezda*, on September 8. Written by the deputy minister of defense for personnel, Army General Ivan Shkadov, it made a strong plea for the "further strengthening of the sole commander system (*edinonachalie*)" in the armed forces. The speed and complexity of modern weapons, Shkadov argued, made it essen-

tial for military commanders to have full authority to act on their own initiative. The article was seen by some observers as a defense of the military's action in the destruction of the KAL jet.

Meanwhile, some faint murmurings of dissatisfaction were beginning to be heard from Soviet party officials. Some "senior Soviet officials," speaking privately to Western newsmen, suggested that the attack "may be attributed partly to error," and that "they believed Moscow mishandled the incident internationally."⁶ The most authoritative criticism came from the chief editor of *Pravda*, Viktor Afanasev, during a visit to Britain. When asked in a BBC interview why the Soviet leadership had taken so long to admit that the USSR was responsible for the destruction of the jet, Afanasev commented: "I think in this respect our military people are guilty. Probably they let some inaccuracies slip by. . . . I wouldn't say I was very pleased with our first reports."⁷

On the following day, another member of Afanasev's delegation, Viktor Linnik, virtually admitted that the KAL jet was not a spy plane at all. Interviewed on BBC television, Linnik said of the incident: "Of course it was a mistake in the sense that the pilots took this plane for a reconnaissance plane." Within an hour, Linnik was trying to retract his statement. He nonetheless repeated his earlier statement that, had the Soviet pilots known that civilians were on board the plane, "our decision would have been different."⁸ Linnik was described as a consultant in the Department of International Information of the Central Committee of the CPSU. A former staff member at the Institute of the USA and Canada, he was a frequent commentator on foreign (particularly American) affairs for Afanasev's newspaper *Pravda*.

All the expressions of seeming dissent from the official line had been voiced exclusively to Western audiences. No word of doubt that the official line was the correct one appeared in the official Soviet media. It therefore seems likely that the doubts being expressed by such officials as Afanasev and Linnik were officially sanctioned and intended for Western consumption in an attempt to limit the damage to the Soviet Union in the eyes of Western public opinion. Not the slightest suspicion that the downing of the aircraft was not right was allowed to surface in the Soviet domestic media.

Indeed, Linnik's words were directly contradicted by a Novosti press agency commentary that explained the Soviet law on frontiers with specific reference to the downing of the KAL jet: "It is quite obvious that the South Korean Boeing was carrying out a spying mission . . . if a civilian aircraft is on a special reconnaissance mission . . . it ceases to enjoy the status of a civilian aircraft and loses the right to claim any legal defense."⁹

A new law on state frontiers was the first legislation introduced under Andropov's leadership.¹⁰ Although the new law appeared to make few substantial alterations in the law previously in effect (which dated from 1960), it provided an occasion for the Soviet media to warn the Soviet public yet again of the need for "heightened vigilance" against "ideological subversion" and the "all-out espionage" supposedly carried out against the USSR by "imperialist special services." The new law set the tone for the tougher attitudes of the Andropov leadership. The downing of the KAL jet and its repercussions suggested that the Soviet military could make this kind of decision on its own and that—whatever the consequences for Moscow's foreign policy initiatives—it was not likely to be rebuked by the political leadership.

8

What Happened in the Politburo?

Elizabeth Teague

Since Iurii Andropov's election as general secretary of the CPSU at the end of 1982, regular weekly reports entitled "In the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU" had begun to appear in the Soviet press. The effort to inform the Soviet public of the discussions at the weekly meeting of the Politburo, the USSR's highest decision-making body, was one of the first actions taken by the new leadership.

This was an innovation; previously the proceedings of the Politburo had been treated like state secrets. The Soviet public was suddenly able to read about the problems that the Politburo had discussed: the need to improve labor discipline, and whether longer shopping hours would help; corruption in the police force; the development of a new passenger car; or an accident at the nuclear equipment factory in Volgodonsk.

According to information supplied by Leonid Brezhnev, the Politburo would meet in full session once a week, generally on Thursday mornings, and its sessions would normally last between three and six hours.¹

The Politburo is known to have met more frequently on occasion: during the five days of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in May 1972, for example, the Politburo met at least four times in order to formulate Soviet responses to proposals made by the U.S. delegation.² In addition,

it was believed that the Politburo might sometimes be divided into a number of topical committees or policy teams. For one thing, not all of its members were based in Moscow, and for some of them it must have been difficult to attend emergency sessions. Brezhnev also said that because of the complexity of some of the problems discussed by the Politburo, special commissions had at times been set up not only to research particular problems but also to execute whatever "practical measures" were considered appropriate.³

A wide range of questions on Soviet domestic and foreign policy had been discussed in the Politburo. The Soviet system's strong tendency toward centralization, whereby many seemingly mundane matters are referred upward for decision simply because officials at lower levels refuse to take responsibility, is well known. Before reports were carried in the press, however, it was not generally appreciated that the top Kremlin leaders sometimes discuss matters of amazing triviality. In April 1983, for example, it was solemnly reported that the Politburo had at its weekly meeting ordered the equivalent of a winter clearance sale. It seemed hard to believe that the Kremlin elite really discussed such matters as price cuts in "men's and women's winter coats, fur collars, and woolen scarves."⁴

Presumably the chief aim of the Kremlin's new exercise in openness was image-making. The new leadership was apparently trying to create an impression of popular participation in decision-making, and of greater candor and activity on the part of the leaders than during Brezhnev's last, lethargic years. Above all, it seemed that Andropov's leadership was attempting to convince the long-suffering Soviet population that it cared about their problems and was trying to alleviate them. Thus, the first report of a Politburo session under Andropov, published in *Pravda*, revealed that the Politburo had discussed letters from workers complaining about poor management, corruption, and crime.⁵ Many of the subsequent reports concentrated on the need to improve consumer services and the production of consumer goods.

This new openness had its limits, reflected in glaring omissions from the reports of Politburo meetings. Discussion of some important events was not reported at all; instead, they were apparently subsumed under a catch-all sentence that became routine: "The Politburo also examined a number of other events relating to domestic and foreign policy."

September 1983 provided a good example of this reluctance to report everything. According to the official reports, it was a month like any other. The Politburo met five times and found time to discuss fruit and vegetable output and the production of color television sets. They did not, again to judge by the official reports, find time to discuss the destruction of the

South Korean civilian jet by a Soviet fighter plane or the worldwide outcry occasioned by the loss of the lives of the 269 people on board.

The airliner was shot down over Sakhalin early on Thursday, September 1. The Politburo was to meet for its regular session that morning. According to reports from that time, Andropov himself was then on a brief vacation; in retrospect it appears likely that he was already incapacitated by sickness. It was therefore likely that the Politburo was scheduled to discuss fairly routine matters that could be decided even in Andropov's absence, as the report of the Politburo meeting published in *Pravda* on September 3 suggested. According to the official account, the Politburo's discussions were devoted to the problem of labor productivity, which was not rising as fast as wages. The Politburo approved certain unspecified measures designed to insure that higher salaries would be received by workers only as a reward for more and better work. It then discussed possible ways of improving the production of color television sets, in response to complaints by members of the public, and decided that a selective sociodemographic survey of the population was to be conducted in 1985. Although *Pravda's* report ended with the routine sentence "Decisions on certain other issues of the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policy were adopted," there was not any mention whatsoever of the jetliner crisis.

According to Western sources, however, the Politburo met in emergency sessions on both Thursday and Friday to respond to the crisis.⁶ Even though these Western reports seemed credible, no mention of any such emergency discussions could be found in the Soviet media.

When the Politburo met again for its regular session on September 8, the crisis was at its peak. Many Western nations were calling on the Soviet Union to explain how the tragedy had happened, and a number of them were threatening sanctions against the USSR to punish it. However, official reports of the Politburo's meeting, published on September 10, contained no indication that the matter of the airliner had even been discussed. Instead it was reported that the Politburo had reviewed progress on the construction of the Urengoi-Uzhgorod gas pipeline, discussed means of improving socialist competition among Soviet workers, and reviewed plans for the economic and social development of Moscow and Leningrad. Again, a catchall paragraph ended the account of the Politburo's deliberations: it had "considered several other questions concerning the country's domestic life, the deepening of cooperation among the fraternal socialist states, and the implementation of the Soviet Union's peace-loving foreign policy." This might possibly have signified that the Politburo discussed how the crisis was to be handled domestically, within the Soviet bloc, and in the international arena.

The attention given to the airline disaster throughout the world did not abate during the following week. A number of Western nations announced a temporary suspension of air links with the USSR, including bans on the Soviet state airline Aeroflot. On September 9, Gromyko met in Paris with France's President François Mitterrand, who made clear France's anger at the destruction of the plane and the failure of the Soviet leadership to apologize for the action. U.S. President Ronald Reagan warned on September 14 that the incident had damaged the atmosphere of the talks in Geneva where the United States and the USSR were discussing medium-range nuclear missile reductions.

When the Politburo met again on September 15, foreign affairs was at the head of the agenda. The report published in *Pravda* on September 17 still did not make any direct mention of the airline disaster or its adverse effect on the USSR's relations with the outside world. It was reported that the Politburo had discussed and approved the work of the Soviet delegation at the Madrid conference; the positive results of the Madrid meeting, according to the Politburo, proved that the policy of détente "still had a good reserve of vitality." Despite "all the differences in assessing the causes of the present state of international affairs, with all the tension in the present situation in Europe and the world, states with different social systems can come to mutually acceptable agreements" as long as there was "consistent observance of the principles of respect for the sovereignty of states, of noninterference in the internal affairs of others, and the inviolability of existing frontiers."

Leaving foreign affairs aside, the Politburo then discussed land amelioration and redistribution of water resources with the stated aim of improving food supplies and raising the living standards of the Soviet people. Finally, the Politburo "discussed some other issues of the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union." These unspecified issues may well have included, among many other important topics, the impending Beijing visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa, the highest ranking Soviet official to be invited to China in two decades, or the visit to Egypt, due to begin on September 18, of a senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official, Oleg Grinevskii, evidently with a view toward normalization of strained Soviet-Egyptian relations.

On September 20, the UN General Assembly opened its annual session. For the first time ever, Gromyko was absent, as a direct result of the rise in international tensions that followed the downing of the South Korean airliner. Throughout this period there was also a great deal of activity around the talks on reducing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe which had resumed in Geneva on September 6, and those on stra-

tegic weapons reduction, the START talks, due to resume in Geneva also on October 6. While the United States was reassessing its negotiating posture on both sets of talks and calling on the USSR to show comparable flexibility, on September 20 Andropov made his first public statement since the beginning of the crisis: an appeal asking West German legislators to resist the deployment of new American missiles in Europe. On September 21, U.S. Vice President George Bush, after visits to Romania and Hungary, made a speech promising that the United States would extend greater economic, political, and cultural support to those countries that followed a line independent of Moscow and fostered domestic liberalization.

When the Politburo met for its regular session on September 22, it is likely that several of these important events in the international sphere came under discussion. According to the report to the Politburo meeting published in *Pravda* on September 24, the Politburo emphasized the special importance "in the present situation" of unity among socialist countries as a "factor in the stability of international relations." This certainly suggests that Bush's pronouncement had touched the Soviet leaders on a raw nerve: the USSR's relations with its socialist neighbors. Similarly, the report of the Politburo meeting betrayed anxiety on the part of the Soviet leadership that "in the present situation" their professions of peaceful intent were falling on deaf ears among world public opinion. This is the closest that the reports of Politburo meetings came to indicating their awareness and concern that the airliner tragedy and the way in which it was subsequently mishandled by the Soviet authorities were having adverse effects on Soviet foreign policy initiatives. The Politburo noted "the particular importance in the present situation of the explanation to the broad international public of the meaning of the peace initiatives of the socialist countries and of the USSR's proposals at the talks on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe." This formulation suggests fear on the part of the Soviet leaders that the airliner disaster would make some of the adherents of the West European peace movement doubt Moscow's sincerity in seeking an arms limitation agreement with the United States.

At its meeting on September 22 the Politburo also discussed a complex program for the development of consumer goods production and consumer services for the Soviet population, though details were not provided. As usual, "several other questions concerning the international situation and the internal life of our country" were discussed.

On September 28 Andropov issued his "statement on world affairs," remarkable for its uncompromisingly tough stance toward the United States—despite the mildness of the approach adopted by Reagan in his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 26—and for its sugges-

tion that the USSR had renounced the idea of reaching an arms reduction agreement with the United States. Andropov also made his first reference to the KAL disaster but added nothing new, merely reiterating the Soviet position that the airliner had been on a spying mission for the United States. He endorsed the military's action as fully justified.

The Politburo met again on September 29, and the official report was published in *Pravda* on October 1. On this occasion, there was no suggestion that the airliner affair had been discussed, or that it was causing the Soviet leadership the slightest anxiety. Instead, said the official report, the Politburo had focused their attention on the problems of the fruit and vegetable industry. The responsible minister was singled out by name, and told to remedy the inefficiency in his ministry. The Politburo also implied that local and republican party organizations were not all doing what they could to prevent food shortages. The Soviet leaders had, it was reported, approved measures designed to "improve" the Soviet laws relating to taxation, and "some questions of the further deepening of economic cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries and the conduct of the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union" were discussed.

This examination of the reported activities of the Politburo during the crucial month of September 1983 suggests that the innovative practice of reporting the Politburo's agenda was introduced under the Andropov leadership more as a public relations exercise than as a genuine attempt to inform the Soviet population of the concerns of their leaders. It appears that disproportionate emphasis was given in the reports to discussion on consumer products, presumably with the intention of presenting an image of a leadership dedicated to raising the living standards of the population. At the same time, some important items of international affairs were, if the reports are to be believed, not discussed by the Politburo at all. Since it is difficult to believe that the KAL airliner crisis did not occupy a large share of the Politburo's deliberations through the month of September, it must be concluded that the reports published in the Soviet media bore only a tenuous relation to the actual matters discussed during the weekly meetings of that body.

Soviet Citizens Learn from Western Broadcasts

Kathleen Mihalisko and R. Eugene Parta

According to RFE/RL Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research, Western broadcasters to the Soviet Union appeared to have been effective in making the shooting down of the Korean airplane known to their audiences during the days immediately following the incident, when Soviet media coverage of the episode was practically nonexistent.

Western radio was cited as a source of information on the KAL incident by 45 percent of respondents in the survey group of 274 Soviet citizens traveling in the West during September and October 1983. Agitprop meetings and Soviet television were the two most frequently mentioned sources of information, at 62 percent and 48 percent respectively. A similar trend, with the exception of agitprop meetings, emerged from a parallel survey of a group of recent Soviet emigrants. The Western station most often cited by both citizen and emigrant groups was Voice of America.

There was a strong correlation between respondents' source of information on the downing of the Korean plane and their attitude toward the incident. Around 50 percent of Western-radio listeners in the citizen survey group both accepted the Western version of events and expressed disapproval of the Soviet action. Conversely, the nonlisteners in the sample were dominated by adherents to the Soviet version and (to a lesser extent) supporters of the Soviet decision to "terminate" the flight.

According to the official Soviet version, published in *Pravda* on September 11, 1983: "It was obviously calculated that either (1) a plane under guise of a civilian airliner would pass through Soviet airspace over strategically important objects and accomplish its reconnaissance mission, or (2) Soviet air defense forces would terminate the flight, and a frenzied anti-Soviet campaign would . . . begin. It is now clear that the second option came into play. . . ." An unusually heavy media and agitprop campaign aimed at exonerating the Soviet Union in the eyes of its citizens was orchestrated along these lines for several weeks after the incident.¹

RFE/RL researchers began querying Soviet citizens on their awareness of and reactions to the incident almost immediately after it took place. The purpose was to study the process by which Soviet citizens acquire information on important events and to ascertain how the persons interviewed saw the episode and to what extent they accepted their government's arguments in justification of the shooting.

Between early September and mid-November 1983, 274 respondents answered all or part of the following questions:

1. Are you aware of the incident involving the Korean airliner which was shot down over Sakhalin?
2. If yes, from what source did you originally learn about it?
3. After first hearing of the incident, to what other sources of information did you then refer?
4. Which of the sources of information do you believe?
5. What is your opinion of the Soviet action?
6. Why do you feel that the Soviet action was justified/unjustified?

Understandably, a considerable number of those approached for the survey refused to discuss the topic at all, and even among the 274 travelers who did respond to the query, not everyone provided answers to all six questions. Because of this reticence, and the fact that the sample was skewed in favor of urban educated males of Russian nationality who were members of the Communist party, the figures could not be projected back on to the Soviet population as a whole. But they were indicative of the correlations between attitude and source of information.

From the outset, Western broadcasters to the Soviet Union gave heavy coverage to the KAL incident. Soviet media, however, during the first week of September, restricted their discussion of the affair to a series of cryptic hints indicating that a foreign plane had violated Soviet airspace. Not until September 7 did *Pravda* acknowledge that the Korean Air Lines plane had been shot down by Soviet air defense. This was the signal for the launching of a full-scale media and agitprop campaign aimed at mobilizing domestic opinion in support of the government position.

Among the sources of information, Western radio was mentioned by almost half the respondents, thus comparing very favorably with Soviet tv and radio. The most important source, however, was agitprop meetings. These meetings, which are usually organized at the workplace, are a common feature of Soviet life, and they apparently proved to be an effective means of rallying support among the population. The Soviet written press was cited at the surprisingly low rate of 19 percent, which may have reflected somewhat confused coverage in the immediate aftermath of the incident, coupled with a possible decision to emphasize television and agitprop to make the government's case. Some respondents also noted that they had acquired information on the airplane tragedy in the course of conversations with foreigners during their travels abroad, or from the foreign press (see table 1).

Seventy-four of the 121 Western-radio listeners in the survey group explicitly cited Western radio as a source of information. Almost half this

Table 1 Sources of Information on KAL Incident*

	%
Agitprop meetings	62
Soviet television	48
Western radio	45
Soviet radio	44
Soviet media (unspecified)	32
Word of mouth	24
Soviet press	19

Note: Total exceeds 100 percent because of possible multiple responses.

* Total N = 164 cases of ascertainable information only.

number indicated that Western broadcasts had been their primary source of information on the tragedy. This was a clear indication of the effectiveness of Western broadcasts in disseminating information at a time when Soviet sources were either silent on a given issue, or failed to treat it in a coherent manner.

The Western station most frequently cited as a source of information was VOA, the station with the largest audience among Western broadcasters to the USSR.²

With one exception, the rank order of sources was the same for listeners as for nonlisteners. Western radio headed the ranking for listeners, followed by agitprop meetings, while meetings came in first place for nonlisteners. Respondents in the sample who were Western-radio listeners relied more on Western stations for information on the KAL incident than on any other source of information (see table 2).

The only variation in the two lists was the ranking of Soviet radio and television, which came in third and fourth place respectively for listeners, and in reverse order for nonlisteners. The relative importance of television was considerably higher among nonlisteners, however, with over half the nonlistener respondents in the table citing television as a source, against only 35 percent of the listeners.

Word-of-mouth communication was used as a source of information slightly more by Western-radio listeners than by the nonlisteners. This bore out earlier findings showing that Western-radio listeners relied more on word-of-mouth sources for international news than did nonlisteners.³ This implied a greater proclivity toward unofficial sources, and also indicated that the information obtained from the outside world by Western radio was undergoing continued discussion and dissemination.

A striking dichotomy of attitude between Western-radio listeners and

Table 2 Information Sources by Western-Radio Listening

	Listeners to Western radio N = 74* %	Nonlisteners to Western radio N = 99* %
Western radio	100	—
Agitprop meetings	51	64
Soviet radio	41	42
Soviet television	35	53
Soviet media (unspec.)	31	30
Word of mouth	26	20
Soviet press	22	15

Note: Total exceeds 100 percent due to possible multiple responses.

* Table 2 includes cases of ascertainable information only.

nonlisteners is evident in table 3. The Soviet version of events was accepted by nearly 80 percent of nonlisteners to Western radio, as against fewer than 20 percent of Western-radio listeners. Inversely, a far larger proportion of listeners than nonlisteners tended to believe the Western view of the incident. However, it was evident from respondents' comments that many people had reservations about adopting one version or the other down to every last detail.

The percentage of "no opinion" answers was almost twice as large among listener respondents compared to nonlisteners. Possibly this greater reticence stems from the fact that Western-radio listeners had been exposed to two conflicting accounts of the incident, and consequently found it more difficult to reach a conclusion. However, holding a position of "no

Table 3 Credibility of Different Versions of Events

	Listeners to Western radio N = 110* %	Nonlisteners to Western radio N = 114* %
Soviet version		
most credible	18	79
No opinion	30	16
Western version		
most credible	52	6
Total	100	101

* Table 3 includes cases of ascertainable credibility only.

Table 4 Attitudes toward Downing of Aircraft

	Listeners to Western radio N = 74* %	Nonlisteners to Western radio N = 125* %
Approval	22	70
No opinion	31	20
Disapproval	47	11
Total:	100	101

* Table 4 includes cases of ascertainable approval only.

opinion" may have already indicated a reluctance to accept the official version of events.

The attitudes expressed in table 4 mirrored closely the credibility patterns shown in the previous section. Just as some 50 percent of Western-radio listeners accepted the Western version of events, nearly 50 percent also disapproved of the Soviet action. Inversely, the nonlistener group was dominated by respondents who approved the shooting down of the aircraft. While the percentage of "no opinions" stayed much the same for the listeners to Western radio, the figure increased slightly among non-listeners, possibly because acceptance of the official version of events was not tantamount to condoning official violence.

As is evident from table 5, Soviet television proved the most effective

Table 5 Attitudes toward Downing of Aircraft by Information Source

		Approve %	No opinion %	Dis- approve %	
Soviet television	[N = 61]*	70	21	8	= 99
Soviet radio	[N = 56]	68	18	14	= 100
Agitprop meetings	[N = 75]	64	24	12	= 100
Word of mouth	[N = 31]	61	23	16	= 100
Unspecified Soviet media	[N = 39]	51	23	26	= 100
Soviet press	[N = 21]	38	43	19	= 100
Western radio	[N = 39]	13	33	54	= 100

* Table 5 includes only cases where both attitude and source of information were ascertainable.

means of persuading the public of the government's position, closely followed by Soviet radio, with agitprop meetings in third place. Least successful in this respect was the Soviet written press. Among respondents who cited Western radio as a source of information on the KAL incident, the trend went the other way, with respondents showing a far greater inclination to condemn than to support the downing of the Korean aircraft.

The effectiveness of Soviet television could be linked to the press conference given by Marshal Ogarkov on September 9, and to the following day's edition of *Vremya* (the main television evening news program), which featured an interview with the pilot who shot down the aircraft. It is conceivable that this apparent openness on the part of the authorities influenced the attitudes of certain respondents, and led them to conclude that the government had nothing to hide.

Respondents of Russian nationality were more likely to approve the downing of the Korean plane than natives of the other Soviet republics.⁴ The Ukrainians and Belorussians showed a pattern of response similar to that of their fellow Slavs, but the trend for the Baltic states and the three Caucasian SSRs diverged markedly from the Russian pattern. Given the low sample sizes for the non-Russian nationalities, however, these figures were purely indicative and did not allow for inferring definite opinion trends by nationality (see table 6).

During the months of November and December 1983, 83 recent emigrants from the USSR were also queried on their sources of information on the KAL incident. Since the attitudes of these emigrants were of less interest than their methods of gathering information, the questions put to them differed in emphasis from those put to the citizens. Respondents were asked when they had first heard of the incident; what were their primary and secondary sources of information; which version of events they

Table 6 Attitudes toward Downing of Aircraft by Nationality

	Russian N = 100 %	Ukr/Bel N = 36 %	Balts* N = 19 %	Caucasians** N = 9 %
Approve	59	53	16	22
Disapprove	17	22	64	44
No opinion	24	25	21	33
Total	100	100	101	99

* Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians.

** Armenians, Azeris, Georgians.

had at first believed; whether they had subsequently changed their mind on this; and if so, why they had changed their mind.

Most of the respondents had listened to Western radio in the USSR, and it emerged that they had gathered their information in much the same way as the Western-radio listeners in the citizen sample. Western radio was the main source of first information (cited by 58 percent of respondents); again, voa was the station most often mentioned. As regards Soviet information sources, television was first on the emigrant list and the written press last; this also conformed to the pattern laid down by the citizens. The predictable absence of agitprop meetings from the emigrants' list of sources was the only major difference. In the final months before their emigration, the respondents did not work, and therefore did not participate in agitprop meetings.

Of the emigrant group,⁵ 22 percent noted that they had begun by believing the Soviet account, but had changed their minds after becoming more familiar with Western information on the incident.

IV The Peace Movement in West and East

10

Soviet Exploitation of Western Protests Elizabeth Teague

As the date for the installation of the new American missiles in Western Europe approached, the Soviet media began to reflect the irritation of the Soviet leadership and the perplexity of the Soviet population over the West European peace movement's failure to prevent the deployment. A letter from a puzzled worker in Novosibirsk Oblast, quoted on Soviet television on August 20, 1983, asked why, if the antiwar movement was growing, the danger of war showed no sign of diminishing. The daily *Sovetskaia Rossiia* reported on September 30 that it was receiving many letters from readers asking how the increased activity of the Western peace movement could be reconciled with the fact that earlier in the year electorates in Britain, West Germany, and Italy—the very countries in which the new missiles were to be deployed first—voted overwhelmingly for governments that supported the missile deployment.

The explanation was that although the peace movement had made some spectacular strides,¹ and although the Soviet Union had been waging what was described as “its greatest postwar propaganda campaign,”² the battle for the hearts and minds of the majority of the populations of Western Europe had not been won by the peace movement. Opinion polls in West European countries regularly showed large majorities favoring membership in NATO and alliance with the United States and rejecting a neutralist or pacifist alternative. The reason for this, as the polls made clear, was considerable mistrust of Soviet intentions among West European populations and, at the same time, a substantial reserve of pro-American sentiment.³

Although the peace movement was able to mobilize large numbers of people around the single issue of the American missiles, it did not succeed

in reversing government policy in the countries where the missiles were to be deployed.

Nonetheless, Soviet leaders continued to pin their hopes on the movement, in an effort to turn to their own advantage the widespread longing for peace that existed throughout Europe. The Soviet authorities hoped that through participation in the antiwar movement large numbers of Western Europeans would become radicalized and gradually alienated from their elected governments.

In his speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on June 15, 1983, Andropov called for "a fresh assessment" of the antiwar movement and the communists' role in it. As a result, Soviet ideologists began to employ a new propaganda formulation. In an editorial in its August 1983 issue, the journal *Kommunist* argued that the world situation at that time was characterized not simply by antagonism between socialism and capitalism, but by "a global struggle between the forces of imperialism, on the one hand, and the interests of all mankind, on the other."

If the struggle against war was defined as the cardinal struggle, it followed that this was the main battleground on which the class struggle was being waged. The struggle for peace was therefore to be transformed into the struggle for socialism. Western communist parties were, accordingly, exhorted by their Soviet counterparts to exploit popular concern about nuclear war and thereby weaken the foundations of consent upon which Western liberal democracies were based.

Several aspects of the Western peace movements, however, clearly disturbed the Soviet leaders. Among them was the idea held by many peace activists that the Warsaw Pact bore as much responsibility for the arms race as NATO and that there should be agitation not only against the planned deployment of new U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe but also for the removal of the vast numbers of Soviet SS-20 missiles already targeted on Western Europe from the European part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities were also aware of the danger that Western peace movements might spark a backlash and lead to the growth of similar sentiments among the populations of the USSR and Eastern Europe.

These preoccupations were visible in an interesting debate entitled "Should Peace Champions Speak Out against Their Own Governments?" published in the Soviet weekly *Literaturnaia gazeta*.⁴ Representing the point of view of many Western peace movements was the distinguished British academic Gabriel Horn, professor of zoology at Cambridge University and fellow of King's College, Cambridge. The Soviet response was articulated by a leading Soviet expert on Middle Eastern affairs, Academician

Evgenii Primakov, head of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and first deputy chairman of the official Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

Horn's carefully, even diplomatically, worded contribution emphasized "that the antiwar movements should speak with an independent voice, and not be the mouthpiece of the government, of NATO, of Washington or of Moscow. . . . Any attempt to subordinate them to the hegemony of those centers can only weaken and divide them, reduce their effectiveness, and increase the risk of nuclear war."

Asking "Where Is the Greenham Common of the Soviet Union?" Horn explained that the Soviet peace movement was regarded by many in the West as an instrument of the government and therefore as liable to be used by it for political purposes. If the Soviet peace movement was subordinate to its government, "then there is no counterpart in the USSR to the Western peace movement, which will thereby suffer a serious blow."

Primakov offered no new replies to Horn's arguments. Instead he repeated the well-worn Soviet position that in the USSR, "the peace movement does not and cannot mean a struggle against government policy." This was supposedly not because the Soviet peace movement was not independent but because there was a happy coincidence between the views of the Soviet peace movement and those of the Soviet government.

Horn objected that even if the intentions of governments were laudable, their actions might sometimes be mistaken and might, even unintentionally, run the risk of war. He argued that "the antiwar movements in the West support the intentions of their governments, but protest against many of their concrete actions. That is their purpose and function, and that is why they want to see similar independent organizations in the Soviet Union."

Horn stressed the "enormous damage" that had been done by the news that independent peace activists in the USSR were being persecuted by the authorities. He emphasized the need to "establish mutual trust" between the superpowers and listed a number of initiatives for building human contacts outside the governmental framework that were reminiscent of the proposals made by the unofficial peace movement created in the spring of 1982 in Moscow, the Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the USA.

Sergei Batovrin, one of the founders of the group, who subsequently emigrated to the West, described what happened to this independent Soviet peace movement: "Repression began literally as soon as the existence of the group was announced. From then on we were put under constant pressure. We were repeatedly arrested and interrogated. The members of

the group were kept in confinement for fifteen-day periods, and I personally was put in a psychiatric hospital. . . . As soon as we tried to take any measures they were cut short by the KGB with brute force."⁵

11

World Peace Assembly in Prague Backfires

Vladimir V. Kusin

The World Assembly for Peace and Life and Against Nuclear War, carefully prepared and stage-managed, took place from June 21 to June 26, 1983. It was attended by 3,625 people from 132 countries and all continents.¹ Some of the delegates represented peace groups, others were solitary do-gooders, and yet others were former generals, presidents, and assorted VIPs, past and present, handpicked by the organizers. The World Peace Council (a front group supported and sponsored by Moscow) and the Czechoslovak Peace Committee were the joint patrons of the assembly. All foreign delegates apparently had their board and lodging bills footed by the hosts, though travel costs were not reimbursed to everyone.

The assembly was a marathon of speechifying. In plenary sessions, at open-air rallies, during visits to some seventy districts outside Prague, at press conferences and official receptions, millions of words must have been spoken, and not all of them had been censored or manipulated in advance. But the official message, starting with Czechoslovak party and state leader Gustáv Husák's inaugural speech and ending with the final appeal by the assembly, came out loud and clear on the side of the Soviet Union and against the West.

In this simplistic vision of things there was no room for considering Soviet military buildup, balance of forces, deterrence, political expansionism, and other strategic political issues, not to mention the Soviet and Czechoslovak human rights records. The peace festivity was no milestone, because it neither concluded an era nor started a new one. It did not amplify anything; it just purveyed a message written by someone else.

The brief final appeal was cleverly composed. It did not censure the United States by name, but said that "plans to site new first-strike nuclear rockets in Western Europe are especially dangerous." It coupled this appeal against new deployment in the West with a call for a "reduction of nuclear weapons in the world altogether." This may be seen as a conces-

sion to peace partisans aware of the fact that the Soviet Union, too, possessed an awesome arsenal. The Soviet military buildup was, however, not mentioned. And the catch phrases at the end of the appeal were formulated so as to facilitate endorsement by the widest circles in the peace movement: "No to new rockets in Europe! YES to talks on real reduction of all kinds of nuclear weapons in Europe! FREEZE all nuclear arsenals! No to nuclear weapons in the West or in the East, throughout the world! STOP the arms race, nuclear and conventional! YES to nuclear-free zones! For general and total disarmament! YES to peaceful political talks! No to military confrontations!"²

But despite the meticulous stage management, there were flies in the ointment, especially against the background of Czechoslovakia's appalling human rights record.

An "alternative philosophy of peace," as it later became known, was postulated on the occasion with firmness and clarity by none other than František Cardinal Tomášek, the Archbishop of Prague, after the authorities had prevailed upon him to take part in the festivities. The cardinal had been in conflict with the state for a number of years, most recently before the assembly over the *Pacem in Terris* organization of pro-regime priests condemned by the Vatican. It was reported that Tomášek, not wanting to precipitate confrontation, accepted the invitation and then left Prague shortly after delivering his brief address to the conference's "inter-Church meeting" on June 24. The party daily *Rudé právo* mentioned his contribution in two brief sentences but said nothing of its true content.³ Its message was that Christians were against every war and also against every oppression. He quoted Pope John XXIII as saying that peace would remain a hollow word unless it was pursued on the principles of truth, justice, love, and freedom.⁴ Then came an incantation that should be quoted in full:

He who threatens truth in the name of propaganda threatens peace.
 He who threatens respect for justice for all people without distinction threatens peace. He who threatens basic human liberties, including religious freedom, threatens peace. He who threatens mutual understanding and love among men threatens peace. He who threatens the tranquility of man's self threatens peace. He who threatens the life of children who have the right to be born threatens peace.

The cardinal's speech was not the only incident that disturbed the peace of the "peace" rally. At the end of the first day's merrymaking, a group of perhaps 300 young people drew away from the official crowd and, marching somewhat boisterously to Wenceslas Square, shouted unlicensed

slogans, such as "We Want Peace . . . and Freedom," "Abolish the Armies," and "Disarm the Soldiers." After some hesitation, the police surrounded them, picked out half a dozen "ringleaders," manhandled a few, including an American reporter, and dispersed the deviationists. An official spokesman later said they had been drunk.

Most attention among foreign observers, however, centered on the attempts by Charter 77, the unofficial human rights movement, to gain access to the peace assembly and to be allowed to present its concept of unity between the peace effort and the observance of human rights. But the human rights activists were not admitted to the assembly because, as officials said, they were not an organization and represented no one. Charter 77 did, however, circulate a letter among the delegates, restating its position.⁵ Three members of the West German "Green" party (Gaby Potthast and Heidi Dann, both parliamentary deputies, and Walter Oswalt), as well as two observers from the British Council for Nuclear Disarmament, arranged for an unofficial meeting in a Prague park on June 23, 1983, with some ten Charter 77 representatives, including erstwhile Foreign Minister Jiří Hájek, playwright Václav Havel, and all three current spokesmen for the movement. They signed a joint statement apparently endorsing the Charter position linking peace and human rights. Several dozen police then materialized from the bushes, urged the meeting to disperse, and confiscated film from the British, Austrian, and West German tv crews present, not without some scuffling.⁶ The Greens reacted by walking out of the assembly and leaving Prague prematurely, on Friday, June 24, a step much maligned at several press conferences in Prague, without, however, divulging the real reason for their departure.⁷

The peace assembly, designed as a mouthpiece for Soviet-inspired policies and a predetermined ideological stance, backfired at least partly. The oppressive nature of the Prague regime led the authorities to overreact by sending out police against a group of young people and against the Charter 77 activists meeting with Western delegates. To their credit, the Charter 77 adherents maintained a constructive and dignified attitude. No one could accuse them of trying to throw a wrench into the peace works. They were willing to talk about the peace effort seriously and calmly, proving that in the sixth year of its existence Charter 77 was still an important force.

The Peace Movement in Eastern Europe

Ronald D. Asmus

The phrase "peace movement" became a standard part of the political vocabulary in the West. The term, as generally used, refers to a loose and heterogeneous coalition—pacifists, ecologists, Christians, leftists, feminists—remarkable in their diversity, yet united in their opposition to what they perceived as an uncontrolled arms race between East and West. The Western peace movement was, in some ways, an outgrowth of the various protest movements of the late 1960s and 1970s opposing NATO's "dual decision" of December 1979, when its member states unanimously agreed to plan for the deployment of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles, while simultaneously offering to negotiate over their stationing with the Soviet Union.

In the East European context, however, the concept of a "peace movement" had a vastly different meaning. There were two separate movements—official and unofficial. All of the Warsaw Pact countries had their own "peace movements," headed by their respective official National Peace Councils or Committees. All of these were members of the World Peace Council (wpc), perhaps the classic communist front organization designed to present a facade of respectability and independence for a group that had for decades served as the tool of various Soviet peace offensives.

In addition to these "official" peace movements, however, new and independent peace groups operating outside the official channels emerged. Although they lacked an established structure, a set policy, or official spokesmen, a group of devoted and courageous individuals articulated and publicized their views on the issues of peace and disarmament. Although few, their real significance did not lie in their numbers but rather in their very existence. In no East European country had a communist party ever been willing to sanction any social groups outside its control. The appearance of the independent peace groups meant that the peace issue was no longer a monopoly of the agitprop apparatuses of the East bloc regimes.

The GDR In the GDR a variety of independent peace groups emerged¹ within the East German Evangelical Church. In the early eighties, a remarkable array of their unofficial peace moves ranged from petitions, peace forums, silent demonstrations, and hunger strikes to the production of a rather impressive set of studies on the causes of the arms race and strategic issues by the Church. Equally important was their sponsorship of discus-

sion of domestic issues, such as the right to be a conscientious objector or the role of military education and paramilitary training in the school system. Such events started to occur regularly in various parts of the country, with the various peace groups attempting to coordinate action. That such a development could occur in one of the bastions of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in Eastern Europe caught many observers by surprise. The regime of the Socialist Unity party of Germany (SED) did at times live up to its reputation by responding to such activities with harassment and persecution or by simply expelling undesired peace activists to the West.

Czechoslovakia In a number of statements, Charter 77 staked out its own views on issues of nuclear disarmament, pacifism, conscientious objection, and Western peace movements, stressing consistently that peace and the right to life were basic human rights. It repeatedly emphasized the "indivisibility of peace": the importance of eliminating the use and threat of violence, not only between states but also between individuals and between the state and society. In attempting to clarify its relationship with the Western peace movement, particularly the advocates of unilateral disarmament, Charter 77 eloquently pointed out that it was necessary to question the sincerity of peace proposals by states suppressing civil and human rights, for in such cases peace efforts may have been little more than "the momentary strategy of the powerful."² The Czechoslovak authorities responded either by ignoring the challenge or by harassment. Nonetheless, Charter 77 again managed to bring its views forward during the World Assembly for Peace and Life and against Nuclear War in Prague on June 21-26, 1983.³

Hungary In Hungary, conscientious objection and pacifism had long been important within the so-called "basic communities" of the Catholic Church, particularly among the followers of György Bulányi. According to a Hungarian dissident source, there had been at any one time one hundred young Hungarians serving prison terms for refusing conscription. The Catholic hierarchy, which had always supported the state's right to universal conscription, took a number of disciplinary measures against priests who questioned it in their sermons. Since the autumn of 1981, unofficial peace groups emerged among secondary and university students and, later, among young artists and writers.⁴ One of these groups, called the Peace Group for Dialogue, had some of its material published in the West; there had also been contacts with unofficial East German peace groups. Some groups called for a dialogue within Hungarian society on questions of peace and disarmament with all interested parties, including the Hungarian Peace Council. The Kádár regime responded characteristically by inviting unofficial peace groups to discuss possible cooperation with the Hungarian Peace

Council; one even met with Politburo member in charge of cultural affairs, György Aczél. Such efforts served to play off the various groups against one another or co-opt them without unnecessary confrontation. But the Hungarian authorities also were quite capable of harassment if independent peace activities went beyond the limits of official tolerance.⁵

Other Countries of Eastern Europe The "peace" issue apparently evoked only a faint echo through the rest of Eastern Europe, particularly Bulgaria and Romania, apart from the periodical public-relations exercises based on Ceaușescu disarmament proposals. The Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the U.S. in the Soviet Union—a small group of courageous Soviet citizens who in early June 1982 announced their intention of forming an independent peace organization in the USSR—was effectively suppressed. It was also virtually inconceivable that any unofficial peace initiative could have ever received the support of the Russian Orthodox Church.

In Poland, even before the introduction of martial law, Solidarity had paid little attention to issues of peace and disarmament. It had more important items on its agenda and its leadership deliberately tried to steer clear of defense and foreign policy issues to avoid unnecessary provocation. The Solidarity Congress in Gdańsk did call for a reduction of armament expenditures. The call, attributable more to the dismal state of the Polish economy and the burden of armament expenditures than to fears of the nuclear arms race, was incorporated into Solidarity's program.⁶

Two messages by the Committee on Social Self-Defense (kos) to "all participants and sympathizers of the pacifist and antinuclear movements of Western Europe" in May 1983 emphasized the necessity for disarmament in both East and West, warning Western peace activists that "the greatest threat to peace and the world is the communist totalitarian system."⁷ Both statements noted the "hypocritical" peace offensive in Eastern Europe aimed at destabilizing Western democratic societies. The kos letter asked Western activists to also demand the "elimination of the ss-20 missiles" aimed at their cities.

Why in the GDR? The differences in the intensity of the peace movements in the various countries of the Warsaw Pact could not simply be attributed to the relative levels of efficiency of the security apparatuses. To explain the appearance of the peace movement in the GDR three other factors deserve mention:

First, the GDR was heavily penetrated by Western influences, particularly thanks to West German radio and television. Thus East German society had been affected by the fears and concerns that fueled the West German peace movement. Germans in both the East and West clearly per-

ceived themselves as directly affected by the arms race, the deterioration in the East-West climate, and the prospect of new missiles stationed in the territories of East and West Germany. Although independent East German peace groups were not direct descendants of either the West European or West German peace movements, their Western predecessors influenced at least some of their activities. The East Germans' emulation of such groups provided a relatively safe form of expression, in view of the SED's enthusiastic praise of the peace movement in the West.

Second, the development of unofficial peace activism in the GDR could be seen as an emotional reaction against the pervasive military indoctrination of East German society. This factor also helped to explain the peace activists' strong emphasis on domestic issues, such as conscientious objection or military education in the schools. Although military indoctrination was not limited to the GDR, it had reached there a level unsurpassed within the Soviet bloc.

Third, and perhaps most important, the development of independent peace activism in the GDR would have been inconceivable without the active role played by the Evangelical Church, which, while claiming that it merely aspired to the role of a mediator in the peace discussion, nonetheless played a critical role as a source of independent information, moral support, and guidance, and, finally, as a sort of institutional umbrella under which independent discussion and activities could flourish. The Church also developed its own peace education program to counterbalance the regime's indoctrination efforts and on numerous occasions intervened to protect peace activists who came into conflict with the state authorities.

The East German Evangelical Church also had been very active in international church circles on the peace issue, often adopting positions far more radical than those of its West German counterpart. Church officials were well aware of the dangers and dilemma inherent in their policy vis-à-vis both the state and the more radical peace activists disappointed that the Church has not taken a much stronger stand. The path between simultaneous accusations of opposition and opportunism had not been easy or without risk, yet Church officials appeared determined to continue their policy, partially on account of their sense of special historic responsibility stemming from the Church's and Germany's past.

A Challenge and a Dilemma The emergence of unofficial peace groups in Eastern Europe posed a fundamental challenge to these regimes. Official authorities heatedly denied the existence of any independent peace movements in their countries, claiming that peace and socialism were two sides of the same coin. In the words of one East German official, such movements could not exist independently insofar as they would only "make

sense in a country whose policy is oriented toward the preparation for war, in other words, in Western countries." In reference to independent peace groups in the GDR, the official dismissed them as political dissidents wearing a "pacifist mask" and concluded: "There cannot be a pacifist movement, because the government's policy is pacifism. The entire country is pacifist!"⁸

The existence of such groups posed a challenge to the claims of these regimes that peace and socialism were synonymous, so that a peace movement could not be directed against government policy supposedly consonant with society's views. At the same time, the groups also posed a dilemma, particularly as many of them claimed that they were not necessarily opposed to their regime's peace efforts, but rather considered the issue to be one of such overwhelming importance that they also had the right to take a stand. This dilemma was reflected in the manner in which the regimes attempted to deal with unofficial peace activism. The number of individuals involved in such activities remained small—not surprisingly, considering the personal risk involved—and clearly the Eastern bloc security apparatuses had the means to muzzle such voices. Yet, they apparently perceived the price as too high. A harsh domestic crackdown was likely to result in undesired consequences, further alienating an already apathetic youth at a time when all of these regimes desperately needed to concentrate on pressing economic problems. In the East German case, a crackdown would have also burdened Church-state relations at a time when the SED was attempting to use the Luther anniversary celebrations to polish its reputation in the West. Foreign policy considerations may have also played an important role, particularly during the Warsaw Pact's own active peace offensive against NATO. Moves against independent peace groups would have generated unwanted publicity and further damaged the Soviet Union's reputation in the Western peace movement, particularly as Western peace activists were becoming more sensitized to the plight of their Eastern counterparts.

East Germany Publicizes Protests

Ronald D. Asmus

Traditionally, the official East German media's coverage of arms control had been limited to repeating commentaries from the regime-sponsored official "peace movement," statements from East German Church officials or Christian peace groups in the GDR that conformed to the SED's own policy, or statements by Western peace groups critical of NATO policy. In late October 1983, however, the party daily *Neues Deutschland*, in an unprecedented move, published two letters addressed to SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker from Evangelical Church congregations in the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany. The first letter, published under the title "Disarmament through Decisive Negotiations" was written by members of an Evangelical Church congregation in Dresden-Loschwitz; the second came from an Evangelical Church congregation in Hausen-Polheim, West Germany.

Publication of the two letters was sensational, by East German standards, as they addressed a number of traditional taboos. The Dresden-Loschwitz letter referred to the growing fear in large parts of East German society about a "counterdeployment" and concerns over the possibility of a new "ice age" in inter-German relations; moreover, as an answer to such problems it proposed nothing less than steps toward unilateral disarmament as confidence-building measures to help bring the arms race under control.

According to the letter, many East German citizens believed that they were particularly threatened by the escalation of the arms race and the prospect of the installation of more nuclear missiles on East German territory. The letter reminded Honecker that on more than one occasion he had said that more arms did not necessarily mean more security, that he had appealed for a "coalition of reason" between both German states, and that he had expressed his support for disarmament proposals such as the Palme Commission's appeal for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. "We Christians would like to encourage [such ideas] and at the same time urgently ask you to turn these statements into political reality . . . to do everything in your power so that the negotiations in Geneva are concluded successfully . . . and to continue the dialogue between the two German states and expand it so that trust can be created for a security partnership: in your words, a coalition of reason."

Finally, the letter appealed for a willingness to take unilateral steps toward disarmament as confidence-building measures:

For us as Christians the key to overcoming tension lies in the creation of trust between states. It seems to us that trust combined with the willingness to take unilateral measures . . . is the only possibility of preserving peace. . . . We know that the teachings of Jesus, above all in connection with his command to love your neighbor and your enemy, have until now been viewed as politically impracticable or even irrational. In view of the deadly armaments spiral, one can, however, perhaps find hope here for liberation: the creation of trust through measures that amount to one-sided unilateral moves so that the deadly automatic [momentum of the arms race] will be broken.

The authors of the letter concluded by noting that although their political and philosophical premises were different from those of Honecker, they believed that they had a moral obligation as Christians and as Germans to contribute to the "great peace discussion in our country" and to help insure that another war did not emanate from German soil. The letter from the West German congregation, although much shorter and more general in its wording, also expressed its opposition to weapons of mass destruction and appealed to Honecker to consider such views and to do everything possible to help preserve peace.

It was unprecedented for the SED to print such letters in a *Neues Deutschland* column normally reserved for official commentaries. The Dresden-Loschwitz letter was the first one outside the regime-sponsored peace movement to be published in an official forum. Also, its contents—its expression of fear and horror over the prospect of nuclear missiles being installed in the GDR and its appeal for unilateral action as the only answer to an escalating arms race—stood in sharp contrast to the SED's official policy.

The publication of the letters was undoubtedly timed to coincide with the height of the peace demonstrations against NATO's "dual track" decision in the FRG and elsewhere in the West. Letter-writing campaigns had, of course, always been a standard weapon in the agitprop repertoire of the SED. Conceivably, the SED chose this instrument to demonstrate that it shared the public's concerns. It was clear that the concern was widespread within society; yet this had often been the case on other issues in the past, without the SED resorting to the unusual move of publishing dissenting voices in an official party forum.

In any case, it did not take long for "counter" letters to appear following the announcement on October 25 by the USSR, GDR, and Czecho-

slovakia that preparatory work had been initiated for the installation of Soviet intermediate range missiles as "countermeasures" to NATO's planned deployment, justifying the necessity of this move and explaining that it was not possible to ignore the aggressive nature of the "imperialist West" striving for "military superiority." Similarly, a campaign had also been launched in factories to collect signatures supporting the government's move.

Those moves raised broader questions of the motivations behind the SED's policy on the peace issue. The SED had taken a number of small novel steps indicative of greater tolerance or flexibility particularly when compared to other East-bloc countries. First, there was Honecker's appeal to the "German people" in a letter to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl pleading for a "coalition of reason" between the two German states to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Second, there was the surprising decision to allow Udo Lindenberg, a well-known West German rock singer active in the Western peace movements, to sing in East Berlin. He and his recordings had been blacklisted for some time in the GDR after he had issued his hit single in the West "Sonderzug nach Pankow," which chastised Honecker for not allowing him to sing in the GDR. Third, there was the meeting between Honecker and various representatives from the West German environmentalist Green Party; Honecker's signing of a so-called personal "peace treaty"; and Honecker's agreement to a live television debate between politicians and Church representatives from both German states.

The SED was evidently addressing two separate audiences. First, it was obviously attempting to demonstrate to its own domestic audience that it was doing everything possible for the cause of peace. Second, at least some of these actions were undeniably aimed at the West, above all West Germany, and the desire to bolster the GDR's and the Warsaw Pact's "peace image" at a time when Western antimissile opposition was climaxing. At the same time, the limits of official tolerance were periodically made quite clear. On both October 22—the day of large antimissile demonstrations in the West—and on November 4, East German security officials prevented independent peace demonstrations in East Berlin and other cities in the GDR by detaining numerous peace activists. In the latter case, the event had received considerable publicity as a number of Green representatives had announced their intention of participating in a demonstration in East Berlin to be held before the Soviet and American embassies. The SED showed that there were well-defined limits to the tactical concessions that it might make for the Warsaw Pact's peace offensive and that priorities of internal security continued to prevail.

War Scare in the USSR

Elizabeth Teague

It became clear toward the end of 1983 that the Soviet leaders had renounced all ideas of reaching an arms agreement with the United States. This was the message of a number of statements issued by Soviet party chief Iurii Andropov. It might be argued that these statements were directed primarily at an external audience, such as West European public opinion, were it not that the Soviet media were telling domestic audiences the same thing.

Soviet propaganda had never been particularly controlled when denouncing the evils of the capitalist system and the wickedness of imperialism, but the Soviet media had in the last few years previous to 1983 generally avoided making personally abusive remarks about individual Western leaders. By the end of 1983, however, Soviet press portrayals of President Ronald Reagan had reached an unusually bitter level of personal abuse. Reagan was described as dangerous, lying, unscrupulous, hypocritical, even criminal; as a man who "scraped his fortune together" by speculating in real estate while governor of California, defrauding the Internal Revenue Service, collaborating with the Mafia, and switching his political allegiances whenever it served his personal advantage.¹ In short, he was portrayed as a man who could not be trusted and with whom it was impossible to do business.

A typical attack—in which Reagan was described as "the embodiment of deception, danger, and risk"—was contained in a series of four articles published in the mass-circulation weekly *Ogonek*, generally considered the mouthpiece of the Soviet Union's most reactionary forces.² Entitled "Robbery in the White House," the four-part series concerned the leaking of Jimmy Carter's briefing book to the Reagan team during the presidential election of 1980. The implicit message was that the members of the Reagan administration could not be trusted and that no agreement could be expected between the USSR and the United States as long as Reagan remained in office. Andropov himself, in an interview in March 1983, accused Reagan of "deliberately lying" about Soviet missile deployments.³ Veteran observers could not recall in twenty years any instance of a Soviet leader publicly accusing an American president of lying. Andropov also called Reagan's strategic proposals "irresponsible" and "insane."

At the end of August 1983, when some Western commentators began

to speculate that a "thaw" might be in the offing, Moscow was quick to discourage the idea. Writing in *Izvestiia* on August 28, Aleksandr Bovin, one of the Soviet Union's most authoritative commentators, called such "optimism" unfounded. "The real state of affairs," he wrote, "is quite different . . . the tension in Soviet-American relations is not yet abating."

September 1 saw two further events of significance besides the destruction of the KAL jetliner and a sharp deterioration in East-West relations. First, the West German peace movement, on which Moscow had focused its hopes, opened its last-ditch, unsuccessful campaign to prevent the deployment of new American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Throughout the fall, the activities of the West European peace movement were given wide publicity in the Soviet media. Well-organized "peace demonstrations" were held in many Soviet cities to coincide with the far more lively, spontaneous, and unpredictable demonstrations held in West European capitals. Thousands of Soviet citizens, brought to the marshaling points on buses provided by their factories or trade unions, carried banners with slogans such as "Shame on the American aggressors" and "We fully approve of the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union."⁴

Also on September 1 a new academic year began in the USSR. For the first time all schools held a "peace class" in which children were told about "the nature and the acuteness of the war threat looming over the world and the sources of that threat."⁵

The threat of foreign enemies had always been useful to the Soviet leadership as a means of mobilizing the population and distracting it from shortages and deprivations at home. In the fall of 1983 the threat of war began to be emphasized in the Soviet media to an unusual degree. The propaganda barrage was particularly heavy following the KAL disaster and again as the deadline for the start of INF deployment approached. It was likely, too, that much of the rhetoric coming from Moscow was aimed at foreign audiences—specifically at West Europeans, in order to lead them to believe that the alliance with the United States was endangering them. "The Soviets clearly want us to believe that meaningful negotiations with the United States have become useless," a senior French official was quoted as saying. "Whether or not they are just saying that to scare us is another matter."⁶

On September 28, Andropov denounced the United States for its "reluctance to hold any serious talks." He declared: "Even if anyone had any illusions as to the possible evolution for the better of the policy of the present administration, the latest developments have finally dispelled them."

The Soviet authorities fanned the flames of war hysteria by constantly

impugning the intentions of the United States and other Western nations. The KAL incident was portrayed in the Soviet media as a deliberate provocation by unscrupulous U.S. militarists. Tension was maintained as the date approached for the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Western Europe, and the missiles' actual installation was claimed as proof that the United States was preparing to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most striking example of Soviet war propaganda was the comparison between Reagan and Hitler. First made by the USSR's highest-ranking professional soldier, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, it gained increasing currency in late 1983 and early 1984, and received top-level sanction when employed on two occasions by Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarev. In an article printed in *Kommunist* in November 1983 Ponomarev likened the policies of the American administration to "the hysterical ravings of Fascist Germany."⁷ In the December issue of *World Marxist Review* he likened Reagan to Hitler because of their shared "anticommunism and anti-Sovietism" and warned that Reagan might yet prove the more dangerous because his policies supposedly threatened the world with a nuclear war in which all life on earth would be destroyed.⁸

The barrage of Soviet war propaganda was extremely heavy inside the Soviet Union. To select a few examples:

—One of the speakers at an antiwar demonstration in Leningrad in October 1983 told the 400,000 participants that the international situation was now more dangerous "than at any time since World War II."⁹

—On November 22, 1983, a "unified political day" was held in offices, institutes, and factories all over Moscow; workers were lectured on the theme "American Imperialism: The Enemy of Peace, Progress, and Freedom."¹⁰

—At the beginning of December, the newspaper *Komsomolskaia pravda* printed a series of postcards preprinted with the slogan "I vote for peace!" and a message protesting against the planned INF deployment. Young people were called upon to clip the cards from the newspaper and post them to Reagan, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Italian President Sandro Pertini, and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.¹¹ Only three weeks after the publication of the first postcard, the newspaper reported that over 2 million young people had already signed and dispatched their cards.¹² This campaign was reminiscent of a similar one conducted by the same newspaper in December 1981, when young people were asked to clip and send to NATO headquarters in Brussels a preprinted postcard calling for an end to the arms race.¹³ On that occasion, 273,126 messages bearing some 8.5 million signatures were dispatched.¹⁴

—During January 1984, it was reported that Army General Aleksei Epishev visited Soviet troops stationed in East Germany and urged them to be prepared for a Western invasion; in a special program for young listeners, Radio Moscow called upon Soviet youths to be ready to defend the motherland against aggressors; and Radio Volga, the broadcaster to the Soviet armed forces, warned its audience that the United States was planning to launch a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR.

—On January 13 a nationwide "Civil Defense Month" was inaugurated. The agenda included lectures, speeches, meetings with military personnel and war veterans, sports and military training, and visits to places of historical importance; also young people were to be invited to go to military garrisons for training.¹⁵

—On January 30 Radio Volga broadcast—without explanation—a recording of Stalin's voice in a speech that he had delivered on November 7, 1941, from the top of the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square as he was reviewing Soviet troops marching to the front at the outskirts of the city. The excerpts carried by Radio Volga included the words "The war in which you are fighting is a war of liberation, a just war" and his famous evocation of the heroes of Russia's past: "May you be inspired . . . by the gallantry of our great ancestors." Stalin's list of heroes began with Aleksandr Nevskii, who in the thirteenth century defeated the Teutonic Order, and ended with two famous commanders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Aleksandr Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov.

This propaganda campaign apparently had a profoundly unsettling effect on the Soviet population. The specter of war conjured up by the authorities evidently terrified many Soviet citizens. The deployment of the new American missiles at the end of 1983 probably contributed to this apprehension, for it demonstrated the powerlessness of the Western peace movement and the failure of the most determined efforts of the Soviet leadership to prevent the implementation of NATO policy.

The mood of the Soviet people was graphically described by Aleksandr Bovin in an interview that he gave to a Japanese newspaper at the end of December. He said: "A sense of crisis prevails now in the Soviet Union because the people know what war is. . . . The Soviet people feel that the threat of war has mounted at present. Personally I feel there will be no war. . . . However, there is something like a sense among the masses that transcends sound judgment and intensifies the feeling of terror."¹⁶

Support for the idea that a wave of war hysteria swept through the USSR during the final months of 1983 was provided by data gathered from interviews conducted during that year with Soviet citizens traveling to the West.¹⁷ The following question was put to a sample of 1,928 respondents

interviewed between January and November 1983: "There has been a lot written recently in both East and West on the danger of nuclear war. Do you feel that the danger of war is greater now than a few years ago?"

The replies received were categorized as follows:

- 56 percent believed there was a greater danger of nuclear war at that time;
- 20 percent did not believe that the danger was greater;
- 24 percent expressed no opinion.

During the three-month period from September to November 1983, however, the proportion of those replying that there was a greater danger of nuclear war climbed to 66 percent out of a respondent base of 522. Furthermore, this impression apparently was general throughout society. Since those three months corresponded exactly with the period of increased East-West polemics, it seems likely that this perception of the greater danger of nuclear war was a backlash effect of the USSR's own propaganda on its population.

One respondent gave the following details: "We have been hearing a lot of rumors about the possibility of war in the near future. At political information meetings they are saying that the United States is getting ready to attack the USSR, and that we should be prepared for an attack at any moment. From what I could see, those who believed these warnings significantly outnumbered those who didn't. The simple people are very frightened of war."

There were also signs of popular disquiet in certain East European countries following the announcement on October 24, 1983, that new Soviet nuclear missiles were to be deployed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

There was some evidence that the Soviet authorities realized that their propaganda could give rise to panic, hopelessness, or demoralization, which could potentially get out of control. Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov's address to military veterans and senior army officers in Moscow on December 14 illustrated the dilemma as well as the Soviet leaders' attempts to deal with it. Ustinov told his listeners that, although the current state of East-West relations was "very tense, there is no sense in dramatizing it." Imperialism, he said, "is far from all-powerful." He reminded them that "we of the older generation have lived through times much more difficult than now," that the international situation was not to be compared with those times, and that Soviet defenses were fully capable of deterring a nuclear war.¹⁸

Krasnaia zvezda struck the same note on January 7: "Lenin's Party and the Soviet state are doing everything to remove the threat of nuclear war. . . . The Soviet army and navy . . . are a mighty factor for peace and security and a reliable means of curbing the aggressive forces of imperialism."

The fears aroused among the population by Soviet propaganda apparently were not easy to allay, for a statement issued by the CPSU Central Committee on February 3 made the same soothing points once again: "Although the military and political situation is complex, it should not be overdramatized. The Soviet people have strong nerves. We have shown enough strength and resources to uphold the interests of the USSR and its friends and allies."¹⁹

The tone of an interview published in *Pravda* on January 25, 1984, in which Andropov replied to Reagan's appeal for an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, was also markedly more moderate than Andropov's previous statements of September 28 and November 2, 1983, had been. Even though in its basic content Andropov's message was just as unyielding as before, its language had sharply shifted from the invective of his previous personal attacks on Reagan.

Apparently the aim of the interview had been to calm the anxieties of the general public—both in Western Europe and inside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—and to show that the USSR was reasonable and had peaceful intentions. The message conveyed by Andropov was not, however, fundamentally different from that of his statements of September and November: that Moscow was not intending to make any attempt to reach agreement while the Reagan administration remained in office.

V The Arms Control Impasse

15

The Tactics of Soviet Policy

Bruce Porter

From approximately October 1979, when Leonid Brezhnev announced a unilateral withdrawal of several thousand Soviet troops and tanks from East Germany, until the deployment of U.S. Pershing missiles in late 1983, the USSR conducted a massive peace offensive toward Western Europe. The principal aim of this diplomatic campaign had been to forestall any kind of unified response on the part of NATO to the deployment, since 1977, of large numbers of Soviet SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe. By means of rhetoric, diplomatic initiatives, media propaganda, and negotiating skill, the Soviet Union had sought to encourage pacifist and neutralist tendencies in the West, to weaken the political will of West European leaders, and to split the North Atlantic Alliance. Despite this peace offensive, however, NATO had proceeded with the implementation of its dual-track decision of December 1979: to initiate the counterdeployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe, while seeking to negotiate an agreement with the USSR that would make any such counterdeployment unnecessary.

This did not mean that the Soviet peace offensive was without effect. On the contrary, it had significantly influenced public opinion in Western Europe and complicated NATO's implementation of the dual decision. NATO's performance with regard to the Euromissile issue had been anything but stellar, and many factors had contributed to this, but Soviet diplomacy deserved some credit for playing a spoiling role. Inevitably, a review of the whole affair must evoke a sense of *déjà vu*, for it was not the first time that the West's unity and will had been sorely tested by a Soviet peace offensive. Indeed, the peace offensive as a tactic of Soviet foreign policy can be traced back to Lenin's "Decree on Peace," the first official foreign policy statement of the Soviet regime. Because so-called

peace had been the leitmotif of sundry Soviet diplomatic campaigns, the essence of these campaigns had often been obscured. They were not based upon good will or willingness to reach a fair compromise—as the word peace would imply in Western usage—but upon a calculated combination of intimidation and deception. It is the first of these elements—intimidation—that was most often overlooked or misunderstood in the West, but this element seemed to be an integral part of Soviet diplomacy and of every well-conceived peace offensive. The USSR offered peace initiatives only after it had created the military threat that made the West so anxious for peace in the first place.

In the case of the Euromissile dispute, the element of intimidation was first introduced when the ss-20 missiles began to be deployed in 1977, at a time when the Soviet Union enjoyed strategic nuclear parity with the United States and, by most measures, superiority or at least a strongly skewed parity of nuclear forces in the European theater. It came, moreover, at a time when the governments of Western Europe were fairly committed to détente. There was thus no plausible military justification for the deployment of the new missiles, which came as a shock and an embarrassment to governments committed to various forms of *Ostpolitik*. As the deployment proceeded, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, one of the architects and strongest supporters of *Ostpolitik*, called on the United States to make some sort of concrete response to the ss-20s.

There was the possibility that the Soviet Union miscalculated the degree of concern with which the deployment of the ss-20s would be viewed in West Germany and elsewhere, but it seems improbable that the Soviet leadership would have assumed that the deployment could go forward without triggering some kind of response from the West. More likely, the Soviet leaders acted with the knowledge that a number of elements in the West would respond with indignation and determination to undertake reciprocal defensive measures, while others would be convinced that growing Soviet military superiority made détente and conciliation all the more critical for Western security. The Kremlin took a calculated risk, it seems, that the phenomenon of accommodation—judicious deference to superior power—would outweigh the instinct of indignation in the face of an unjustified threat. In any event, the two differing responses would have given the USSR opportunities for splitting Western politics.

Once the threat had been created and the element of intimidation introduced, a classic peace offensive began to unfold. It consisted of three closely interrelated aspects: actual intransigence, feigned flexibility, and assumption of the role of the injured party. The first of these, actual intransigence, was reflected in the fact that throughout the Euromissile dis-

pute Moscow had—despite numerous proposals and initiatives from the Soviet side—never once made an unequivocal statement of its willingness to dismantle even a single ss-20 missile as a quid pro quo for NATO's cancellation of its plans for counterdeployment. Soviet statements had always referred to plans for reduction of the number of ss-20s in Europe, which seemed to mean that some of them simply were to be withdrawn east of the Urals, to locations where they would still have posed a very real, if not immediate, threat to Western Europe (not to mention China and Japan). Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in his press conference of April 2, 1983, even stated in categorical terms that no agreement could ever be reached if the United States insisted on extending it to areas outside Europe. Intransigence at the negotiating table was a key Soviet tactic, for it put pressure on the opposite side to make the first concessions, pressure that increased in direct proportion to public momentum calling for an agreement.

While remaining intransigent in practice, the Soviet Union could not afford to appear so. At the heart of the peace offensive, therefore, were a series of initiatives often portrayed as concrete proposals, intended to give the appearance of great flexibility and willingness to compromise. Such initiatives tended to fall into two categories. Either they were so drastic and sweeping in scope as to be obviously unrealistic and useless as starting points for negotiation—such as the perennial Soviet call for total universal disarmament—or they were maddeningly vague and difficult for Western negotiators to pin down. Almost invariably, the latter proved to be patently one-sided, such as Andropov's proposal of December 21, 1982, in which he called on the West to cancel its deployment plans in exchange for a reduction of Soviet ss-20s in Europe to the combined level of British and French nuclear forces. Aside from the obvious attempt to split the Alliance, this proposal would have enabled the USSR to keep all of its ss-20s, albeit a portion in Asia, while NATO deployed not a single missile in response.

Both types of initiatives were usually offered together with abundant doses of self-righteousness, protestations of injury, and accusations of Western wrongdoing. When Reagan retreated from the zero option and suggested that the United States and the USSR negotiate an interim agreement of some kind, Gromyko responded with a press conference in which he bent over backwards to assume the role of the injured party and to appear as open to compromise as possible, while in fact stressing categorically that the USSR would not compromise on the issue of including French and British forces in the negotiation, excluding Asia, and including nuclear-capable aircraft, as well as missiles, in the talks. It was a remarkable performance, the tenor of which can best be illustrated with the following

excerpt from the soliloquy with which Gromyko opened the news conference:

Soviet foreign policy . . . is a peaceful policy, a policy of friendship among peoples. . . . It is aimed at reversing the mindless arms race and, above all, arriving at ways to reduce and limit armaments. . . . For some reason the Soviet proposal concerning universal and complete disarmament is not being spoken or written about in the West.

. . . After World War II ended the Soviet Union proposed two things that will go down in history in letters of gold. . . . The first concerned the conclusion of an international convention banning the application and use of nuclear weapons in perpetuity. Second, the Soviet Union proposed full and universal disarmament. It emerged that other states intended to drag out deciding the question of disarmament on various pretexts—how to precisely define ratios, how to approach reductions in weapons of one type or the other, and how to combine all this. Under the pretext of complexity they began to frustrate the resolution of this problem. The Soviet Union proposed: let us cut short the disputes. Let us work toward full and universal disarmament.

Then our partners began to ask: How can we implement full and universal disarmament without being convinced that it is being implemented in practice? . . . The Soviet Union then proposed full and universal control. . . . This proposal of ours remains in force today.

Gromyko continued in this vein before finally making it clear that the USSR was not ready to negotiate on any interim proposal that would necessitate the dismantling of its ss-20s. By assuming the role of the injured party he sought to throw the onus of failure to reach an agreement back on the West.

The effectiveness of such tactics can be seen in the events that led to Reagan's offer to negotiate an interim agreement. The president of the United States was responding to pressures from Western Europe to be more forthcoming, pressures that arose partly from a widely held view that the USSR was itself showing "signs of flexibility." Even the usually hard-line journal *The Economist* noted in its December 18 issue before Andropov's speech of December 21 that the Soviet Union was showing signs of flexibility on three points: a willingness to dismantle ss-20s, a willingness to discuss land-based missiles alone, and an acknowledgment that the ss-20s stationed in the Far East had to be counted. Gromyko categorically renounced all three of these presumed signs of flexibility at

his press conference. Having succeeded through its peace offensive in forcing the United States to abandon its initial negotiating position, the USSR returned to its intransigent stance, evidently waiting to see what the West would do next.

This did not mean that the USSR was not planning eventually to begin seriously negotiating at Geneva. But it was not likely to do so if there was a possibility for gaining concessions in this manner, or if any doubt remained about NATO's will to go forward with the planned deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The whole pattern of Soviet tactics on the Euromissile issue might appropriately be termed "protection racket diplomacy": the parallels with Mafia tactics were striking. The USSR began by creating a profound physical threat to its neighbors' security, and then offered to protect them from this threat in the event they made certain concessions. When the threatened neighbors probed for signs of good will or compromise, it responded by admonishing them to be "reasonable" or "realistic." When they took steps to defend themselves, the specter of nuclear war was evoked in vague terms. The entire tactic was based on first creating fear and then seeking to exploit it.

Some Western commentators and analysts saw Soviet intransigence as a sign of shortsightedness on the part of the Kremlin and "heavy-handedness" in Soviet diplomacy as evidence of failure. They marveled at the myopic vision of the Soviet leadership that prevented it from seeing that a few relatively minor concessions—such as compromising on the ss-20s, returning the disputed islands to Japan, or reducing its forces on the Chinese border—would reap it a huge harvest of good will and great diplomatic advantage over Washington. This perspective missed the point of Soviet diplomacy, which operated on the assumption that in the long run power, rather than good will, would decide the fate of the earth.

Much as in the case of the pressures brought to bear on a community by the Mafia, the threatened neighbors could best deal with the tactics of a Soviet peace offensive by acting with unity and resolve and not permitting any one of them to be singled out and intimidated. In the face of such unity, the Mafia is doomed to failure, insuring safety of the neighborhood. The peace and security of Western Europe were not dependent on reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union, but rather on maintaining the unity and resolve of the North Atlantic alliance.

Romanian Call for a Nuclear Freeze

Vladimir Socor

As the December 1983 deadline for the start of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear missile (INF) placement in Western Europe was approaching and an agreement at the U.S.-Soviet negotiations at Geneva was not yet in sight, Romanian party and state leader Nicolae Ceaușescu sent simultaneous messages to Andropov and Reagan, proposing ways of averting further missile deployment. Ceaușescu's messages made no attempt to assign blame to one side or the other for the lack of progress in the Geneva negotiations. The texts, which were released by the Romanian media on August 22,¹ were almost identical in substance, although they differed somewhat in their rhetorics. The message to Andropov was sent in the name of the RCP Central Committee's Executive Political Committee; the message to Reagan in the name of the Romanian people. The message addressed to the U.S. president purported to speak also on behalf of all European nations, with Ceaușescu attempting to cast himself as a spokesman for the European peoples' "vital interests" and "ardent aspirations," as he defined them.

Ceaușescu's messages requested a freeze on "new" missiles in Europe, to be followed by reduction of "existing" intermediate-range missiles, leading ultimately to an agreement on elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europe. In Bucharest's international discourse, the phrase "new missile deployment" referred chiefly to the U.S. intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles scheduled to be stationed in Western Europe beginning in December, while the formula "the existing missiles" denoted the Soviet intermediate-range missiles already in place and also, as now became clear, the British and French nuclear forces. In its diplomatic contacts with Western governments Bucharest advocated the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in the category of "existing missiles," subject to reductions in the Geneva negotiations on INF. This demand had already emerged in the talks held in Bucharest by Ceaușescu and his foreign minister Stefan Andrei with the French and Japanese foreign ministers, Claude Cheysson in April and Shintaro Abe in August, with the Bucharest leaders restating their unconditional opposition to the planned NATO missile deployment and urging the inclusion of the French and British nuclear forces in the INF reduction talks in Geneva. This had prompted Cheysson to speak of a "complete incompatibility of views" between Bucharest and

Paris on this issue.² Ceaușescu made this position public for the first time in a speech on September 8 commenting on his messages to Andropov and Reagan. To clarify his concept of nuclear balance in Europe and balanced reductions of "existing missiles," Ceaușescu said that "obviously, when speaking about intermediate-range missiles, all missiles should be considered, including the missiles of France and England and other delivery capabilities equivalent to intermediate-range nuclear missiles. . . . All those who have nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in Europe, because Europe is at issue now, must comply with the measures for reduction and elimination of those weapons."³

In order to achieve those objectives, Ceaușescu's messages to Andropov and Reagan proposed three possible approaches, in the following order of preference.

Ceaușescu's First Option This proposal called for a prompt, "successful" conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva, with success defined as an agreement providing for no "new" missile deployment and cuts in "existing" missiles. The latter provision was the sole point of substance on which the language of the two texts differed in emphasis. While the letter to Andropov spoke of "reduction of the existing ones," the letter to Reagan read "withdrawal and destruction of the existing ones, as an interim measure toward ridding the continent of any nuclear weapons." The more explicit phrasing of this point was present only in the letter to Reagan and not in the one to Andropov. The request for a trade-off involving cancellation of NATO deployment in exchange for the scaling down of the number of existing Soviet missiles and the ultimate corollary of a denuclearized Europe had been the standard Romanian position ever since NATO's adoption of the December 1979 decision to do away with the current Soviet INF monopoly by positioning comparable missiles of its own, while at the same time seeking a negotiated solution at Geneva.

The trade-off now once again proposed by Ceaușescu, whereby NATO was to renounce INF in Europe altogether in exchange for a mere reduction of the existing Soviet missiles, with a view to the ultimate "denuclearization" of Europe, was akin to the series of pronouncements issued by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states demanding the same solution as part of their "peace" offensive against the scheduled NATO deployment.⁴

Ceaușescu's Second Option Given a failure to reach a prompt agreement at Geneva along the suggested lines, Ceaușescu proposed as a second best option the postponement of NATO's deployment, scheduled to begin in December 1983, "at least until the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985," while the Soviet Union would "provide guarantees in line with its previous statements during the negotiations that it would halt the siting of

further intermediate-range missiles and their modernization and that it would unilaterally proceed to cut some of the missiles in the European zone of the USSR." Indeed, the Soviet Union had been repeatedly offering at Geneva, as part of this "peace" offensive, to "halt" the already completed modernization and withdraw "unilaterally" some of its intermediate-range missiles in Europe in exchange for the cancellation of the planned American deployment.

Ceașescu's call for postponement of the American deployment by at least a year had been preceded a few days earlier by a proposal from the socialist government of Greece for a postponement of six months. This proposal had already been rejected by the U.S. and Allied governments as detrimental to the West and endangering the chances of a negotiated agreement at Geneva.

In sum, Ceașescu's second option, in practice, would have had the same effect as the first. He would have preserved the Soviet monopoly in INF, without, however, codifying it in a formal agreement as the first option suggested.

Ceașescu's Third Option A last-resort position, designed for the event that the first two options failed, suggested "no deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and other [unnamed] states," as an interim measure until an agreement was finally reached in Geneva.

Ceașescu's suggestion for a trade-off of a Western renunciation of missiles in West Germany for a Soviet renunciation of missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia was echoed the next day by the GDR party and state leader Erich Honecker, who proposed the obverse of this proposition. Honecker warned, in a meeting with the West German SPD disarmament specialist Egon Bahr, that the scheduled Western INF deployment would force the Soviet Union to station nuclear missiles in forward positions on the territories of Warsaw Pact states. While Ceașescu suggested that if the West refrained from stationing missiles in West Germany, the Soviet Union would refrain from putting them in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, Honecker warned that if the West did go ahead with placing missiles in West Germany, the Soviet Union would do the same in Warsaw Pact countries. Neither the Soviet statement in May nor Honecker (as quoted by Bahr) mentioned the GDR or Czechoslovakia by name, but Moscow did so within days in suggesting a similar trade-off to visiting West German SPD foreign-policy spokesman Karsten Voigt. Western commentators noted that Ceașescu's proposal was the first one to specifically and publicly identify the countries in which Moscow threatened to introduce its intermediate-range missiles.⁵

The trade-off proposed by Ceaușescu was clearly one-sided, since the deterrence mission of NATO's planned deployment would have called for deployment mainly in West Germany, whereas Soviet INF deployment in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or any other Warsaw Pact country seemed unnecessary from the Soviet point of view, since there was ample scope for stationing missiles on Soviet territory itself. Ceaușescu's proposal to exempt the above-named three countries from intermediate-range nuclear deployment was consonant with the oft-repeated Soviet and Warsaw Pact plan for establishment of a denuclearized area in Central Europe, promoted since the late 1950s and always rejected by the West.

Other Measures Proposed by Ceaușescu Besides his proposals regarding INF deployment, Ceaușescu's messages to Andropov and Reagan contained two additional ones. The first proposal suggested that denuclearized areas in Northern Europe and the Balkans—Central Europe had been discussed in part under Ceaușescu's third scenario—be established as interim stages leading to "denuclearization of Europe." This concept corresponded to the traditional stated objective of Soviet policy in Europe: demands that Northern Europe be turned into a "denuclearized area" to which Ceaușescu had been consistently lending his support. He had been especially active in promoting suggestions for removing the Western military presence from the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, even in a comprehensive draft charter to that effect.⁶ Both projects had been consistently rejected by the NATO member countries, except for some socialist and social democratic parties, notably Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's PASOK.

The second additional measure proposed in Ceaușescu's messages to Andropov and Reagan suggested a unilateral freeze on military spending by the U.S. and the Soviet Union at 1983 levels for the following two years and concurrent initiation of U.S.-Soviet negotiations for reduction of military spending after 1985. Proposals along these lines had been standard in Romanian as well as in Soviet and Warsaw Pact pronouncements. However, Eastern compliance with an international or U.S.-Soviet agreement limiting military spending would have been impossible to monitor or enforce because of the fundamental differences between the open political processes determining the allocation of national resources in the democratic societies of the West and the secrecy governing such decisions by the Soviet and East European rulers, who do not have to be accountable to their populations.

Conclusions Ceaușescu's proposals were generally in line with the official Soviet and Warsaw Pact positions. They differed fundamentally from the solutions offered by the West, which were predicated on the prin-

ciple of East-West equality in INF missiles and stationing of new American missiles to achieve that balance. Ceaușescu's proposals would have perpetuated a Soviet INF monopoly. All the elements contained in Ceaușescu's messages had already been found unacceptable by the NATO governments when advanced from other quarters.

17

Romanian Proposal for Balkan Denuclearization

Vladimir Socor

In 1983, Romania's official foreign policy magazine, the weekly *Lumea*, published a 13-part series on a plan to turn the Balkans and, in effect, Asia Minor and the adjacent Aegean and eastern Mediterranean waters, into a denuclearized area.¹ The comprehensive document included an outline for a charter banning nuclear weapons systems and foreign nuclear installations from the region. The charter, Romania's most systematic denuclearization proposal to date, was intended as a basis for inter-Balkan discussions sought by Romania on the subjects of denuclearization and the establishment of a "zone of peace."²

Romania, along with Bulgaria, had been a persistent advocate of the concept of removing nuclear weapons and foreign bases from the Balkans, a plan dating back to a series of Warsaw Pact proposals first aired by Romania in 1957. For the past quarter of a century Turkey and Greece had been the only countries in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean to host and help transit nuclear systems and to maintain supporting base structures for Western air and naval forces, both as part of NATO commitments and as part of defense arrangements with the United States.

Arms Reduction Impact: A Rare Romanian Disclosure In practical terms, the only forces and bases that would have been removed from the region under the proposal would have been Western ones, since only the United States and NATO admitted having nuclear capabilities and bases in the area under consideration. As the Romanian document noted, the Soviet Union had no bases or forces, nuclear or otherwise, either in Romania or in Bulgaria.³ In a rare disclosure of Romania's and Bulgaria's nuclear capabilities, *Lumea* quoted with approval passages from a study published in the arms control-oriented *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* advocating the military denuclearization of the Balkans. Among the passages repro-

duced and thus indirectly confirmed by *Lumea* was one describing Romania's and Bulgaria's potential nuclear capabilities as consisting of Soviet-made short-range FROG and SCUD missiles, which, however, were not armed with nuclear warheads in either of those countries.⁴ Where, then, was the trade-off? The Romanian document did not take any account of the fact that any Balkan denuclearization or disengagement under these circumstances would have amounted to unilateral disarmament by NATO in the region. This was the reason for Turkey's skepticism toward the project from the start. This also was the case with the Greek government prior to the advent of the Papandreou government.

Geographic Ambit of the Project The area from which nuclear weapons systems and their transit were to be banned would have consisted of the totality of land, sea, and air spaces of six countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. This definition was narrower than the one promoted by Romania in previous years, when the area to be subjected to denuclearization had been variously defined as "the Balkans" and the "Black Sea" or "the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean." These formulas were dropped in 1983. The Romanian plan did not propose to include in the denuclearized area any territory where the Soviet Union deployed nuclear capabilities relevant to the area. The plan did, however, envisage a future extension of the Balkan denuclearized area into the entire Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic, and the Central Danubian Basin, as intermediate stages toward gradually "denuclearizing" all of Europe.⁵

Defining Denuclearization in the Balkans The Romanian project proposed to extend the commonly accepted definition of the concept of denuclearization so as to exclude from the area not only nuclear weapons proper, but also all components of nuclear-capable systems, including sea-borne and airborne vehicles, prohibit their transit through the territories, the air space, and the waters of the states of the area, and outlaw any base or support facilities that might have served as infrastructure for nuclear capabilities.⁶ Throughout the text a heavy emphasis was placed on bans on support facilities, and all types of nuclear transit were heavily emphasized.⁷ In practical terms, this would have affected only the American and NATO forces in the eastern Mediterranean and could have forced the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the area, while leaving Soviet nuclear deployments on Soviet territories unaffected.

Obligations of the Participating States The denuclearization statute was to be worked out by the states of the area among themselves and was to commit them to prohibiting on their territories, air spaces, and waters the following activities: production or development of nuclear arms, by these states or by "others"; possession, acquisition, storage, or stockpiling

of nuclear weapons systems or any of their components, with specific prohibitions on naval transit and port calls; and the launching of nuclear weapons from the area.⁸ At the same time, special provisions were to be included to safeguard the participating states' unabridged right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to acquire peaceful nuclear technology.

The project stated repeatedly that denuclearization was meant to be perpetual and irreversible and that no subsequent international developments in the area were to be invoked as a cause for revising or altering the area's denuclearized status.

Obligations of the Nuclear Powers The area's denuclearized status was to be guaranteed by the nuclear powers, which were to be asked to extend the following pledges: not to use or threaten others with the use of any type of military force in the area; not to provide the countries in the area with military nuclear technology; not to introduce or transit nuclear weapons systems or their components in the area's land, air, or sea spaces; not to maintain "military bases" (the qualifier "nuclear" was missing) in the area, and to remove them from "where they exist."⁹

Romania proposed¹⁰ that the instrument embodying the guarantees provided by the nuclear powers be modeled after the U.S.-Soviet agreement of 1978 and quoted the stipulations of the latter as "convincing evidence" that guarantees of this type would provide the denuclearized area's states with an effective protection against external aggression. The fact that Bucharest cited so confidently restraining ordinances preventing the development of situations that exacerbated tension and the use or threat of force against other states systematically violated by Moscow was hardly likely to convince Turkey, Yugoslavia, or other Balkan countries to give up the protection afforded by military balance and NATO deterrence in exchange for paper assurances from Moscow.

From Denuclearized Area to "Zone of Peace": "Decoupling" NATO's Balkan Flank In earlier Romanian proposals, calls for denuclearizing the Balkans had been implicitly tied to the concept of a "zone of peace." This concept transcended mere denuclearization: it proposed the removal of all foreign forces and bases from the area and the severance of military ties to outside "blocs." The Romanian project of 1983 was more explicit than all the preceding proposals about the interconnection of the two concepts. Citing Ceaușescu's definition of a "zone of peace"—"no more foreign forces and bases"—the document postulated that denuclearization was ultimately "incompatible and irreconcilable with the presence of foreign bases and troops on the territories of the Balkan states,"¹¹ and treated denucleari-

zation as merely an intermediate stage of the final creation of a "zone of peace":

Insuring the total and perpetual absence of nuclear weapons from a particular area is not a goal for its own sake. On the contrary, it is a subordinate aim, or better said, a means serving higher, overriding objectives. . . . Denuclearized areas pave the way toward the creation of zones of peace.¹²

The denuclearized area forms a component part of the zone of peace. In fact, it is nothing more—and it is not being conceived as anything other than—a necessary stage toward the attainment of the fundamental goal, which is that of transforming a given geographical area, in this case the Balkans, into a zone of peace.¹³

How was denuclearization to be reconciled with the existing alliance commitments of the states that were the host to nuclear (and non-nuclear) foreign forces and bases? The Romanian project stipulated that the choice of denuclearization and its consequences for undertaking obligations was an essential prerogative of state sovereignty overriding existing alliance commitments. Such commitments were not to be invoked by any party to prevent a state's decision to become a part of the denuclearized area.¹⁴ These provisions had been obviously designed with Greece and Turkey in mind.

That the project was aimed at bringing about the West's military withdrawal from the Balkans was again made clear by the following comment accompanying the proposed outline of the denuclearization statute:

From a strictly military viewpoint . . . inasmuch as the nuclear weapons in the area are exclusively in the inventory of the latter forces . . . would signify the *decoupling* of this theater from the global nuclear-strategic equation, thereby eliminating the very reason why certain foreign forces and bases are currently implanted in the Balkans [emphases in the original].¹⁵

In discussing the matter of obligations and safeguards for the Balkan states under a denuclearized status, the document invoked the specter of nuclear war and explicitly withheld guarantees of immunity from states failing to decouple after consenting to denuclearization. After first arguing that banning nuclear systems from a country's territory was a prerequisite for insuring it against nuclear or other type of attack,¹⁶ the document then stipulated that this prerequisite, while necessary, was not in itself sufficient.

Even a country that had banned nuclear systems and foreign bases from its territory would not have been entitled to immunity from nuclear attack if it became the source of, or lent its territory to, undefined "acts of force" or "threats of force" including those arising from its relations with "third parties." This would "result in the loss for those states of the very guarantees that had been conferred upon them by their denuclearized status, leaving them to face the full consequences of contemporary conflict."¹⁷ These strictures were clearly aimed at Greece's and Turkey's commitments under the U.S.-NATO alliance system, and could only reinforce the arguments of the Greek and Turkish opponents of denuclearization, who had pointed out that it would not procure their countries' immunity against threats from nuclear missiles deployed in the Soviet Union.

The Romanian document also appeared to envisage the contingency of Soviet aggression when it referred to a possible conventional attack by a nuclear power on a member state of the denuclearized area. In such case, stipulated the document, "the zone's very *raison d'être* would cease to exist";¹⁸ the consolation must seem slight to any potential victim.

The Institutional Mechanism The Romanian project proposed the establishment of an "Agency for the Denuclearization of the Balkans" (ADB) consisting of all Balkan states that would agree to become a part of a denuclearized area. The agency's role was "to insure the orderly development of the denuclearization process," a formula indicating that it was to focus on states hosting nuclear weapons systems and undertake to remove them from their territories. The functions and prerogatives to be exercised by the ADB, as outlined by the Romanian document, were to be essentially of a legal, diplomatic, administrative, and scientific-advisory nature. The ADB in structure was to be modeled after the United Nations, with a General Conference, an Executive Council, and a Secretariat, and the addition of a Scientific Council. Decisions in the ADB "on substantive matters were to be reached by consensus."¹⁹

The project did not contain stipulations instructing member states how to settle differences of interpretation that might arise over the application of the denuclearization statute, did not propose any decision-making mechanism, and did not envisage any enforcement authority for the ADB. Most of the space devoted to the ADB focused on the proposed agency's internal administration. The ADB, in sum, would not have had any real "teeth." This raised serious questions concerning the real locus of decision-making and enforcing power, if any, over the "denuclearization process," were the latter ever to be set into motion as Bucharest anticipated.

Verification and Enforcement The plan proposed that a "control

system" be set up by the member states of the denuclearized area. The control system's tasks were defined only in the most general way as "over-seeing" the contracting parties' compliance with the provisions of the denuclearization statute. The control system was to, inter alia, "ascertain the removal of foreign military bases [the qualifier "nuclear" was again missing], of nuclear arms, and of all other components of such weapons systems from the territories of the contracting parties where they are deployed at the time when the denuclearization agreement comes into effect."²⁰ No clues were provided concerning the specific tasks of this body, its composition and its jurisdiction, how it would reach its decisions, the means with which it would carry out its duties, or the extent, if any, of its enforcement powers. All matters of this nature were left to be settled by the contracting parties *after* the denuclearization treaty had been concluded. The project had nothing to say about policing powers, about how to handle detected violations, or about how to insure that the control system would not be misused as a means of interference or pressure against the member states which had given up the protection provided by Western deployments.

The provisions dealing with the institutional mechanisms and verification were among the major weaknesses of the Romanian project and seriously detracted from whatever plausibility it might have had.

Objections and Obstacles to the Plan The commentary accompanying the plan repeatedly acknowledged that this remained a "long-haul" project that called for a "gradual approach." It also recommended ways to deal with the numerous built-in obstacles and missing prerequisites.

With respect to frontier disputes and other pending issues, a peaceful resolution of "all issues pending between some Balkan states" and an agreement recognizing "the current frontiers as final and unalterable" was to go hand in hand with Balkan denuclearization.²¹ The latter suggestion responded to a concern that had been voiced by Yugoslavia vis-à-vis Bulgaria in connection with previous demands for a denuclearized area or "zone of peace."

Another issue was insufficient development of multilateral cooperation among the Balkan states. The document called for further development of bilateral cooperation and transition to "a qualitatively new stage" in multilateral cooperation, including regional political meetings at various levels culminating in a regional summit meeting. Ceaușescu was quoted as having asked since 1982 (in the wake of the Socialist party's advent to power in Greece) for an immediate start of preparations for a Balkan summit with denuclearization on the agenda.²²

The possibility of skepticism, caution, or outright opposition from the

non-Warsaw Pact Balkan states was neatly skirted by the Romanian document through the claim that the concept of Balkan denuclearization enjoyed general support in the area.²³ This sanguine assessment failed to acknowledge and deal with the consistent opposition to the plan shown by Turkey, Yugoslavia, and the Greek nonsocialist parties and society. It seemed to miss the nuances of the Papandreu government's position that, despite its rhetoric, was unlikely to take the plunge, content to exploit the issue for propaganda; and did not address Yugoslavia's concern about the preservation in the Balkans of an East-West balance of power that made its own nonalignment possible.²⁴

Bucharest, however, must have been aware of at least some of these problems, as indicated by the propositions that allowed individual Balkan states to join the denuclearized area at a later stage if they did not desire to participate in the preparatory stages. (This was probably intended primarily for Turkey, but the Romanians might have been disappointed by Greece and Yugoslavia as well.) Other stipulations provided for participation—exclusive, if necessary—of “at least all militarily important states of the region,” thus implicitly making a concession about Albania, which had indeed rejected the plan as impractical.²⁵

The obstacle posed by NATO's rejection of the concept establishing denuclearized areas in the absence of a nuclear arms reduction agreement for all of Europe, complete with Soviet reductions, was met by the counterargument that the establishment of denuclearized areas paved the way toward the “nuclear disarmament of Europe,” describing this as the aim of current “European efforts,” missing the goals of pacifist and neutralist movements in the West. The document also renewed the familiar Romanian demands parallel to Warsaw Pact proposals for the establishment of denuclearized areas in Central and in Northern Europe,²⁶ in addition to the Balkan region. The publication of the Romanian document coincided with renewed pronouncements and diplomatic activities by both Moscow and Sofia on behalf of the Balkan denuclearized area.²⁷

Conclusions The plan drafted in Bucharest in effect called for unilateral disengagement measures by the U.S.-NATO alliance system from the area in question, and for a de-alignment of Greece and Turkey, without corresponding developments on the Warsaw Pact's Balkan flank. The plan continued Ceaușescu's support for Soviet and Warsaw Pact-launched nuclear disarmament proposals on a regional basis, calling for unilateral dismantlement by NATO of its existing nuclear capabilities which would be unreciprocated by the Warsaw Pact, and leave unaffected both the conventional Soviet deployments, to which the Western deterrent had been designed to respond in the first place, and the Soviet nuclear missiles. Be-

cause of its one-sided nature, the plan's prospects of acceptance by any of the non-Warsaw Pact Balkan states did not seem any better than those of previous Romanian and Bulgarian denuclearization proposals for the past twenty-five years.

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New Soviet Missiles for Eastern Europe
Kenneth Hunt, Bill Murphy, Ronald D. Asmus,
and Vladimir V. Kusun

In October 1983 the USSR Ministry of Defense announced that the Soviet Union was starting preparatory work on the deployment of "operational-tactical" missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The action was being taken, according to the communiqué, in response to NATO preparations to site U.S. Pershing II ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles on their soil. The Soviet "counterdeployments" would not have constituted a qualitatively new threat to the West, but Moscow's public announcement of them made the "fraternal" peoples of Eastern Europe, and perhaps their governments, uneasy.

The New Missiles The official Soviet communiqué did not identify the "operational-tactical" missiles that had been deployed. It was said, however, that NATO officials believed that the term referred to two short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles known in the West as the ss-21 and ss-23.

The ss-21 was a highly accurate mobile missile first deployed within the USSR in 1978.¹ It could carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. It also had a greater range (120-125 kilometers) than the missile it was to replace in the Soviet inventory, the FROG-7, with 70-kilometer range. The similar ss-23 had first been deployed within the USSR in 1979-1980. It too had a greater range (500 kilometers) than the SCUD missiles (150-300 kilometers) that it was to replace. Both missiles, in their nuclear version, carried a single—perhaps 200-kiloton—warhead similar to warheads of the missiles they were replacing. The combination of increased accuracy and relatively low nuclear yield suggested that the mission of the new missiles was to attack military targets in Western Europe.

Notwithstanding the enhanced capabilities of the new missiles, NATO

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officials apparently did not believe that the introduction of the ss-21 and ss-23 into Eastern Europe presented a qualitatively new military threat. Indeed, even before the NATO INF decision of 1979, it was said that Western intelligence services were expecting the obsolescent FROG-7 and SCUD missiles to be replaced by technologically more advanced systems in a routine process of military modernization.

The novelty of the Soviet communiqué thus consisted not in the revelation that Moscow was modernizing the short-range missiles deployed with its forces in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, but rather, in its public acknowledgment that the new "operational-tactical" missiles to be fielded there were to possess military capabilities similar to those of the new NATO intermediate-range systems—that they would also be armed with nuclear warheads. NATO planners, of course, had long proceeded on the assumption that Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe were equipped with nuclear warheads. The Soviet government's official acknowledgment of the nuclear role of these new systems suggested to many Western observers that their deployment was essentially designed to have political rather than military impact. One probable purpose of the Soviet announcement was to increase the anxiety of the public in Western Europe and spur the various "peace" movements there to put increased pressure on government leaders. A probably even more important goal was to induce "second thoughts" in NATO councils, particularly in the smaller member states like Belgium and the Netherlands, where there was significant popular opposition to hosting new U.S. intermediate-range missiles, and Norway and Denmark, which had long before renounced any nuclear role in the Alliance.

Deployment in East Germany In mid-January 1984 the Soviet military newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda* published two articles by a correspondent visiting a Soviet missile unit in the GDR equipped with new missiles in response to the initial NATO deployment.² Subsequent statements by Czechoslovak officials also confirmed that deployment was under way in Czechoslovakia as well.³ In response to Western claims that the alleged "counter-measures" were part of a longstanding modernization plan for Soviet nuclear forces in Eastern Europe, involving short-range missiles of the ss-21 and ss-23 types, both Soviet and East German sources countered with hints that the placements involved a longer-range missile known in NATO jargon as the ss-22.⁴ In late January several Western press reports quoted U.S. intelligence sources as claiming that an ss-22 had been spotted in the East German city of Bernsdorf, about 50 kilometers west of the Polish border. This was the first time that this missile had been sited outside of the Soviet Union.⁵

On May 14, 1984, TASS and East German press agency ADN announced that the governments of the USSR and GDR had agreed to "additional" deployment of "enhanced-range theater missiles complexes" in response to NATO's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.⁶ In its justification of the move TASS claimed that NATO's "continuing" buildup of arms had compelled the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to adopt countermeasures to insure their security. Finally, the TASS announcement left open the possibility of further countermeasures, while reassuring all interested observers that current and future measures were to be kept "strictly within the limits necessary for maintaining the balance of forces and neutralizing" the threat caused by NATO's INF deployment.

A number of observations could be made about the TASS statement. First, the "additional" deployment was reported to be taking place only in the GDR and apparently did not affect Czechoslovakia, as had been the case in the past. Details of this move had presumably been worked out during the visit of a high-ranking East German military delegation to the Soviet Union in late February. Second, it was unclear what significance should have been attached to the reference to "additional" deployment, since the Soviet Union had never disclosed any figures on its deployment plans. Whether the new missiles were part of the planned but undisclosed number the Soviet Union had threatened to deploy in the past or whether this was a separate move was left to speculation. The third key issue was the political motivation behind this move. The announcement was a not-so-subtle reminder from Moscow to both Western governments and the West European public of the seriousness with which it viewed the INF issue, the consequences for Western Europe, and the fact that the Soviet Union did not intend to allow that issue to drop out of public view.

Moscow's claim that its decision was in response to the "continuing" NATO buildup was disingenuous since it was common knowledge that NATO's deployment plans would take five years to implement and that there had been no new developments in the West to which the Soviet move could be directly connected. It appeared more likely that the move represented a general hardening in the preceding months of Soviet policy toward the West, as symbolized by the Soviet decision to boycott the Los Angeles Olympics. A similar interpretation was offered by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt, who, speaking at a press conference on May 16 in Brussels after a meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG), stated that the fact that the Soviets were continuing to modernize their theater nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe did not come as a surprise and that

the timing of the recent announcement was clearly designed to "intimidate" the Western public in the hope that public pressure would force NATO to make additional concessions.

Political Implications in Eastern Europe The Soviet public announcement in October 1983 that the USSR would deploy nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe had the strongest political repercussions in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The East German Evangelical Church called upon the party leadership to reconsider the deployment decision and *Neues Deutschland* took the unprecedented step of printing the dissenting views of several Church communities "shocked" by the prospect of additional nuclear weapons on East German soil.⁷ There even were several reports of East German party officials indicating that they had reservations about such a deployment. The reasons for such discontent in the past had not been simply political but also economic, since any such new deployment would have clearly constituted a heavy financial burden at a time of economic austerity. One West German source suggested that the GDR would have to bear up to 70 percent of the costs of this program.

Among Czechs and Slovaks concern over the siting of Soviet missiles in their country reached such a level that the authorities were compelled to respond publicly. The first hint of a crack in the armor of supposedly solid public support for the announcement, on October 24, 1983, of "preparations for the development of missile complexes intended for operational-tactical use" in Czechoslovakia came in the admission during a radio broadcast that it had provoked "lively discussion" among citizens.⁸ Two weeks later, *Rudé právo* revealed that it had received "stacks of letters" from concerned citizens. Although the paper gave only meager quotations from the critical comments, concentrating on a lengthy and cliché-ridden rebuttal, it was apparent that a fairly substantial body of opinion diverged from the official line.

In Bulgaria, the Soviet deployments raised the specter that the government of that country might also be pressured into acquiescence in the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, thereby undermining its professed interest in a Balkan zone free of nuclear weapons.

More generally, the deployments created a climate of East-West hostility which complicated the access of East European states to the Western capital and credits that they needed to maintain the material standards of living necessary for domestic political harmony. But Soviet deployment of the new nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe also undermined the main propaganda argument behind the anti-INF campaign directed toward Western Europe.

The centerpiece of the Soviet anti-INF campaign was the charge that

the U.S. decision to "foist" intermediate-range missiles on its West European allies was the first step in the Pentagon's strategy of "decoupling" the defense of Europe from that of the continental United States and thereby limiting any potential East-West nuclear shoot-out exclusively to the Old World. East Europeans were thus left to wonder whether the limited nuclear war strategy ascribed by the Soviet government to the United States might not have been a mirror reflection of Moscow's own military intentions. The variety and numbers of battlefield, tactical, and medium-range nuclear weapons which Moscow deployed in the forward area was suggestive of a strategy geared toward acquisition of the wherewithal to fight a nuclear war in the non-Soviet European theater at any conceivable level of intensity. If this was an option under consideration, Moscow could have been planning to hold its formidable USSR-based SS-20 force in reserve, at least initially, to see if it would deter U.S. and NATO commanders from launching Pershing II and cruise missile attacks on the territory of the USSR.

East European leaders were likely to be made nervous by the thought that Moscow was preparing to sacrifice their homelands in order to maximize the possibility that the territory of the USSR would be spared nuclear devastation as a privileged "sanctuary." The stakes were such that in the future they could be emboldened to act in private Warsaw Pact councils as a restraining influence on the Soviet nuclear buildup in the area.

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The Stockholm Conference

Roland Eggleston, Ronald D. Asmus, Bill Murphy,
and George Cioranescu

Winter Session On January 17, 1984, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe opened in Stockholm amidst considerable fanfare and attention in the press. This conference was the result of some three years of intense and at times bitter negotiation conducted shortly before and during the Madrid Conference on

Roland Eggleston was responsible for reports from the conference, Ronald D. Asmus for the introduction and conclusion, Bill Murphy for material about Gromyko's speech, and George Cioranescu for the Romanian material.

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was an integral part of the process started at the 1975 Helsinki conference whose Final Act, however, had contained only a few major mandatory confidence-building measures, such as a commitment to provide advance notification of troop maneuvers involving 25,000 troops or more.

Official interest of Warsaw Pact countries in a conference on security and disarmament in Europe was already evident during the 1977 Belgrade follow-up meeting. The Soviets and their allies initially wanted the entire Madrid review session to be devoted to "military détente" as a necessary complement to "political détente," claiming that the creation of confidence and trust between East and West, rather than issues such as human rights violations, was the primary task of the Helsinki process. In February 1980, Polish party leader Edward Gierek announced that Warsaw would be willing to act as host to a "Conference on Military Détente and Disarmament in Europe."

Gierek's proposal, subsequently endorsed by the Warsaw Pact as a whole, gave rise to Western doubts. First, it was evident that the Warsaw Pact envisioned a disarmament conference with an independent existence, not necessarily imbedded in the Helsinki process. Second, it was unclear whether Europe was to be defined as stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals," or only as far as a 250-km-wide strip of the European part of the USSR. Third, the initiative did not specify an agenda, thus raising the prospect of endless discussions.

However, even before the Warsaw Pact proposal, the French developed one of their own, dating back to a speech by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing at the special disarmament session of the United Nations in May 1978.¹ With the support of other West European countries, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, the North Atlantic Council in December 1979 cautiously endorsed the notion that Madrid should issue a mandate for a special conference under the aegis of the CSCE process.

At variance with the Warsaw Pact proposal, the French and NATO proposals defined Europe à la de Gaulle as a geostrategic entity stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Second, the French proposal limited the initial mandate of the conference to the negotiation of confidence-building measures significant in military terms and politically binding. Third, the proposal specified that the conference should remain an integral part of the Helsinki process and planned to submit its results to a follow-up meeting for examination. Finally, the French initiative emphasized the vital importance of adequate verification measures.

The period between the initial agreement on the framework of the Stockholm conference and its actual opening in mid-January 1984 wit-

nessed a further deterioration in East-West relations as a result of the dispute over the Euromissiles. This led to a growing interest in Western Europe in the conference. West Germany especially came to view it as an opportunity to insure that East-West relations would not deteriorate further and to lend new impetus to the stalled dialogue between the two superpowers.² Any such expectations were tempered, however, by the opening round of speeches, which merely served as a sober reminder of just how deep the differences between East and West really were.

The stridently anti-American speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was not of the stuff that had on past occasions set Western journalists humming with admiration about his long years on the diplomatic scene. He spoke of "a drastic turn for the worse" in international affairs and of "an increasing danger of war," which he sought to blame exclusively on the United States. At the same time, Gromyko exhorted the Soviet Union's "fellow" Europeans to show that "détente" still had "a considerable reserve of vitality."

The speech by Gromyko was a disappointment to almost everyone in the hall, but many of the Western participants expected something positive to emerge from the private bilateral exchanges on the margins of the conference. However, the private U.S.-Soviet meeting on January 25 produced no movement on the stalemated Geneva nuclear arms talks. With cautious optimism, the United States characterized the talks for the press as substantive and wide-ranging and as having contributed to a better understanding of the two parties' respective positions. In contrast, the Soviet news agency TASS reported even before the talks ended that the Soviet Union had presented a list of complaints about U.S. policies.³

The predominant feeling among Western participants at the Stockholm conference appeared to be that the Soviet Union had painted itself into a corner and that this was therefore no time for the West to press its case. Western press reports portrayed the USSR as having been forced into a blind alley by U.S. deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs, at a time when the Soviet leadership was deeply aware of economic weakness at home and political difficulties abroad. Anonymous Soviet officials in Stockholm apparently sought to fuel these impressions by asserting that the content and strongly anti-American tone of Gromyko's speech reflected accurately the frustration, anger, and fears of the Soviet leadership.

West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher reportedly attributed the USSR's behavior to its alleged failure to recover fully from "the psychological defeat" resulting from its miscalculation that the Western peace movement would cause deep divisions in NATO and thus prohibit INF deployment. He advised that it was imperative for the West to pre-

vent Moscow from underestimating the seriousness of NATO's willingness to carry on a dialogue.⁴

Gromyko was probably not cornered, but rather, had carefully chosen his tactics to drive wedges between the United States and its NATO allies. By focusing attention on nuclear weapons—not the subject of the conference—he was furthering the sense of crisis in some parts of the Western camp. He promoted the view—congenial to many of his Western audiences—that the nuclear arms race was the cause, rather than the reflection, of East-West political tension. He played to the longing of some of the Western leaders to preserve Europe as an island of détente insulated from the superpowers' global competition. He dispensed favors to those of the NATO leaders most apparently unnerved by the stalemate in disarmament talks, thereby encouraging them to act as mediators between East and West. Gromyko's real accomplishment at Stockholm, however, may have been that he aroused sympathy for his "plight," strengthening the peculiar belief of some circles in the West that the Soviet Union had to be helped out of its self-created nuclear-missile impasse. The old master was perhaps never more surefooted than when he appeared to stumble.

On the eve of the conference, on January 20 in a surprise move, Romania, separately from the Warsaw Pact group, offered a detailed plan on confidence-building measures, security, and disarmament in Europe.⁵ The Romanian plan, presented in the form of a working document on January 25, included standard Warsaw Pact proposals, Western and neutral countries' suggestions, and ideas of Ceaușescu's own conception. This was all the more curious since East European diplomats had told Western officials that they had been instructed to do no more than stress Gromyko's themes.⁶

The Romanian suggestions supported by the Warsaw Pact included the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, an appeal for nuclear-free zones, and a freeze on military budgets. In the prevailing Western view, such a pact would have been acceptable only after the adoption of other substantial confidence-building measures and only after those had proved their usefulness.⁷ However, in 1983 Genscher had suggested that mutual renunciation of force be included within the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, thus implicitly rejecting the Brezhnev Doctrine.⁸ It was believed that he had discussed these ideas with his Romanian hosts while he was visiting Bucharest on August 9, 1983.

Romania's proposals for nuclear-free zones in Europe, particularly in the Balkans, had already been opposed by a conference of Balkan experts in Athens on January 16. Turkey and Yugoslavia rejected the idea as one-

sided. Another Warsaw Pact proposal for a freeze of military budgets, to be followed by their reduction, was mentioned in the Romanian proposals.

The Soviet proposal to renounce a nuclear first strike was missing from the Romanian package. But the package called for the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor on both sides of the East-West border along the lines of an earlier suggestion by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. In Romania's view, the Palme corridor could be extended northward and southward, running across all of Europe and uniting denuclearized zones in northern European countries with those in the Balkans.⁹ Some neutral and nonaligned countries could have been interested in Romania's proposal for a ban on multinational maneuvers close to the borders of other states. Romania's proposal that the size of armed forces participating in military maneuvers be limited to 40,000–50,000 men merely repeated a Soviet suggestion.

The Romanian proposal most similar to Western notions concerned the compulsory notification of all substantial land, sea, and air maneuvers or military movements. The Romanian paper also mentioned the establishment of a system of information, communication, and consultation among states on problems relating to the management of crises. Among the suggested practical measures were consultations between governmental representatives on a regular basis or whenever necessary; the establishment of a standing consultative body that would meet periodically and in emergencies; and the installation of a telephone system for consultations among heads of state.

At first sight Western diplomats in Stockholm did not consider most of the Romanian proposals to be of any real military significance, since some of them were too general for actual implementation. However, the NATO countries did hold a long session in Stockholm to discuss the Romanian paper and the areas in which it could have been possible to reach a consensus.

Besides Romania, the sixteen NATO countries were the only ones to present a set of detailed proposals at the beginning of the conference:

1. Each participating state was to provide information on the structure of both its ground and land-based air forces to create an initial framework for confidence-building measures.
2. Participating states were to exchange annual forecasts of planned military activities, thus helping to clarify whether military activities during times of tension had been previously planned or designed to exert pressure on or intimidate other states.
3. Participating states were to provide 45 days' advance notice of all important military activity.

4. Observers were to be present during all important military activities to confirm their routine nature.

5. Compliance and verification measures were to be improved through participants' commitment not to interfere in another country's means of national verification and through agreements on monitoring compliance through inspection.

6. The means of communication between participating states were to be improved.

The head of the Soviet delegation, Oleg Grinevskii, dismissed the NATO proposals as likely to lead "into a boggy quagmire of endless discussion of technical measures." At a press conference, he answered almost every question about Warsaw Pact plans with a sharp attack on the deployment of the NATO missiles which, he claimed, had brought the threat of war closer to Europe. He criticized the West's proposals for reducing the risk of surprise attack by giving forty-five days' notice as its attempt to spy on Warsaw Pact defenses. When asked about Romania's separate set of proposals, Grinevskii again supported those dealing with nuclear weapons. He just brushed aside a question dealing with the part of the Romanian plan calling for an exchange of military information.

The West was not particularly concerned about the propaganda effect of the Warsaw Pact's persistent beating of the missile drum. There was a fairly confident belief on its part that the public in general realized that its proposals were realistic and potentially achievable. But growing irritation in the Western camp, and also among neutral countries such as Switzerland and Austria, was caused by the Soviet failure to do anything else but beat the propaganda drum. Not even on the side—in the private conversations in the corridors or in the unofficial bilateral talks—did the Soviets show any interest in getting down to serious negotiations.

The Warsaw Pact did not take the minimal step of formally tabling its proposals on nuclear issues as a conference document, airily proclaiming that it was not necessary. In fact, as the Maltese delegate Evarist Saliba told Grinevskii at a private lunch, there was an explicit rule requiring this if the proposals were to be the subject of negotiations.

The Warsaw Pact gave priority to two proposals. One called on all the thirty-five states taking part in the conference to renounce the use of force. The other was to oblige states in possession of nuclear weapons that participated in the conference not to be the first to use them. As far as most other countries were concerned, the renunciation of force would only have been a repetition of statements already contained in the United Nations charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The NATO countries saw the proposal on non-first-use of nuclear weapons as a blatant piece of propaganda

designed to deceive the more innocent members of the public while giving the Soviet Union a one-sided military advantage. Western diplomats had said that any discussion of non-first-use of nuclear weapons would have had to be preceded by an East-West agreement reducing conventional forces to a balanced level.

The third Warsaw Pact proposal called for a freeze on military expenditures, including those on nuclear weapons. It put extra gloss on the idea by stating that the money thus saved could be used for economic and social development and help to Third World countries. Unlike NATO, the Soviet Union and most of its Warsaw Pact allies had for years refused to participate in the most important preliminary step for a freeze: standardized reporting of military expenditures through the system developed at the United Nations. By refusing to participate in the scheme, the Soviet Union and its allies could continue to claim year after year that the level of their military expenditures had barely changed, although a simple survey of new missile deployments and the appearance of new ships and aircraft would have invalidated this claim. According to NATO diplomats in Stockholm, Moscow's proposal was a model example of Soviet duplicity.

The fourth Warsaw Pact idea consisted of a proposed ban on chemical weapons in Europe. The Western response to this was that a ban on such weapons had been discussed for years at the Geneva disarmament conference and that the only barrier to agreement was Moscow's refusal to allow verification of its adherence to the accord. The West believed that a ban limited to Europe would have been an insufficient safeguard because the weapons could be stockpiled elsewhere. The Soviet Union at the time had the world's biggest stockpile of chemical weapons which, according to American intelligence estimates, amounted to 350,000 tons built up over the previous fourteen years.

The fifth of the main Warsaw Pact proposals took up the idea of nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe, an idea strongly supported by Sweden and some Balkan countries. (Finland had first developed the concept of a zone free of nuclear weapons in Northern Europe in 1957.) Western military experts, however, said that the zones would not have offered any real advantages for defense in a modern war and in practice would have benefited only the Soviet Union.

In Northern Europe, so as far as the noncommunist countries were concerned, there was already a *de facto* nuclear-free zone. There were no U.S. nuclear weapons in neutral Sweden and Finland, and Norway and Denmark would not allow them on their soil in peacetime. However, the latter two countries were wary of formalizing this situation in a treaty because it would have left them at a disadvantage in the event of a Soviet at-

tack. A senior Norwegian diplomat explained to reporters that neither country could resist the strong conventional forces in the north of the Soviet Union. If attacked, they would call on the United States for assistance. If a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons on their soil existed, however, they would have to say in effect: "We are in desperate need, please help—but leave your nuclear weapons at home."

The Soviet Union not only had strong conventional forces in the north but also nuclear missiles in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia and nuclear submarines in the Baltic. Assurances that Moscow would be prepared to renounce some of this capability to aid the creation of a nuclear-free zone were received skeptically. "It would be like putting your head in a wolf's mouth and expecting it not to bite when it was hungry," a Nordic diplomat told reporters. Moscow's credibility had suffered sorely in Scandinavia since the Whiskey-class submarine grounded in 1981 in Swedish waters confirmed the suspicions that the Soviet navy had been consistently violating Swedish territory. Moreover, even if the Soviet Union had removed its missiles from the Baltic states, there would still have been no nuclear-free zone in the north. It was known that the Soviet Union had nuclear missiles in the Kola Peninsula, and there was no credible suggestion that they were about to be removed.

Another argument applying equally to both parts of Europe was that with modern transport and the sophisticated nuclear weapons in use, a nuclear-free zone would have meant nothing. Weapons taken out of a zone could have been returned extremely quickly. This concerned also the suggestion by Swedish Premier Olof Palme that a corridor free of nuclear artillery, short-range missiles, and atomic mines should be formed along the East-West border. Moreover, NATO had little enough space in which to operate in West Germany, and would have lost even more if a corridor were to be established along the East-West border. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, had thousands of kilometers of territory extending to the Soviet Urals.

Finally, the West had to take into account the political factor. The creation of a nuclear-free zone in either Scandinavia or the Balkans would have prompted a Soviet-inspired public campaign for the creation of others—particularly in West Germany, the key to NATO's defense strategy in Western Europe.

A sixth Warsaw Pact proposal called for an exchange of advance information about military movements.

Summer Session On the first day of its summer session on May 8, the conference was formally presented with a package of Soviet proposals.

It contained all the ideas that Grinevskii, and other members of the Warsaw Pact delegations had discussed in speeches during the conference's first nine-week session, which had ended in March.

Most of these ideas remained as unacceptable to the Western, neutral, and nonaligned nations as they had been before. By compiling them into a formal proposal and from the Western perspective slightly improving on its previous position, the Soviet Union opened up the possibility for some real negotiations.

For the West, the main interest in the Soviet paper lay in its sixth point, dealing with the Western demand that the rules on prior notification of major military maneuvers and troop movements be toughened. Unlike the Western paper tabled in January, it did not give any suggestions as to the number of troops whose activities were to be reported. However, the absence of figures was not as important to the West as was the very fact that the Soviet Union now set out some of its ideas. Equally important was the last paragraph of the Soviet paper which acknowledged the necessity of procedures for verifying that agreements were being honored.

However, Western diplomats were taken aback by the unusual political tone of this package. In its final form the package began with a preamble criticizing the deployment of NATO's new medium-range missiles in Western Europe. The presentation of the Soviet proposals was also accompanied by political arguments about their value.

Another question arising from the proposal concerned the absence of any cosponsors from among the other states of the Warsaw Pact. Western diplomats reported that they had been told unofficially that the document had been intended to be issued in the name of the Warsaw Pact. They also said that they had no information as to why this had not been done.

The conference ended its first week of the summer session with a hint that real negotiations might be forthcoming. It agreed to create a system of working groups satisfactory to both the East and West. This might have seemed like a relatively unimportant task, but as the chief Polish negotiator, Włodzimierz Konarski, pointed out to the press later, it was highly political. Konarski said that the Warsaw Pact would insist that the working groups be devised in such a way as to give equal weight to both the concrete measures sought by the West and to the political ideas expressed in the Soviet package. The Soviet Union and its allies argued that the conference should take up the nuclear issue, which, according to them, posed the greatest threat to peace in Europe. They thus demanded an agreement calling for non-first-use of nuclear weapons. The other main Soviet goal was the proposed treaty on the non-use of force in mutual re-

lations. The West would not agree to a treaty, but it was willing to discuss the Soviet demand. In its view the real goal of the negotiations was to reach agreements that went beyond mere words.

However, Western review of the Soviet package of proposals showed that five of its six points were either empty of real meaning or were already being negotiated in other forums. Its curiosities began with the preamble, which stated that the document contained not only formal proposals for confidence-building in Europe but also "suggestions," thus leaving the impression that much of the document was not intended for serious negotiations.

The first point in the Soviet package was an appeal to countries possessing nuclear weapons not to be the first to use them—but this obligation could be assumed unilaterally by nuclear states or, in the words of the document, "could become the subject of an internationally drafted international agreement." There was no specific statement that this agreement was to be reached at Stockholm.

The second point was a call for a treaty on the non-use of force in mutual relations, specifically suggesting that the thirty-five states participating in the Stockholm conference could assume such an obligation. The West believed this was a serious proposal, and NATO countries were prepared to discuss it. However, the fundamental Western view held that a statement on the non-use of force could not in itself be a confidence-building measure and that confidence had to be built first.

Three ideas in the category of "suggestions" included a call for a freeze on military budgets, a ban on chemical weapons in Europe, and the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons in the Balkans and Scandinavia. But in practice, the Soviet Union and its allies boycotted efforts at the United Nations to create the conditions for a freeze on military budgets. The Soviet Union was also responsible for obstructing the negotiations in Geneva for a ban on chemical weapons throughout the world—not just in Europe. And its policy on nuclear-free zones had always been based on the principle of do as we suggest and don't look at what we do ourselves. Moscow made it clear that it would not accept a ban on Soviet nuclear forces in the zones.

The only point in the Soviet program that offered room for real negotiations was the last. Beset with traps designed to give the Warsaw Pact an advantage, the four subdivisions of this point were:

1. Limitation on the number of troops permitted to take part in maneuvers in Europe and the adjoining sea area and air space. NATO experts said that the key was the Soviet Union's stress on the number of troops.

Although this proposal did not suggest what the limits should be, previous Warsaw Pact proposals in other forums had suggested a limit of 40,000 to 50,000 men. This limit would not have affected the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners, because they rarely engaged more than 12,000 to 15,000 troops in any one maneuver; the West, however, would have been severely affected. NATO exercises usually involved between 60,000 to 70,000 men and sometimes even more.

For the West another reason for the unworkability of this Soviet proposal was the impossibility of counting numbers of troops. NATO experts argued that observers sent to check whether the limits were being honored would be unable to tell whether 25,000 men or 50,000 were involved in maneuvers. Many believed that the Soviet Union preferred to stress the limit on numbers because it widened the possibilities for cheating.

2. Prior notification of maneuvers involving ground troops and air and naval forces, whether conducted independently or jointly. NATO experts said that at first sight this appeared to be a primitive version of NATO's own proposal, which called for forty-five days' notice of a wide range of maneuvers and troop movements. But NATO's real objection was to the suggestion that there should be prior notification of independent naval and air maneuvers. This would have been a direct contradiction of the mandate for the Stockholm conference, which stated that notification of naval and air activities needed to be given only when they were part of maneuvers taking place inside Europe. NATO saw the Soviet proposal as a new effort by the USSR to obtain information about U.S. naval and air activity, particularly in the Atlantic, but also in other seas close to Europe.

3. Prior notification of major troop movements and transfers, not only within Europe but also into and out of Europe. NATO also wanted an agreement requiring prior notification of the transfer of large bodies of troops or weapons from one part of Europe to another. But the USSR made this proposal in order to gain prior notification of the activities of the United States' rapid deployment force. The key was the reference to movements into and out of Europe. If this proposition were to be accepted, the United States would have to give prior notification of its intention to land a force anywhere in Western Europe—for refueling while it was on its way to the Middle East, for instance.

4. Development of the existing practice of inviting observers from other countries to attend major military maneuvers. This would have been genuinely welcomed by the West; but in the past the Soviet Union and its allies had developed a practice of keeping the observers well away from real-activity maneuvers, having them watch a stage-managed showpiece

instead. In many cases the observers had been allowed to watch even this only from a distance. In at least one case the observers had been provided with binoculars that could not be focused.

Three weeks after the start of the summer session the West was still waiting for the USSR to show an interest in the real work of negotiations. Although Grinevskii and other Warsaw Pact spokesmen repeatedly declared their interest in beginning negotiations, whenever representatives of the West or the neutral and nonaligned group offered concrete suggestions for beginning them, the USSR always found an excuse for not doing so. Apparently, all the appeals from Western and neutral states to begin real negotiations were met by the USSR demanding first an agreement that would stress the danger posed by nuclear missiles and the need to eliminate it.

Western diplomats were astonished by the USSR's unexpected reversion to its old demand that NATO not only had to halt the deployment of its cruise and Pershing missiles, but also to withdraw those already deployed as a condition for the return of Soviet negotiators to the missile talks in Geneva. The West found it inconceivable that the Soviet leadership could really have believed that NATO was going to pull out its missiles and leave itself at the mercy of the SS-20 missiles targeted by the USSR on Western Europe since the late 1970s. It seemed as if the USSR still had not realized the failure of its enormous propaganda campaign in 1983 that attempted to cover up its own threat to peace and put the West in the dock instead.

The speeches of Soviet representatives in Stockholm obviously had been born in Moscow. In Moscow, for example, Gromyko spoke out against NATO's new medium-range missiles at a luncheon for Genscher. Only hours later, Grinevskii was delivering a speech in Stockholm on the same subject containing virtually word for word several of the same sentences that Gromyko had used. The speeches by the East European delegates were also orchestrated by Grinevskii. He was often seen in the cafeteria with an East European delegate scheduled to speak in the next few days, reviewing and rewriting the speech. Grinevskii put on his earphones during a session of the conference addressed by an East European only if the delegate happened to be a Romanian. With the possible exception of the Romanians, he apparently knew in advance the content of the East Europeans' speeches.

In the meantime, the USSR obstructed by endless debate about procedural matters discussion of the concrete military measures for reducing the risk of surprise military attack sought by the West, the neutral and nonaligned states, and Romania. In long, wearying speeches the Soviet

delegates discoursed on the arrangement of the working groups and the order in which they should discuss the topics assigned to them. Consequently, the real work at the session could not begin, and the suspicion was growing among observers that the USSR did not want it to begin.

What could have been expected from the conference? First, the experience of the entire CSCE process repeatedly demonstrated that such a forum was not able to resolve any of the basic antagonisms between the East and West. Soviet participation at Helsinki, Belgrade, Madrid, and then Stockholm never meant that Moscow had renounced its broader ideological struggle or that it had declared a political armistice with the West: these forums functioned as a focal point of competition termed "ideological-political warfare" by U.S. ambassador to the Madrid conference Max Kampelman. Soviet tactics at Stockholm and throughout the CSCE process remained remarkably constant. Despite the fact that Moscow had lent its signature to agreements and documents entailing specific responsibilities and limitations—both in terms of its domestic and international behavior and its conduct in the CSCE process—the Soviets repeatedly attempted to interpret passages undesirable for them in a one-sided fashion serving their own objectives.

These qualifications, however, did not mean that either the Stockholm conference or the broader CSCE process should be considered useless; the goals set for them were limited and were to be kept in perspective. The fact that the CSCE process was based on consensus meant that its achievements had to be the result of compromise likely to involve long and intense bargaining. In the case of Stockholm, this meant step-by-step attempts to achieve consensus-based agreements on the exchange of practical military information in order to limit miscalculation and misunderstanding, and reduce the chances of a military confrontation in Europe. This objective corresponded to Stockholm's mandate as set down in the Madrid Final Document. Finally, the Stockholm conference met a growing West European demand for the creation of a disarmament forum in which all European countries would be present, rather than just the superpowers.

VI The Chernenko Succession

20

A New Man in Power

Alexander Rahr

On February 13, 1984, four days after the official announcement of Iurii Andropov's death, seventy-two-year-old Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko became the new general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.¹

The appointment of Brezhnev's long-time party *apparatchik* to the post of party chief foiled predictions by Western sovietologists and journalists, many of whom had grown accustomed to analyzing Kremlin politics in the narrow terms of a bitter power struggle among members of the Politburo. From the time of Andropov's appointment on, they began to predict Chernenko's inevitable downfall. Three arguments had been advanced against Chernenko's candidacy for the leadership: first, his advanced age;² second, his opposition to Andropov's supposedly reformist faction;³ and, third, his "dullness" and lack of "personality." Malcolm Toon, former American ambassador to Moscow who took part in a meeting between Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in 1979, commented on the choice of Chernenko as general secretary thus: "The only impression I formed of him is that he was a dullard."⁴

The problem of succession of a new generation in the top party leadership that had been made more acute by a "policy of trust" toward Brezhnev's cadres, was not resolved by Chernenko's appointment. The septuagenarians in the ruling Politburo hesitated to adopt the style of government of the Western democratic parties favoring the appointment of more energetic and "fresher" politicians. Indeed, Chernenko's advanced age probably aided his appointment.

Major changes in the central and peripheral party apparatus and in the government apparatus which the Andropov administration had managed to carry out during its fifteen months in power⁵ tended to undermine the trust of some Central Committee members in the Politburo. The ap-

pointment of Chernenko as Andropov's successor represented a step toward restoring stability within the framework of "a policy of trust of cadres"—i.e., of Brezhnev's appointees. Thus, voting for or against the new general secretary at the decisive Politburo meeting may have amounted to no more than automatic promotion of the "faceless" Chernenko to the post of general secretary by the party machine, rebelling against the changes planned by Andropov. Evidently, the KGB apparatus, which had successfully pushed forward Andropov as a successor to Brezhnev, was, in the view of the prevailing weight of the Central Committee Secretariat headed by Chernenko, not in a position this time to secure power for "their" man.

The new general secretary was truly a product of the party apparatus. Like Andropov before him, he could be regarded as "the most informed man" among the Soviet leaders. For almost thirty years Chernenko had worked as an aide and adviser to Leonid Brezhnev and, moreover, headed Brezhnev's personal cabinet, in which all the general secretary's internal, foreign, and economic policies had been worked out. The directives issued from these "headquarters" served as a practical basis for planning the entire policy of the party and the Soviet government. As Brezhnev's chief of staff, Chernenko had in many ways surpassed the well-known head of Stalin's chancellery, Aleksandr Poskrebyshv.

As early as 1979 sovietologist Abdurakhman A. Avtorkhanov foresaw Chernenko's growing role in the party leadership. He wrote:

After Stalin's death the "Special Sector" was liquidated and, in all probability, the old "secret sub-department" was restored to the office of the General Department. This General Department, under Chernenko's leadership, has now become a part of Brezhnev's "inner cabinet." The degree of importance that this "cabinet" has now acquired may be judged by a comparison: whereas the head of Stalin's "cabinet," Poskrebyshv, was only a member of the Central Committee, the head of Brezhnev's "cabinet" has become both a Central Committee secretary and a member of the Politburo.⁶

Thus, an experienced organizer, manipulator, and a wielder of power came as a successor to the KGB chief Andropov. In promoting Chernenko, the party, moreover, fulfilled the wishes of Brezhnev, who had consistently promoted Chernenko among his "heirs apparent." Avtorkhanov wrote:

If it depends on Brezhnev's wishes, Chernenko, who has advanced his career at a speed unprecedented in party history, must become his heir. In under three years he proceeded from his position as Brezhnev's personal secretary to become first a Central Committee secre-

tary, then a candidate member of the Politburo, and finally a full member of the Politburo, all the while remaining Brezhnev's secretary. All this does not mean, however, that the question of Brezhnev's successor has already been totally resolved, and that one fine day, Chernenko will take the chair of general secretary. Absolutely not. The remainder of Chernenko's path to the pinnacle of power is steeper and, therefore, more dangerous. This is the fault of Brezhnev himself. By this sharp and unexpected promotion of his protégé to a number-two position behind himself, Brezhnev is provoking Chernenko's rivals—and legitimate pretenders to the Kremlin throne—into intrigue, trickery, and a continuation of the silent battle.⁷

Chernenko was born in 1911, in a suburb of Krasnoiarsk in central Russia. When he was seven years old, Krasnoiarsk fell into the hands of the "Whites." By January 1920, however, the Soviet regime had finally established itself there. In 1929, at the height of Stalinist collectivization, the eighteen-year-old Chernenko was appointed deputy head, and then head, of the Komsomol Department of Agitation and Propaganda in his native Novoselovsk Raion.⁸ A year later he was sent as a propaganda worker to the border detachment of the security forces (OGPU) on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. There, in Kazakhstan, Chernenko became a member of the Communist party.

After completing his army service, Chernenko returned to propaganda work in his native region. In 1941 he was promoted to the position of secretary of the Krasnoiarsk Kraikom for ideology. Thus, at the age of thirty-three, he came to occupy a post that, especially during the war, was under strict surveillance from Moscow. In 1943 he was sent to the Higher Party School in Moscow to further improve his ideological training and style of party work. After the war Chernenko was appointed through *nomenklatura*—a system whereby the party controls the appointments to various important posts—as secretary for ideology of the Penza Oblast Committee. There he met his future colleague in the ideological apparatus of the Central Committee, Sergei Pavlovich Trapeznikov.

In 1948 Chernenko and Trapeznikov were transferred to very important posts in the Moldavian party apparatus. Like the Baltic countries, acquired by the Soviet Union during the war, the new republic of Moldavia that included Bessarabia (taken by the Red Army) was undergoing sovietization. In 1948 the CPSU Central Committee appointed Chernenko as head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the republican Communist party Central Committee, assigning him the responsibility for ideological and thus propaganda activities.

In 1950, however, the CPSU Central Committee issued the decree "On Shortcomings in the Work of the Moldavian CP Central Committee." Nikolai G. Koval, the first secretary of the Moldavian CP Central Committee was discharged, and Brezhnev took his place to preside over the successful collectivization. In his subsequent advancement to power, Brezhnev relied heavily on the people with whom he had worked in Moldavia.⁹ However, unlike Chernenko, several members of this Moldavian Mafia subsequently ended their Moscow careers by falling from power for one reason or another.

In 1953 Chernenko, as the overseer for Moldavian ideology, received a diploma from the Kishinev Pedagogical Institute. In 1956, when Brezhnev became Communist Party Central Committee secretary for industry, Chernenko was at once transferred to the central apparatus of the party, receiving the post of head of the Sector of Mass Agitation in the Communist Party Central Committee Department of Agitation and Propaganda. In 1960 Brezhnev became the new chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Chernenko once again followed his patron, taking over the post of head of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. After the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, the new general secretary, Brezhnev, immediately installed the fifty-four-year-old Chernenko as his chief aide and appointed him head of the CPSU Central Committee General Department.

Chernenko spent a total of twelve years in this post, always under Brezhnev's control. He obediently worked as the head of Brezhnev's chancery and, until his appointment as a Central Committee secretary, was little known in the West.

By the end of the 1970s, after the removal of Podgornyi, Shelepin, Polianskii, Voronov, Mazurov, Shelest, and finally Kosygin, Brezhnev had consolidated his position. Apart from the chief ideologue Suslov, who unquestionably occupied second place in the party, Central Committee Secretary Andrei Kirilenko had also attained considerable influence. As a counterweight to Kirilenko, Brezhnev promoted his own "heir apparent," Chernenko. In 1976 Chernenko became a Central Committee secretary, in 1977 a candidate member of the Politburo, and in 1978 a full member of the Politburo—a rapid rise to prominence.

When Leonid Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982, instead of Chernenko Andropov became the new general secretary. On the instructions of the Politburo, Chernenko proposed Andropov as the new general secretary at the extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In his speech he called upon the new general secretary to continue Brezhnev's policy of "trust in cadres" and in the collective leadership. Since at the fu-

neral itself, Brezhnev's former "heir apparent" was not given the opportunity to speak, he used this last opportunity to honor the memory of his patron:

To be at the side of Leonid Ilich, to hear him, to sense for yourself the sharpness of his mind, his resourcefulness, his zest for life—this was a schooling for all of us whose good fortune it was to work hand in hand with him.

Leonid Ilich leaves us a valuable legacy. Our eighteen-million-strong party is united and firm in resolve. The Soviet people believes utterly in the wisdom of the party. The norms of our life have become high standards and *respect for cadres*. . . . Now it is doubly, triply important to manage party affairs collectively . . . all the members of the Politburo consider that Iurii Vladimirovich understands well the Brezhnev style of leadership . . . *Brezhnev's attitude to cadres*.¹⁰

But Chernenko remained number two in the party apparatus, in effect an unofficial second secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief ideologist. He was also elected to replace Suslov as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. Significantly, at the first meeting of the Council of the Union, at which Chernenko's name was put forward, all the members of the Politburo were present except for Andropov.¹¹

Having buried Brezhnev, Andropov promptly developed his own personal "attitude to cadres." Aging Brezhnevites who had dug themselves into leading positions in the party apparatus were gradually given honorable retirement. Chernenko, who by this time had obviously lost much of his former power, was unable to hinder the undermining of Brezhnev's staff by the new general secretary. After March 1983 he even disappeared from view for a time. Western journalists were told that he "had a cold."¹² Other sources reported that he had pneumonia—the apparent reason why Andropov's man, Grigorii Romanov, was sent in place of Chernenko to the international conference "Karl Marx and the Present Day" held in East Berlin.¹³ He was also absent from the Kremlin Palace gathering held to mark the 113th anniversary of Lenin's birth and from the May 1 celebrations of the same year.¹⁴

But the failing health of the general secretary again gave Chernenko the opportunity to gather strength. At the June plenum of the Central Committee he gave the main speech in his capacity as "chief ideologist."¹⁵ Since September 1983, when Andropov was no longer taking part in meetings of the Politburo or of the Central Committee Secretariat, the working

meetings were reportedly chaired in turn by Chernenko (who also received delegations from the socialist countries in the general secretary's absence), Romanov, and Gorbachev. The gravely ill Andropov probably from time to time received certain members of the Politburo in a sanatorium. He was known to have spoken with Grishin,¹⁶ Gorbachev,¹⁷ Romanov,¹⁸ and Gromyko. The Soviet press did not contain, however, even an indirect indication that Andropov received or spoke to Chernenko during this time.

In mid-December 1983 the CPSU Central Committee sharply criticized the work of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist party¹⁹—possibly an attempt to discredit Chernenko, who had previously worked in Moldavia and who also was a deputy to the Supreme Soviet from Kishinev.²⁰ Yet despite the continuing criticism on the pages of the central Soviet press until the last days of Andropov's life, neither Chernenko nor the Moldavian party leaders were subject to any attacks from the Kremlin.

By the beginning of 1983 Chernenko's position may have become so strong that he was able to protect his Moldavian power base from Andropov's purge. The Moldavian leaders showed their appreciation in their own way. Two days before Andropov's death *Pravda* published a long review of the second edition of a collection of "Selected Speeches and Articles" by Chernenko. On the following day *Sovetskaia Moldaviia* reprinted the *Pravda* article, which did not appear in any other provincial newspaper.

Chernenko's ascendancy also became obvious during the campaign for elections to the Supreme Soviet at the beginning of January. On the list of official candidates Chernenko was placed second after Andropov.

On February 13, 1984, Tikhonov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, was appointed by the Politburo to propose Chernenko's election as new party secretary. In his speech he mentioned the man responsible for both his and Chernenko's advent to power: "Konstantin Ustinovich is well known as an outstanding figure of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, as the loyal adviser of such Leninist leaders as L. I. Brezhnev and Iu. V. Andropov."²¹

Tikhonov's speech contained another unusual note that seemed to testify to the support given Chernenko by the military: "Our military personnel know how concerned Konstantin Ustinovich is with the question of strengthening the defense capacity of the country."²² Thus it could be inferred that the Soviet marshals who had previously supported Andropov then put their trust in Chernenko.

The Nature of the Chernenko Leadership

Elizabeth Teague

Leonid Brezhnev was incapacitated by sickness during the last years of his life, and, after only a few months in power, his successor Iurii Andropov was also struck by crippling illness. It seems likely, therefore, that for some four or five years the USSR had been governed by some form of collective leadership, and that this style of government operated, too, after Andropov's death.¹

Collective leadership by no means implies unanimity; in fact, periods of such leadership following the deaths of Lenin and Stalin and the ouster of Khrushchev were characterized by high levels of political disagreement.

Konstantin Chernenko, elected CPSU general secretary in February 1984, appears to have been a compromise candidate who won the post by default because none of the younger contenders was sufficiently established or considered experienced enough to take over the leadership. It seems likely that Chernenko gained the support of power brokers Andrei Gromyko and Dmitrii Ustinov—who had rejected him in November 1982 for the same post—at least partly because they thought they could control him. He was not expected to be a strong leader.

Unable to consolidate his position quickly, Chernenko could not impose a firm and coherent policy. Negative decisions being the easiest to reach in times of uncertainty and instability, the policies that emerged from the divided leadership tended to be hard-line, reactive, and even, in some respects, irrational.

Chernenko's style of leadership differed from that of Andropov, but, in the domestic sphere at least, a compromise appeared to be reached between older, complacent leaders opposed to change and younger members of the elite, impatient to see a decisive break with the inefficiency and corruption of Brezhnev's last years. Thus, the new leadership seemed to be continuing the policies instituted under Andropov. These included a legal and administrative crackdown, not only on dissent but also in the cultural sphere, evidently aimed at restricting as far as possible the impact of foreign ideas and influences on the Soviet population.

Nor was there any sign of weakening of the campaign against corruption launched under Andropov's leadership. A wide-ranging purge of leading officials was announced in Uzbekistan in June 1984, accompanied by similar, though smaller, cleanup campaigns in other republics.

Andropov's younger disciples in the Politburo seemed to succeed in keeping his economic policies more or less intact. There was no sign that the economic experiment instituted under Andropov—the introduction of limited managerial autonomy in selected sectors of the economy—was being played down.

On the contrary, it was revealed that a Politburo commission had been charged with working out proposals for a restructuring of the economic mechanism, for introduction in the next five-year plan period (1986–1990). The commission envisaged a degree of decentralization to enterprise level, combined with a strengthening of central planning by means of rationalization of the all-union federal administration.²

Debate over alternative economic priorities continued unabated in the pages of the Soviet press. The problems of the economy being chronic, debate over what to do about them was also a permanent feature, regardless of which leader happened to be in power.

In foreign policy, however, the months that followed Chernenko's election as party leader saw the USSR embarking on a new and defiant policy of self-imposed isolation from what it appeared to see as an increasingly threatening and hostile outside world.

Soviet antagonism was directed not only against the USSR's major rival, the United States—led since 1981 by a president who made no secret of his disdain for communism—but to other countries as well, socialist as well as capitalist. The Soviet mood amounted to what was dubbed “an omnidirectional grump.”³

Evidence suggested that the new leadership had undertaken a fundamental reassessment of foreign policy priorities, based on the assumption that détente was dead and that there was little to be gained from trying to revive it. Improving relations with the outside world led, the Soviet leaders seemed to feel, to more problems than advantages. Their retreat into a “Fortress Russia” mentality promised no amelioration in East-West tensions in the foreseeable future, regardless of which candidate won the U.S. presidential elections in November of 1984.

Here a fair degree of continuity might be discerned. As early as the spring of 1983, Andropov was charging that it would be impossible for the USSR to do business with the West as long as the Reagan administration remained in office, and his statement following the Korean airline disaster in the fall of that year made it clear that the Soviet Union had abandoned all idea of reaching an accommodation with the United States.⁴

For a brief period following Andropov's death, Western observers thought they detected mixed signals from the Kremlin with regard to the

vexing question of a resumption of U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations. But any hopes that the USSR would abandon its intransigent line were dashed when Chernenko's toughly worded interview was published in *Pravda* on April 9.

Within the space of a few weeks, a series of harsh measures suggested that a sharp turn had been made in Soviet policy. These were the key events:

—On April 21 the Soviet army began its spring offensive against Afghan resistance forces with a massive attack against insurgent positions in the Panjshir Valley. For the first time, Soviet forces made use of high-altitude saturation bombing which inevitably took a heavy toll on the civilian population. This indicated a fresh and determined effort to wipe out resistance once and for all, regardless of the revulsion the Soviet actions aroused not only in the West, but also in many neutral and nonaligned countries.

—On May 8 the USSR announced its withdrawal from the summer Olympics in Los Angeles. The decision appeared to have been made at short notice. As late as April 24 Soviet sports officials were saying that they thought Moscow's complaints about the way the Games were being organized could be amicably resolved.⁵ The president of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee stated his belief that the decision was made sometime around April 26 or 27.⁶

—On May 9 the Soviet government announced the cancellation of a planned visit to Beijing by Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov. No reason was given for the cancellation of the visit, which had been formally confirmed by the Soviet authorities as recently as April 25.⁷ Arkhipov would have been the highest-ranking Soviet official to visit China since the late 1960s. Soviet propaganda directed against China had been growing sharper for some months, but the cancellation of the visit suggested that the USSR was abandoning the attempt, initiated in all probability by Andropov, to achieve a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.⁸

—On May 2 Soviet physicist and human rights campaigner Andrei Sakharov started a hunger strike to press his demand that his wife, Elena Bonner, be allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment. The authorities reacted with ferocity. On May 4 they announced the discovery of a "plot" hatched by Sakharov and Bonner whereby she would take refuge in the U.S. embassy in Moscow to publicize his hunger strike. She was ordered by police to remain in the closed city of Gorkii while charges against her of anti-Soviet slander were prepared. Of Sakharov no more was heard, other than unconfirmed reports that he was being kept incommunicado in a

Gorkii hospital and treated with mind-altering drugs or hypnosis in an effort to break his will. The inhumanity of Sakharov's treatment aroused public outcry throughout the Western world.

—On May 5 *Pravda* published an article by the veteran propagandist, Ernst Genri, warning against what he claimed was a rebirth of "militarism and revanchism" in Japan and West Germany. A few days later, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, took up the theme in an interview to mark Victory Day. "With the obvious connivance and even direct participation of the official authorities," he charged, "revanchist and neofascist organizations" in West Germany "are again, as on the eve of the Second World War . . . calling for the restoration of the German Reich within its historical frontiers."⁹

Moscow maintained throughout the summer its accusations that Bonn was aspiring toward a reunification of Germany within its prewar boundaries. But the real target was not so much West Germany as East Germany, as Moscow evidently aimed at preventing the establishment of warmer relations between the two German states. The USSR may also have been giving publicity to its squabble with East Germany as a means of warning its other Warsaw Pact allies not to pursue a rapprochement with the West at a time when Moscow's own relations with the outside world were frozen.

There had already been signs during the Andropov period that Moscow's control over its satellites was slipping, perhaps because Andropov himself was more tolerant of diversity within the socialist bloc or, more probably, because certain East European leaders took advantage of his failing health and slackening grip to assert some limited degree of autonomy. After Andropov's death the leadership attempted to reassert control, as evidenced during March and April 1984 by an outburst of polemics in the party press of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and that of Hungary and the GDR on the other. Thus the USSR's quarrel with the GDR was a manifestation of a much wider conflict.

In additional displays of Soviet truculence in the summer of 1984, American tourists in the USSR were harassed, Soviet police beat up a U.S. consulate Marine guard in Leningrad, and some fifty members of an unofficial Soviet peace group were detained in Moscow.

All these developments suggested that a decisive shift had taken place either in Soviet policy or in Soviet policy-making. Even if some decisions were logical extensions of earlier policies, the Soviet leaders appeared suddenly to have decided to pursue policies of confrontation and isolation regardless of the damage this would cause to the USSR's already tarnished image in the outside world. The reason for Moscow's "mental atrophy" was

probably to be found in the continuing disarray among the top leadership at a period of quick succession.

A newly elected general secretary is usually in a weak position because he inherits the leadership team selected by his predecessor. It takes him time to consolidate his own power base sufficiently to bring in his own supporters. At such a time, jockeying for position by ambitious younger leaders tends to result in negative, reactive decisions—not only because such decisions are easier to reach in a time of uncertainty but also because no leader wants to risk appearing weak or conciliatory. Until the power struggle is resolved, therefore, policy-making is likely to remain negative, if not altogether deadlocked or even irrational.

In the absence of strong central leadership, centrifugal forces tend to operate within the elite, leading to a fragmentation or division of power. Each interest grouping seeks to pursue its own policies within its sphere of competence with a minimum of interference from above. For example, the KGB seemed to have decided, in May 1984, to “solve” the Sakharov question once and for all, regardless of the international outcry this would provoke. By the same token, the military tried by the use of saturation bombing to “win” the Afghan war, paying no attention to international opprobrium.

The Soviet decision-making process is ill-adapted to weak leadership. Moreover, its inherent weaknesses are likely to be exacerbated during the period of leadership transition. The American analyst Ellen Jones has argued that Soviet committee-style decision-making, though designed to facilitate broad organizational participation in the formulation of policy, is time-consuming and inefficient and tends to produce compromise decisions. It may work well enough in times of economic prosperity and international stability but it is less suitable during periods of economic stringency or foreign crisis, which call for rapid and decisive action. Such moments require a strong, determined leadership prepared to force decisions through despite conflicting organizational interests.¹⁰

This is precisely the sort of leadership that the last three general secretaries have failed to provide: Brezhnev led from consensus, and neither Andropov during his brief tenure nor Chernenko in his first months of power seemed to build up the kind of power base that firm leadership requires. If the leadership is insecure, its ability to make rational decisions may be reduced.

Soviet policy-making operates within established structures and geopolitical constraints that of themselves impose a fair degree of continuity, yet history shows that the contribution of individual personalities can and does affect the outcome of the process. In this respect, many observers

pointed to the dominant role played in the Chernenko leadership by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. During most of his long years in the foreign service, Gromyko carried out orders rather than made foreign policy. Under Chernenko, he appeared to become its initiator, architect, and chief executor. Soviet foreign policy under Gromyko's guidance became unusually bellicose, prompting speculation that Gromyko was bitter and disappointed at the failure of détente in the 1970s and eager to take his revenge in the 1980s.

To these shortcomings must be added the unwillingness or inability of a self-perpetuating group of aging leaders to choose a way out of the Soviet Union's chronic economic, social, and political problems that would not threaten the political system upon which their own power and privilege depend. The Chernenko regime's policy of increased repression at home and belligerent xenophobia abroad promised, in the long run, only to exacerbate existing difficulties.

22

Gorbachev as the Heir Apparent

Alexander Rahr

While attending a conference on "Dialogues about the Prospects of Disarmament," staged by the Swedish communists in Stockholm, *Pravda* Chief Editor Viktor Afanasev answered questions by a correspondent of the newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*. Unlike the stereotyped statements customarily made in such cases by Soviet spokesmen, Afanasev replied to the question about Chernenko's possible successor by stating that Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev appeared to be the most likely candidate.

Afanasev then confirmed that Gorbachev was now holding the key position of supervising the work of the Central Committee Secretariat in the party formerly occupied by the late Mikhail Suslov. He added, however, that Gorbachev, unlike Suslov, was not the party's chief ideologist, since Chernenko himself had retained responsibility for ideological questions.¹

This was not the first time that Afanasev had shed some light on the behind-the-scenes struggle for power in the Kremlin. In a conversation with Japanese journalists at the time of Brezhnev's funeral in November

1982, he remarked in connection with Iurii Andropov's election as general secretary that "Chernenko's candidacy was discussed at the Politburo meeting, but mature and outspoken individuals within the party leadership favored Andropov."²

Within a month of Andropov's death, the new team in the Kremlin had settled down. Chernenko, who had been regarded as the number-two secretary under Andropov, became general secretary. His place was taken by Gorbachev, the next in line. Although only the first or general secretary was so designated officially, there was within the party apparatus an unspoken order of precedence, with each Central Committee secretary occupying a specific position within the party hierarchy.³ The number-two secretary's duties, for example, included supervising the day-to-day work of the apparatus of the Secretariat and its twenty-three departments. He was also in charge of cadres policy and it was to him that the heads of the army and *КВВ* sometimes reported.⁴ The holder of this position was therefore often regarded as the general secretary's "crown prince."

During its first sixty-six years in power, the CPSU had allowed several of these "crown princes" to rise. In Lenin's time there were Trotskii and Bukharin; Georgii Malenkov was regarded as Stalin's heir; and during the latter part of Nikita Khrushchev's rule, Aleksei Kirichenko and Frol Kozlov were accorded the role at different times. One exception in this respect was the Kremlin's longtime chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov. After Khrushchev's victory over the "anti-party group," Suslov became the number-two man in the party, but it appears that he never aspired to the post of general secretary. Although later in overall charge of all ideological matters and, for practical purposes, deputy general secretary, he was never regarded as a potential successor to Brezhnev.⁵ Instead, for almost fifteen years this role was held by Andrei Kirilenko, although he, like Suslov, was older than Brezhnev. To maintain some sort of a balance within the Brezhnev leadership, the number-two position was in fact probably divided between Suslov (in charge of the party *apparatus* and ideology) and Kirilenko (in charge of the economy and personnel appointments). Toward the end of the Brezhnev era, however, Kirilenko had to relinquish his position to Brezhnev's own protégé, Konstantin Chernenko.⁶

After Suslov's death early in 1982, Chernenko apparently tried to add Suslov's responsibility for ideology to the functions that he had inherited from Kirilenko and, for a short time, he did hold the number-two position alone. When Andropov was brought in to the Secretariat at the Central Committee plenum of May 1982, he took over Suslov's place in the party leadership⁷ and subsequently outstripped Chernenko in the race to pick up the reins of power then slipping from the dying Brezhnev's hands.

Under Andropov, the functions seem to have been divided once again—between Chernenko, responsible for ideology and supervision of the Secretariat, and Gorbachev, responsible for the economy and personnel appointments, but after Andropov's death and Chernenko's election as general secretary, Gorbachev was left to take over the number-two position completely. However, if Afanasev's information was correct, Chernenko had retained responsibility for ideology.

Gorbachev's elevation to the status of "crown prince" did not mean that the question of the succession had been settled. Chernenko's initial failure to push through his claim demonstrated this fact quite clearly.

Little had been known in the West about Gorbachev. Arkadii Shevchenko, a former UN undersecretary who defected to the West a few years ago, claimed to have met him when Gorbachev was the first secretary of the Stavropol Krai Party Committee. Gorbachev impressed him as being "intelligent, well-educated, and well-mannered." In Stavropol, says Shevchenko, Gorbachev "had earned a reputation as an energetic regional party leader and manager and as a competent agricultural specialist. He was also known as a reasonable man without the usual arrogance common to professional party apparatchiks."⁸

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, a Russian, was born on March 2, 1931, in the village of Privolnoe in the Krasnogvardeiskoe Raion of Stavropol Krai. His parents were peasants.⁹ In 1946, while still at secondary school, he started work at a machine-tractor station. At the age of nineteen he entered the law faculty of the Moscow University, from which he graduated in 1955. He became a member of the party in 1952. Having proved himself a capable komsomol organizer at university, Gorbachev returned to Stavropol and instead of law devoted himself entirely to komsomol and party work. In 1956, he was appointed first secretary of the Stavropol City Komsomol Committee, and in 1958, he became deputy head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Stavropol Krai Komsomol Committee. The same year, the young komsomol ideological worker was promoted to the post of second and, soon afterward, first secretary of the Stavropol Krai Komsomol Committee.

In 1960 Fedor Kulakov, one of Khrushchev's leading agricultural specialists, was appointed first secretary of the Stavropol Krai Party Committee. Two years later, Gorbachev was made party organizer of the Stavropol Krai Kolkhoz-Sovkhoz Administration, but in December 1962, he was promoted to the responsible post of head of the department of party organs of the Stavropol Krai Party Committee. In this capacity, Gorbachev supervised party cadres in the krai until he was appointed first secretary of the Stavropol City Party Committee in September 1966. A few months later,

Gorbachev was awarded an agronomist's diploma by the Stavropol Agricultural Institute. In August 1968 he was appointed second secretary of the Stavropol Krai Party Committee. He became first secretary in April 1970. At the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev was elected to the Central Committee.

In November 1978 Gorbachev succeeded his former boss—and possibly patron—Kulakov as Central Committee secretary in charge of agriculture. At Kulakov's funeral, which for some reason was not attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, or Chernenko,¹⁰ Gorbachev spoke on Red Square as a member of the funeral commission.¹¹ His name also appeared under Kulakov's obituary, immediately following those of the heads of Central Committee departments.¹² In 1979 Gorbachev was elected a candidate member, and, in 1980, a full member of the Politburo.

Gorbachev's rapid rise to prominence was all the more remarkable because he was not yet fifty, a mere stripling compared with most of the members of the Politburo. It was suggested at the time that Gorbachev had the support of Suslov, who was said to be anxious to create some sort of "counterweight" to Brezhnev's protégés Tikhonov and Chernenko.¹³ For purposes of comparison, it may be noted that Chernenko was elected a Central Committee secretary in 1976, and a candidate and full member of the Politburo in 1977 and 1979, respectively; Tikhonov was elected a candidate member of the Politburo in 1978 and became a full member a year later.

Following the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in 1981, Gorbachev's name appeared immediately after Chernenko's in the list of Central Committee secretaries,¹⁴ but his career received its greatest boost in 1982. After the deaths of Suslov and Brezhnev, and following Kirilenko's retirement, the secretary in charge of agriculture advanced to third place in the Central Committee Secretariat, behind Andropov and Chernenko. However, his achievement of this position in the Secretariat may be attributed to the lack of competition. During the latter half of Brezhnev's rule, a number of people in Gorbachev's age group—Konstantin Katushev, Iakov Riabov, and Vladimir Dolgikh—joined the Secretariat but, for one reason or another, failed to retain their posts or did not succeed in penetrating the select circle of the Politburo.

Gorbachev's role became even more important under Andropov. Some observers believed that Gorbachev had been one of the initiators of Andropov's economic policy.¹⁵ After Brezhnev's death, the new administration brought a number of members of Gorbachev's generation into the Politburo and the Secretariat: Geidar Aliev (1923), Vitalii Vorotnikov (1926), Egor Ligachev (1920), and Nikolai Ryzhkov (1929). Last year Gorbachev

was placed in overall charge of the party election campaign, in the course of which 20 percent of the oblast and krai first secretaries were replaced.

In May 1983 Gorbachev visited Canada, his first assignment abroad as a representative of the Kremlin leadership.¹⁶ In June he nominated Vitalii Vorotnikov for the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.¹⁷ He also attended the plenum of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee at which Grigorii Romanov was released from his duties as first secretary in connection with his transfer to Moscow as a Central Committee secretary.¹⁸ In carrying out these duties, Gorbachev appeared to be assuming the role of "gray eminence" so long held by Suslov. With Chernenko's assumption of the general secretaryship upon Andropov's death, Gorbachev virtually became his deputy and "crown prince." He had been nominated as a candidate for the USSR Supreme Soviet in eight electoral districts, thus becoming the fourth-ranking member of the Politburo behind Andropov, Chernenko, and Tikhonov.¹⁹ His status was confirmed on February 29, when except for Tikhonov and Chernenko, he was the last party leader to deliver a speech in his constituency.²⁰

Gorbachev occupied a prominent place among the members of the Politburo at Andropov's funeral ceremonies, although he did not make a speech. When the members of the Central Committee went to the Hall of Columns where Andropov was lying in state, Gorbachev stood at Chernenko's right,²¹ the place occupied on such occasions in Brezhnev's day by Suslov and, after Suslov's death, by Chernenko. In the funeral procession, Gorbachev walked at Chernenko's side in the first row.²²

Even more significant were the words that he used in addressing the plenum of the Central Committee that elected Chernenko to succeed Andropov. Closing the meeting, he said: "Permit me, in the name of the Politburo, to express confidence that all members of the Central Committee, all participants in the plenum, will, on returning to their jobs, to their party organizations, act in the spirit of unity and solidarity, strict discipline and responsibility, that has characterized the present plenum of the party Central Committee."²³ These were the words not simply of a secretary of the Central Committee but of a person of great authority among the Kremlin leadership. It should be noted that, in proposing Chernenko's candidacy at the plenum, Tikhonov, in the same way as Chernenko himself when proposing Andropov in 1982, did not speak "in the name of the Politburo" but "on the instructions of the Politburo."²⁴ The phraseology used by party officials had become so firmly entrenched that chance deviations were hardly likely.

Gorbachev's assumption of the role of Suslov and Chernenko as second man in the part was further confirmed by his speech at the first session

of the new USSR Supreme Soviet on April 11. Proposing the election of Chernenko to the chairmanship of its Presidium, he justified the choice in the following terms:

Relying on the experience of party and state construction in recent years and proceeding from the lofty interests of Soviet society and state, the plenum of the Central Committee has deemed it essential that the general secretary of the Central Committee of our party . . . should simultaneously hold the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. . . . At the same time, the execution by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee of the functions of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is of enormous importance for the conduct of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.²⁵

It is interesting to note that in June of the preceding year, when Chernenko similarly proposed the election of Andropov to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, his words differed from those of Gorbachev only inasmuch as he called the choice of Andropov "desirable" instead of "essential."²⁶

At the same session of the Supreme Soviet on April 11, Gorbachev was elected chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union. This post was held for almost twenty years by Suslov and, after his death, by his successor as Central Committee secretary for ideological affairs, Chernenko. The importance of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union, the more prestigious of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, was stressed by Gorbachev himself in his speech proposing Chernenko's candidacy when he said: "K. U. Chernenko headed the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which under his leadership actively implemented the foreign policy course of our party and state."²⁷ Thus, the new chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union attached great importance to the additional functions that he had assumed. Never before had this office been accorded such publicity. It may be conjectured that Gorbachev was thus seeking to multiply his chances in the succession.

VII Moscow's Stagnant Foreign Relations

23

Andropov's Holding Action

Alexey Levin, Robert Rand, and Roland Eggleston

The great expectations aroused by Andropov's diplomatic performance at Brezhnev's funeral failed to materialize. Developments in the subsequent year seemed to underscore the remark by Milovan Djilas: "Andropov signifies not the beginning of a new era, but the end of the old one." There were no breakthroughs in Soviet foreign policy—no new initiatives in the Middle East, no decisive developments in Soviet-Chinese relations, no change in the state of Soviet-American relations, no modification in the Soviet attitude toward Western Europe's concern about the installation of ss-20 missiles, and no letup in the Afghanistan war.

Andropov was hardly a person who could initiate a new foreign policy. His formative years coincided with the last years of Stalin's Great Terror. His first direct experience of Stalin's brutal conduct of foreign policy came at the start of his career as an *apparatchik* in Karelia in 1940, in the aftermath of the ill-judged war against Finland. He was personally involved in Stalin's second attempt to subvert Finland in the summer of 1948. Andropov also was an active participant in the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and, as head of the KGB security services, played a key role in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Andropov belonged to the generation of Soviet leaders that accepted brutality and deceit as normal features of foreign policy. While the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan might be attributed to Brezhnev, and the failure to bring it to an end after Brezhnev's death to the power struggle in the Kremlin, the characteristic mixture of brutality and deceit with which the Korean airliner tragedy was handled had to be credited solely to Andropov. Nor could he be expected to be averse to the same elements of foreign policy in Indochina, in Afghanistan, in the conflict with China, in the

Robert Rand was responsible for the material on China, Central America, and Libya, Roland Eggleston for the material on the PLO and Syria.

Euromissile confrontation, in the subversion of African countries, and in the penetration of Central America.

Oleg Bitov, cultural editor of *Literaturnaia gazeta* who subsequently defected to Britain, claimed that the Soviet military came under sharp attack from certain party circles for their handling of the Korean airliner incident. With the then-existing alignment in the Kremlin, opposition to the military clearly meant opposition to Andropov himself. This may explain Andropov's belated public support for the military's version of the incident. During the entire first year of Andropov's tenure, any foreign policy preferences that he might have entertained were probably blocked by a leadership stalemate. This supposition seemed validated by Soviet policies with regard to China, Central America, and the Middle East.

In March 1982 Brezhnev had made an unexpected overture to China, according it once more the title of "a Socialist country." Upon Brezhnev's death the intention of the Andropov administration to improve Sino-Soviet relations was signaled when Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko received his Chinese counterpart in Moscow—the highest-level encounter between the two nations since 1969.

Moscow's drive to normalize ties with China yielded tangible but modest results:

—A restoration of political contacts. Negotiators met once in Beijing in October 1982 and once in Moscow in March 1983.

—An increase in commercial contacts. The Sino-Soviet trade agreement for 1983 provided for an expansion by more than 150 percent over 1982. The two countries reopened a Central Asian border-crossing point between Kirghizia and Xinjiang, closed for the past twenty years.

—A reduction in polemics. For a period of several months beginning in September 1982, the Soviet press was almost devoid of anti-Chinese propaganda.

—A growth of cultural relations. Friendship delegations of one sort or another traveled between the two countries. The USSR Academy of Sciences formed an "Association of Soviet Sinologists" to conduct research on China and to "promote the development of friendship and mutual understanding between the Soviet and Chinese peoples."

These developments by no means amounted to a full-fledged rapprochement. The two countries remained at odds on key political and military issues. The Soviet Union was believed to have deployed forty-eight divisions, totaling at least 600,000 men, along the 7,200-kilometer border, and the Chinese were thought to have deployed twice that number. Soviet and Chinese negotiators had discussed ways to reduce their military forces, but a mutual pullback seemed unlikely because of the lack of mutual trust.

China was also reportedly concerned about the possible transfer of Soviet medium-range ss-20 nuclear missiles from Europe to Asia. Beijing adamantly opposed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and rejected the formation of a pro-Soviet, Vietnamese-backed government in Cambodia. In short, a breakthrough in relations between Moscow and Beijing was not on the horizon.

With regard to Central America, the Soviet press predictably lashed out at the Reagan administration's efforts to put pressure on Nicaragua but Soviet policy toward the region remained unaffected. As before, Moscow viewed its links with Cuba and with Nicaragua as the centerpiece of its Central American strategy, and Soviet assistance to those two countries was, according to a State Department analyst, "proceeding apace" without any unusual step-up in activity.

Soviet involvement in the region took the form of military and economic assistance. Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba were at their highest levels since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, amounting to some 60,000 metric tons a year. The island nation remained economically dependent on the USSR.

Soviet and Cuban arms and advisers found their way to Nicaragua. According to independent military reports, Managua received fifty Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile rocket-launchers, SAM-75 and other antiaircraft missiles, and a wide range of Soviet-made artillery. The Sandinista government also accepted some two thousand military advisers from Cuba, fifty from the Soviet Union, and thirty-five from East European countries.¹

To the extent that Moscow's Central American friends continued to prosper, its standing in the region was apt to grow. Moreover, increased American military involvement in Central America had the potential effect of diminishing Washington's military presence elsewhere in the world in regions where Moscow's strategic interests were tangible, direct, and more important than any stake the USSR may have had in Central America.

During the Libyan military intervention in Chad, the Kremlin's reserved reaction reflected the complex nature of Soviet-Libyan ties. On the one hand, Moscow became Tripoli's major supplier of military equipment. In an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, officials at the State Department said that, of the \$10 billion worth of arms deliveries accepted by Libya since 1977, about 60 percent came from the Soviet Union. Another \$1.5 billion worth was supplied by other communist countries, especially those of Eastern Europe. The officials indicated that Soviet-Libyan arms contracts had been conducted at such a rapid pace that a sizable backlog in actual deliveries developed. It was reported that Soviet weaponry

involved in the arms deals included the advanced T-72 tanks, SAM-9 surface-to-air missiles, and MiG-25 jet aircraft.² Also, "at least 2,000" Soviet military personnel had been sent to Libya to help train the Libyan armed forces in operating and maintaining the equipment. Libyan military personnel were trained in the Soviet Union. Moscow's willingness to provide Libya with large quantities of military hardware could partly be explained by Tripoli's ability to pay in cash.

On the other hand, the State Department had "no evidence of any direct Soviet involvement in Chad." Libya's expansive territorial ambitions had never been endorsed by the Soviet leadership, and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict had also generated disagreement. Libya had been outspoken in its criticism of the USSR's failure to aid the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1982 war in Lebanon, while Moscow criticized Tripoli's "extremist" position that called for the elimination of the State of Israel. Evidence of these disagreements became apparent in March 1983, when a high-level Libyan delegation traveled to Moscow. A TASS account of talks between Libya's second most powerful leader, Abd al-Salam Jalloud, and Soviet Premier Nikolai Tikhonov said that the discussions were "notable for frankness and mutual understanding,"³ a characterization thought to indicate a divergence of views. Moscow's unwillingness to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Libya, despite agreement in principle to do so, also evidenced Soviet disapproval of some of Qaddafi's policies.

In November 1983 the Soviet Union made no secret of its dismay over the fighting between rival factions of the PLO. Since June, Soviet reports on the conflict within the PLO stressed that the Palestinians must be united to maintain their movement as a force in the struggle against Israel. For many weeks, however, none of such reports contained any expression of support for Yasir Arafat's survival as a leader. Several political analysts saw this as an indication that Moscow would accept his replacement as chairman of the PLO by a collective leadership. Most analysts believed that the Soviet Union wanted the PLO to survive as an internationally recognized entity, but no one was sure how this would fit in with Syria's apparent desire to control the organization.

The Soviet Union's concern over the disarray in the Palestinian ranks was motivated by a desire to enhance its influence in the Middle East by aligning itself with the Arab cause. The Kremlin often equated Arab political or military successes with its foreign policy victories. Disunity, however, not only immobilized the Arab world's capacity to function but damaged Moscow's ability to pursue its objectives in the region. The Soviet Union's

real concerns were hinted quite clearly on Saturday, November 19, when a TASS report stated that the internal fighting in the PLO constituted "a most opportune bonanza for the United States and Israel."

Many analysts believed that the Soviet leadership might sympathize with Arafat's opponents in the PLO because they would be more to its political liking. The revolt was, after all, based on charges that Arafat had become too moderate and was willing to consider political solutions to the Middle East problem, such as the plan presented by President Reagan for the creation of some sort of Palestinian homeland in association with Jordan. The rebel leaders' formal rejection of Reagan's plan must have been gratifying to the Soviet Union.

Less gratifying to Moscow, however, was the fact that Syria held strong influence over most of the PLO hard-liners, under whose command the PLO would have been controlled by Syria. Most analysts believed that the Soviet Union would have preferred an independent PLO, but it had to balance this preference with its need to maintain its close links with Syria.

Syria offered the Soviet Union its best chance of achieving its long-held goal of getting involved in the Middle East peace process. President Hafiz al-Assad said frequently that Syria had to participate in any settlement in Lebanon or in any negotiations in the broader Mideast context involving Israel, but he made it clear that one of Syria's conditions was the participation of the Soviet Union as well as of the United States. Another important factor for Soviet involvement was Syria's relative stability: with the chaos in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war, Syria remained the only reasonable base from which the Soviet Union could exert its influence. Clearly, Moscow did not want any problems with Syria that might have disturbed this relationship.

24

Andropov and Eastern Europe

Robert L. Hutchings

The mingled hopes and fears in Eastern Europe that attended Iurii Andropov's accession to the Soviet leadership in November 1982 had all but disappeared the following summer, to be replaced by a new set of uncertainties generated by his prolonged incapacitation. Andropov's death marked

the end of a brief and inconclusive fifteen-month chapter in Soviet-East European relations; his legacy was one of continued disarray in Eastern Europe, aggravated by a marked deterioration in East-West relations.

Andropov's early initiatives in the Soviet domestic arena—the opening of a renewed economic reform discussion, the campaign toward labor discipline, the crackdown on dissent, and the series of personnel changes in the Soviet party and state apparatus—found little echo in Eastern Europe, where party policies were characterized by continued stagnation and immobility. Despite Andropov's reputation as a man who understood East European problems better than his predecessor, the key political and economic issues affecting Soviet-East European relations were held largely in abeyance. The "Andropov era" in Eastern Europe never really began.

Andropov inherited an East European situation in considerable disarray. It had been more than a decade since the Soviet leadership had attempted to deal in any comprehensive fashion with the tasks of alliance management. The strategies adopted then—*détente* and expanded trade relations with the West, consumer-oriented domestic economic policies, and a vigorous, Soviet-led drive for integration in Eastern Europe—promoted a certain stability in the region, at least on the surface, but they proved utterly inadequate to deal with the serious challenges of the late 1970s: severe economic deterioration, mounting dissent and societal disaffection, and political stagnation among most of the ruling parties. The social revolution in Poland was the most spectacular consequence of these trends, but their impact was felt to one degree or another throughout Eastern Europe. For its part, the Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev had proved itself unable or unwilling to come to grips with these realities or to fashion new policies to deal with mounting difficulties in Eastern Europe.

East-West relations, meanwhile, had undergone a similar deterioration during Brezhnev's final years. The *détente* euphoria of the early 1970s had given way to a decided chill in East-West relations, particularly after the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan. Consequently, Soviet and East European diplomacy assumed an increasingly defensive character, as the Warsaw Pact mounted a concerted peace campaign designed to fend off Western criticism at the Madrid conference, forestall deployment of American-built Pershing II and cruise missiles, and preserve what was left of European *détente*.

Far from arresting the deterioration in East-West relations, Soviet policy under Andropov accelerated the process. Unremitting Soviet pressure on West European governments over the Euromissiles issue helped to strengthen NATO resolve, and the Soviet hopes for massive popular resis-

tance in Western Europe failed to materialize. Not only did Andropov's failure to prevent the deployment of the Euromissiles mark a serious defeat for Soviet foreign policy, it also created unexpected strains within the Warsaw Pact, as the propaganda machinery set in motion for Western consumption also generated disquiet among the East European populaces.

The dire warnings associated with the campaign against the deployment of Euromissiles, the threatened deployment of new Soviet nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet walkout from the Geneva disarmament talks all contributed to growing public uneasiness and even resistance in Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. These developments introduced unprecedented disunity into the Warsaw Pact's ranks, evidence of which could be seen in the GDR's cultivation of ever closer relations with West Germany, Hungary's increasingly active foreign policy, and continued Romanian divisiveness on Warsaw Pact and foreign policy matters.

There was similarly little indication of decisive Soviet leadership under Andropov on other key issues affecting Eastern Europe. Even before his incapacitation in August 1983, and certainly afterward, Soviet-Polish relations were held in abeyance. Aside from a few pointed commentaries in the Soviet media and some symbolic efforts to stress Poland's growing "normalization" after the formal lifting of martial law, the Soviet Union under Andropov showed no readiness to grapple with the prolonged political stalemate in Poland or the longer-term consequences of the Polish events for the stability of the Warsaw Pact. As to the severe economic deterioration gripping all of Eastern Europe, there was again no evidence of an encompassing Soviet policy, not even the scheduling of the long-awaited, long-delayed CMEA summit meeting to hammer out Soviet-East European economic disputes, particularly in the energy sector.

Andropov's tenure was inevitably an interim one, in Soviet-East European relations as in other spheres. For Eastern Europe, however, the stagnation in Soviet policy, which was apparent even before Andropov's accession to power, came at a particularly sensitive time, for it coincided with growing instability in Eastern Europe itself. To the problems of economic decline, social disquiet, and the impact of the Polish social revolution were now added the uncertainties attending yet another Soviet succession. These clearly were Andropov's immediate legacies.

Stalemate Bequeathed to Chernenko

Sallie Wise

During the last six months under Andropov in late 1983 and early 1984 Soviet foreign policy reached a state of virtual paralysis. The most notable "action" during that period—the successive Soviet walkouts from the three main arms control talks—was merely a reaction. The Kremlin's refusal to continue arms control negotiations with the West apparently reflected the Soviet leadership's inability to formulate any constructive policy. Chernenko therefore took office confronting an across-the-board impasse on the international front. Generally considered cautious, conservative, and with little substantive experience in foreign policy, he was unlikely to launch any bold initiatives on his own.

Arms Control The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, which had yielded very few results during the ten years that they had been in existence, were slated to resume in March 1984, thus providing another forum, in addition to the Stockholm conference, for East-West "dialogue." However, their prospects for substantive progress were as dim as ever. Concerning the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction (START) talks, the USSR seemed reluctant to resume bilateral negotiations with the United States in an election year unless or until it became clear that President Ronald Reagan would be reelected. Also, the Kremlin would have doubtless disliked losing face by a quick return to the talks after it had laid the blame for the arms control stalemate so squarely on the United States. Since Chernenko took office, the Soviet media had been sending mixed signals about the USSR's willingness to resume the INF talks. Several authoritative commentaries on East-West relations did not mention the Soviet precondition for returning to the INF talks: that the United States and its NATO allies "display readiness to return to the situation existing before deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles" in Western Europe.¹ Other commentaries had, however, reiterated this precondition.² The Kremlin seemed resolved to stall for time on the Euromissile issue while continuing its attempt to lay blame for the impasse on the United States.

Western Europe The Euromissile dilemma, though dormant, was far from dead. Moscow continued to pursue its long-term objective of decoupling the United States from its NATO allies not only by trying to influence the West European public through its perennial "peace offensive,"

but also by attempts to woo official opinion. By continuing to ignore the United States while courting West European governments, the Soviet leadership sought to convey an impression of striving for improved East-West relations without seeming to capitulate to Washington. Several West European governments, notably those of conservative leaders Helmut Kohl in West Germany and Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, still faced considerable domestic pressure from the left, which the Kremlin was hoping to exploit.

China Another round of Sino-Soviet normalization talks was due to resume in March. Although three fundamental obstacles to rapprochement³ still divided the two countries, the atmosphere had improved during the previous year. While there had been no progress on the issues of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and cessation of aid to Vietnam, a reduction of Soviet troops on the Chinese border seemed out of the question.

Eastern Europe The Soviet Union continued to face a crisis in Eastern Europe. "Normalization" in Poland was yet to materialize; opposition to the regime of General Jaruzelski remained defiant, and the regime appeared to be adrift. Hungary's foreign policy pursued Western connections. Chernenko, unlike Andropov at his predecessor's funeral, held an at least symbolic summit meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders after Andropov's funeral.

Middle East Soviet policy in this region had been to sit and wait. The relationship between the Soviet Union and Syria, cemented in 1980 by a treaty of friendship and cooperation, had been determined more by political expediency than by ideological affinity. It was unclear to what extent Moscow had been guiding Syrian policy in Lebanon. Both the USSR and Syria had an interest in fomenting instability in the region, but Syria had shown itself to be more than merely a compliant Soviet puppet. The USSR, while seeking a more active role in the region to the detriment of U.S. interests in the Mideast, wanted to avoid any direct confrontation with the United States that could lead to war. Its strategy had been to wait and hope that the United States would lose its credibility either by becoming hopelessly bogged down in Lebanon or by withdrawing altogether. Yet, despite the USSR's bad gambles on clients such as Egypt and Somalia in the past, it was likely that the Kremlin would maintain its large stake in Syria in order to win for itself a more prominent role in the Middle East.

Afghanistan Soviet troops had become deeply entrenched in the quagmire of Afghanistan. For whatever reason—opposition from the Soviet military, strategic considerations, or simple inertia—there were no signs that the USSR was inclined to reduce its involvement.

Ustinov and Gromyko These two key ministers, about whom it was

widely believed that they had blocked Chernenko's election to the general secretaryship after Leonid Brezhnev's death, were presumably a crucial source of support for Chernenko's subsequent accession to that office. Their continued visibility was suggestive of their decisive influence on foreign policy.

Rhetoric Chernenko's own tortuous style contrasted with Andropov's direct and forceful rhetoric. Chernenko's first speech as general secretary⁴ contained relatively little about foreign affairs, and what he did say was couched in stock expressions. Although Western leaders had chosen, as a gesture of goodwill, to interpret Chernenko's remarks as a signal of Soviet readiness for improved East-West relations, there was little to substantiate their interpretation. Chernenko stressed "continuity"; in the realm of Soviet foreign policy, continuity meant further stagnation.

26

Chernenko's First Hundred Days

Sallie Wise

The first one hundred days of Chernenko in power witnessed at least superficial dissipation of the paralysis that gripped Soviet foreign policy during Andropov's last months.¹ Chernenko's agenda was filled with highly visible meetings with foreign visitors, while high-ranking Kremlin officials were busy making trips abroad. But the resumption of Soviet diplomatic activity merely confirmed that its sharp reduction before had been linked to Andropov's debilitating illness. It did not mask the continuing lack of substantive policy initiatives.

Decisions continued to be made by a collective leadership,² which, in a time of transition, tends to shun innovation and act in accordance with its conservative reflexes. Chernenko, an ideologue of deeply orthodox instincts, had little practical experience in foreign policy. The changes in foreign policy discernible since he took office could therefore not necessarily be attributed to him personally, but perhaps rather to the continuing ascendancy, with Chernenko's ideological blessing, of a particularly hard-line *kollektiv* in the Politburo, notably Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov. These changes, though some largely matters of degree—increasingly harsh rhetoric, for example, and the return

to stock ideological phrases—pointed to a trend toward isolationism and vigilance.

Soviet-U.S. Relations The chief target for hard-line rhetoric continued to be the United States, and specifically the Reagan administration. Despite Chernenko's transparent denial of the accusation that the USSR was freezing relations with the United States until the presidential election in November,³ it was clear that the Kremlin was avoiding any appearance of Soviet-U.S. cooperation or conciliation that could have possibly boosted Reagan's chances of defeating a challenger who might be more inclined to revive détente. The USSR's decision not to participate in the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles was no doubt motivated in part—aside from fear of defections and an urge to retaliate for the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow—by the desire to discredit Reagan. Yet some routine Soviet-U.S. contacts continued despite Soviet posturing, and U.S. officials did not see real "crisis" in bilateral relations.⁴

Arms Control The principal casualty of the Kremlin's refusal to do business with the United States was the arms control process, particularly the bilateral INF and START negotiations. Chernenko continued to cling to Andropov's precondition for returning to the INF talks: restoration by the United States and its allies of "the situation existing before the beginning of the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe."⁵ The USSR announced the deployment of "an additional quantity of Soviet operational-tactical missile complexes of enhanced range" in the GDR as "a countermeasure" to U.S. missile deployments in Western Europe.⁶ This seemed calculated to intimidate Western public opinion at a time when the INF issue had faded somewhat from the front pages.

The MBFR talks, which the Warsaw Pact side had broken off in December 1983, did resume in March 1984, but scant progress had been made there. The Warsaw Pact participants rejected a new NATO proposal that sought to overcome the thorny "data-base" problem. Similarly, the USSR rejected a new U.S. draft treaty for a ban on chemical weapons presented to the Geneva disarmament conference. An article in *Pravda* emphatically repeated Soviet objections to on-site inspection as a means of verifying arms control agreements.⁷ Chernenko and his colleagues evidently considered arms control the linchpin of Soviet-U.S. relations, and for this reason they were unlikely to make any moves that could be construed as concessions to Washington. The latest Soviet "peace initiative" was a recycled Warsaw Pact proposal for an East-West nonaggression treaty. Thus far, continued intransigence—stalling for time—and lack of originality were the hallmarks of Chernenko's arms control policies.

Western Europe Although the USSR had chosen not to have any high-level talks with U.S. officials, it was still willing to talk *at*, if not *to*, U.S. allies in Western Europe. Italy's foreign minister, Giulio Andreotti, visited Moscow at the end of April. In a speech at a luncheon in the Kremlin in Andreotti's honor, Gromyko blamed the United States for "wrecking" the INF talks and, in a rather tasteless analogy, implied that the destruction of Pompeii nearly two thousand years ago would pale in comparison with a nuclear attack: "People today know about the death of Pompeii, incinerated by a volcano. . . . But how many Vesuviuses does one thermonuclear bomb conceal within it?"⁸ Chernenko, on the other hand, urged a return to détente and the creation of "a climate of trust" among states with different social systems.⁹

Andreotti and Gromyko did eventually turn their attention to more concrete matters—in the form of bilateral economic relations. Italy had been running a deficit with the USSR¹⁰ and had not yet concluded an agreement for the purchase of Soviet natural gas, although the Italian state energy conglomerate was authorized in December 1983 to resume gas price negotiations with the USSR.¹¹ The two foreign ministers signed a long-term (until 1990) agreement for cooperation in economic, industrial, and technological spheres.¹² No mention was made, however, of any progress on the sale of Soviet natural gas to Italy.

West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow on May 21 and 22. His reception was noticeably cooler than Andreotti's. Gromyko's treatment bordered on rudeness. Although Chernenko, at his meeting with Genscher, declared that "the Soviet Union is in favor of meaningful dialogue"¹³ both he and Gromyko dispensed with "dialogue" to lecture Genscher on the necessity of removing new U.S. nuclear missiles from Western Europe.

The juxtaposition of Gromyko's and Genscher's speeches at the Kremlin luncheon in Genscher's honor was particularly telling. Genscher, who had a considerable domestic political stake in the conduct of *Ostpolitik*, spoke of the need "to identify spheres of accord between East and West" and asserted that "it would be utterly wrong to sink in despondency" over East-West differences. Gromyko, in stark contrast, dismissed the Western view that "'a new glacial period' has not set in" as "a sham, artificial optimism."¹⁴ Genscher's efforts to raise sensitive topics such as the plight of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner and obstacles to the emigration of ethnic Germans from the USSR were predictably rebuffed by the Soviets, and his remarks on those issues were censored by the Soviet media.

Eastern Europe The Kremlin under Chernenko seemed to be devoting more attention to its "fraternal" allies than it did under Andropov.

This increased attention, however, included an increased emphasis on ideological orthodoxy at a time when various members of the Warsaw Pact were showing signs of independence.

Asia Moscow's lukewarm courtship of Beijing suddenly became cooler since Chernenko took office as a result of Sino-Japanese and Sino-U.S. rapprochement, as well as of ongoing Sino-Vietnamese border clashes. Despite the improved atmosphere achieved the previous year in Sino-Soviet relations and increased contacts in peripheral spheres such as tourism and sports, substantive progress at the bilateral normalization talks failed to materialize. The most surprising occurrence was the sudden postponement in mid-May of a visit to Beijing by Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Arkhipov one day before his scheduled arrival. Arkhipov's visit, intended primarily to expand Sino-Soviet economic and trade ties, had been touted as signaling a new phase in relations between Moscow and Beijing. In any event, he would have been the highest-ranking Soviet government official to visit China in fifteen years, and the indefinite postponement of his trip on the flimsy excuse of "insufficient preparation" was a definite setback to any progress that had been achieved in Sino-Soviet relations. The Kremlin must have been piqued by the warm reception accorded the leaders of two capitalist economic superpowers, Japan and the United States, in Beijing. The three major obstacles to Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the Chinese view had actually worsened since Chernenko came to power: Soviet troops in Afghanistan mounted a massive campaign, including aerial bombing, in the strategic Panjshir Valley; Vietnamese troops in Cambodia stepped up their operations against the Cambodian resistance and even attacked refugee camps; and while there was no evidence that the Soviet military presence specifically on the Sino-Soviet border increased, the USSR was continuing construction of two new ss-20 bases in the eastern part of its territory that were expected to become operational within a few months.¹⁵

Middle East and Africa Although the USSR's chief client and ally in the Middle East, Syria, increased its dominance in the region in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon, Moscow did not capitalize significantly on this development. As far as other Middle Eastern countries were concerned, Moscow paved the way for restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt, appeared to tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict, and continued to urge a settlement to the dispute within the PLO.

The potential for Soviet gains in the Middle East was offset by the Kremlin's frustration over events in southern Africa where Angola and Mozambique, the two principal Soviet clients in the region, negotiated agreements with the Republic of South Africa in March. Angola and South Africa agreed to a cease-fire along the Angolan-Namibian frontier,

while Mozambique and South Africa concluded a wide-ranging nonaggression treaty. Both Angola and Mozambique, especially the latter, were trying to expand their contacts with the West, also much to Moscow's displeasure. In May, it was reported that Cuba had refused to begin a phased withdrawal of its troops from Angola because an accord in southern Africa could have boosted Reagan's chances of reelection.¹⁶

The overall picture was one of a Soviet Union largely *reacting* rather than acting in the international arena. The impulse of the Chernenko leadership was toward negative or even passive policies rather than toward positive, innovative initiatives in foreign affairs. In many areas, especially with regard to East-West relations, ideology replaced subtlety as the operative consideration. Indeed, the Kremlin seemed bent on flouting international opinion and flexing its military and ideological muscles. The cumulative effect of its massive military maneuvers in the North Atlantic, the offensive in Afghanistan, its public praise for the downing of KAL 007 in September 1983, the emphasis on Soviet missile counterdeployments in Eastern Europe, the Olympic pullout, ideological tightening in Eastern Europe, and denunciation of the Sakharovs resulted in a trend toward self-isolation.

VIII The War in Afghanistan

27

No Exit from Afghanistan

Steve Sego

Since the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, official Soviet policy hardly showed signs of a weakening resolve. Despite the unexpectedly determined opposition by the Afghan resistance, the question remained whether the war had yet become costly enough to impel the Soviet Union toward negotiation, or whether Moscow's professed eagerness to negotiate was merely a minor concession to the worldwide condemnation of the invasion.

Before the death of Leonid Brezhnev, there had been few clues in the Soviet press as to the true nature of Soviet military involvement. During the last year of Brezhnev's life there appeared in such papers as *Krasnaia zvezda* and *Komsomolskaia pravda* a few oblique references to military officers or Komsomol members and their brave or heroic conduct while carrying out their "internationalist duty," but in almost every case either the location or the circumstances of such bravery were withheld. A noteworthy exception to this blackout was made in the party organs of Turkmenistan, which on March 27, 1982, carried an address by the first secretary of the Communist party of Turkmenistan, Mukhamednazar Gapurov, before a Komsomol congress. Gapurov eulogized at some length the death in battle of a Turkmen soldier who had been "carrying out the sacred duty of a soldier and an internationalist" in Afghanistan.

Within a month of Andropov's accession, *Krasnaia zvezda* wrote about the hostile conditions under which Soviet sappers had to work in Afghanistan clearing mines. By February 1983 the same newspapers that had previously so carefully avoided specific mention of the Soviet army's operations in Afghanistan were carrying explicit accounts of the dangers faced by Soviet troops giving "combat training" in Afghanistan. In March they began to include eyewitness descriptions of armed men hijacking Af-

ghan trucks. The intent of this new public relations strategy was clearly not to illustrate to the Soviet public the cost of the war, but rather, by showing the exemplary behavior of Soviet soldiers and the real danger of the combat zone to awaken in the Soviet people a patriotic support of a long struggle. Workers, teachers, and others who had been giving nonmilitary "fraternal assistance" to the Afghan people had already been given recognition in the Soviet press for some time.

Further evidence of readiness to continue fighting in Afghanistan was provided by the discussion of techniques of mountain warfare, especially with respect to advocacy of more and better training of land forces in this type of combat, in the Soviet specialized military press.

At Brezhnev's funeral, President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan considered Andropov "flexible" on the matter of negotiating the Afghanistan problem. Subsequent UN-sponsored indirect talks in April and June between the foreign ministers of Pakistan and the Soviet-backed government in Kabul were described as having made great progress, but despite rumors that a settlement had been outlined during them, this progress was not yet apparent to the outside world. Iran, a natural party to any regional negotiations on Afghanistan, had not moved from its refusal to participate until Soviet troops were withdrawn. On the Soviet side, the emphasis continued to be on international guarantees of noninterference, while Pakistan wanted more than any country a withdrawal of Soviet forces and a solution to the enormous refugee problem. While Moscow was still talking of a negotiated settlement, a year of Andropov's rule gave no clear reason to assume there had been a shift in that direction, and as bombardment of the Afghan civilian population increased, it filled Pakistan's border areas with the potential for destabilizing the country's delicate balance of ethnic groups.

The first year of Andropov's rule saw a few tactical adjustments on the part of the Soviet army and its client Afghan army. The Soviet army acquired some flexibility in field maneuvers, and outposts were set up in several areas of particularly heavy guerrilla activity to be used as bases from which to attack resistance forces. Heavy bombing of civilian areas suspected of giving support to the guerrillas continued and increased as the guerrillas' effectiveness against Soviet and Afghan forces—presumably on account of better equipment supplies reaching them through Pakistan—made the fighting gradually more costly for the Soviet Union and the Afghan government.

Another frontline development in the first year of Andropov's rule was the truce in the Panjshir Valley negotiated in the spring of 1983. Although this might not have been more than a necessity of the moment acceptable to both sides, it placed the Tajik leader of the *mujahideen* forces in the

Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Masoud, in the rather extraordinary position of having successfully negotiated from a position of strength directly with Soviet representatives on behalf of his people. This was more noteworthy on account of the fact that the Panjshir Valley was not merely a guerrilla base, but rather, a well-integrated and self-administered community of farms and villages.

Soviet policy toward Afghanistan was a direct continuation of the strategy for Central Asia employed by Moscow for at least a century. The Russians moved in stages to extend their influence eastward and southeastward; at first indirectly, then by undisguised military force, and ultimately by political assimilation. Since Lenin's time, a fourth, ideological stage was added: cultural assimilation—the so-called merging of nations. Afghanistan is historically, geographically, culturally, and ethnically a part of Soviet Central Asia, and as the object of Moscow's expanding influence, it had passed from the stage of indirect pressure to that of military brutalization. So many steps had already been taken toward cultural and economic integration of Afghanistan into Soviet Central Asia that it was difficult to avoid concluding that a more or less articulated plan for political assimilation had been in the minds of the Soviet leadership at least since the decision to invade had been made.

The educational system, the infrastructure for cultural assimilation, became an early object of Soviet attention. Even before the invasion, the communist regime in Kabul carried out extensive purges of Afghanistan's intelligentsia and opened the way for an intellectual reorientation toward the USSR. Faculty members of Kabul's schools of higher education came largely from the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Education was patterned after that of Tajikistan, and textbooks were translated from Russian or Tajik. Some ten to twenty thousand young Afghans were sent to the Soviet Union, especially Soviet Central Asia, for training, while large number of teachers from the Soviet Union came to work in Afghanistan's classrooms. Such links were especially close among the large Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen populations of Afghanistan, who share similar languages with Soviet Central Asia.

The Soviet policy in Afghanistan was an extension of the so-called Leninist nationalities policy, geared toward the cultivation of the national identities of the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen in Afghanistan. Their national historical figures were thus regularly portrayed with links to the history of the Soviet republics. Radio broadcasts and school instruction in the local languages also pointed to a development along the lines of the Soviet national republics.

The operations of the Ministry of Justice in Afghanistan were con-

trolled by Soviet advisers, and new laws even were being drafted first in Russian.

The economic integration of northern Afghanistan with the Soviet system included new rail and road links, the inclusion of certain areas in the electrical power grids of Tajikistan, and the export of most of northern Afghanistan's raw materials to the Soviet Union, including natural gas, which was metered on the Soviet side of the border.

Afghanistan's secret police organization, *khad*, also predictably came under the direct control of its Soviet counterpart, the *kGB*. In January 1983, this control was boosted by the return of possibly as many as eight hundred new agents from training in the USSR.

The areas of Afghanistan subjected to the most intense sovietization were those nearest the Soviet border and the cities and towns controlled by the regime in Kabul. These areas corresponded roughly to the non-Pushtun areas of Afghanistan, while the traditional tribal areas of the fiercely independent Pushtuns remained largely outside the control of the Soviet-Afghan forces. Some Pushtuns not engaged in active resistance occasionally allowed themselves to be bought into unreliable support for Kabul, while many others sought safety across the Durand Line in Pakistani Pushtunistan.

28

Who Is in Command?

Peter Kruzhin

Despite the official description of the Soviet armed force in Afghanistan as "a limited contingent," its total force was estimated at almost 120,000 troops. The Soviet authorities had been maintaining complete silence about the identity of the person in command of this enormous force, doing everything possible to conceal his name. However, sufficient evidence gradually appeared from various sources to make it possible to at least tentatively identify the man directly responsible for the criminal methods of warfare used by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

According to unofficial sources in Afghanistan, the commander of the Soviet forces there was a marshal of the Soviet Union. This piece of information did not, however, seem to be entirely accurate. None of the known marshals of the Soviet Union had been out of the public view for any ex-

tended period of time except for Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, who was over eighty years old and had made no appearances for three years, apparently owing to illness. The same could not be said of the generals of the army, whose insignia were often difficult to distinguish from those of the marshals. A general of the army therefore became a possibility.

At the beginning of December 1981 Mikhail Ivanovich Sorokin, promoted to general of the army a month earlier, was replaced as commander of the Leningrad Military District by Colonel General Boris Vasilevich Snetkov.¹ Subsequently, General of the Army Sorokin dropped out of sight. His name did appear three times in military periodicals, though—twice signed on obituaries and once in connection with his acceptance of the Order of Lenin on May 31, 1982.² Judging from the position of his signature on the obituaries, Sorokin was holding a very important post—at least at the level of a first deputy chief of general staff. His acceptance of the Order of Lenin (even though awarded in connection with his sixtieth birthday) showed that Sorokin continued to enjoy the highest confidence of the Soviet leadership. But where was he?

Some light was shed on this question by the *Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik*, published in 1983. This official reference stated that Sorokin had been in “a leadership assignment in the field” since 1981 (i.e., since his reassignment from the Leningrad Military District).³ In the military press the expression “leadership assignment” usually designates a command position. The phrase “in the field” could only mean one thing: Sorokin, rather than serving on the central staff of the military, was assigned to one of the military districts or groups of Soviet forces stationed abroad. The key command personnel of those military districts and the groups of forces were known, but Sorokin was not among them. Was he in a place where only two Soviet divisions were garrisoned? Commanding only two divisions is not a job for a general of the army, though; a lieutenant general can handle that. Consequently, it is possible that Sorokin was serving with the so-called limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan—the command staff of which had not been made public.

Obviously, any speculation based on this kind of information cannot be conclusive. However, the information clearly indicated that General of the Army Sorokin was likely to be in command of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Sixty-one years old in 1984, Sorokin started out during World War II as chief of a communications center and ended up as the executive officer of a motorized rifle regiment. After the war he graduated from the Frunze Academy and the General Staff Academy, advancing during this period from battalion commander to commander in chief of a military district. He spent more than four years as deputy commander of airborne

forces. He served in the Far East and Hungary; his career had been smooth and successful. He also possessed recognized political authority: in 1981 he was selected as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and he had also served as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.⁴

29

Soviet Propaganda Campaign

Peter Kruzhin

During the last months of 1983 and during the first quarter of 1984 the Soviet press began to publish with greater frequency correspondents' reports about the situation in Afghanistan and the presence of Soviet troops there. Not only did *Krasnaia zvezda* feature the "Afghanistan theme" almost every day, but *Izvestiia*, *Komsomolskaia pravda*, and *Literaturnaia gazeta* were also paying more attention to this topic than previously.

The so-called April revolution—the Soviet Union's political-military operation aimed at the sovietization of Afghanistan—obviously had become stalled. The Soviet forces already had been in the country for almost four and a half years, engaged in a war without clearly defined battle lines, suffering casualties, and still unable to control the whole country. This created multifaceted discontent among a broad segment of the Soviet population. Various groups ventured, in one way or another, to protest against the forcible sovietization of Afghanistan. Parents whose sons had ended up in "the limited contingent of Soviet troops" did not refer to Afghanistan kindly. Even those who probably would not have been opposed to the sovietization of Afghanistan might have begun to have second thoughts about strategic miscalculations on the part of the political leadership, the general staff, and the intelligence services as was the case during the Soviet-Finnish war, which lasted for only three and a half months.

The stepped-up coverage of Afghanistan in the Soviet press could be explained by citizens' discontent over the war. It is even possible that the "counterpropaganda" advocated by the new general secretary of the CPSU, Konstantin Chernenko, included instructions for the press to give special treatment to certain topics in order to promote the Kremlin's point of view. An analysis of the materials on Afghanistan published in the Soviet press provided a convincing indication that extensive reporting on the war

in Afghanistan posed a variety of problems for Soviet journalists. The press had obviously been called on to show that "the April revolution" was gaining strength from year to year. This required explanations as to why this "revolution" had lasted so long. The press, it seemed, was forbidden to mention that Soviet forces were taking part in operations aimed at recapturing the areas of Afghanistan under the control of insurgents. However, the press was supposed to do everything possible to enhance the prestige of the soldiers and officers serving there. Materials published about Afghanistan were loosely written, often stretched the point, and contained a considerable amount of distortions and omissions.

On December 22, 1983, Radio Moscow reported that in the course of the previous five years more than 350,000 farm families in Afghanistan had received plots of land free of charge; that more than one thousand farm cooperatives had already been established throughout the country; that out of 170 economic enterprises that were to be constructed with Soviet assistance, 80 were already in operation; and, finally, that Babrak Karmal's party already had about 100,000 members. On December 27, it tried to assure its listeners that the Afghan people under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Karmal government were "successfully conducting the class struggle" against all those who had their privileges taken away by the revolution. In December *Krasnaia zvezda* reported that "the struggle against the enemies of the revolution in Afghanistan was assuming an all-national character."¹

From the press reports, it would have seemed that "the April revolution" was decisively and firmly marching forward to its ultimate victory. But *Krasnaia zvezda* had earlier remarked that "not everybody in Afghanistan is capable of understanding the situation independently."² It also reported that peace, though "still fragile and unstable,"³ existed in the areas where government control had been established with the help of Soviet troops. In its evaluation of the general situation in Afghanistan, *Izvestiia* warned that "a hard struggle is still ahead."⁴ In their attempts to portray the effects of "the April revolution" on the people of Afghanistan, Soviet newspapers as a rule confined themselves to insignificant facts, such as that Afghan youths were becoming enthusiastic about volleyball and that Afghan female students were being taught to prepare Russian pirogi by Soviet officers' wives.⁵

Evidently guided by Lenin's thesis that a revolution was worth something only if it was able to defend itself, the Soviet press quite often reported on the armed forces of "the April revolution." Besides the regular Afghan army and anti-aircraft defense forces, these included the people's militia, volunteer units recruited by "activists" of the People's Democratic

Party and the Democratic Youth Organization, and the self-defense units formed at various enterprises and farm cooperatives.⁶ There also were civil defense units formed at all large industrial enterprises in order to defend both the enterprises and the population against attacks by "armed bands."⁷ The Soviet press claimed that these forces were waging a successful struggle against the insurgents. Factual data to support this claim were, however, seldom provided. One skirmish between a small unit of government forces and the insurgents was reported, accompanied by a description of the brutalities on both sides.⁸

Scrutiny of the Soviet press on Afghanistan left the impression that the Babrak regime was more or less in control only in the large cities and in the Soviet-controlled northern areas. The insurgents controlled the Kabul-Termez highway. Afghan truck convoys traveled on this highway in daytime only, fearing "bandit attacks" by the insurgents at night.⁹ This highway has been nicknamed "The Lifeline" by Soviet journalists because Afghanistan was receiving supplies through it.¹⁰ Soviet readers familiar with the history of the Soviet-German war might have associated "The Lifeline" with the blockade of Leningrad and the road over ice-covered Lake Ladoga, the only channel of communication with the "mainland," and thus take the nickname of the Kabul-Termez highway as a hint that Kabul was under siege by the insurgents.

It was also reported that the insurgents were in control of the Kandahar highway,¹¹ and that the Khost airport had been shelled by the insurgents' artillery, with a heavy transport AN-12 plane severely damaged and almost all of its crew wounded.¹² According to the Soviet press, the mortar shelling of unidentified airports had become an everyday occurrence for Soviet helicopter pilots.¹³ Olive plantations in the Jalalabad Valley were under the control of the insurgents.¹⁴ A movie theater had been blown up in daytime in one city and a hand grenade was thrown at a sports field during a game in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif.¹⁵ *Izvestiia* stated: "Those who live and work in Afghanistan cannot be surprised by tales of sabotage and acts of terrorism."¹⁶

In describing the opponents of the sovietization of Afghanistan, fighting against both the Soviet occupation forces and Karmal's followers, the Soviet press used to report that they included those who hated the new regime because it had taken away their former privileges, ordinary criminals, and those who had been misled, scared, or bought. Later there was a noticeable departure from this differentiation: *Izvestiia* portrayed them all as "savage bandits" who would not stop at any crime.¹⁷ *Krasnaia zvezda*, in contrast, occasionally used the term "rebels"¹⁸ for the insurgents as if to acknowledge that they were political opponents of the regime.

The published materials created the impression that Soviet forces in Afghanistan were occupied mainly with guard duty involving protection of economic objects, communications lines, and strategically important buildings. At the same time, they quite often described the various troubles of Soviet troops guarding truck convoys, transporting supplies by helicopters, and evacuating wounded Afghans. There also were reports of casualties among truck drivers who had stumbled on mines or were ambushed, or helicopter pilots who had come under heavy fire from the insurgents. Some of the reports also described the difficult and dangerous work of Soviet army engineers whose job it was to clear the roads of mines before the arrival of convoys.¹⁹

According to Soviet press reports, Soviet troops performed their "international duty" by helping the Afghan people build a peaceful life. It was said that they helped in the rebuilding of destroyed mosques, schools, and river crossings while propagating the Soviet way of life.²⁰ Such reports occasionally included some interesting lapses: a report in *Krasnaia zvezda* mentioned that when a Soviet propaganda unit approached the *kishlak* (village) of Shigal, "some panic-stricken fanatics almost decided to kill their wives and children in order not to let them fall into the Russians' hands."²¹ The author of the report explained that the *kishlak's* population had fallen under the influence of "the enemy cutthroats' propaganda." He then promptly assured the readers that "more and more Afghans are beginning to understand who is the enemy and who is the friend of their country."²²

On December 22, 1983, Radio Moscow stated: "A limited Soviet military contingent has been brought to Afghanistan. Its functions are also limited. Likewise limited is the length of stay in Afghanistan. The Soviet government has repeatedly stated that Soviet military detachments will be withdrawn as soon as intervention from outside ceases, but this is not happening so far." The commentator on Radio Moscow then placed all the responsibility for the situation in Afghanistan on the United States and "some" of its NATO allies. The message received by the Soviet listener conveyed the impression that everything depended on the United States.

A paragraph in *Krasnaia zvezda* indicated that, having failed as far as "the April revolution" was concerned, the Soviet Union then attempted to wear down the resistance: "And still, time has always been, is, and remains the best medicine. Even against political ailments. It removes the shroud of deceit and misconceptions, opening the eyes of more and more new people in Afghanistan."²³ The true meaning of this paragraph was that sooner or later the Afghans would have to reconcile themselves to the sovietization of their country. In the meantime, a young Soviet-educated ad-

ministration was to be formed and then the Soviet forces were to leave Afghanistan.

High-ranking Soviet military officials in Afghanistan seemed to have no doubts about the eventual triumph of Soviet policy. Thus, one Soviet general (apparently a prominent political officer) told a correspondent of *Krasnaia zvezda*: "Years will pass, and I—an old and grey-haired man by that time—will go with my grandchildren to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on a tourist pass."²⁴

30

Afghanistan and Soviet Dissidents

Julia Wishnevsky

In *Jane's Defence Weekly* John Gunston, a former British and Rhodesian army officer, reported that the war in Afghanistan was threatening to spread to the territory of the Soviet Union. Gunston spent some time with a group of insurgents belonging to the ultrareligious Hezbi-i-Islami party. He claimed that over the past two years, Hezbi-i-Islami had been distributing its leaflets in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and that the number of members of Hezbi-i-Islami within the USSR had reached three thousand. Gunston also stated that one of the commanders of the Afghan *mujahideen* would regularly cross the Amu-Darya into the Soviet Union to disseminate political propaganda and to discuss the laws and ideals of Islam with Soviet Muslims.¹

Thus, for example, in mid-March of 1983 the bulletin *Vesti iz SSSR*, published in Munich, reported the arrest of five people charged with circulating leaflets protesting against the war in Afghanistan in Dushanbe, in the second half of 1982. They were also charged with distributing false announcements of the deaths of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan "with the aim of provoking discontent" among the population, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and membership in an anti-Soviet organization. Although charged under the Criminal Code of the Tajik SSR, they were transferred to Moscow for investigation and held in the KGB central pretrial detention prison at Lefortovo. According to *Vesti iz SSSR*, it was "claimed that those arrested are connected with the Afghan partisans."²

Apparently, the war in Afghanistan had led to the emergence of quite a large volume of Tajik samizdat material. According to one source, samiz-

dat was very widely circulated,³ but it had not reached the West. A possible reason for this was the unwillingness of Soviet Muslims to establish links with "infidel" dissidents in Moscow and, through them, with accredited Western journalists living in the Soviet capital. Otherwise, at least some Tajik and Uzbek samizdat material would undoubtedly have filtered through to the West.

The samizdat statements of the Lezghin writer Iskander Kaziev (exiled from his native Daghestan to the settlement of Ugledar in Donetsk Oblast for his involvement in the Lezghin nationalist movement) did reach the West. His assessment of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan reflected no specific sense of solidarity among the Muslim peoples: "We feel our guilt and remorse like the right-minded Germans in Germany on September 1, 1939, when the German army invaded Poland."⁴ This theme of guilt and national responsibility for the crimes of their own government was more characteristic of Russian samizdat than of the samizdat of other peoples of the USSR. The main theme of Kaziev's statement was an appeal in defense of Andrei Sakharov, who had been the first of the Moscow dissidents to condemn the occupation of Afghanistan in an interview with ABC correspondent Charles Birbauer on January 17, 1980.⁵ Five days later, on January 22, the KGB intercepted Sakharov on the street and subsequently exiled him to Gorkii without trial.⁶ Even in exile, however, Sakharov had not stopped protesting against the war in Afghanistan.⁷

For Sakharov, the invasion of Afghanistan was "the most sharply negative manifestation of Soviet policy," above all because of the suffering that it brought to the Afghan people,⁸ and also because "the events in Afghanistan have fundamentally changed the world political situation":

They have struck a blow at détente, they have created a direct threat to peace not only in that region but everywhere. . . . Soviet actions have promoted (and could not avoid promoting) an increase in military budgets and implementation of new military programs in all major countries.⁹

It is the general change in the world balance of power caused by the invasion of Afghanistan and other concurrent events that are the underlying reasons for the nonratification of the SALT II treaty.¹⁰

The shadow of the Afghan war was a constant theme of Russian samizdat. Almost a month after the invasion of Afghanistan, the Moscow Group for Furthering the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR devoted one of its documents to this event.¹¹ Nine other well-known Moscow dissidents joined the Helsinki group in making this protest. The Action Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids appealed

to the International Red Cross to give aid to Afghans who had become invalids as a result of the war.¹² In one way or another the theme of Afghanistan found its way into various samizdat journals.¹³

Accusations of criticizing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were made in the trials of Anatolii Marchenko; Viacheslav Bakhmin, one of the founders of the Working Commission for the Investigation of the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes; Aleksei Smirnov, one of the compilers of *The Chronicle of Current Events*; Dmitrii Mazur, a Ukrainian political prisoner; and Leonid Malyshev, a mechanical engineer from the city of Cherkassy in the Ukraine who wrote an open letter in January 1980 to the newspaper *Izvestiia* entitled "Get the Troops Out of Afghanistan." Copies of the letter were also sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU and to Academician Sakharov in Gorkii.¹⁴ The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Iosyf Terelia related that in March 1980, during his compulsory treatment in the Dnepropetrovsk psychiatric hospital, guards and local KGB officials interrogated him about his attitude toward the dispatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan,¹⁵ while he was still recovering from the administration of drugs.

References in samizdat to the war in Afghanistan could be found in the most unexpected contexts. An article by the Pentecostal Galina Barats about the persecution of the family of Stefaniia Levitskaya in the village of Kachanovka in the Ternopol Oblast described how "they threatened to set fire to her house and to send her son to Afghanistan."¹⁶ Afghanistan figured very frequently in anonymous leaflets distributed by SMOT (Free Interprofessional Workers' Association) calling for a boycott of the "Lenin Subbotniks"¹⁷ and in the statement of the "Action Group for Popular Democracy."¹⁸ Although in these documents events in Afghanistan were mentioned only in passing, in the "Memorandum" and the "Proclamations" of the Democratic National Front of the Soviet Union the invasion of Afghanistan was featured at the very beginning of the "Memorandum," and the recall of the Soviet army from Afghanistan was the first demand made by the authors of the "Proclamation" to the Soviet government. These materials had been circulated in Estonia in June 1981.¹⁹

Solidarity with the Afghans seemed particularly strong among the Baltic peoples. An open letter from twenty-one inhabitants of the Baltic republics to the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to the UN secretary-general, and to the Afghan people bore the same date as Charles Birbauer's interview with Sakharov. In this letter, the first collective protest against the invasion of Afghanistan, representatives of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peoples referred to the Soviet government's invocation of the treaty of friendship, good neighborly relations, and

cooperation between the Soviet and Afghan peoples to justify its aggression: "The Baltic countries had similar treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the USSR, and in 1940 the Soviet Union used these treaties as a pretext to bring in troops."²⁰

An article entitled "Our Boys Are Perishing in Afghanistan," published under the pseudonym S. Ziemys in the Lithuanian samizdat journal *Ausra*, stated: "After invading a quiet land, unaffected by any political struggle, the occupiers launched a fratricidal war. Representatives of other nations are also forced to participate in this war: Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians. Under oppression themselves, they must obey the brutal orders of Russian officers and shed both their own and Afghan blood. . . ."²¹

Two years after Ziemys's article appeared, reports of pro-Afghan samizdat circulating in Central Asia reached the West.

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Eyewitness Report by a Soviet Deserter

NAUMOV: My name is Vladislav Naumov. I was born in the city of Volgograd, the former Stalingrad. I am twenty-one years old. I grew up and went to school in Volgograd. After secondary school, which I completed in 1979, I enrolled at the Astrakhan Marine College, from which I graduated with a navigator-engineer's certificate and with an assignment to the Volga-Gorkii Shipping Company. From there I was drafted into the army on 1 October 1982. Although my qualifications were related directly to the navy, I ended up serving in Afghanistan.

SALKAZANOVA: I asked Vladislav Naumov what he had known about Afghanistan before being drafted into the army and what he had known about the war in that country before he arrived there.

NAUMOV: In 1981 I met a chap in the "Ostrava" restaurant in Volgograd. He was very drunk and, as a result, was not in control of himself. In his rage, he burst out with imprecations against Soviet officers. Sitting on the steps of the restaurant building, he told me that Russian lads, eighteen to twenty years old, were dying in Afghanistan, and that the whole war was

A selection from one of a series of interviews conducted at Pashawar, Pakistan, by Radio Liberty correspondent Fatima Salkazanова with a former Soviet serviceman who served in Afghanistan, Vladislav Naumov.

a senseless waste of time. He had a lot of bad things to say about the insurgents too, but he did not spare the Soviet government as the cause of all this madness. I learned from this conversation that the life of our soldiers in Afghanistan was no picnic, and later I found out at first hand that the whole burden of the war falls on the enlisted men, who are fobbed off with medals and decorations—as if this could substitute for the deaths of their comrades and innocent Afghan people. As regards the press, the first article I read was in *Komsomolskaia pravda*. That article immediately provoked debates about the tasks of our soldiers in Afghanistan. The press, of course, writes very little about Afghanistan. Even now, with the war at its height and the situation of our lads becoming more and more difficult with every day that passes, the Soviet people think that things are returning to normal in Afghanistan and that our contingent is serving under the same conditions as it would in one of the people's democracies. . . . The war is only known to those people who have been directly affected by the Afghan problem—the soldiers themselves and the mothers who are the recipients of the white zinc coffins.

SALKAZANOVA: Please tell us how you were drafted into the army . . . and what kind of punishment would have awaited you if you had refused to participate in this war.

NAUMOV: After I received the summons from the military registration office—which I had to sign for on the doorstep so that I could not delay reporting for duty—I was called in to the draft office for a talk, together with my relatives. At the draft office, those of us who were draftees were told that we would be doing our service at the front. In other words, they gave us to understand that we would be sent to Afghanistan but, at the same time, avoided any direct mention of the war. The conditions at the recruiting center were terrible. The so-called medical commission rubber-stamped the words “fit for travel” without any checkups or questions. Finally, toward evening, the whole crowd of draftees was loaded to the gills. There was a great commotion at the recruiting center, with much cursing and fist fights. In order to cope with this wild behavior, the people in charge of the recruiting center had to call in mounted police. The draftees then realized that the police constituted no great obstacle to them and pelted them with empty bottles and curses. Toward nightfall, everyone collapsed exhausted, and at this point we were collected without resistance and taken to buses that drove us to the railroad station, where a train had been readied beforehand.

I learned about going abroad only after being told the number of my travel orders. All those who received orders with the number 280 were being sent abroad, to the people's democracies or to the Democratic Repub-

lic of Afghanistan. Later, the officers often tried to scare us by mentioning Afghanistan. The soldiers who accompanied our troop train kept on telling us: "Hang yourselves." We did not know who had made the decisions about us, but I can definitely say that my name was one of the first on the list at the recruiting center. I think that they had been watching me even before I was drafted, that an eye had been kept on me ever since school. At school I had practiced shooting and immediately gained a third-class rating. I also practiced karate, so I was already becoming what our warriors wanted me to be.

At Termez we built models of Afghan villages. Before every combat exercise, Major Makarov would constantly repeat: "Look in the direction of the village, there are the 'dushmans.'¹ Forward! Kill them! They kill completely innocent people!" And then the truly punitive operations would start. To begin with, we were armed to the teeth; some even rolled up the sleeves of their camouflage cloaks. Then we would attach the bayonets and silencers to our sharpshooter rifles and join the line. Under the cover of the infantry's combat vehicles we would raze the village to the ground. Then, working under the scorching sun, we would rebuild the model, all over again. We had training during the nights also. Without a sound we would capture house after house, fortress after fortress. We had bayonets and silencers attached to our rifles, and we learned to use them pretty skillfully. The major often repeated Suvorov's words: "The bullet is a fool, the bayonet—a stalwart. Hit with the bayonet and try to turn it around in the body." At Termez, they did not hide from us that we were being trained for Afghanistan. On the contrary, during these exercises we used combat arms—the same as we had in Afghanistan. Before the oath I could still have avoided service in Afghanistan, but after having been sworn in, I would have risked prison or a disciplinary battalion. The soldiers believe that it is better to spend a year in prison or a camp than serve one month in the disciplinary battalion.

From the city of Ashkhabad, I was shipped to Afghanistan aboard a plane. Although everyone knew where we were being taken to, Captain Kniaev, who was accompanying us, repeatedly talked of Poland for some reason. Knowing a little of what was going on in Poland, none of us had practically any doubt about our actual destination, but there was no firm opinion about it. The pilot would come out and say: "We're flying over the Alps." He was joking, but there was nothing improbable about this. Then he said: "We're flying over Poland," and, finally, when we were nearing the end of our flight, he came out of the pilot's cabin and informed us that we had landed in Warsaw. Only later did we learn that we were in Kabul, and this was because we met a group of soldiers, decorated with

medals and orders, who were being discharged. There were several wounded among them.

In Afghanistan I was sent to serve in the city of Jalalabad and was assigned to the large 66th Brigade. Jalalabad is considered to be a hot spot—there is hardly any difference between Jalalabad and Kandahar. The soldiers used to recite this verse: “If you want a bullet in your butt, then take a trip to Jalalabad.” The first thing that we faced in Jalalabad was the freedom of action on the part of the insurgents. For Soviet soldiers the territory in Afghanistan is too limited. Only 18 percent of the territory is under occupation. On May Day, the insurgents opened mortar fire. Shells fell next to the tents occupied by soldiers. There were dead and wounded. The number of dead and wounded was concealed from us. It is very difficult to estimate the number of casualties in Afghanistan, as in Jalalabad alone two or three and maybe even more persons are killed every week. The estimate provided by Western experts—twenty to twenty-five thousand—is just a fraction of the casualties. What can Western theoreticians say without leaving their offices? I would better advise them to set up an organization for rescuing the servicemen and providing material aid. This would be more effective.

The question of relations among soldiers—between the so-called old men and the young ones—is the principal scourge as far as “the limited contingent” is concerned. In this connection, one may accord the first place to nationality relations between officers and men. Commanding officers often take advantage of this to maintain order and discipline. One officer, for example, told me that he prefers to staff his company with Georgians. Here it may be noted that soldiers are recruited into companies so as to form national majorities and in order of their being drafted. For example, the company’s commanding officer would take only Russians first, but second time around he would take young Turkmen soldiers. And here national tensions would begin. Finally, the first Russian recruits are discharged and the Turkmen, who by this time had been trained by slaps from the Russians, become “old men,” and the commanding officer then gets a new complement consisting exclusively of Russian soldiers this time. And a new round of humiliations begins. From this, one can draw the conclusion that officers are interested in maintaining such a state of affairs—they are the real instigators of antagonisms, and this is why there is no unity among soldiers and why they cannot present their suggestions and complaints en masse, as a body. In the Soviet army, soldiers prefer to be each for himself and not one for all. As far as the officers are concerned, the soldiers simply hate them; only in exceptional cases are they respected or appreciated.

SALKAZANOVA: It is being said that Soviet soldiers are the neediest soldiers in the world and that the system of "self-supply" is very popular in the Soviet army—even in Afghanistan. Is this true?

NAUMOV: Yes, soldiers try in any possible way to procure what is necessary. Mainly it is watches, jeans, and various trinkets that fill the Afghan shops to overflow. Many buy *mummyo*,² cigarettes, drugs, vodka, "Diplomat" briefcases. Where do the soldiers get Afghan currency? During punitive expeditions, they engage not only in extermination but also in plunder. A countryman of mine—an officer who had been on a first-name basis with me—used to tell me that his soldiers had a lot of money. "They plunder, but I do not put a stop to them." The second method—the most popular one—consists of selling things. I have already mentioned that everything is for sale by everybody. The commanding officer of a tank battalion took a whole fortune home with him. He used to deal in diesel oil. To judge by everything, the system of "self-supply" does not apply here. It is rather a system of plundering, profiteering and fraud. . . .

The mood of the Soviet soldier? The first thing that strikes one is total indifference. This indifference can be noticed in combat, in one's treatment of military technology. Of course, the soldiers are unhappy with the war and with Afghanistan on the whole. I believe that if this continues much longer, the results will be very costly for those who have cooked up this mess. It seems to me that the soldiers need only some officer leaders to turn their arms in the other direction. It is now time to pay attention to Afghanistan. What is needed is only a beginning and then, I think, the soldiers themselves will start joining the insurgents. Of course, this depends not only on the soldiers but on the officers as well. And, first and foremost, this depends on the West. One should counter propaganda. It is the communist regime's only base. This is its root. And if you cut the roots, something unprecedented may happen. Thus one could liberate not only the Afghan people but Russia itself. There are rumors circulating among soldiers about a free Russian unit in Afghanistan. Vadim Plotnikov, for example, left his detachment in order to find this unit. Maybe it does not exist, but the soldiers want it to be. Many claim to have seen it. According to rumors, this unit was formed by soldiers from our Jalalabad brigade.

SALKAZANOVA: Do the Soviet soldiers believe that they are fighting in Afghanistan against former mercenaries?

NAUMOV: The myth about mercenaries has been shattered, as the saying goes. The soldiers know that at present there are no foreign forces in Afghanistan, with the exception of the Soviet ones. The officers allege that Afghanistan swarms with foreign forces. During one operation the officer cried to us: "Look, the mercenaries!" I looked through my rifle's tele-

scopic sight. People in uniform were moving in my direction, and their actions bore no resemblance to those of ordinary insurgents. One could see that the soldiers had completed military training. Several other snipers—friends of mine—were sitting next to me. The junior officer asked us to be more attentive and to hit the bull's-eye, as they say. I fired a shot, and a so-called mercenary fell to the ground. When we reached the body, we saw that it was an Afghan in a liberation uniform. The officer, who had alleged that this was a mercenary, fell silent.

SALKAZANOVA: And what do the Soviet soldiers tell about their combat "deeds," about their "heroic" actions in Afghanistan?

NAUMOV: Those soldiers who have been in combat talk about their adventures mainly to young and inexperienced troops. One will not hear such talk among themselves—*i.e.*, among the veterans. Of course, some soldiers want to avenge the death of their comrades by striking at the insurgents, but let's not hurry with conclusions. For they also know whose fault it really is, but one can understand them. And as for deeds. . . . What kind of deeds are possible in this war? Maybe just that we tried to rescue each other's life. But in combat one has no choice. They shoot at you, and you shoot back in order to survive. . . .

I have already talked a little about punitive operations, and therefore I am not going to dwell on this question. I am ashamed of my past. . . . Still, I would like to recount a small episode related to this topic.

In May 1983 I arrived at the post guarding a certain section of the Kabul-Jalalabad road. Not having yet familiarized myself with the post, I was doing repair work on two combat vehicles. These two tanks had been knocked out during one of the punitive expeditions. The damages were slight, and I quickly finished the job in one day. I still had the evening and the morning to myself. During the night I had to do guard duty like everyone else. I took a bath, changed, and waited for supper. There was still plenty of time until supper and I was loitering about the post. All of a sudden I heard crude cursing from beyond the crossing. The cursing was so loud that everybody around stopped working and looked at the mound where two soldiers were chasing a man whose hands were tied. The man's face was swollen, there were fresh scratches, his mouth was bleeding. Having brought the man to the tanks, they forced the Afghan prisoner to his knees. "Well, what shall we do with him?" There came two junior officers. They were very drunk, and it seemed that they were supporting each other in order not to fall down. The tall soldier reported to the drunken officer about the prisoner. The officer looked at the Afghan and, smiling crookedly, said: "This beast is unworthy of prison. As soldiers, we must shoot him." "No," mumbled the second officer, "such a cur must be hung in the

sun with his head down so that he can slowly realize against whom he decided to fight." "Hey, you rotten soul! What's happening here?" asked a lieutenant who had just arrived on the scene. "We have caught a ghost," quickly rapped out the words of the tall soldier. The Afghan was squatting on his knees and was wiping blood from his face with his tied hands. "Well, we'll square the accounts with you yet. . . . Shoot him!" commanded the officer. The same two soldiers lifted the man and dragged him to the combat vehicle. "Bring an automatic rifle," commanded the lieutenant. The Afghan realized what was happening and started saying something in his own language. No one listened to him. Everybody stood around and watched, waiting to see what came next. "Automatic rifles are under lock," reported the tall one. "All right, we'll manage without a bullet. C'mon, boys, let's lift him closer to the gun." The officer climbed into the turret. The soldiers hung the Afghan on the gun barrel by wrapping his tied hands around it. "Load!"—came the order. The gun's bolt clicked. "Move aside!"—hollered the officer. "Disperse!" The order again: "Fire!" The gun roared. A cloud of smoke and dust hung over the combat vehicle. There was silence. When the smoke died away, there was no one hanging on the gun barrel. The shell had blown away the man's whole body. We all dispersed. There was a dog running around us that was obviously mad with hunger. It was growling and whining. I went to the mess hall in the hope of getting some food soon. My hope came true and, having filled half of my mess kit with porridge, if you can call it that, I trudged along to get some tea and stood in line waiting. While waiting, I ate half my porridge. Next to me there stood a bespectacled sergeant. And suddenly this sergeant cried: "Hey, hey, go away, you dirty beast!" I didn't quite get what happened. There in front of me stood the dog with a chunk of meat in its teeth. I looked closer and saw that it had brought the hand of the man that had been shot. Just a glance at this hand was enough to make me choke on my food. In rage I threw my mess kit aside and went away, but the others continued eating as if nothing had happened.

SALKAZANOVA: Is it true that there are many drug addicts among the Soviet soldiers? Is it true that more Soviet soldiers are dying from disease than from the bullets of the Afghan insurgents?

NAUMOV: Little notice is paid to breaches of army discipline in the Fortieth Army. For beating a young soldier half to death a regular may only be cautioned by an officer. Drugs? Nobody can deal with them because a great deal of drugs are being used. There are these tablets. For the most part they smoke hashish and cocaine. There are also those who shoot. There are not many of them, of course, but there are some. The soldiers get hold of drugs by means of sale and exchange. They sell literally every-

thing possible: fat, butter, canned goods, soap, hardware, and arms and ammunition.

One could talk forever about the living conditions of the Soviet soldier in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. I will not touch on all the problems; I am writing a book about this. I would like to read some excerpts from my drafts.

"In July it was terribly hot. The thermometer crept over 60 degrees. We took refuge from this hell either in the river or in a smoking area where a camouflage net had been spread out. We quickly became weak and dried out in the heat. At that time the sick bays were not in a position to accept people with heat stroke. I know of nine cases of heat stroke that proved fatal. How many soldiers altogether have died in Afghanistan not from bullets but from disease and the negligence of their commanders? More than half, I am sure. The diagnoses were: first, heat stroke—every one of us had that—vomiting, severe giddiness, high temperature, stomach pains, all the symptoms of dysentery; the doctors took heat stroke for dysentery and packed the sick off to the infectious section. Second, pneumonia—it's not considered a disease in Afghanistan. To this day I have no idea whether it is an infectious disease or not. I lay in the infectious section with pneumonia. They discharged me on the fourth day when my temperature fell. The doctor I ended up with in reception could not even establish a diagnosis. 'All the symptoms of typhus,' he said. 'My lung hurts,' I corrected him. He listened to me and wrote pneumonia in my case history.

"On one operation we sat in the mountain for seven hours without water in 65-degree heat under the open sky. Sat, or rather stood, because it was impossible to sit, in the proper sense of the word, on the rock. It was red-hot like a stove. But our commander, of course, had water and food, and they provided him with shelter from the heat with a shroud tent. I repeat, we sat there seven hours, and then a signal came: 'Operation canceled, all back to base.' Down below there was a small mountain rivulet. The soldiers went leaping down from the mountains to the water. We avidly drank our fill of water, and the sweat poured off us. Our clothing got soaked and then dried out and became white from the crystals of salt that dried on it. Some jumped straight into the water with their clothes on in order to wash off the sweat and dirt. They either had a cardiac arrest or brain hemorrhage from the abrupt fall in temperature. Many lost consciousness. Those who had not gone into the water grabbed them and dragged them out just so they would survive. Another diagnosis is no less dangerous and serious. That is Botkin's disease, jaundice, or hepatitis. . . . In Afghanistan almost everybody caught hepatitis—some two or three times. A person who has contracted hepatitis remains a cripple for life. This

disease is highly infectious. It is enough for one to catch it, and you have a whole epidemic that is impossible to stop. The doctors are faced with the problem of what to do. Two or three wounded, and during an operation maybe ten or fifteen, but the rest, even in the surgical section, are down with hepatitis. Some soldiers have whole bunches of diseases. Andrei Gulkov, for instance, had a broken rib, jaundice, and malaria. You have typhus and jaundice, dysentery and pneumonia, and so on. In some areas of Afghanistan oriental boils are rampant. The bites of Leishmanian midges leave deep sores, and there are lice all year round. Lice are the scourge of the Soviet army." Well, perhaps that's enough of excerpts.

SALKAZANOVA: Do the Soviet soldiers know about the fate of defectors?

NAUMOV: Many talk about defectors and think that the insurgents take revenge on them right away. Officers often cited examples of such actions by the partisans. So those who defect are those in quite a hopeless situation. To me it was all the same whether they killed me or not. The soldiers know nothing of prisoners of war. Can there really be prisoners? They kill them all. This is also the influence of political studies. So it is very difficult to get taken prisoner in battle. What question can there be? Some soldiers leave the last bullet for themselves.

SALKAZANOVA: What methods and what weapons do the Soviet forces use to fight the soldiers of the Afghan liberation movement?

NAUMOV: Many people are talking about scorched earth tactics all over the world. This war is very much like the war against the Basmachi—only technology is employed, of course, in all its applications. The main weapon, obviously, is the air force. Mi-8 and 24 helicopters operate very effectively. The BM-23 rocket launchers, code-named "Grad," are used. The rocket warheads are filled with napalm. Napalm is widely used in Afghanistan. The artillery shells are for the most part all fragmentation mortar shells. Aerial cluster bombs are also used. Thirty or fifty small charges—ten-kilogram bombs—separate from one bomb, and these destroy one square kilometer of terrain. An operation begins with an artillery and "Grad" rocket barrage, then the helicopters are used; they bomb one specific area. Behind them, under cover of armored vehicles, come the infantry and assault troops that carry out the bloody reprisals in Afghan villages.

SALKAZANOVA: When, how, and why did you get the desire to go over to the side of the Afghan insurgents, and how did you realize this desire?

NAUMOV: On one occasion an Afghan came to me and asked if I couldn't steal some ammunition and arms for him. I refused, but I thought that he could still be of use to me, so I didn't report him. Then all this story with the food started. The partisans cut the road that linked us with

Kabul. There began to be interruptions in the supply of foodstuffs. In the dining hall they gave us porridge teeming with insects and revolting mashed potatoes made of rotten maggoty potatoes. I suggested to the lads that we refuse to eat it. That day nobody ate it. Then I was called to the special section. An officer threatened me. I had developed a downright hatred of our commanders. They ate decent food, they and their toadies. I helped the Afghans with arms and ammunition. Of course, I never took money from them for it, but then the KGB discovered me all the same. I couldn't stand the nervous strain and ran. They caught me after three days. Already by then I had firmly resolved to escape when any suitable chance offered itself. They caught me and put me in the brigade prison. There I was severely beaten and made a monkey of. I spent a month in solitary, in a cell two meters by one. The specials wanted to finish me off. In all this time I ate two loaves of black bread and drank sixty mugs of water. After that diet I lost nearly forty kilograms. In the cell it was dark. During the day it was very hot and stuffy from the evaporation of water heavily charged with chlorine that they continually poured over me. Outside it was terribly hot, and the water evaporated on one's eyes and the chlorine bit into one's eyes. My whole body itched from the lice, and my hands were permanently tied. Stuck in all this filth, enduring the nightmare of night attacks, seeing what the officers ate and what they fed us with, the fear of death, the disgust at the orders we were given, at the murders, at the bombing of villages—how, after all that, could one believe that the USSR is the finest, the most just, the greatest country in the world.

I was born in Russia and escaped from it. I simply could not take all this horror. I had a little longer to sit in that cell and then my path would lead to Kabul, to the central army prison. Finally, one fine day, the door was thrown open and an escort ordered "Out!" I went out. I was taken through a long corridor to the street. At the gates stood a GAZ-24. "Get in!" ordered a lieutenant. I got in. Two soldiers sat down on the sides. The car started. The lieutenant asked me, "Have you any complaints?" "No," I replied. I was sitting on the back seat and sweat poured off me in streams. The car stopped at the special section. "Out!" I got out and they took me to an office. There was nobody in the office. I sat there alone. There was water standing on the table. I had a great desire to drink, an overpowering desire to drink. A major opened the door. He came in and sat down opposite me behind a large writing desk. The major began the conversation gently and calmly; he even pretended that he sympathized with me. "Come on now, let's introduce ourselves. I'm Major Miroshnik, an investigator of the special section." "Vladislav Naumov." "Fine, now we know each other. Think carefully and try to remember everything that the man

you passed the arms to asked you about." I suddenly had the bright idea that I need not hurry because I had Kabul waiting for me. I said that he had asked me some details but I had told him nothing. I realized that the major was a *chekist* [secret police agent], that he was not in the least interested in the arms; he did not ask me even once how many and what I had passed on. The major adopted a very restrained and tactical stance. "So, Vladislav, you must help us; we must catch your friend. You see, this matter is rather more complicated than you think. This man may have been recruited by the Pakistani or some other intelligence service. We must catch him." "Yes, I understand." "So you must meet with him, understand? You definitely must meet with him, but there's the question how. I don't have time now but tomorrow we will try to think something up." They drove me back again to the prison. With these conversations I had missed dinner and supper; the whole day I had had nothing to eat. I asked the escort for some bread, my ration. In reply I got one in the liver. "Had enough?" "Yes, thanks." The following day the car came at the same time. They took me to the same place, into the same office. The major met me with a smile. "Come over to me!" He chatted to me, as to a friend or someone even closer. I sat down on the chair. The major moved his desk closer to me, spread out a newspaper and brought out from somewhere a can of stew and a piece of white bread, an onion, and salt. I set about opening the can, and the major came to help me. "Eat up, eat up, and when you have had a bit to eat, lie down and sleep, rest, we have much to do today." I had something to eat, wrapped up the remains in the newspaper, lay down on a big couch, and fell asleep there. I was roused by the major, who had a hunting knife in his hands. "This is for you. Take it with you whatever happens. After all, he may not come alone and he may be armed. If you notice he has a weapon, don't be afraid, stick it in boldly, but not to kill. I need him." The major's eyes flashed with the excitement of a hunter. "Now, don't hesitate. If you catch him, I'll put in a word for you. After all, he's guilty too, and why should you take all the responsibility alone?" Miroshnik took me for a child, he thought I would sell out Akhmat to get a lesser term for myself. But in this case it was the gallows. We reached the place. Miroshnik posted guards and then kept me covered. I saw all this and did not dare to make any unnecessary movement.

I had prepared my flight carefully. In the cell I had thought out every detail, counted the steps, the minutes, the seconds. For safety's sake I had decided to postpone my flight until evening. It got dark quickly and that would help me. Miroshnik's car pulled up, I was brought out of the cell, and we set off. The major ordered the car to stop a hundred meters from the place. I got out of the car and went over to my former tank, sat down

on the turret, and waited for darkness. Beside me, leaning on the machine gun, sat a friend of mine, from the same part of the country, a fine chap. I am very fond of him. He brought me a can of water and a packet of sugar. "Eat, eat, while nobody is here. If anyone comes, I'll let you know. Ah, Vladya, what is to become of you! If you can, run! The lads won't shoot at you. My advice to you," he repeated, "is run! Run, you'll be alive, and there you'll see." My heart ached at the idea of parting from Andrei, from my bosom friend. More than once we had covered each other in battle, together we had fed the lice, were face to face with death, shared our joys and sorrow. For another hour we sat there and chatted, and then Miroshnik came up to us. Andrei had been dragged into my case, and I knew that, if I were to get away, I would be saving both myself, and him, and another comrade. Miroshnik came up: "Right, off you go, don't dally. And you keep a good watch and, if there's anything, cut off the road with the machine gun. If he runs, mow him down." When the major uttered these words, I had already moved a little way away from the tank, but the major spoke especially loudly so that I could hear what was in store for me. I went on. I moved further and further. And then there came Miroshnik's savage roar: "What are you looking at, you brutes, fire, fire, get on with it!" But the machine gun remained silent. Behind me, at three times my height, tracer bullets flew over my head; my friends were seeing me off. What became of Andrei, I do not know. But Miroshnik was put away. For how long? But is that important? Subsequently, when I was already in safety, the KGB offered the commander of the detachment to which I went over a large sum of money, but that man was very fond of me and quite simply answered the KGB: "Even if you promise me all of Moscow, I will not hand back people to be tortured."

In that man's family, I got to know his brother, a fine, bold and courageous man. He endured the purges of Amin and Taraki, and Karmal, of course, locked him up in prison, where they tortured him with the electric shock treatment. He began to lose his sight from these tortures. The KGB was involved in that, of course, too.

SALKAZANOVA: And how is the war in Afghanistan affecting the minds of Soviet young people?

NAUMOV: Of course, this war does not have such a strong influence. I mean on all Soviet young people. As regards those who have fought in Afghanistan, they are for some reason regarded as the silent ones. Among those of his own age, among his friends, such a one does, of course, enjoy some authority, but when it comes to talking about the war, he doesn't. As a rule, these people sign an undertaking not to talk. In general, of course, the Soviet army does influence the minds of young people. After the army,

a person becomes shy because he has fallen two or three years behind people of his own age. As a rule, in the army young people lose their identity, which is, of course, advantageous for our political leadership. If someone gets to thinking, let him think, but he does not dare to voice his thoughts because he knows from the example of the army how deeply he can get in the mire. I think that the Soviet army is the epicenter of the destruction of a man's character. And I am not going to conceal the fact that very few young people after the army continue their studies in secondary, technical, or higher institutions. The army, as a rule, destroys a man—that is, the human in him—with its slavish, overwhelming toil. In a company, for example, there are 120 men of various ages. The sergeant, who is the direct commander for the private, is eighteen or nineteen. The one who is given the orders is twenty-seven. These luckless ones, who end up in the army after going to an institute, endure humiliation not only from the sergeants but also from the regulars. Of course, at twenty-six or twenty-seven, it is already difficult to break a person's character, but I have seen some who have run to wash the socks of the regulars. And such a man has a wife and child at home.

SALKAZANOVA: According to reports from the Soviet Union, very many Soviet draftees voluntarily write applications to be sent to the war in Afghanistan. How do you explain this?

NAUMOV: Yes, many do write to be sent to Afghanistan. How can I explain it to you? In my view, they are people who have absolutely no idea of what Afghanistan is about. Such people are, as a rule, the victims of romantic ideas about glory. I can tell them that war is no game of summer lightning. There is very little romantic about it. In the final analysis there are times when glory and romantics have to be paid for with one's life. To judge from such applications, one can say that Soviet citizens know very little about the unjust war in Afghanistan.

SALKAZANOVA: Have you heard that Nikolai Ryzhkov and Aleksandr Voronov, who also went over to the side of the insurgents in Afghanistan, are now living in America?

NAUMOV: Yes, we read in the newspaper *Russkaia mysl*, which we receive regularly, that Resistance International carried out this very complicated and very useful operation. I think that a little more attention needs to be paid to such things. Of course, this is a major and very useful work. We are, after all, Russians, and we must take a direct part in liberating our homeland. Just by the fact that we are living witnesses of the war the USSR is waging in Afghanistan, we have annoyed our political leadership. What would we like to advise or wish Nikolai and Shura? Of course, one cannot, just because one is far away from the homeland, avert one's

eyes from the tragedy. One must do whatever possible to oppose the war, even if this may incur savage reprisals. It is your duty to us. Take courage, friends, and do not forget that you are not alone; there's us too, defectors and prisoners; we are many, we are of different nationalities, of different faiths, but we are in captivity, while you are in freedom. So act!

SALKAZANOVA: What would you like to broadcast to your relatives in the Soviet Union and what would you like to say to young Soviet draftees?

NAUMOV: We would like to address ourselves to those people who know us well. Don't worry about us, there is no need to be oversentimental; we have not betrayed you, and we will never forget you. It may happen that we have to die or go away to a distant foreign country. Don't think badly of us. As long as we live, we are with you body and soul. My dear young friends, if you have to come to Afghanistan, don't forget one thing—that it is impossible to make war on an entire people. These are not my words, they are the words of a soldier prisoner of war. I am not calling on you to go over to the side of the insurgents or to go to the Free World. The only thing I do beg of you is to refuse to commit crimes. I would also like to address the mothers whose sons have fallen or are missing in the mountains of a foreign land. I am not going to try to reassure you: raise your heads, say your say, tell as much as you can about the unjust war, say just that your children died in Afghanistan.

IX The Unresolved Polish Crisis

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Soviet Dissidents on the Lessons of Poland

Mario Corti and Bohdan Nahajlo

The situation in Poland aroused enormous interest on all levels of Soviet society. Some of the unofficial reaction to the events in Poland could be gleaned from a samizdat report on the responses of Soviet citizens of diverse social backgrounds to a questionnaire compiled by the Paris journal *L'Alternative*.¹ The struggle of the Polish workers for their rights also did not fail to be reflected in the bulletins of SMOT (Free Interprofessional Workers' Association), the only independent trade-union organization in embryo still active in the Soviet Union.² A samizdat document telling of strikes at a bus factory in the city of Pavlovo in Gorkii Oblast in 1981 and 1982 described how at secret meetings workers circulated the highly significant slogan "If the [production] norms are raised, we'll do the same as in Poland."³ Moreover, Western correspondents who visited the mining city of Donetsk in December 1980 and questioned workers there were told the conditions that had led to worker unrest in Poland existed in a more extreme form in the Soviet Union.⁴

The events in Poland were the subject of an anonymous samizdat document entitled "The Polish Revolution" written apparently by a member of the "liberal" Moscow intelligentsia. According to the author, the Catholic Church, the intelligentsia, the peasantry, and the urban proletariat "consciously or unconsciously" showed the most resistance toward the communist regime, gradually securing significant concessions from the authorities. The circumstance that Polish ruling circles have at various times been compelled to reckon with these forces made Poland the most "liberal" but also the most unstable society in the socialist camp.

The formation in 1976 of the Committee for Social Self-Defense (KOR) was considered by the author a landmark in the recent history of the resistance of the Polish people to the regime. To this event he linked the rise

of a real political opposition in Poland, and he considered historically significant the emergence of a political consciousness among independent organizations. In contrast, the Soviet regime encountered no opposition because of the political vacuum in the Soviet Union. In the author's view, Soviet dissidents were incapable of presenting any serious resistance to the regime because of their deliberate policy of "no politics" and their "legalistic squabbling": "'Dissidents' in the Soviet Union despise all political reckoning, for they believe that only bad people consider the consequences of their actions, while good people should express their feelings spontaneously, without thinking what might result from them." He pointed out that "wherever laws are not applied and even made with no intention of applying them, legalistic squabbling simply substitutes for more productive forms of thinking, for which the dissidents have no aptitude."

In his opinion, a more fruitful form of opposition would have been a combination of both legal and illegal forms of open and underground activity. He alluded to this in describing the activities of the KOR in Poland. He entitled the last chapter "Their [the authorities'] Last Battle"—words used by the press spokesman for "Solidarity," Karol Modzelewski. By doing so, he made clear that he did not believe "in the durability of the Polish military dictatorship," as it attempted to defeat "Solidarity." In the title "The Polish Revolution"⁵ he indicated that he regarded the changes in Polish society as radical, profound, and irreversible.

Remarking that "events in Poland have been deliberately and systematically concealed from the Soviet citizen," the author concluded that "The Muse of History today speaks Polish. It is our job to teach her Russian."

Vasyl Stus, a leading Ukrainian dissident, expressed his views on developments in Poland in a document written in a Soviet labor camp.⁶ It was the most detailed commentary on this issue that emerged from Ukrainian dissident circles. Moreover, it contained a candid critique of the self-imposed limits of Soviet dissent. Having followed events in Poland with great interest since his return to the Ukraine from internal exile in the remote Magadan Oblast in the fall of 1979, Stus unreservedly admired the emancipatory efforts of the Poles: "Long live the volunteers on behalf of freedom! Their defiance of Soviet despotism is exhilarating. Their all-embracing popular upheavals impress: the workers, the intelligentsia, the students—everyone is involved, except the army and the police. If events continue to take this course, tomorrow the flames will also envelop the army. What will the Brezhnev and the Jaruzelskis do then?" Stus averred that "in the totalitarian world" there was no other nation that defended its

human and national rights as resolutely as the Poles and declared: "I regret that I am not a Pole."

In Stus's opinion, psychologically the Ukrainians are probably closer than any other of the Soviet peoples to the Poles, but he described them as lacking the most important element that consolidated the Poles—"ardent patriotism." For this reason, he argued that the Ukraine was "regrettably" not ready "to take lessons from its Polish teacher." He wrote: "The trade-union way to liberation would also be exceptionally effective in the USSR. If the initiatives made by the engineer Khlebanov⁷ were supported throughout the country, the government of the USSR would be faced with probably the most up-to-date antagonist."

The Polish experience, according to Stus, highlighted the weaknesses of the Helsinki movement in the Soviet Union: "Had it been a mass movement of popular initiative with a broad program of social and political demands and had it aimed eventually to take power, then it would have had some prospect of success."

Stus was not the first Ukrainian to advocate the broadening of the social base of dissent in the Ukraine and the creation of independent trade unions. Shortly before the birth of "Solidarity," a Ukrainian dissident group calling itself the Ukrainian Patriotic Group issued an appeal on behalf of Vladimir Khlebanov and called on Ukrainian workers to establish free trade unions at their places of work.⁸ Iurii Lytvyn, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki monitoring group, was particularly interested in forging an alliance between Ukrainian dissidents and workers. He wrote a study entitled "The Soviet State and the Soviet Working Class," and its unfinished manuscript was confiscated during a search of his home in August 1979.⁹ In November 1980 Mykola Pohyba, a previously unknown Ukrainian worker, for a time imprisoned in the same labor camp in the Kiev Oblast as Lytvyn, wrote in an open letter that "recent events in Poland have clearly shown that the working class is capable of waging a struggle for its rights and freedoms, for a real improvement of its well-being, and that the efficacy of this struggle depends on the degree of solidarity of the working class and on its level of self-organization."¹⁰

During the rise of Solidarity, it was reported that several strikes took place in a number of Ukrainian cities and towns.¹¹ Throughout the Polish crisis, the Ukrainian authorities were displaying anxiety about its possible spillover effect and were tightening controls.¹² Yet in February and March 1983, leaflets supporting Solidarity and urging workers to strike were reportedly circulated in the Western Ukraine.¹³

Stus's reflections evidenced an increasing sense of disillusionment with

traditional forms of open and legalistic dissent in the USSR. The major offensive against all forms of dissent launched in the latter part of 1979 made this type of activity appear increasingly futile and inappropriate. Anonymous appeals from other sources were made for clandestine, more militant, and broader-based resistance.¹⁴ It was possible that the restrained, apolitical phase of Soviet dissidence, as exemplified by the Helsinki monitoring groups, had already had its day.

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Poland's Underground Press

Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka

Underground publishing in Poland is part of a tradition almost two centuries old that began when Poland lost its independent statehood. More recently it began with the Workers' Defense Committee information sheets of 1976 about the repression of workers who had protested against food price increases. These publications spawned a regularly appearing information bulletin, the unofficial workers' paper *Robotnik*, several sociopolitical and literary periodicals, and even independent publishing houses, the most important of which was NOWA. Most of these unofficial publications were accessible only to the initiated intelligentsia—through the channels of democratic opposition activists—and to a small group of workers in contact with the free trade unions on the Baltic coast and in the Silesian coal basin.

The independent network of information that challenged the official monopoly of information was an important factor in the success of the August 1980 strikes. The daily bulletin of the strike in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk gave its name *Solidarność* (Solidarity) to the independent labor movement which then developed its own information and communication network, drawing on the experience of the democratic opposition press. In the ensuing boom in publications, virtually every factory, enterprise, and institute had its own Solidarity newsletter. The regional union chapters often had sophisticated weekly publications, produced on modern printing equipment, much of it donated by Western labor organizations.

Such publications, intended "for internal circulation only," were officially exempt from censorship. The authorities, however, soon branded many of them "antisocialist." There were repeated cases of harassment and

Solidarity members involved in the publication or distribution of the union press even had been physically assaulted.¹ In the autumn of 1981 several union publishers were tried on charges such as "undermining confidence in the socialist system and economy, and presenting Polish-Soviet relations in a false light," or "inciting to actions directed against the PPR's unity with allied countries."²

The First Martial Law Publications The declaration of martial law in December 1981 struck first and foremost at union publications. Telephones and telex lines were cut, much of the printing, duplicating, and recording equipment was destroyed or impounded, and Solidarity offices were sealed. Many union publishers and journalists were interned. These tactics, however, did not silence the free press because it had become an established part of Polish life. Fliers bearing slogans, appeals, and calls to resistance appeared on the very first day of martial law, shortly followed by information bulletins, lists of the interned, and protest songs and verse. They appeared spontaneously throughout the country, with a few rare exceptions manifestly the work of amateurs primarily concerned with passing on information and bearing witness to the facts. Most of the early publications were single-page, typed, and even handwritten carbon-copied bulletins. They often carried the words: "read, copy, pass on." Many titles appeared and then disappeared—largely as a result of exposure resulting from lack of experience with the rules of clandestine work.

The underground editors remained anonymous. (The only known exception was Bogdan Borusewicz, a democratic opposition activist from the period before August 1980, who signed the *Gdańsk Independent Information Service* with his own name.) Usually, the masthead of the publications carried resistance slogans such as "The eagle [the Polish national symbol] shall not be vanquished by the crow [a pun on the Polish acronym for the military regime WRON]" or "Edited by the team, printed by the team, and distributed by the team. As a team we shall prevail . . .," or captions such as "Editorial address known only to the editorial team." The address was very often a mobile one: a room in a workers' hostel, a friend's cellar, a garage, a craftsman's workshop, or a farmer's shed.

As life under martial law began to fall into a pattern and as restrictions were gradually eased and people became more familiar with the new conditions, the underground press became increasingly "institutionalized" and permanent. By the beginning of April 1982 one of the underground weeklies in Warsaw could offer its readers a review of the clandestine press in different parts of the country.³ Shortly afterward a list of 149 separate titles was published in the West. Two additional lists were compiled in Poland in August and December 1982, giving a total figure of 535 titles. The com-

plers estimated that at least 700 titles had appeared in 1982. Some 80 titles, with a total of 800 issues, had appeared in the Małopolska region in southern Poland alone.⁴

The main problem of the presses was finding ink, paper, and printing equipment. The declaration of martial law had brought stringent controls over the distribution and use of these "dangerous" items. The military commissars assigned to each factory, enterprise, and institution took a keen interest in company printing supplies and machinery. At the Synthetics and Paints Industry Institute in Gliwice even the typewriters were kept under lock and key, and a record of their use was kept.⁵ Such regulations could not last indefinitely, because the bulk of the workers refused to be intimidated and there were not enough informers. People began to construct primitive printing machinery with plastic bags, methylated spirit, kitchen tables, and pastry cooks' rolling pins.⁶ A somewhat more sophisticated method involved the use of ordinary colloid stencils, a technique used earlier for duplication of uncensored publications by the pre-Solidarity democratic opposition.

Paper and ink were available—though at a price—on the black market which, under martial law, was thriving more than ever. This expense presented a problem, since most underground publications were distributed free of charge. Only when individual publications became established, won regular readers, and set up reliable distribution channels did it prove possible to collect contributions from readers and establish publishing funds. The appeals for contributions were often accompanied by reminders that the funds "would be accounted for after the war by people enjoying popular confidence." Readers sent their contributions through the distributors of the underground press. Readers had pseudonyms, and each paper had a special column to acknowledge contributions, which also served as confirmation of receipt. Sometimes the contributions were in the form of paper or ink. The pseudonyms included symbolic and historical names, acronyms, initials, and numbers, puns and jokes, and even the names of prominent regime officials or local "collaborators."

A uniquely Polish phenomenon was the appearance of clandestine newsletters and papers in the internment camps, usually handwritten on scraps of paper. Behind bars, they helped maintain the internees' morale and, smuggled outside, they represented a solid front of resistance. At least twenty titles reached the West, including *Skrot* (Abbreviation), *Kipisz Codzienny* (Daily Inspection), *Kurier Wiezienny* (Prison Courier), and *Nasza Krata* (Our Bars).

One Year Later After initial chaos and improvisation, flash-in-the-

pan enthusiasts and amateurs were eliminated by natural selection. The first step in organization and consolidation of the underground press was the establishment of regular and permanent service to satisfy the readers' enormous thirst for undistorted information. This demand was, however, subject to ordinary market mechanisms, and it began to slump as the first euphoria subsided and the daily grind brought the dispirited masses back to the television set, too weary to go in search of independent information or give the often barely legible sheets more than a cursory glance.⁷ The free press responded by improving both the technical quality and the journalistic standards of its publications. Although the colloid stencil technique was still widely used, ordinary Xerox and screen process printing also became popular. Use of the offset method resulted in well-produced newspapers and even books on art quality paper.

The improvement of content was a direct outcome of the reestablishment of regional Solidarity structures and communications. This required time to adjust to the conditions of martial law. The formation on April 22, 1982, of the Interim Coordinating Commission (icc) as the national underground Solidarity leadership signaled the first step toward institutionalization of the underground. By August 1982 the icc had established contact with official Solidarity organizations in fourteen regions. The regional Solidarity authorities, besides fulfilling a representative and coordinating function, supported and organized local resistance.⁸ One of their most important endeavors was the clandestine publishing movement: besides producing their own publications, they supported independent local efforts. The reappearance of Solidarity press at the regional level helped restore morale and counteract isolation.

The production of high-quality publications and the establishment of an efficient distribution system would have been impossible without a vast increase in funding. The creation of regional funds permitted better management of resources, provided at least some support for the weaker publications, and helped cover losses caused by confiscation. To give some idea of the sums involved, the Gdańsk Regional Coordinating Commission spent 2,252,150 zloty out of its total budget of 6,104,800 zloty (equivalent to some \$70,000 at the official exchange rate) on publishing and broadcasting in less than three weeks during December 1982, and the factory commission at the Ursus Tractor Factory allocated 49,300 zloty out of its 132,600 zloty budget to publishing.⁹

When random contributions did not suffice to support the independent press, a fund-raising campaign was launched. A popular method to raise funds involved the production and sale of Solidarity calendars for

1983. Five different models were available in the Cracow region alone, including a twelve-page version illustrated with postage stamps and seals clandestinely produced by the inmates of internment camps.

As they were becoming more permanent, several publishing houses produced, besides bulletins and periodicals, reports, speeches, collections of documents, research papers, political pamphlets, historical, religious, economic, philosophical, and sociological essays, a wide range of books, and even photograph albums such as *May 3 in Warsaw*, or *Pictures from the Białoleka Internment Center*. The publishing companies were normally independent of the underground Solidarity authorities. In addition to NOWA, Głos (The Voice), and the May 3 Constitution Press, all well established even before August 1980, several new independent publishers had emerged. Their output included some one hundred titles, including such important publications as Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski's *History of Modern Poland 1864-1945*; *Czechoslovakia, August 1968* (Volume II—the first volume had been seized in its entirety shortly after the imposition of martial law); Marek Tarniewski's *Political Dictionary*; and Wojciech Karpiński's *Sketches on Freedom*. Union activists from one of the large Warsaw factories used the entire profit, 150,000 zloty, from the sales of a poetry volume, *Raptularz Wojenny* (Wartime Notebook), to help the families of internees and political prisoners.¹⁰ Some of these publications, in preparation before December 13, evidently managed to escape the police dragnet in the days immediately following the imposition of martial law. Others, such as Marek Nowakowski's collection of short stories, *Report on Martial Law*, or Adam Michnik's *Letter from Białoleka*, were written since martial law was imposed.

The events of winter 1982—the passage in the Sejm on October 8 of the new trade union law, with its so-called “delegalization” of Solidarity, the failure of the general strike called for November 10, and the “suspension” of martial law as of December 31, accompanied by legislation that made martial law restrictions permanent—constituted a turning point for the underground movement. Solidarity's strategy thus became one of long-term resistance outlined in a program document, “Solidarity Today.” Clandestine Factory Commissions began to be formed throughout the country.¹¹ An important aspect of their work was publishing; a whole new generation of “shop-floor bulletins” had emerged.

The reorientation of strategy had also affected the regional underground press. The total number of different publications had decreased; but there was a definite trend toward professionalism in the new publications. The once emotional tone of many publications gave way to a more considered and matter-of-fact attitude. Papers began catering to different

groups, interests, and political orientations. At the same time better distribution among the various regions of the country led to less duplication and more original material.

The "Shop-Floor Press" Most of the major industrial plants, many smaller factories, enterprises, and institutions produced their own clandestine information newsletters intended primarily for internal circulation. In some of the larger factories individual departments had their own bulletins. This "shop-floor press" formed the base of the underground press as a whole. The Gdańsk shipyard produced *Rozwaga i Solidarność* (Discretion and Solidarity); the Pso automobile factory in Warsaw had its *Monter* (The Fitter); *Kablowiec* (The Cable Layer) appeared in the Cracow cable factory; *Montinowiec* in the Montin plant in Nowa Huta had a circulation of 4,000; factories in the Grzegorzki district of Cracow together produced *Solidarność Grzegorzek*.

Another development was the establishment of interfactory and inter-district publications. One of the most influential was the weekly *CDN—Głos Wolnego Robotnika* (To Be Continued—The Voice of the Free Worker), produced by the Solidarity Interfactory Workers' Committee. It began as the *Głos Wolnego Hutnika* (The Voice of the Free Steelworker), and was first published by a group of Warsaw steelworkers in late 1981, joined by workers from other factories in March 1982. In May they joined forces with the *CDN* group.

Clandestine Interfactory Commissions also existed in Gdańsk and produced their own paper, *Łącznik* (Link). In the Małopolska region, the Cracow Interdistrict Strike Committee had taken over the fortnightly *Kronika Małopolska*, which first appeared in February 1982. The Nowa Huta Interdistrict Strike Committee, based in the Lenin Steelworks, was responsible for two weeklies: *Hutnik* (The Steelworker), which had appeared almost since the beginning of martial law, and *Obserwator Wojenny* (War Observer), appearing since October 22, 1982, inspired by *Obserwator Robotniczy* (Workers' Observer), published before December 13 by the information section of the Lenin Steelworks Solidarity branch.

The publications, mostly two- or four-page newsletters, featured news about the fate of fellow workers interned, arrested, and sentenced to prison terms, or harassed, beaten, or dismissed from work on political grounds. Regular news about those already serving sentences appeared, "lest they be forgotten." *Hutnik* started a campaign, for example, of letter-writing to imprisoned local activists.¹²

The factory bulletins primarily focused on labor problems and matters directly affecting the local labor work force. Short editorials dealt with the issues of the day: protests against the suspension of union rights; the in-

terment and imprisonment of labor activists; rejection of the October 8, 1982, union law; emphasis on the continuing validity of Solidarity ideals; calls for a boycott of the new government-sponsored unions; nonworking Saturdays; protests against the transfer of Solidarity funds to the new government-sponsored unions and whether the workers ought to become involved in them. Some of the factory bulletins published opinion polls.

Another regular feature was shop-floor news: revelations of hushed-up irregularities and abuses, secret production results and export figures, personnel decisions, and infringement of health and safety regulations. *Hutnik* unmasked the head of a Nowa Huta pro-regime union as a member of the secret police. CND—*Głos Wolnego Robotnika* called attention to the fact that workers at the Ursus plant had to have special permits in order to enter departments other than their own.¹³

The shop-floor press chronicled resistance to martial law. It documented the local activities attesting to the mass nature of the opposition to the Jaruzelski regime. *Hutnik* described Jaruzelski's reception at Lenin Steelworks when he made his "surprise visit" after one of the plant's employees had been shot by a secret police officer: the workers first banged on metal sheets and then maintained a stony silence. According to *Montinowiec*, employees given warning notices after participating in protests against the new labor law refused to be intimidated and began to post them on the factory notice board. Someone then wrote "Only Solidarity" across them.¹⁴

The shop-floor bulletins showed that the government-sponsored unions had meager support, revealing the underhanded and irregular methods used by the authorities to establish such unions; recruitment of past criminals and the use of bribery and blackmail. They treated "collaborators"—organizers and members of the new unions, bootlickers, provocateurs, and informers—with particular venom. *Rozwaga i Solidarność*, for example, printed the names of managers who had helped the police identify demonstration participants from photographs taken by the police.

Regional Publications Most of the regional underground Solidarity structures had their own publications. The four major regions of Solidarity represented in the ICC—Mazowsze, Gdańsk, Małopolska, and Lower Silesia—issued separate information bulletins devoid of comment appearing roughly twice a week and serving as a sort of news agency for other publications. In addition to the official union organs, there was a host of independent underground publications, most of which were directly inspired by the Solidarity ideals.

Informacja Solidarności had been published in the Mazowsze region more or less regularly since the beginning of martial law. The Lower Silesia Solidarity committee had *Serwis Informacyjny* in addition to the estab-

lished *Z Dnia na Dzień* (From Day to Day), with a circulation of 25,000. The *Serwis Informacyjny RKW Małopolska*, a weekly publication of some ten to twenty pages, was produced by the Małopolska Solidarity authorities together with a separate *Review of the Labor and Independent Press*.

The most important weekly in the Mazowsze region was *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, the official journal of the regional Solidarity authorities. Its anonymous editors had a free hand in the selection of material, but they had to include the official views of the regional authorities. *Tygodnik Mazowsze* aimed to provide its readers with as "normal" and as comprehensive a coverage as possible in an abnormal situation. Regular reading for thousands of Solidarity members, it publishes statements, resolutions, and reports issued by the Mazowsze Solidarity authorities as well as usual newspaper fare, spiced with morale-building slogans and appeals, leaks from official party and government sources, and a wide variety of discussion articles.

The Mazowsze region had also produced several issues of an impressive monthly magazine called *Fakty*, a publication more than one hundred pages long, which aimed to record events and activities significant in the history of Poland but intentionally ignored by official agencies. A valuable collection of documents, it included personal depositions about the first roundup of internees on the night of December 12-13, 1981, and previously unknown union records from the first week of martial law, chronological and eyewitness accounts of strikes and street demonstrations in different parts of Poland, and the different views of the great underground political debate following the imposition of martial law in December 1981. *Fakty* also organized opinion polls among intellectuals involved in the post-August 1980 reform movement.

Warsaw had many other publications, more or less independent of the Mazowsze regional committee. *Tygodnik Wojenny* appeared regularly since January 7, 1982, pursuing an independent editorial policy.

The most important publication in the Gdańsk region was *Solidarność*, the continuation of the strike bulletin that first appeared under the same name in the Lenin Shipyard on August 23, 1980, and gave its name to the entire independent union movement. *Solidarność* carried information of general interest, practical advice, and suggestions for labor activists, as well as the clandestine debate on the future of the opposition movement. It did not avoid controversial subjects, such as the failure of the strike called for November 10, 1982, or the moral dilemma of elected Solidarity officials offered one-way passports to exile.

The Małopolska regional press produced two publications under the auspices of the regional executive committee: the weekly *Aktualności*, a

newspaper that carried full texts of its communiqués and official reports, and *Biuletyn Małopolski*, a more ambitious social, political, and literary weekly with a circulation of 10,000 copies.

Of the four main regions of underground Solidarity, Lower Silesia was the least prolific in clandestine publications. Its regional committee, in contrast to the Małopolska tendency to centralize, apparently preferred a completely independent press. The most important regional publications were *Replika*, a social and political monthly, and *Biuletyn Dolnośląski*, a regional monthly founded in June 1979 that remained independent of the regional Solidarity authorities after August 1980, although it was in close contact with the union. Its motto was "Solidarity is our reason and shall be our victory," and its circulation 2,000 copies. It published a variety of social, political, and general-interest articles of a high standard, as well as numerous reprints from foreign journals and books published abroad, including those by Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and Leszek Kołakowski. Another influential regional paper was *Solidarność Walcząca* (Fighting Solidarity), published by a group that had formerly opposed the icc's "soft" approach to the military regime.

Discussion on Strategy The most heated debates in the underground press dealt with the strategy of the independent social movement. A nationwide discussion redefined or openly stated for the first time the aspirations of the movement. Martial law created an awareness that only Poland's political sovereignty could guarantee systemic changes necessary for lasting reforms.

Three main orientations, "negotiators," "militants," and "pragmatists," can be distinguished. The "negotiators," representing the most conservative approach, refused at first to view the December 13 military clampdown as irreversible. They called for negotiations with the government under the following conditions: the release of all the internees, and later, amnesty for all political prisoners; the lifting of martial law; the reactivation of trade unions; and the renegotiation of the social agreements of August 1980. They believed that underground work could last only for a short transition period since the authorities could not govern against the will of the people forever. Its adherents were mainly associated with Zbigniew Bujak and the Mazowsze region Solidarity leaders. Bujak was convinced that the best guarantee for the survival of Solidarity was a strongly decentralized movement active in various areas and with a broad popular base of support. He believed that a national uprising was possible only as the very last stage of a struggle for independence.¹⁵ This orientation was reflected in the decisions of the icc, careful not to overstep the bounds of the self-limiting revolution: acceptance of the system, in exchange for inde-

pendent unions. However, when the "negotiators" realized that the suspension of martial law in fact institutionalized repression, they adopted the "long march" strategy.¹⁶ There was a heated debate over the advisability of a general strike.

The "militants" believed from the beginning that the regime was incapable of compromise and advocated preparations for a mass protest that would hasten its downfall and prepare the foundations of a new political leadership. The proponents of this solution included the veteran activist and Solidarity adviser Jacek Kuroń, whose thinking had been influenced by the radical mood among the younger generation of Solidarity's working-class labor activists. Kuroń warned the rcc that without proper organization and direction popular frustrations could ignite an explosion of anger that could have a tragic end. Rather than advocating action against the authorities, he was recommending measures to control the situation, such as a program of national reconstruction independent of the party-state apparatus.¹⁷ This concept presumably would have required a powerful underground decision and command center with cadres, a hierarchical structure, and unquestioning discipline.

A similar militant attitude was held by Porozumienie Solidarność Walcząca (Association of Fighting Solidarity) in Lower Silesia, which published a weekly *Solidarność Walcząca*, and by the group around the monthly *Niepodległość* (Independence) datelined Warsaw-Katowice. Fighting Solidarity stated outright that it sought the overthrow of the regime. Its aim was to build a "Polish Solidarity Republic" responsive to interests of individuals as far as they were concurrent with the common good, and devoted to promotion of solidarity among nations, propagating "active defense of persecuted people and downtrodden ideals." Accusing the rcc of a lack of purpose, it intended to reach this goal through free flow of information, self-education groups, street demonstrations, and strikes. While it expected its members to risk their lives in the struggle, it had repeatedly declared that it was opposed to using armed force to achieve its end. However, *Niepodległość* accused the Solidarity leadership of discounting the possibility of a popular overthrow of the authorities. It urged that the official reactivation of Solidarity as a union be part of a broader program aimed at full national independence. It published a draft of the constitutional principles on which an independent Republic of Poland could be based: a representative democracy with a strong central executive and a presidency, active local and workers' self-government, and priority for personal freedom over equality. In foreign policy it supported a Polish-German agreement.

The third group, the "pragmatists," considered both compromise and

the "big strike at the authorities" unrealistic. They opted for a strategy of isolating the regime and its agencies through the development of alternate social structures. The most important representatives of this trend were Adam Michnik and the Committee of Social Resistance (kos) and the Circles of Social Resistance (also kos). The circles were clandestine, five-man cells consisting of family members or friends involved in local resistance activities independently of the formal underground structures—although most of their members were Solidarity members or sympathizers. KOS has its own publishing company, Wydawnictwo Spoleczne—kos (kos Social Press), which produced four periodicals, including the KOS weekly; *Mysl Niezależna* (Independent Thought), a monthly journal of political thought; *Tu, Teraz* (Here, Now) for the teaching profession; and the *Biuletyn Społeczny* (Social Bulletin), a publication of the Freedom, Justice, Independence, Social Movement (Polish acronym: RS WSN), a political offshoot of kos aiming to organize a nationwide social movement (rather than a political party).

The top political analyst for kos, writing under the name Dawid Warszawski, consistently argued that street demonstrations and symbolic protest could not replace day-to-day involvement in independently organized communication, education, and welfare structures. The kos group regarded each resistance activity as an end in itself—as an independent manifestation of Polish self-determination, rather than simply as a means used in an overall revolutionary strategy.

A contributor to *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, Maciej Poleski, similarly rejected the belief that the regime could not in the long run continue without support from the people, since it "might not rule a country but could certainly administer a labor camp that existed not for the good of its inmates but for the convenience of the warders."¹⁸ According to Poleski, in a "terrorist" state the possibility of dialogue did not exist; the "self-limiting revolution" was killed as soon as the state ceased to limit itself. For him, the most important task was the organization of a broad grassroots movement transcending the formula of a labor union. The role of the Solidarity leadership was to be inspirational: rather than devising programs—which was to be the task of independent local groups—it was to point out the organization's objectives. Poleski opposed the general strike, which in his view could only escalate into a national uprising doomed to failure. Rather he favored the development of autonomous local initiatives that would create independently of the existing system the elements of a future order.

The Wola group, organized around the Interfactory Coordinating Committee (MKK) and based in Warsaw's predominantly working-class district of the same name, produced the weekly *Wola* and the monthly

Idee (Ideas), advocating a strong underground grassroots labor movement. It rejected "the myth of the great strike" because it believed that the people were unprepared to overthrow the government. However, it had also rejected the regime as fundamentally illegal and, like the "militants," favored the foundation of an underground state with a centralized headquarters that would transmit orders to the regional resistance organizations. The Wola strategists reserved this executive role for the underground Solidarity leadership and suggested that a Council of National Solidarity be founded to coordinate the development of an independent social movement and to act as a temporary parliament until free elections could be held.

All the above-mentioned resistance groups repudiated recourse to violence. In spite of their tactical differences, they all recognized the legitimacy of the ICC as the underground Solidarity leadership, although they differed in their opinion of its role. The course of events brought both "negotiators" and "militants" closer to the "pragmatists" by invalidating some of their tenets and making their tactics obsolete. The main issue of contention remained the general strike, advocated in the ICC program document "Solidarity Today" as the underground's ultimate weapon. This document remained, however, within the pre-martial law formula in its determination to build a "self-governing republic" without calling for an independent Poland. The "pragmatists" and "militants," who also opted for a system based on local and workers' self-government, favored independence.

Other Themes An all-pervading theme was the regime's distortion of the principles of the economic reform and the resultant worsening of the crisis. Shop-floor bulletins were most concerned about real income and the food situation. Various weeklies provided a platform for disenchanted or dismissed economists, most of whom agreed that a further fall in production was unavoidable and that the price increases in 1982 would only unleash the inflationary spiral. Poland's economic relations with the USSR and the lack of development prospects in agriculture, as well as the government proposals for cuts in social and welfare spending, were discussed. The clandestine news services provided economic data and information unavailable in the official press, such as plan fulfillment quotas and information on unfavorable trade deals with the other Soviet bloc countries.

Interest in international politics was largely restricted to issues bearing on the Polish situation and the potential destabilization of the Soviet bloc. *Tygodnik Mazowsze* published "Poland Under Martial Law," which analyzed the situation in Poland in the light of international developments. The Soviet Union after Brezhnev constituted a frequent topic; particular attention was also given to post-December 13 official Western statements

on the Polish situation. Certain speeches and articles were reprinted in translation from the Western press, and toward the end of 1982, KOS began a regular column feature entitled "From Our Correspondent in the West." A new publication called *Obóz*, wholly devoted to developments in the East bloc, appeared in 1983.

A warning that the people might not heed the voice of the Church¹⁹ if the discrepancy between its pronouncements and their aspirations continued to grow appeared in an article signed "Christian" and entitled "Will We Be Able to Overcome Hatred?" This provoked a broad discussion throughout the underground press. "Father Joseph" cautioned his readers that "divide and conquer" tactics were being used to weaken the solidarity between the Church and the people. *Mysl Niezależna* was against the identification of Solidarity or the resistance movement with the Church because of their autonomous aims. Maciej Poleski wrote that the Church was "a third force" striving for a solution to the stalemate between the authorities and the people.²⁰

In addition to publishing court reports and denunciations of acts of repression and lawlessness on the part of the Interior Ministry's agencies, the underground press analyzed legal developments and provided advice such as guidelines for behavior when searched, apprehended, or investigated by the police and in court. Above all, the underground press attempted to bring to full public knowledge information about the methods of the security police—in particular its efforts to gain informers by blackmail. It also publicized the fact that testimony or signatures extracted under duress were legally invalid.

An extraordinarily large number of leaks from official sources appeared in the underground press. *Tygodnik Mazowsze* even featured a special column entitled "From Party Sources." Showing the inroads solidarity had made into the bastions of the establishment the leaks included items from the Communist party's internal information service and reports of meetings where official policy was presented without any pretense of "social consultation." *Tygodnik Mazowsze* documented a judges' meeting where the Minister of Justice requested more severe sentences for offenders against the martial law, and publicized an anticlerical and antipapal speech made by a Wrocław party official.²¹ KOS made public police instructions on recruitment of informers which illegally recommended that files be kept on possible subjects of blackmail.²²

Professional Publications Specialized publications for professional groups formulated their common aims, propagated "codes of professional ethics," and discussed professional problems. The teaching profession was among the best organized: an Independent Education (IE) Movement had

been in existence since the spring of 1982. The IE Movement produced *Tu, Teraz* (Here, Now) (not to be confused with *Tu i Teraz* [Here and Now], an official weekly), as well as a regular textbook series entitled *Zeszyty Edukacji Narodowej* (National Education Notebooks). Several local and regional teachers' groups produced their own publications.

The teachers' press held that the education of children must not be subjected to the ideologists. It analyzed the failings of the educational system and organized discussions on its future. *Tu, Teraz* in a series of articles indicated that apparently neutral scientific subjects such as mathematics or physics were subject to manipulation to insure conformity, and presented suggestions for teaching children how to think independently.

The medical profession had its *A Health Service Discussion and Information Bulletin* in Małopolska and *Health Service Information* under the aegis of kos in Warsaw and other regions, publishing documents such as statistics on Western medical aid to Poland, official instructions to hospital doctors to provide details of all casualty admissions on days of street demonstrations, and the Cracow doctors' "Preliminary Evaluation of the Severe Traumatic Injuries Inflicted upon the Population of Cracow on 13 May 1982."

Individual universities, colleges, and institutes published their own bulletins; and intercollegiate publications existed in several of the larger cities, such as *Kontrapunkt* in Lublin and *Biuletyn Wojenny* (War Bulletin) in Poznań. The issues of "verification" and collaboration, particularly acute in a profession in which lecturing and research opportunities were controlled by the state authorities, were frequently discussed as were the attempts to salvage the autonomy of the universities, won with such difficulties in 1981, and the need to protect students from the consequences of their rash actions.

The underground student publications apparently did not have a consistent program besides monotonously denouncing the moves and policies of the regime. The authorities evidently had succeeded in breaking up the independent student movement. Its scattered activists, unable to reestablish contacts on a national scale, were absorbed by the society-wide resistance movement.

Several youth publications of high quality were published including *Gnom* (Gnome), the paper of the Independent Youth Organization in Warsaw; *Topolówka*, published by pupils of one of Gdańsk's secondary schools; and *Promienisty* (Radiant), "fathers' and grandfathers' publication for sons and grandsons," published in Lublin.

Poland's private farmers also had their own underground publications. The Polish Farmers' Resistance Committee (Polish acronym: OKOR), the

underground resistance coordination center, published *Solidarność Rolników Indywidualnych* (Private Farmers' Solidarity); and an independent Polish Peasants' party called Roch had a regular column in the KOS weekly. Members of the Rural Solidarity in the Białystok region had their own paper called *Goniec Wojenny* (War Courier). Warsaw's *Tygodnik Wojenny* also dealt with the problems and resistance efforts of private farmers.

Even the two bastions of the totalitarian regime, the police and the army, published their own papers. *Godność* (Dignity), the independent paper for policemen, aimed to change the image of the police by encouraging them to act in accordance with society's need for law and order rather than as an instrument of repression.

The monthly underground publication for soldiers first appeared in September 1982. Entitled *Reduta* (Redoubt), it attempted to counteract their ideological indoctrination and lay the foundations of an independent social movement among both officers and enlisted men. Articles in *Reduta* pointed out that the activities of the Polish army were a travesty of its avowed aim to protect the country against external aggression. They included information on underground activities and material of direct interest to the military: actions by the generals and martial law commissioners in the civilian administrative *apparat* and the ties between the cadres of the Polish and the Soviet army. *Reduta* provided information on the military activities of the Soviet Union concealed from the average East bloc citizen.

Morale and attitudes of the Polish army were the topic of much interest and speculation in other underground publications. *Tygodnik Wojenny* described the growing gulf between the officer corps, the noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men. Martial law had presented an opportunity for officers faced with the prospect of a mediocre career to exercise power in the civilian apparatus, while the lot of the enlisted men was one of weariness and apathy.²³ Several underground groups stressed the importance of agitation within the army, reprinting appeals and exhortations addressed to soldiers in many underground publications.

Literary Periodicals Testifying that hardship and suffering tend to be propitious to creative writing, the underground press under martial law produced a blossoming of poetry—albeit of widely different quality. Throughout the first year of martial law short stories, diaries, and poems appeared in most of the free publications, as well as in the purely literary quarterly *Wezwanie* (The Call), which included literary criticism and essays, as well as original creative writing and graphic art. A tendency toward specialization later became apparent: many of the underground social and political

publications left literature to publications devoted specifically to it, such as *Zapis* (The Record), which continued the tradition of an independent literary publication of the same name that first appeared in January 1977, or the Wrocław literary magazine *Obecność* (The Community).

Humor and Satire Humor and satire helped to build morale by deflating martial law, its leaders, and its institutions. Songs, poems, short stories, and skits proliferated in the underground press. Political jokes included: "What is good luck?—To live under socialism. What is bad luck?—To have that good luck!" "What will we get after martial laws?—Freedom . . . in rations." "A short television vocabulary: 3 Poles constitute an illegal gathering; 5 Poles an illegal rally; 10,000,000 Poles a handful of extremists." Among the satirical publications that reached the West were *Vulture*, *Scarecrow*, *Rook*, or *Night Heron* ("blind crow" in Polish). The Polish acronym WRON, meaning "crow," for the Military Council of National Salvation, led to these ornithological puns and jokes. Papuga TASS-manska, "Tasmanian parrot," referred to the Polish press agency PAP's "parroting" of its Soviet mentor TASS. Insects, rodents, and other creepy creatures also were favored in titles like *Hornet*, *Wasp*, *Mole*, and *Earthworm*. Other titles mocked the official propaganda: *Extremists' Voice* or *Zomogovernment* (a pun on the riot police and self-government). Cartoons were prominent in most of these publications (see figures 1 and 2).


The Authorities' Response The government apparently believed that the December 13 swoop would effectively silence the free press by depriving it of both its human and technical means of production. The official policy first ignored the publications that appeared under martial law while penalizing persons caught with even one or two handbills. Gradually it dawned upon the authorities that the underground free press was a mass phenomenon. Police efforts were intensified, informants mobilized, and raids on suspected printing houses became more systematic.

While the national press at first ignored the underground press, local papers were allowed to ridicule certain aspects of it in order to discredit it as irresponsible or downright harmful to the public interest. The official Wrocław party daily, *Gazeta Robotnicza*, espoused this crusade with a particular vengeance. The *Gazeta* made a sensational three-part serial out of the police seizure of a homemade printing press producing copies of *Z Dnia na Dzień*, discovered when the caretaker of the workers' hostel became suspicious of ink stains on the table.²⁴ News about the alleged success of police raids were usually published in official local press, with little concrete information but much propaganda invective. Most of those caught red-handed were charged with violating Article 48 of the martial law de-

Figures 1 and 2



We had everything ready
for talks, only Bujak
didn't turn up. . . .



National Agreement

cree: spreading "false information" to "incite public unrest or cause disturbances," "weaken the state's military preparedness," or "substance of which was insulting to the supreme PPR authorities."²⁵

Despite the penalties—up to five years' imprisonment for disseminating "false" information entailing "a particularly high degree of social danger," and up to eight years in cases in which state security had been allegedly endangered—the numbers of volunteers for clandestine publishing activities increased. The national press was more reticent than the local about details of convictions on this score, simply listing the sentences without elaboration. It was only shortly before the "suspension" of martial law at the end of 1982 that the government released, for the first time, figures giving the number of seized printing presses: by mid-March 1983, 1,310 pieces of equipment had been confiscated, including 368 large-capacity printing presses.²⁶ At the time of the "suspension" of martial law, many of the printing houses were discovered and seized within a short space of time. The police used an operation code-named "Possession" which involved a systematic combing of all buildings in certain areas under the pretext of checking on the use of space and compliance with safety provisions.

The authorities also used undercover agents to infiltrate the underground. One of them was later presented to the official press as a "disillusioned conspirator" who had recanted after being caught and had given "evidence" discrediting the Wrocław weekly *Wiadomości Bieżące*, which later denied any acquaintance with him.²⁷ Many enthusiastic, but naive, youngsters were lured into underground publishing by unknown individuals, who later disappeared without a trace. Two Warsaw students, nineteen-year-old Tomasz Sokolewicz and seventeen-year-old Emil Barchański, were approached about helping out with underground publishing by Andrzej Omasta, an agent of the security police. Subsequently, both were beaten during interrogation. Barchański received a suspended sentence. On June 6, 1982, his body was found in the Vistula River.²⁸

The security police also planted publications to confuse and discredit the underground press. In August, a publication resembling *Tygodnik Mazowsze* and containing a bogus interview with underground leader Bujak along with a call for a three-month moratorium on protests was actually delivered to the building housing several Western news agencies, arousing their suspicions.²⁹ On December 12, 1982, a fake issue of a paper entitled *Wolny Związkowiec* (formerly the local Solidarity bulletin at Huta Katowice) was distributed at a plant in Poznań. One of the distributors was caught by the workers and reported to the management—only to be transferred to a better job in a different department.³⁰

In an effort to discourage collaboration with the independent press,

the security police in January 1983 raided the houses of six authors whose works had been published underground and in the West.³¹

An Independent National Culture In spite of their determination to quash the underground publishing movement, the authorities were unable to stop or even slow down the free flow of information. However, the circuit could not have functioned without mass public response and the "silent conspiracy" of the Polish nation.³² This was the result of the Solidarity's success in introducing the masses to a free press by awakening unprecedented public interest in social and political life.

34

Political Diversification of the Polish Underground

Stefan Malski

The underground opposition in Poland evolved into a wide spectrum of political trends and outlooks, which gave rise to a lively debate, particularly in the independent press. Although these groups called themselves explicitly independent political associations or "political parties," their manifestoes and political and economic programs tended to be vague and abstract, and nothing suggested the existence of any organizational structure or organized political activity. The forces behind the "programs" were actually little more than loose associations with a common political orientation, a vision for the future of Polish society, and a similar approach to international relations. However, a greater degree of organization could not be expected under the political conditions in Poland.

Precedents Most of the political opposition groups had emerged in the late 1970s. They had been tolerated by the Gierek regime because of its own political weakness, its need for a liberal image to obtain Western credits, and because of the protective umbrella afforded to some of these groups by the Catholic Church. The most prominent were KOR (Workers' Defense Committee, which later became KSS "KOR"—the Social Self-Defense Committee), with its publications *Robotnik* (The Worker) and *Głos* (The Voice), formed in September 1976; ROPCO (Movement for the Defense of Human and Citizens' Rights) publishing *Opinia* (The Opinion), founded in March 1977; the anonymous PPN (Polish Accord for Independence), with a publication of the same name, founded in May 1976; KPN (Confederation of Independent Poland), producing *Droga* (The Path) and

Gazeta Polska (Polish Gazette), established after a split with ROPCO; RMP (Young Poland Movement), founded in August 1979 with its publication *Bratniak* (Fraternity); and others.

In the more open political climate of the Solidarity period, especially in the fall of 1981, there was a visible movement toward the creation of organizations vaguely comparable to open political parties. The more notable were the *Freedom, Justice, Independence Clubs of the Self-Governing Republic* (*Kluby Rzeczypospolitej Samorządnej—Wolność, Sprawiedliwość, Niepodległość*), which included some former members of the disbanded KOR; the *Clubs in the Service of Independence* (*Kluby Służby Niepodległości—KSN*), founded in September 1981; and the *Polish Labor Party* (*Polska Partia Pracy—PPP*), established in May 1981 and proposed to act as Solidarity's "political" arm. Though these "parties" were nearly all composed of Solidarity members, there was not any formal relationship between them and the union. Solidarity's position on political parties was positive but detached: pledged to "support and protect all social initiatives trying to introduce different political, economic, and social programs into society," as one of the resolutions presented at its congress stated.

Once "state of war" was declared, most of the "parties and clubs" and other groups that had operated relatively openly disappeared. Their networks, known to the authorities, were broken and their members were interned, imprisoned, or forced to emigrate. The remaining democratic opposition in Poland mostly went underground and consolidated in support of Solidarity.

The New Political Opposition Groups The conspiratorial nature of these groups presents problems for an assessment of the size, organization, and membership or the extent of their informal support within society. The fact that many of the leaders and members of the old opposition groups were in prison, abroad, or otherwise prevented from resuming their activities suggested that such groups largely consisted of new members.

Although all the political groups identified themselves with the Solidarity movement, their activities were usually advertised as subordinated to it. Although these groups had their own identities, they were not incompatible with or antagonistic to Solidarity.

Freedom, Justice, Independence (*Wolność, Sprawiedliwość, Niepodległość—WSN*) This group, founded again in May 1983 as an underground version of the WSN Clubs of November 1981, was inspired by the Polish Socialist party, defunct since 1948, as well as the declarations of Solidarity's first congress. WSN sought to harness the growing political "will for liberation" and direct it into a plan of action to avoid the "shedding of blood in chaotic explosions of rebellion." It stated that "this movement should be

active on a different level from that of the trade union but should be in a natural coalition with Solidarity." It rejected, however, the "compromise programs and agreements, illusory and misleading, which led to capitulation. . . ." It supported self-help and self-education; sustained political action; freedom of the individual; pluralism and decentralized management; religious and ethnic tolerance; and a mixed economy that would serve social needs and liberate labor. WSN also advocated Poland's right to self-determination, an independent state, and a "free and open Europe." It declared that it was open to a partnership with all resistance forces and groups founded on the principle of solidarity with the workers.¹

Polish National Independence Party (Polska Narodowa Partia Niepodległości—PNPN) Starting out as a "political group" called "Independence" in April 1982, it became associated with the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) in September of the same year. It sought the establishment of an independent republic, a democratic and pluralistic political system, and a foreign policy "in line with [Poland's] national interest." It suggested the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory and a declaration of neutrality.

PNPN's economic program advocated the abolition of central planning and the introduction of workers' control over decision-making, private ownership in small-scale enterprises, and private farming. In this both the industrial and the farmers' Solidarity were to play a "big role." The bureaucracy and arms spending were to be reduced, and housing, welfare, and environmental protection were to be expanded.²

The Association of Fighting Solidarity (Porozumienie Solidarność Walcząca) This group called itself an "open political movement." Its aim was to build a democratic self-governing "Solidarity republic" with a social system that would protect the individual from economic risk and political enslavement. The basic mechanism of such protection was to be the Solidarity trade union. Fighting Solidarity was in favor of decentralized government, political pluralism, and an independent judiciary. As one of its statements put it, "the principle of the so-called leading role of the PZUR [Polish United Workers party] was nothing more than dictatorship by Moscow stooges that led to moral and economic collapse and the devaluation of 'socialism.'" The group did not believe that agreement or compromise with the regime was possible. However, since it believed that a direct confrontation would lead to "disaster," it planned to use propaganda and other means to fight the regime in the long term. It took credit for several publications and was intending to publish materials in other Eastern European languages.³

Independent Peasant Activists (Niezależni Ludowcy—ROCH) The In-

dependent Peasant Activists declared themselves a "social-political movement" loyal to the political traditions of the prewar Polish Peasant party. Although not opposed to socialism, they wished to realize within its framework a program of political pluralism combined with an agrarian peoples' movement. They supported a social agreement between the authorities and society "honestly respected by both sides" and denounced the present Peasant party (ZSL) as a "compromised" and "opportunistic" satellite of the PZUR. In their declaration, they referred to the special problems of farmers and called for cooperation from workers and academics. "We join Solidarity and its program," the peasant activists declared in their manifesto.⁴

The Polish "Solidarity" Party (Polska Partia "Solidarność"—PPS) Established on November 11, 1982, in Warsaw, this "party" declared its opposition to the regime, describing the Polish authorities as Soviet agents working "against the will of the nation and in the interests of Soviet imperialism." Stating that the "communist dictatorship in Poland precluded the existence of independent, self-governing organizations," it advocated the dismantling of the dictatorship in order to create genuine "territorial self-government, a free Sejm [parliament], and free institutions representing the nation." PPS claimed that it was a strictly secret organization based on three- or five-person cells led by a provisional committee pledged to summon a congress as soon as conditions made aboveground activity possible. The declaration accepted the resolutions of Solidarity's first congress and the Church's directives. The "party" based its program on the social and political programs of Józef Piłsudski, Edward Abramowski, and Roman Dmowski, and subscribed to peaceful action. Its main aim was the development of "internal self-government and external independence." It allegedly published two papers, *Głos Wolny* (The Free Voice) and *Niezależne Wydawnictwo "Solidarność"* (Independent Solidarity Publishers).⁵

Similarities and Differences Nearly all the groups had basically similar goals: the establishment of a self-governing Polish republic, independence, democracy, and political and economic pluralism. Change of the system was to be achieved through an underground opposition movement based both on Solidarity and on independent political organizations. Differences among them concerned mainly strategy and tactics with respect to issues such as Poland's readiness for decisive action that would bring about political change; Poland's *raison d'état* and whether its geopolitical situation demanded "Finlandization" or total independence; whether cooperation or compromise with the government were possible; and whether the existence of political parties would help or hinder Solidarity as an opposition movement.

All the groups tended to be more radical than the underground Soli-

darity leadership, not only in their policy proposals but also in their degree of politicization and their more defined ideological profile, usually with historical or visionary connotations.

Polemics Declarations of the political groups aroused some lively polemics in the underground press. The political groups tended to justify their existence by pointing out the inadequacy of the Solidarity's Provisional Steering Committee (Tymczasowy Komitet Kierujący) policies and the need for some kind of "political" opposition. The issue of opposition had been discussed for some time in the underground *Solidarity* and had gained positive support. *Opornik* (The Resister) consistently urged more political action formally separate but waged in conformity with the union.⁶ PNP's *Niepodległość* proposed an "opposition Labor Party-Solidarity," arguing that Poland needed skilled politicians for the future.⁷

In response, KOS called *Niepodległość* "romantic" and derided the quasipolitical parties for assuming that "independence can be achieved through talking."⁸ It took issue with their proliferation and criticized those who accused the TKK of excessive restraint and vacillation. Other criticism concerned the "parties'" rejection of compromise and their underestimation of Poland's geopolitical predicament. A Solidarity publication, *CDN*, acknowledged that the general goal of the Polish opposition both before and during the Solidarity period was an independent and democratic Poland. However, this unity of purpose rapidly disintegrated as differences among groups obscured and sometimes even eroded the common cause.⁹ As a result, the "December catastrophe" allegedly fragmented, rather than consolidated, the national reform movement before its common enemy could be vanquished. *CDN* called for centrally directed resistance.

Causes of Emergence To some extent, political groups that emerged during and after martial law were pre-martial law organizations that reappeared in different forms. However, the emergence of previously unknown groups can be attributed to the frustration with the political and social situation arising from the suppression of Solidarity and the resultant blocking of the channels of political articulation. It also was due to Solidarity's reluctance to formally acknowledge the political nature of its activity through a political program. This led the more radical activists to form their own groups in search for political identity and self-expression. Some of these groups declared themselves as "political parties" with their own vague manifestoes and social programs in order to rationalize the high risk involved in their activities. An article in *Solidarność Walcząca* argued: "Without the opportunity to undertake political actions, we will always remain the object of politics."¹⁰

Another factor encouraging the creation of autonomous political

groups was the underground environment, which made it difficult for Solidarity to consolidate the opposition movement as a whole. Conspiratorial activities conducive to self-isolation and poor communications, as well as the diversity arising from different conditions, resulted in fragmentation.

The successive failures of Solidarity's efforts to restore dialogue with the government lowered the authority of the Solidarity leadership and contributed to the emergence of independent political units. These unsuccessful efforts gave rise to polemical analyses in the independent press, thus helping to crystallize the particular programs of other political groups.¹¹

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The Church's Balancing Act

Ewa Celt

Since the imposition of martial law in December 1981, the various pastoral initiatives of the Catholic Church included efforts to organize spiritual, material, and legal assistance for the thousands of internees and their families; distribution of Western charitable aid; and pastoral ministration to farmers, workers, students, and artists.

In an attempt to contain Church influence over public life,¹ the Jaruzelski regime hampered these initiatives, even at the risk of aggravating the country's grave economic situation and provoking an outburst of public discontent.

An example of this policy was Jaruzelski's handling of the Agricultural Development Fund, a vast project sponsored by the Polish episcopate in concert with a number of Western church organizations and private donors and designed to provide assistance to private farmers. Farm machinery, fertilizers, and other farm goods not available in Poland were to be purchased in the West and then distributed in Poland by the Church-sponsored foundation to help modernize the private sector of agriculture. The goods, imported for hard currency, were to be resold in Poland to farmers and village craftsmen for (nonconvertible) zloty, and the money thus raised was to be used by the foundation for yet unspecified social purposes.²

Although the project was approved during the papal visit to Poland in June 1983, the regime kept delaying its implementation on the grounds that existing legislation did not provide the necessary legal framework. The

delay, however, seems to have been caused by the authorities' desire to control the distribution of the funds and to divert them to state farms. More official misgivings followed Lech Wałęsa's public pledge to donate all of his \$190,000 of Nobel Peace Prize money to the proposed fund, since Western correspondents reported that the Polish government was pressuring bishops to decline Wałęsa's contribution.³

Along similar lines, the Church-sponsored Rural Pastoral Communities were intended to play a key role in distributing the farm goods purchased from the fund's money among private farmers, thus bypassing the notoriously corrupt officials.⁴ The bishops decided to set up these communities at their plenary meeting in December 1982 with the aim of including the entire rural population of about 15 million in the organization. The first national conference of their delegates convened in Warsaw in April; a second followed two months later. Working under the guidance of local parish priests, the small groups, already numbering more than 10,000 nationwide, were conducting activities ranging from the organization of religious retreats and pilgrimages to the provision of legal counsel for farmers and assistance to the families of political prisoners and those dismissed from their jobs for political reasons. The groups also organized self-help among the peasants, including farm work as well as the care of the sick and the elderly. Another of their initiatives was the collection of food for needy town dwellers and the inviting of people from the towns to spend their vacations in the countryside. Self-education programs included the study of history, particularly that of the peasant movement, and the preservation of local folklore, customs, and religious traditions.

Although the communities operated with official blessing, their growing influence led the authorities to subject them to petty harassment. Articles in the press began to warn the Church to concentrate on religion rather than engaging in "social and economic activity" in the countryside.⁵ Participation of former Rural Solidarity activists in the movement was officially viewed with special suspicion. However, the Rural Pastoral Communities had been explicitly endorsed by the Pope, who, during a visit to Niepokalanów on June 18, 1983, publicly supported their efforts for the "renewal of the Polish countryside."

The much lesser known Pastoral Service to Workers evolved from the Episcopal Commission for Spiritual Service to the Working People, headed since May 1980 by Monsignor Herbert Bednarz from Katowice. It was reorganized in April 1982⁶ with the aim of establishing Church-sponsored communities among factory workers.

The Primate's Social Council, an advisory body consisting of twenty-eight lay Catholic activists from various professions and different parts of

the country, was established on December 12, 1981, under the presidency of Professor Stanisław Stomma, a noted Cracow scholar and a committed Catholic politician. It included specialists from various fields to provide its commissions with expert advice. Similar advisory bodies were also created at diocesan level.

On April 15, 1982, the council submitted to the primate an eleven-page document, "Theses of the Primate's Social Council on Social Conciliation," specifying the conditions for a possible "accord" between the martial law authorities and the public.⁷ As its essential elements the council singled out the reactivation of Solidarity, the release of all political prisoners, a general amnesty, the rehiring of people dismissed for their political convictions, and the reinstatement of the suspended academic and artistic associations. The ten-point draft program proposed by the Church for nationwide discussion, sent to various public agencies and offices, and even to Jaruzelski, never appeared in the mass media, nor was it given any official response.

The Primate's Relief Committee for People Deprived of Liberty and for Their Families had been in operation since 1981. Volunteers, working with the support of the Church hierarchy and the consent of the government—in spite of occasional police intimidation—organized aid for prison and internment camp inmates, including food, medical supplies, and legal counsel, and arranged for regular visits by priests and bishops.

In September 1981 chaplains were authorized to work in prisons. According to a decree issued by the Ministry of Justice, inmates were given the right to attend Masses read for them in prison chapels on Sundays and holidays, or at least to hear religious services on the radio.⁸ The decree also assured pastoral care for hospitals and asylums. Local priests regularly visited those institutions, heard confession, and administered the sacraments.

Army chaplains were a Polish institution without an equivalent in other communist countries that had been in existence since the very beginning of communist rule. Even the Polish units organized in the Soviet Union in 1943 had Catholic chaplains assigned to them. At the end of 1983 more than 150 army chaplains, carefully selected by the authorities, were ministering to the spiritual needs of soldiers. Garrison churches, maintained by the military authorities, were reportedly very well kept,⁹ and soldiers were readily availing themselves of their right to religious observances.

The Episcopal Charitable Commission distributed some 40 percent of the Western charitable donations in 1981; one year later this figure had almost doubled.¹⁰ Although the Catholic Church was the main channel of foreign relief supplies, equally trusted by the donors and by the recipients,

it was denied the right to run an official charitable organization. A substitute for such a body was the charitable commission attached to the Polish Episcopate. At its headquarters in Katowice records were kept, co-operation with the related agencies at home and abroad was monitored, and truckloads of donations were dispatched to provincial and local committees. Part of the aid was directed to children's and old people's homes and hospitals, but the bulk of the supplies was divided into small parcels distributed periodically among the most needy, irrespective of creed or ideology, including, since December 1981, martial law interneers and their families.

Another relatively new field of pastoral work was the Church's ministration to creative and performing artists. The organization called Pastoral Care of the Artists had had occasional "cultural weeks" in various cities for years. After the imposition of military rule in 1981, it helped many artists survive political repression and served as a meeting place.

One example of its activities was the Christian Cultural Week organized in Warsaw between November 20 and 30, 1983, by that city's Metropolitan Curia. During that period twenty-five meetings were held in various churches, seminaries, and church museums at which nearly fifty poets and novelists, including Marek Nowakowski, Andrzej Braun, Julian Strykowski, Jerzy Ficowski, and Wiktor Woroszyński, read from their works. There were thirteen performances of various sorts, including a play by Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II), *At the Jeweler's Shop*, another play dealing with the rescue of Vienna in 1683 by King John III Sobieski, and a "Marian Tryptychon" starring the famous actress Halina Mikołajska. Art exhibits featured works of young Polish artists; there were more than a dozen concerts; and a number of films were shown, including Franco Zeffirelli's religious works. Discussions were held on cultural and philosophical themes, and Professors Irena Sławińska and Jacek Woźniakowski delivered lectures followed by public discussion. On November 27 Cardinal Glemp met the artists in one of the downtown churches.

In Warsaw's Church of the Visitation, the cultural and artistic programs included seminars dealing with "Art and the Church," Pope John Paul II's teachings, and biblical themes, as well as a number of performances and art exhibits. In Łódź in July, Professor Józef Tischner of Cracow lectured about the "role of the suffering in the shaping of history," while other scholars dealt with Church-state relations, social and economic matters, and Polish émigré literature. Attendance at the regular weekly meetings, theatrical performances, concerts, and discussions organized by these groups was extremely high.¹¹

The Pastoral Service to Students, conducted for at least two decades

in various academic centers, developed further during the Solidarity era and later under martial law. One extremely active center, called "the Barrel," operating at the Dominican Church in Cracow since the early 1960s, had more than one thousand student activists participating in philosophical symposiums and public discussions attended by prominent religious and cultural figures as well as in purely religious and educational programs. Karol Wojtyła, then still Archbishop of Cracow, and later his successor, Franciszek Cardinal Macharski, were known for their active support of this work. In mid-1981 a National Forum of Students' Pastoral Service took place in Cracow under Macharski's presidency.

Immediately after the imposition of martial law on December 15, 1981, "the Barrel" began to provide assistance to internees and their families. The students agreed to help the prisoners' families, supplying them with food and medicine, in order to allow the bishop's office to concentrate on visits to prisons and internment camps. Part of Western aid packages also went to students who had been expelled from universities for their participation in Solidarity.

A number of regular Church projects normally run by national Church institutions, such as the antialcohol and antidrug campaigns, family counseling, and care of the aged, were pursued together with the Barrel's new initiatives. The authorities' warnings that the Church should confine itself to purely religious work tended to further widen the chasm between the governing and the governed.

In his annual Christmas message read in all Churches, Cardinal Glemp appealed for moderation and tolerance.¹² The keynote of his message was the need for social peace and conciliation. Without naming either Solidarity or the government, Glemp appealed to both to moderate their demands, to refrain from mutual accusations, and to rely on their "instinct of self-preservation" in order not to aggravate Poland's already difficult and possibly explosive situation.

The primate's chief worry apparently was to be that a renewed outbreak of unrest in Poland could ignite a nuclear holocaust. According to him, the Church would do all in its power to prevent such calamity, and protect "every human life and all that mankind had attained." The primate indirectly chastised both sides for the state of affairs in Poland. He blamed the government for its failure to produce any viable program on which a true national reconciliation could be based but also criticized opposition activists for occasionally resorting to "un-Christian" and even "suicidal" forms of protest.

In view of the alleged "existential threat" facing Poland, the episcopate, following the explicit orders of the Holy See, warned the clergy not

to become involved in politics in the future: "This refers to all priests, those engaged in the [pro-regime organization] Caritas as well as those who, in the fervor of their commitment on behalf of the persecuted, reflect within themselves the existing social frictions."

In Glemp's view a priest's task did not exclude him from service to the nation; economic and public affairs, however, were to remain principally in the hands of lay men.

Admitting that the bishops continued to look with the greatest concern at the "huge amount of evil and suffering" that Polish society had been experiencing, the primate also called his audience's attention to some positive aspects of the events of 1983, urging Catholics to count their blessings. Referring to 1983 as a "year of bountiful grace" he singled out the papal visit in June, "a week of joyful experiences, unifying the nation"; the beatification of three Polish religious figures; the commemoration of Sobieski's victory over the Turks in 1683 in Vienna; the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Wałęsa; the return of those interned or imprisoned during martial law; and the construction of many new churches.¹³

Glemp's conciliatory policies at times earned him critical remarks from Polish and foreign proponents of more uncompromising democratic opposition. His rebuff to politically engaged clergymen seemed to echo the regime's warnings to the Church to stay out of politics. His call for moderation and mutual understanding, however, was not surprising in the light of his previous statements and of Pope John Paul II's well-known stand on the political engagement of Catholic priests.

The message met with different responses from the regime and clerical quarters. While government spokesman Jerzy Urban praised the cardinal's fine "sense of political realities" at a press conference on December 20, some members of the episcopate reportedly objected to the wording of Glemp's warning to politically committed priests. In their view, naming in one breath pro-regime clerics and those engaged in pro-Solidarity work implied that the Church hierarchy was putting both on the same footing. The primate apparently saw his critics' point, because the sentence in question was quietly dropped from the final version of the speech sent to parishes.¹⁴

The Pattern of Repression

Janusz Bugajski

On March 9, 1984, the Polish authorities in Wrocław announced the arrest of thirty-five underground members¹ of the Fighting Solidarity organization,² which had branches in several cities. At least ten major successful police operations were reported in the mass media during the first two months of 1984; they included the key underground strongholds of Warsaw, Wrocław, Cracow, Łódź, and Szczecin. Nationwide, they entailed the detection and detention of nearly one hundred activists, the confiscation of printing presses and large amounts of samizdat material, and the breaking up of local Solidarity cells.

Assessment of Previous Government Claims Government assertions could not be taken at face value, particularly as previously reported coups against the underground had proved to be more important in terms of propaganda value than in destroying covert union structures. Despite the capture in August 1983 of Władysław Hardek, chairman of Solidarity's Regional Executive Commission in the Małopolska region of southern Poland,³ over one hundred clandestine factory commissions continued to function and the publication of samizdat materials had barely been affected. The capture in December 1982 of Janusz Pałubicki, chairman of the Interim Regional Board in the Wielkopolska region of western Poland, was initially called by the authorities a major police success,⁴ yet despite their assertions, the police did not confiscate any documentation detailing the region's underground network or secret lists of its members because such dossiers had never been compiled. In the key cities of Gdańsk and Warsaw the regional and subregional underground structures remained largely intact.

The security forces proved more adept in Wrocław, where a succession of regional leaders had been uncloaked in 1982 and 1983. As a result, the Lower Silesian Regional Strike Committee, purportedly coordinating one of the best organized clandestine networks, suffered severe setbacks and underwent a protracted and thorough process of reconstruction. For several months, the new regional chairman remained anonymous. Factory and interfactory committees, however, continued to operate in the region throughout the disruptions, organizing a week of protest actions during which work was slowed down in a number of major factories in March 1983. Short strikes in protest against a rise in food prices at the end of

January 1984 took place in three key Wrocław enterprises where clandestine Solidarity cells were active.⁵

It appears that the much-publicized arrests of Solidarity's regional leaders did not drastically disrupt the network of publishing, distributing samizdat material, collecting union dues, and providing aid to persecuted Solidarity members; nor did they threaten the existence of factory committees, although they undoubtedly inflicted painful psychological blows on the movement at crucial junctures. The "underground" in Poland included not only people in hiding but also many ordinary employees who anonymously and unobtrusively assisted the movement without attracting police attention.

According to official figures, 1,132 people "willingly revealed their illegal activities" and were "allowed to return home" during the amnesty of 1983.⁶ Although it is difficult to distinguish in all cases between voluntary surrender and capture by the police, it is reasonably safe to conclude that the majority who withdrew from the underground were not key activists or clandestine committee members but rather, relatively minor members engaged in printing and distributing bulletins. Apparently, their absence did not drastically affect underground work: the enterprise, interfactory, and regional structures remained intact, although their day-to-day activities did not normally attract publicity. Solidarity's chief organ in Warsaw maintained that very few of the individuals who actually went into hiding after the imposition of martial law in December 1981 later turned themselves in to the police.⁷ Most of the apparent "surrenders" were made by activists captured by the security forces and offered a choice between serving a prison sentence or signing a statement announcing that they had "taken advantage of the benefits of the amnesty." The majority apparently opted for the latter course; the authorities extracted maximum propaganda advantage from these activists' decision to surrender by appearing both effective and merciful in their dealings with the underground opposition.

Security Service Methods The Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa), or plainclothes political police which stood at the forefront of the anti-underground campaign, employed a variety of methods, including misinformation, tight surveillance, detention and interrogation, and provocations, in its attempt to eradicate Solidarity and other underground structures. Its aim was to isolate the movement from society and destroy conspiratorial networks.

Misinformation A section of the Security Service specialized in the production of forged samizdat documents, bulletins, and leaflets. Falsified copies of the Solidarity publications *Z Dnia na Dzień* (From Day to Day) in Wrocław and *Tygodnik Wojenny* (War Weekly) in Warsaw had been

locally circulated; the underground in several cities claimed that the nationally distributed *Bez Dyktatu* (Without Dictatorship) was a Security Service publication carrying false information and deliberately intended to undermine the authority of Solidarity's Interim Coordination Committee.⁸ Counterfeit Solidarity leaflets, allegedly issued by local underground leaders, were distributed by the Security Service or its helpers prior to important national anniversaries in order to discourage workers from staging protests and to sow doubt about the advisability of maintaining opposition.

Fabricated Radio Solidarity programs were also broadcast. On July 20, 1983, in Warsaw, two broadcasts, one authentic and the other a police forgery, were heard on the airwaves. The latter urged underground activists to surrender, advising them that this would not be considered a form of collaboration with the regime.⁹ The broadcaster announced that an elite underground unit would be established to carry out various tasks, thereby dispensing with the need for the services of the army of couriers and supporters. To provide extra credibility, the broadcast was jammed a few minutes after the clearly audible message for surrender. However, there were no reports of mass desertions from the underground after the broadcast, leading to the conclusion that it was generally met with suspicion; a disclaimer was later issued by Solidarity.

The official press, eager to describe the failures of the underground, occasionally quoted statements of anonymous activists who had "surrendered" to the police, in which they claimed that they were ineffective in influencing workers, confessed to the error of their ways, and declared that it was futile to continue the conspiracy. Quotations from Solidarity leaders had been manipulated out of context in an effort to demonstrate their apparent weaknesses, personal ambitions, and conflicts with other activists.

Surveillance, Detentions, and Interrogations According to Solidarity sources in Warsaw, the Security Service conducted an intensive and widespread campaign against the underground during the first phase of the amnesty, from July to October 1983. It involved "interrogations, searches, and detentions, partly blindly and partly based on recognition and denunciations. . . . Thousands passed through militia stations. It was assumed that such actions would always bring some results: a few leaflets would be found; someone else would even say where he had received it . . . some might even agree to sign a statement that they had turned themselves in."¹⁰

The chief of the Security Service, General Władysław Ciasa, alluded to such police operations as "a whole series of preventative and explanatory warning talks with groups of people who might have been susceptible to excesses."¹¹ Periodic extensive actions, with the Security Service net cast widely, may have brought in a certain number of underground

activists; but it was doubtful whether widespread searches and detention were as productive as officially claimed. It was more commonplace to employ agents or informants in workplaces and neighborhoods, conduct tight surveillance on key suspects, and gain information through selective interrogation. Underground sources divided police informers into three categories: residents—salaried, full-time Security Service workers; secret co-workers, who would receive various benefits for gaining snippets of information; and informants, agents with criminal backgrounds who gathered information in return for their freedom.¹² In addition, the Security Service had at its disposal an assortment of surveillance devices and telephone monitoring equipment.

The aim of police interrogation was not only to extract information, but also to bribe, blackmail, or coerce individuals into becoming police informers.¹³ Solidarity estimated that approximately 80 percent of the Security Service's detections of underground activists were the result of successful police interrogation or of police informers' work. A samizdat publication in Cracow outlined the Security Service operations against the underground, alleging that after the declaration of martial law a special Operations Section had been established to deal with the "new opposition."¹⁴ By the summer of 1983 the number of full-time Security Service functionaries in Cracow alone apparently exceeded two thousand, not including paid or blackmailed informers often employed in industry as ordinary workers.

The Security Service Operations Section worked according to a pattern. First, having caught a "thread" by obtaining information about clandestine activities, it would undertake intensive vigils near suspected buildings, eventually planting an agent into the conspiratorial network. The agent would then donate some valuable items, such as paper or ink, to the organization, or offer to act as a courier, thereby gaining information. Finally, when confident that a Solidarity network had been sufficiently infiltrated, the Operations Section would arrest the important activists. Several clandestine structures had thus been apparently eradicated, particularly during the first year of martial law, when much of the Polish underground lacked conspiratorial experience.

Since early 1983 official claims that the Security Service had eradicated major underground structures have been rarer. The capture of individual leaders, printing presses, or samizdat stocks, usually quickly replaceable, did not constitute a major achievement for the police.

Provocations The Security Service tried to arrange provocations in efforts to expose an underground cell or implicate activists in criminal or terroristic activities. A sophisticated provocation, designed to destroy the

movement from within, had the potential to create far-reaching damage by sowing confusion, as in cases when *agents provocateurs* would organize their own conspirational cell or even construct a local network posing as a genuine Solidarity organization.

It was widely believed that the Interregional Commission in Defense of Solidarity (ICDS), active throughout the second half of 1982 and the first half of 1983, had been established by the Security Service. The ICDS presented itself as a nationwide underground network encompassing a sizable number of factory, interfactory, and regional structures. It apparently inflicted some damage, particularly in the Małopolska region. On several occasions the union's Regional Executive Commission and the interfactory commissions in Nowa Huta and Cracow publicly stated that they were not sections of the ICDS, but rather owed their allegiance to the central Solidarity leadership.¹⁵ The ICDS, producing the samizdat publication *Bez Dyktatu* and distributing leaflets in various workplaces, severely criticized the ICC.

Significantly, within a week of the government's amnesty, three of the ICDS leaders "gave themselves up" to the police and issued a long statement declaring that the organization was disbanding voluntarily. The whole affair was given widespread publicity by the official media, both domestically and internationally, in order to demonstrate that a nationwide Solidarity network had "benefited from the amnesty," and thereby encourage others to follow suit. The names of the three activists were provided in full, together with their biographies, contrary to the government's usual practice of revealing only the first names and initials of lower-ranking unionists.¹⁶ The ICDS claimed that after consulting people in fifteen regions and dozens of factories, it obtained a majority decision for "a dialogue between the government and society." Contrary to the facts, they implied that underground Solidarity leaders were not interested in a dialogue, which could have commenced only if they revealed themselves. The ICDS's claims that it represented a nationwide movement were disproved when other activists failed to materialize. The Solidarity underground apparently did not suffer any decline in its activities as a result.

Psychological Warfare The communist authorities' psychological warfare against the underground consisted of a propaganda campaign ascribing success to the security forces and failure to the opposition. The security forces professed to have extensive knowledge of the underground, partly in order to frighten activists and convince them that they were only allowed to operate because the police did not yet consider it a good time to strike.

The reporting of arrests was designed to encourage other activists to

surrender or desist by creating the impression that the police were about to arrest them. Such reports intensified as the amnesty of 1983 approached its climax. Following a periodic lull, announcements of widespread arrests during the Security Service "uncovering-and-repression campaign" would suddenly appear.¹⁷ To demoralize the underground and to discourage demonstrations and other forms of protest, news of important captures was often broadcast immediately prior to a major anniversary.

The underground was occasionally accused of encouraging terrorism. On September 17, 1982, *Żołnierz Wolności* listed several clandestine terrorist organizations, such as the "Young Peoples' Sadistic-Terrorist Organization" and the "Secret Fascist Organization," allegedly inspired by Solidarity's underground leaders and then uncovered by the Security Service.

The authorities fostered the impression that the underground was tiny, insignificant, and ineffective. General Czesław Kiszczak, in a report to the Sejm in December 1983, claimed that there was "no underground Poland," but rather only "isolated groups of people who are intransigent and blind and who pathologically despise the socialist authorities and state."¹⁸

Conclusions The Security Service undoubtedly scored several successes, particularly in capturing a number of important Solidarity leaders and in destroying several clandestine structures. However, the authorities' claims that they had paralyzed the movement by limiting it to a marginal group of extremists was not supported by evidence. Although it may not have formed a powerful political force in Poland, the very survival of an underground movement within a totalitarian system saturated by a highly developed police apparatus was impressive.

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The Party in Crisis

Janusz Bugajski

The Polish United Workers party's (PUWP) Central Committee held a plenum in Warsaw on February 18, 1984,¹ to discuss attempts at reform and deal with the issues of ideology, organization, and recruitment.

Declining Party Membership PUWP First Secretary Wojciech Jarużelski claimed that in 1982 and 1983 the party had been rebuilding its internal strength. In fact, since its peak in 1980, when it could boast

3,100,000 members, the PUPP's numerical strength had declined sharply. During the crucial years of 1980 and 1981 nearly 500,000 members, according to official figures, voted with their feet and left the organization.² The decline was not arrested by martial law, which further diminished the PUPP's popularity. An additional 250,000 individuals returned their party cards or had them withdrawn between early 1982 and late 1983. The subsequent government estimate recorded 2,186,000 members, or less than 12 percent of the adult working population.³ Even more disturbing for party leaders was the PUPP's class composition. Politburo member Tadeusz Porębski announced that workers constituted only 39.4 percent of the party's membership.⁴ A mere 12.6 percent of Poland's industrial working class belonged to the PUPP; and only 3.7 percent of the country's farmers were members.⁵

In addition to mass abandonment by its rank and file, the PUPP was having severe problems in recruiting new members. In 1982, only 17,000 candidate members obtained full party membership;⁶ and though the party was becoming increasingly desperate to recruit more workers, it did not manage to attract them. On March 10, 1983, *Pravda* complained that the Polish party was plagued by "passivity" and urged it to "strengthen its weakened links with the working class." Jaruzelski had since then confirmed that "a wide representation of workers in the party was one of the important conditions for avoiding a repetition of the antisocialist threat."⁷ However, in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, for instance, out of a total work force of over 13,000, the party could only claim 1,986 members: 539 were workers, while 713 were retired people and 734 white-collar staff. Since January 1981 the PUPP membership had declined by 1,013 members.⁸

The party also had very limited support among the young. Apparently only 11 percent of the PUPP was under thirty years of age, the smallest proportion in the organization's history.⁹ Party leaders bemoaned the weak ties between PUPP bodies and the ideological and educational youth organizations. On October 14, 1983, *Sztandar Młodych* confessed that "the party does not fulfill the expectations of youth."

Ideological Cleaning Continued A comprehensive loyalty-check campaign was launched by the PUPP in February 1982, involving government ministries, educational institutions, and the economic administration. According to General Tadeusz Dziekan, the head of the Central Committee Cadre Department, by the summer of 1983, 350 changes had been completed in the CC's political apparatus and more than 6,000 political activists had been replaced lower down in the party hierarchy.¹⁰ "Information activities," entailing a thorough assessment of party officials, had been developed at all levels of the organization.

A document entitled "The Main Assumptions of the PWR's Cadre Policy," authorized by the thirteenth cc plenum last October, provided details about party officials' obligations to uphold ideological-political purity and unity in the ranks. The cc Secretariat began to issue detailed policy guidelines for personnel problems, and ideological training was to be increased. The Politburo decided to create an Academy of Social Studies to produce trustworthy Marxist instructors for positions in the party apparatus and for "the ideological and educational base of the party and state."¹¹

Building ideological unity proved a vexing problem for the PWR, since the Jaruzelski leadership faced internal criticism from the more orthodox Leninists in the Politburo and Central Committee. This was evident in the draft versions of the party's ideological-programmatic declaration, called forth by the ninth congress, frequently amended, shelved, and revised.¹² This suggested that deep divisions at the core of the party on fundamental policy issues remained unresolved. The authorities hoped that the forthcoming national conference would finally accept the latest draft of the declaration, which was to provide a basis for the party's program at the tenth congress. Politburo candidate member Professor Marian Orzechowski, however, admitted after the fifteenth cc plenum that further consultations, discussions, and revisions were likely before the project would receive the green light.¹³

Several postponements in 1983 of the cc plenum devoted to ideological issues also indicated the likelihood of serious divisions in the PWR, most probably on questions of short-term tactics, such as dealing with the Church and private farmers and possibly also the role of the army in local administration. The sudden appearance of Stanisław Kociołek (a leading dogmatist and ambassador to Moscow) in Warsaw just before the fifteenth cc plenum indicated a continuing hard-line offensive against Jaruzelski's policies.

Problems in the Ranks The drive for internal "political-organizational unity" was initiated at the seventh cc plenum in January 1982 on the basis of a party statute accepted at the ninth congress that called for the reorganization of the PWR. The aim was to intensify the political cleansing operation at the local level and to rediscipline the party according to "Leninist norms."

Officials claimed that many internal party cliques had been broken up in recent years. They had been uncovered by PWR area inspectorates, agencies of the militia, and army operational groups, which publicly revealed cases of official corruption, theft, and waste. One important aim of the operation was to oust the remaining vestiges of reformism by removing local officials who sympathized with the principle of "horizontalism" and

maintained contacts with Solidarity.¹⁴ Simultaneously, the Jaruzelski administration disbanded a number of orthodox Marxist "forums" and "discussion clubs" that had provided a platform for the more dogmatic party elements. This did not eliminate them from the scene entirely, however, and in 1983 periodic criticism of Jaruzelski's "soft approach" was heard.

According to Politburo member Stanisław Bejger in an interview with the army daily *Żołnierz Wolności* on November 7, 1983, "the party and the authorities will be strong if basic party groups become strong." To achieve this aim, the cc's Central Control Commission sought to improve the functioning of basic party organizations. Since the ninth congress the Control Commissions in subordinate party bodies, in attempts to "strengthen the class character of the party and its organizational discipline," expelled over 2,700 members and punished 1,700 people for "activities contrary to ideological-political principles" and for "violating the principles of democratic centralism."¹⁵

Though declaring itself in favor of an increase of working-class membership and in opposition to overbureaucratization, the PUPP was unlikely to alter its "class structure." The entrenched apparatus was unwilling to be expunged, while the center was against removing the party's most stable and reliable component. The authorities considered it a beneficial propaganda ploy, however, to demonstrate that the PUPP was being purged of unsavory elements in the process of eliminating corruption. Though between January 1982 and April 1983 some eight hundred party officials were accused of mismanagement, incompetence, waste, and other abuses, this was an insignificant proportion of the white-collar workers occupying important positions in the economy.

The Intraparty Report and Election Campaign was launched after the thirteenth cc plenum and provided a useful means for scrutinizing the work of party organizations and activists. Nationwide, 30-50 percent of PUPP committees at factory, municipal, and district levels had been changed. The fifteenth cc plenum revealed that 7,900 members had been expelled from the party since October 1983.¹⁶ After high-level complaints that in many workplaces officials were ignoring directives from the center, more than 30 percent of the first secretaries at the basic party organization level were replaced. At the voivodship level changes were rarer, largely because they had already been quickly carried out after the imposition of martial law.

What Future for the Party? In a report to the thirteenth cc plenum the Politburo declared that "the PUPP has the historical, political, and moral right to rule the nation."¹⁷ In practice, however, the party seemed unable to fulfill its self-appointed role. The leadership admitted that the

healthier the party the less interference by internal control commissions and other special bodies would be necessary. The multilayered internal commissions and unceasing campaign for internal discipline demonstrated that the PWRP had not found a cure for its maladies.

The PWRP seemed to operate on the assumption that frequent repetition would produce results, hoping that combative propaganda would mobilize trained activists to venture onto the shop floor and convince workers that the party was worth joining. A host of national and local PWRP meetings had been held since December 1981 to bolster sagging confidence among the *aktyw*, such as the First National PWRP Ideological-Theoretical Conference in April 1982, the National Conference of the Workers' Aktif in March 1983, and voivodship party conferences throughout Poland in early 1983. Such meetings offered little to the public and intensive political training did not transform activists into successful missionaries for gaining recruits. However, by imposing stricter discipline on its own members, the center was trying to guarantee that its subordinate agencies, however short they were on members, would not again escape its control.

The party continued to be faced with a seemingly insoluble dilemma between functioning as a mass organization encompassing and controlling a respectable proportion of the working class on one hand, and guaranteeing internal discipline on the other hand. However, only a small percentage of workers—predominantly older or retired—were willing to join an organization that in return for discipline and political purity offered but a bankrupt ideology and a record of mismanagement.

X Hungary in Pursuit of National Interest

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Openings to the West

Alfred Reisch

Vice President Bush in Hungary On September 19, 1983, Vice President George Bush became the highest-ranking American official ever to visit Hungary when he arrived in Budapest from Bucharest on the sixth stop of his ten-day, seven-nation trip to North Africa and East Central Europe.¹

The issue was raised that the granting by the United States of most-favored-nation trade status to Hungary on a year-to-year basis hindered cooperation between Hungarian enterprises and American firms. Both sides agreed that this reduced commercial stability, thus making the expansion of bilateral business ties more difficult. The results of bilateral cooperation in culture and science were also discussed, and both sides agreed to boost tourism.² Bush described his almost two hours of talks with Hungarian Socialist Workers' party (MSWP) First Secretary János Kádár as "stimulating and beautifully frank" and described the Hungarian leader as "a man of enormous capacity and leadership capability."³

Speaking at a state dinner given in his honor by Prime Minister György Lázár, Bush praised Hungary's human rights record and described Hungarian-American relations as "good and active." He said that "Human rights and fundamental freedoms have not represented a point of discord but instead brought us closer together." He also expressed admiration for Hungary's efforts "to tap the spirit of enterprise and creativity" in its citizens.⁴

In his reply, Lázár did not discuss human rights, but reiterated instead the familiar Hungarian foreign policy statement that dialogue between countries with different social systems and between small and big states was much needed.

As could be expected, Bush and Lázár had different views on the subject of medium-range nuclear missiles and their planned installation in

Western Europe in the event the American-Soviet arms negotiations in Geneva failed. Bush said that even though NATO would continue to respond to threats to military stability in Europe, it was ready to seek arms control accords and to "respond to the outstretched hand that seeks a fair agreement." Lázár expressed Hungary's anxiety about the intensification of the arms race and the growing danger of confrontation and nuclear war. According to him, the Hungarian government wished to halt the arms race and hoped to prevent the deployment of additional nuclear weapons. Even though Lázár defended the Soviet stance at the Geneva arms talks, he avoided any overt criticism of the United States. He reaffirmed that it was in Hungary's fundamental national interest both to fulfill its obligations within the Warsaw Pact and to remain open to the rest of the world.

Bush Singles Out Hungary in Speech in Vienna One day after leaving Hungary, Bush reiterated in an uncompromising speech on September 21 in Vienna the American policy of "differentiation" toward the East European countries which accorded Hungary, together with Romania, a special, positive treatment. Bush accused the governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR of maintaining "closed societies," pursuing "belligerent" foreign policies, violating human rights, and underwriting terrorism as "proxies" for the Soviet Union. He then praised Hungary for introducing greater openness in its society, lowering the barriers to human contacts, and engaging in "market-oriented economic reforms." "Hungary's relative prosperity," said Bush, "demonstrates the practical positive results that follow on social and economic liberalization."⁵

Romania was presumably singled out for showing a greater measure of independence in its foreign policy, something that Hungary had not demonstrated, just as domestic political and economic liberalization and respect for human rights did not exist in Romania. The pairing of the two countries may have been deliberate in view of their sensitivity, especially in the case of Hungary, to criticism from Moscow.

Aftermath of the Visit According to the Hungarian media the Bush visit had taken place in spite of the fundamental differences in the political and alliance systems of the two countries and despite the tense international situation. They described Hungarian-American relations as having shown "steady progress" for years and having become basically "settled."⁶ This showed Hungary's concern about the possible effects of the deterioration in East-West relations on its export-oriented economy and particularly its trade with the West.

The Hungarian media were slow to react to Bush's Vienna address, which drew the immediate ire of the Soviet Union, with TASS describing it on September 22 as a libelous speech full of attacks "crammed with

slander and lies" and an attempt to drive a wedge into the unity of the "socialist community." On September 23 UPI quoted a senior Hungarian official as saying that Hungary was interested in better relations with the United States, which had "to accept us as we are . . . members of the Warsaw Pact and allies of the Soviet Union on the basis of a common foreign policy." The message was that Hungary was not willing—or able—to follow a more independent line. Radio Budapest similarly urged the United States to realize that deeper cooperation could take place only if Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact alliance were respected.⁷

The party daily *Népszabadság* accused Bush of playing socialist countries against one another "by means of differentiation" and described the attempt as "speculation built on sand."⁸ The paper also referred to U.S. "pronouncements" questioning the present status quo in Europe and seeking to revise the Helsinki Final Act, since Bush had said in Vienna that "we recognize no lawful division of Europe." To raise this issue would "undermine European realities" and lead to the deepening of the division of Europe, the paper asserted. It acknowledged the existence of important differences among the socialist countries in the economic and cultural fields but added that "those who think that our unity can be undermined by distorting [these differences] and by adding untruths to them are making a profound miscalculation, because what separates us is much less than what unites us."

These Hungarian public utterances were on the whole relatively restrained and reflected embarrassment rather than anger, comparable to the relatively mild Hungarian reaction at the time when Warsaw Pact accounts of the KAL jet tragedy were suffused with anti-American hysteria. The Reagan administration, in its policy of differentiation toward the countries of Eastern Europe, had clearly added Hungary to Yugoslavia and Romania as favored countries.

Hungary and Finland Reaffirm Special Relationship One day after meeting with Bush, Kádár arrived in Helsinki on September 10 for a three-day official visit. At a state banquet in his honor, Kádár made a forceful plea for a return to détente. He said: "We are interested in reducing the danger of nuclear war, in seeing that nuclear weapons are not stationed in countries where they do not exist, and in not increasing the number of such weapons where they are to be found." The remark apparently led Finns to wonder whether Kádár was implying that he was opposed to the deployment of Soviet medium-range SS-20 missiles on Hungarian territory, or whether he was warning that such deployment would occur should the United States and its NATO allies proceed with their planned placement of new medium-range missiles in Western Europe.⁹ Kádár also suggested that

the normal, peaceful relations between neutral Finland and Warsaw Pact member Hungary—two small countries tied by linguistic kinship—served as an example that cooperation was possible between two countries with differing social and political systems.

Kádár's visit to Finland completed a busy month of Hungarian diplomacy: Burma's head of state U San Yu had been in Budapest in early September, returning a visit to Burma made by Hungary's nominal head of state, Pál Losonczi, in June 1982. Other visitors included the foreign ministers of Great Britain and India, both received by Kádár; and the Venezuelan minister of culture. Hungarian Politburo member and Central Committee (cc) Secretary György Aczel met Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in Athens, and Pál Losonczi left on September 25 for New York to attend the 38th session of the UN General Assembly as well as a meeting of heads of state called by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.¹⁰ Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Lajos Faluvégi, the chairman of the National Planning Office, was in Norway and Sweden for economic talks from September 28 to October 7.

The Thatcher Visit Despite a lifelong aversion to communism, Margaret Thatcher became the first British prime minister ever to visit modern Hungary. The two-day visit in February 1984 was also her first trip to a Warsaw Pact country since her election in May 1979. In mid-November 1983, only hours after the first batch of U.S. medium-range cruise missiles had arrived in Britain, she announced that Britain was ready to pursue "a sensible dialogue" with the Soviet Union and its East European allies and that she was going to Hungary in that spirit.¹¹ In a ninety-minute radio interview in January about Hungary's foreign policy in the framework of its Warsaw Pact commitments, Mátyás Szűrös, cc secretary in charge of foreign relations, described the Thatcher visit as a positive step toward reviving the East-West dialogue but he also reaffirmed Hungary's continued loyalty to Moscow.¹²

On February 3, Thatcher discussed international issues with Prime Minister Lázár. Both sides restated their differing views on international affairs, but chose to stress the issues upon which they could agree. Lázár blamed the United States for upsetting the military balance in Europe by deploying new medium-range nuclear missiles in some NATO countries, while Thatcher, by emphasizing the urgency to renew the U.S.-Soviet arms-control negotiations in Geneva, implicitly criticized the Soviet Union for breaking them off.

The next day Thatcher surprised throngs of early morning shoppers by appearing at Budapest's central covered market and doing her own shopping for local produce to the delight of many onlookers.¹³ At a press con-

ference later, she said that her talks with Hungary's leaders had been "open, constructive, and valuable."

Reactions to the Visit As soon as Thatcher left, the Hungarian media described her visit as a success, from the point of view both of Hungarian-British relations and their broader international context. The Hungarian side was pleased by the openness and cordiality of the talks.

The Soviet news agency Tass briefly reported the meeting between Kádár and Thatcher without comment. The visit received sparse coverage in the Bulgarian and East German press and even less on Radio Bucharest, while the Romanian party daily *Scinteia* ignored it completely. The most negative reaction came from Czechoslovakia, which attacked Thatcher for trying to create the impression that the deployment of new U.S. missiles had not changed anything in Europe.¹⁴ Only the Polish press, after providing rather routine coverage of the visit, commented positively once it was over. According to the party daily *Trybuna Ludu*,¹⁵ "in the more tense situation in Europe, every step leading to better mutual understanding deserves support."

The nuances in the reactions of Hungary's Warsaw Pact allies were indicative of the problems faced by Budapest in its new style of foreign policy. The Kádár regime, however, continued to profess its loyalty to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact during the Thatcher visit and at the Stockholm conference on security in Europe by blaming the deterioration of the international situation on NATO's deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles. At the same time, unlike the Soviet Union and its hard-line allies such as Czechoslovakia, it did not accuse the West of preparing a nuclear war and stressed instead that such a war was avoidable and that the East-West dialogue had to be maintained.

Craxi's Visit Promotes Relations with Italy On April 11, 1984 the Socialist Bettino Craxi became the first Italian prime minister to make an official visit to Hungary. As early as October 1983, Craxi had expressed the hope of visiting an unnamed East European country, a signal Budapest greeted with satisfaction. When the invitation came, he promptly accepted it.

Prime Minister Lázár, in an interview published on April 10 in the Rome daily *Il Tempo*, stated that contacts between the West and communist countries such as Hungary that promoted good relations with the West could help to reestablish confidence between East and West but could not supplant Soviet-American negotiations. He reiterated Hungary's full support of the Soviet terms for returning to the negotiations and spoke positively about the economic cooperation within the framework of the CMEA. He rejected a policy of isolationism.

On April 12 Craxi and Lázár held two rounds of talks that were described as "open and cordial." They differed in their assessments of the causes of international tension but agreed on the need for an East-West dialogue that would lead to fruitful negotiations. Although no economic experts took part in the plenary meeting, both sides concluded that Hungarian-Italian economic ties could be further developed through cooperation in production and joint ventures on third markets.

On April 13 Craxi met with Kádár, with whom he discussed the international situation, East-West relations, and ties between the two countries. At a press conference before leaving Budapest, Craxi stated that even if Italy and Hungary disagreed on the cause of international tensions, they agreed on the need to work to ease them. He described Italian-Hungarian relations as unobstructed by political problems and the atmosphere of his Budapest talks as frank and friendly. Craxi said Italy wanted to increase its trade and cultural exchanges with Hungary and would study the relevant Hungarian proposals.

The Hungarian media's coverage of the Craxi visit was more subdued than that of Thatcher's. According to the party daily *Népszabadság*, nothing could replace high-level international contacts. The newspaper dismissed Western speculation about the two countries acting as "intermediaries" between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.¹⁶ The Hungarian media welcomed the fact that the two countries' views coincided on many issues, such as the importance of peace in Europe and the need for a joint effort to invigorate the East-West dialogue, resume disarmament talks, and restore an atmosphere of mutual confidence.¹⁷ Craxi was described as "a good partner" who had found that it was possible to speak to the Hungarian government not by using the language of missiles but by promoting fair negotiations.¹⁸

Kohl Visit Underlines Close Relations with West Germany On June 21-23 West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl became the third West European NATO state leader to make an official visit to Hungary in 1984. It was the second official visit to Hungary by a West German chancellor since Helmut Schmidt's trip to Budapest in September 1979 and underscored the considerable progress in the two countries' bilateral relations since diplomatic ties were established in December 1973.¹⁹ The Hungarian media stressed the continuity of relations since Helsinki and Kádár's visit to Bonn in 1977, calling the two countries "correct partners" whose relations were "settled" and were developing considerably in trade, industry, and finance.

The June 20 issue of the daily *Magyar Nemzet*, after giving a very positive review of the FRG's Ostpolitik in the 1970s, noted Bonn's desire

to pursue East-West détente and normalize relations between the two alliance systems through negotiations and compromise. While the present international situation was difficult, one should look to the future by promoting trade and other forms of cooperation, the paper concluded.²⁰ The party daily *Népszabadság* greeted Kohl as "a politician who is a follower of the further development of cooperation and many-sided economic and cultural relations between Hungary and West Germany, and a promoter of improved East-West relations in general."²¹

In his conversations with Kohl, Lázár blamed the Western missile deployments for the increase in international tensions, but put the main emphasis in his speech on Hungarian-West German relations. He reiterated the Hungarian view that disputes should be solved through negotiations such as the ones that were being held in Stockholm and Vienna and felt confident that talks could move forward if there were willingness to compromise. Hungary, Lázár concluded, was willing to cooperate and continue a dialogue with all those who, like the Federal Republic of Germany, were guided by similar intentions.²²

The chancellor urged his Hungarian hosts to impress upon their Warsaw Pact allies the seriousness of the West's offers of cooperation in both bilateral matters and multilateral arms negotiations. He also stressed the fact that both the FRG and Hungary were working within their respective alliances for a stabilization of the international situation. He called for a Europe that would cooperate politically, economically, and culturally in order to further the ties between East and West. Kohl noted that Hungary's ethnic Germans were able today to maintain their language and traditions, but he felt they could contribute even more. His notion of Hungary's ethnic Germans constituting a bridge between the two countries coincided with that of the Kádár regime with regard to the role of the various national minorities in Hungary and of the large Hungarian minorities in neighboring Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.

On June 22 Kohl and Kádár met for about two hours (longer than expected) in a "cordial and open atmosphere" and discussed international issues, including ways to curb the arms race, reduce East-West tensions, and build mutual confidence. Concluding the official part of his visit with a press conference, the chancellor stated that he and his hosts had predictably disagreed on several questions but fully agreed on the most important ones, such as the need to reduce East-West tensions. According to Kohl, there were no fundamental problems between the two countries that could not be solved.

Since the 1975 Helsinki agreements, the two countries had developed extensive regular contacts in all fields and on all levels. On the political

plane, the foreign ministers had met regularly once a year since 1977 to review bilateral relations. In April 1984, Gyula Horn, head of the HSWP CC's Foreign Relations Department, visited the FRG and met SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel and other SPD officials, members of the CDU-CSU coalition, and Alois Mertes, state minister in the Foreign Office. According to West German sources, the two sides discussed ways of bringing the United States and the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table and agreed to do everything possible within their alliances to reduce East-West tensions.

By 1983 West German-Hungarian trade had grown more than two-fold since 1973 and over fourfold compared with 1970, with the FRG accounting for 8.8 percent of Hungary's total foreign trade as compared with the GDR's 6.3 percent. There were 332 cooperation agreements between Hungarian and West German firms—the highest number of agreements West Germany had with any East European country.

Kohl's visit once more underlined West Germany's intensive diplomatic efforts to influence relations between Warsaw Pact countries and the West as well as between the United States and the Soviet Union. Hungary, equally concerned about the international situation, agreed with Bonn, if not on the causes of increased world political tension then at least on the importance of continuing the East-West dialogue. Bonn's excellent rapport with Hungary contrasted with its uneasy relations with Prague and Warsaw.

Budapest's new activism, while a source of anxiety for dogmatic ideological hard-liners in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, had not been disapproved of by the new Kremlin leadership. Although both the Soviet and the Czechoslovak media largely ignored the Hungarian-West German summit, they at least refrained from criticizing it—with only the Polish press having anything positive to say about it.²³

Hungary in 1983: Rising Expectations,
Declining Economy
William F. Robinson

Although post-World War II Hungary underwent much worse periods, the year 1983 was definitely not a good one for that country in comparison with the period of growing prosperity and rising expectations that began in 1966 and continued more or less unabated until the beginning of the 1980s. The primary disappointment came in the economic sphere, where four setbacks created very serious problems.

First was the poor performance of industry, which as a whole failed to fulfill its production and export plans for the year and to achieve the modest increment envisaged in its contribution to the Domestic Net Material Product—a 1–2 percent production increase.¹ The Central Statistical Office revealed that the output of industry in 1983 was only 0.7 percent higher than in 1982, a year in which plan targets had also not been met. One reason for this was the difficulty in selling Hungarian products on the major markets of a hard-pressed world economy. The main reasons, however, were domestic and included severe import restrictions, low productivity—on the average, half of that of industrially developed countries—the continued production of obsolete products, the slowness with which the production structure was being overhauled, slow technological renovation, a weakly developed infrastructure, exceptionally long production times, organizational and managerial shortcomings, excessive use of energy and basic materials, and a system which, despite changes, still forced many enterprise managers to place such emphasis on political and personal gamesmanship that economic efficiency suffered as a result.

The second setback occurred in agriculture, normally the most productive, efficient, and profitable sector of the Hungarian economy. The third worst drought in the twentieth century destroyed 1,200,000 tons of grain crops and reduced the expected harvest of sugar beets, vegetables, and potatoes between 10 and 30 percent. This shortfall, worth approximately 5 billion forint, represented almost the entire growth of Hungary's Domestic Net Material Product planned for 1983, a modest 0.5 to 1.0 percent. The reduction in output also adversely affected the food processing industry throughout the second half of the year. Finally, coupled with a deterioration in the terms of trade, it reduced the country's expected hard currency export earnings in 1983 by around \$180 million (the food processing

industry alone suffered a 12 percent decrease in dollar earnings compared to 1982).²

As a direct result of the agricultural losses, another setback occurred: namely, two sudden and significant increases in consumer prices for a number of food items. The first, unplanned, round of price hikes took place on September 19. The increases ranged from 10 to 23 percent on articles such as sugar, margarine, cooking oil, bread, and pastry. The second round, on January 23, 1984, involved raising the prices of meat and meat products 10 percent to 24 percent. This time the cost of various construction materials, home-heating oil, water, and electricity also increased about 20 to 30 percent.³ The last major round of price increases for a wide range of consumer goods and industrial and public services took place at the beginning of August 1982. Gasoline price increases averaging 20 percent then occurred in December 1982, the second such increase in six months; new, often substantial, rent increases announced the previous year took effect on July 1. By the end of July 1983 the Consumer Price Index (CPI) had risen by 7.3 percent in accordance with the plan but by the end of April 1984, after the new price hikes, the CPI had gone up 9.3 percent. Since nominal wages in the socialist sector (excluding agricultural producers' cooperatives) increased by only 3 percent in 1983, there was obviously a serious decline in real wages among blue-collar workers. Moreover, despite some increases in social benefits, those on fixed incomes suffered a significant reduction in purchasing power.⁴

The fourth and last major setback concerned Hungary's international solvency and specifically its ability to continue the timely servicing of its large medium- and long-term hard currency debts (approximately \$6,740 million in net terms at the end of 1982), mostly contracted with Western, Japanese, and Middle Eastern banks. Budapest had hoped that it could achieve a foreign-trade hard-currency surplus of \$700 million to \$800 million in 1983 and with this money reduce its net foreign debts to about \$6,100 million by the beginning of 1984. According to Foreign Trade Minister Peter Veres, however, the surplus in the end was only slightly more than \$500 million. Nevertheless, the current accounts balance with non-communist countries, covering exchanges of services as well as goods, was reportedly a surprising \$100 million in the black after a substantial deficit in 1982. This apparently allowed Hungary to continue reducing its debt, but it was unclear to what extent medium- and long-term loans received in 1984 would affect the picture.⁵

The government wished to avoid rescheduling its debts, not only because of the expense, but also because of the potential damage to Hungary's financial reputation and credit rating on the international money

market. It was likely that higher bread and meat prices were introduced and subsidies to agriculture reduced in order to avoid this possibility. The higher bread prices allowed more grain to be diverted for export and for use as fodder in order to cushion the impact of 1983's reduced production. Apparently, the overall purpose of the price increases was to reduce domestic consumption and to channel the commodities involved into hard-currency export markets, mainly in Western Europe, in order to keep Hungary solvent. Similarly, tax savings through the reduction of state subsidies were to help balance the loss caused by the drought.⁶

The NEM to the Rescue? Unlike the retrenchment, recentralization, and a freezing of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) during the economic problems of the mid-1970s, the authorities appeared determined this time to return to economic reform by expanding and developing the NEM and implementing policies and principles never, or only partially, put into practice. Plans for decentralization and the elimination of huge conglomerates and vertical hierarchies, essential for creating truly competitive enterprises, again emerged in Hungarian economic strategy. The abolition of the branch ministries in 1980 to form a new super-Ministry of Industry was part of this process because it partially broke down the long-established bureaucratic links, influence peddling, and special client relationships that had existed between ministry chiefs and certain favored enterprises or managers. In addition, many trusts and large enterprises were dissolved and broken down into smaller, independent units, expected to be more flexible, efficient, and responsive to demand. Perhaps the most spectacular example of this was the division of the famed Csepel Iron and Metal Works on July 1, 1983, into fifteen separate units.⁷

Another extension of the reform occurred in the area of investments, with the government attempting to put previously unproductive capital into the most profitable use. This was a consequence of earlier decentralization, whereby enterprises were instructed to use their own funds for investment and make their own decisions. In many cases their access to state budgetary funds was greatly reduced or simply stopped. The resulting combination of decentralized decision-making and strong legal prohibitions against the free movement of capital led to inefficient investment.⁸

Initial experiments to cope with this situation can be traced to late 1981 and early 1982, but only in 1983 did they apparently become accepted. The new methods consisted of issuing both so-called "communal bonds" to help develop local infrastructures and development bonds to finance the commercial projects of industrial trusts and enterprises. Such bonds paid interest 20-100 percent higher than the National Savings Bank and could be sold on a secondary market. Any capital gain realized on such

sales was tax-free, sometimes entirely and sometimes up to the face value of the bond. The bonds could be issued by local councils in conjunction with the National Savings Bank or by the enterprises and trusts themselves, in some instances only to financial institutions and economic organizations; in other instances private individuals also were allowed to invest a limited amount of their own money in a small enterprise or cooperative.⁹

The issuance of bonds could not simply be regarded as an experiment or an ad hoc policy, however expedient in a time of investment difficulty. The course of the reform was such that one change demanded another if the government was to avoid even worse problems. The bond scheme was a necessary first step toward freeing the movement of capital.

Another major and perhaps the most controversial step in the expansion and development of the NEM was the considerable improvement in the lot of the private sector, especially with respect to new measures to stimulate private initiative and create small enterprises. Rather than providing for an increase in the private *ownership*, the new regulations promoted private or cooperative *use* of state-owned facilities. By the end of 1982, the first year when the establishment of small business ventures was allowed, approximately 6,000 had been started in addition to the private artisans and retail traders operating under the old laws.¹⁰ Such businesses appeared in various administrative and legal forms such as small private firms or co-operatives, "work collectives" at state enterprises, associations, private work collectives, and also in other forms. They had the advantages of improved efficiency and quality, especially in the sector of consumer services. They also had the potential to increase Hungary's hard-currency exports; a special supporting network of commercial agents was established to promote this end. They legalized at least a portion of the underground economy, thus facilitating greater economic activity and providing potentially greater revenues for the tax office. Finally, they offered blue-collar workers for the first time a legal opportunity—which cooperative peasants had had for many years—to increase their standard of living through outside business activities.

Nevertheless, opposition to small enterprises based on private initiative existed both within the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party (HSWP) and among the workers themselves—those who had not yet taken advantage of the new regulations as well as those still adhering to the idea of an egalitarian wage and income structure. According to HSWP First Secretary János Kádár, Western "propagandists" claimed that "the Hungarians were applying capitalist methods in the economic field." The "same question," Kádár said, "is being asked with good intentions, albeit with a certain anxiety on our side, in our society and party, that is, whether we are applying capi-

talist methods instead of socialist ones.”¹¹ In similar vein, Prime Minister György Lázár stated: “There are some people who say that the new entrepreneurial forms work at cross-purposes to our socialist goals. . . . This view is incorrect. One must learn to live together with [these] new . . . forms because they have proved their profitability to both society and the individual.”¹²

Despite such opposition, the top party and government leadership appeared determined to continue developing the NEM, even when this involved methods considered unorthodox for a communist country. Although refusing to sanctify a “reform of the reform,”¹³ meaning an almost complete elimination of official interference in economic affairs and the creation of a completely new mechanism, the leadership seemed genuinely convinced that a serious and thorough application of the NEM’s original principles was the only way to solve the country’s economic difficulties.

This conviction may have been closely connected with the replacement of Sándor Gaspar as secretary-general of the National Trade Union Council on December 9.¹⁴ Gaspar, a Politburo member since 1962 and head of the Hungarian trade unions since 1965, had established a wide power base. During his tenure, Gaspar favored strong unions in which shop stewards shared power with party officials, acting, more than any other East European labor chief, as a spokesman for his constituency in the halls of party power. His removal occurred during a year when various unions had expressed differences with government policies on wages and prices more openly than previously. The trade unions’ general proclivity toward egalitarianism, job security, and social welfare ran counter to the leadership’s renewed drive for economic efficiency, wage differentiation based on performance, mobility, liquidation of unprofitable enterprises, and austerity. The occasionally jarring methods used to reach these goals included the stagnation and even reduction of the living standard. Gaspar’s replacement, Lajos Mehés, had been the first head of the new Ministry of Industry, created to foster the reform process, and thus less likely to side with the unions during its implementation.

Hungary No Longer Immune to Dissent Although Hungary continued to enjoy basic political stability, the year 1983 provided further evidence that dissatisfaction was growing among a limited segment of the population over political, cultural, and social issues. Besides the Church communities’ continued advocacy of conscientious objection to military service and the refusal of their most prominent leader, Father György Bulányi, to recant his views under pressure from the Hungarian Bench of Bishops, the appearance of a new and independent peace movement created obvious concern within the government and the party.

Another example of increased dissent was the continuing dispute between the cultural authorities and The Young Writers' Circle which became acrimonious when Ferenc Kulin was dismissed as editor-in-chief of its nonconformist monthly journal *Mozgó Világ* (The Moving World). Protests over the Kulin-*Mozgó Világ* affair were not confined to the Writers' Circle. Students at various Hungarian universities circulated a petition condemning the authorities' action and demanding Kulin's reinstatement. The presentation of the petition with several hundred signatures, at times gathered under difficult conditions, to Deputy Minister of Culture Dezső Tóth by the students of Loránd Eötvös University's Law School on October 28 was accompanied by a heated, two-and-a-half-hour debate.¹⁵ Available evidence indicated that the majority of the Writers' Union, although not publicly supporting the Young Writers' Circle, also strongly disagreed with official cultural policies and restrictions and their mood was angry and restive.¹⁶

The continued activities of Hungary's small group of openly proclaimed dissenters included production and distribution of samizdat articles, pamphlets, and books, as well as private initiatives—much to the government's embarrassment—such as benefit concerts to raise money for the poor and needy—who comprised 10 to 20 percent of the entire population.¹⁷

The authorities responded to these developments with a harder-line, systematic harassment, and a series of punitive measures unprecedented since 1965. In addition to the dismissal of Kulin and attempts to replace the entire editorial board of *Mozgó Világ*, Sándor Csóori, one of Hungary's most prominent writers, was placed on a "consultation list," which effectively prohibited him from publishing his works other than poetry. After initial, unsuccessful attempts on the part of the authorities to persuade the main independent peace organization, the Peace Group for Dialogue, to merge with the officially sponsored National Peace Council, they so obstructed and restricted it that it dissolved itself while pledging to continue the fight for its goals as an amorphous general movement. On September 1 a new antisamizdat decree that increased the fines up to 10,000 forint for printing and distributing samizdat material went into effect.¹⁸

Aside from threats in the official press against opposition to party and government policies and demands for more autonomy and pluralism direct action by the police was another tactic employed to discourage dissent. The *ABC Bulletin*, a samizdat newspaper reporting on nationality affairs, was stopped altogether.¹⁹ In May László Rajk's samizdat "boutique" was closed.²⁰ The police continued throughout the year to raid the homes of dissidents, confiscating manuscripts, printing equipment, and copies of *Beszélő*, Hungary's main samizdat periodical. Dissidents complained about

their increasing harassment: the police tailed them, beat them, and—in the case of the Jewish members of the opposition—subjected them to anti-Semitic insults.²¹

The government's increasingly harsher policies were due in the first place to the sensitive and politically explosive issue of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia. The frank and often angry treatment of the subject in samizdat publications of relatively wide circulation and easy access was intolerable to the Kádár regime for reasons of both domestic and foreign policy.

Second, the government possibly was afraid that certain dissident ideas might gain in popularity, especially after economic difficulties had resulted in a number of unpopular measures and a decline in living standards. The issue of the minorities posed a considerable danger in this regard, since it had the potential for gaining sympathy for the dissidents from a considerable part of the population dissatisfied with the government's evasion of an issue of great concern to them.

In the third place, the regime had to move against independent peace movements that blamed the arms race and international tensions equally on East and West, and had the temerity to voice specific criticisms of Moscow, as well as against articles questioning the right of the party to interfere in the affairs of other organizations. Such behavior transcended the limits—at times vague—delineated by the Soviet Union for the behavior of its Warsaw Pact allies.

Perhaps the weightiest and most explicit reasons for the crackdown could be found in statements made by János Kádár and Deputy Minister of Culture Deszö Tóth. At the April cc plenum, Kádár noted the existence in Hungarian society of a "certain oppositional, and in some places even hostile movement which is given daily support by the radio stations and other propaganda outlets financed by the imperialists," which "have of late become somewhat more aggressive. Some would like to be legalized in order to gain a forum. . . . In our country, the [existing] social movements provide a wide range of opportunities . . . but we will not legalize hostile endeavors either in the framework of the [Patriotic] People's Front or of the peace movement or in any other area and will not tolerate the establishment of bases of opposition [to party authority"].²²

In an interview with the literary weekly *Elet és Irodalom* (Life and Literature) Deputy Culture Minister Tóth expressed similar sentiments.²³ Speaking about the need to suppress "undesirable views" in the country's cultural life, Tóth said that a compromise would allow such views to achieve a presence and influence out of proportion to their weight and role in society, leading to the development of a political platform and institu-

tional representation by their advocates. He concluded that ultimately a "politically pluralized literary life" would lead to a confrontation with a society organized on the "basis of the popular front and of a policy of [class] alliance." The party's fear of the emergence of some sort of organized opposition clearly came through in such statements.

Foreign Affairs The official visit in July of a Hungarian party and state delegation to the USSR—the first such trip since 1974—led to extensive discussions between Kádár and Andropov.²⁴ The visit confirmed the Soviet party's continued interest in the possible application of certain Hungarian economic methods in the USSR itself and elicited a cautious and indirect endorsement by the new Soviet leadership of the policies pursued by the Kádár regime in Hungary, including a number of aspects of the NEM. It seemed to be a personal success for Kádár, who had succeeded in the past in establishing good relations with both Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Hungary's foreign relations in 1983 were also characterized by a vigorous pursuit of contacts with the West, including active participation in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank—despite the poor state of Soviet-U.S. relations and the resulting tension. This included the growing traffic between Washington and Budapest, including Foreign Minister Peter Várkonyi's visit to Washington and Vice President Bush's visit to Hungary.²⁵ Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister József Marjai continued to act as an emissary to the West on behalf of his government, traveling, among other places, to the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy.²⁶ These trips probably paved the way for visits of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi to Hungary in early 1984.

Resurgence of open Hungarian-Romanian polemics over Transylvania and over the rights of the large Hungarian minority in Romania constituted yet another important development in foreign policy.²⁷ This had been preceded by a sharp dispute over the same issue in the spring of 1982, occasioned by speeches and articles in the Romanian media in celebration of the sixty-fifth anniversary of the incorporation of Transylvania and the Banat into the Romanian state on December 1, 1918. Such polemics have the tendency to fan animosities between the two nationalities. Although usually the official Hungarian policy was to avoid public involvement in the matter, the government was aware of the public concern about the problem that effective official action was expected to solve. Personal diplomacy between 1973 and 1983 did not succeed in achieving a solution, despite the involvement of such high-ranking officials as the two party first secretaries, the two prime ministers, the foreign ministers, and various cc secretaries.²⁸ Probably as a result of the perception that the public had to

be placated to some degree, increased discussion of the issue was permitted at selected forums and replies to Romanian comments—albeit limited in number—were allowed in the party and official press.

On the whole, 1983 was a difficult year for Hungary and its leadership. However, no weakening of the country's determination to cope with and eventually overcome its difficulties was apparent. Problematic was the question of the party's and government's ability to achieve a reconciliation with those who strongly differed with official policy especially with respect to the growing proportion of the generation for whom the 1956 revolution and the resulting societal compromises were merely historical events without particular relevance.

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National Versus International Interests

Alfred Reisch and Vladimir V. Kusin

Mátyás Szűrös, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party (HSWP) CC secretary in charge of foreign relations, provided a distinctly Hungarian interpretation of the relationship between the national and international interests of communist states in the January 1984 issue of the party's ideological and political monthly *Társadalmi Szémlé*.¹ According to Szűrös, the political and economic situation in the world demanded harmonization of the common international and the individual national interests of communist states. However, the latter, in Szűrös' view, should receive priority over the past practice whereby communist international interests were placed above national ones. The common international interest of communist states, as determined within the forums of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, was the "common denominator" of various national interests, subordinate only in "extraordinary cases" that Szűrös did not specify. However, he noted that "similarity in color" and "diversity in form" were difficult to achieve simultaneously and raised many problems for Hungary, especially in the realm of foreign policy.

Hungary in the World System According to Szűrös, changes in the international environment affected Hungary with particular severity because of its geographic location, natural and economic endowment, and Vladimir V. Kusin was responsible for the Czechoslovak material.

relatively small size. One school of thought believed that the role of small countries in world affairs had been reduced to a minimum in a bipolar world, while the other school held that the small countries' role was crucial in bridging differences of views between the superpowers by helping to work out mutually acceptable compromises and promoting the continuation of an East-West dialogue. As an example he used the Helsinki follow-up conference in Madrid that had been concluded a few months before.

While international conditions generally did not hinder the "building of socialism" in Hungary, Szürös wrote, they had occasionally made it more difficult on account of their effect on the country's political, economic, and ideological life. However, he maintained that during the past twenty-five years, Hungary's growing international activism, combined with stability, had many direct and indirect international reverberations, contributing, albeit modestly, to the preservation of peace in Europe and the consolidation of international security.

According to Szürös, contrary to the assertions that communism had been imposed from the outside, the Hungarian people after World War II had accepted communism as a "national program." He admitted, however, that the Soviet Union's military presence combined with its economic and political aid had "accelerated the development of the revolution and the outcome of decisive battles in Hungary's class struggles."

Adverse Effects of the Cold War The uncertain European and world political situation had a negative impact on Hungary during the Cold War, Szürös asserted, in contrast to the basically "positive" state of Hungary's domestic situation. He blamed international tension and the threat of another world war, allegedly the results of "imperialism," for impeding the peaceful development of Hungary and other communist states. Their long-term negative effects included, according to Szürös, the "unhealthy economic structure of certain socialist countries" and forced industrialization—primarily the rapid forced development of heavy industry to the detriment of agriculture and the economic infrastructure. Likewise, he asserted that the West's anticommunist propaganda during the Cold War had forced a response from the East in the form of a similarly one-sided, simplified, and schematic propaganda that "desperately tried to prove the superiority of socialism."

Szürös suggested that international tension and hostility between the two world systems brought about a turning inward and the isolation of both alliance systems, which made it impossible to create the mutual trust needed to solve contentious questions. In this atmosphere, the external threat supposedly strengthened "sectarian and dogmatic features" in Hun-

gary, with the resulting "distortions" seriously harming the "cause of socialism" and the entire international communist movement.

According to Szürös, these developments aggravated problems among communist countries and parties. Among such difficulties he listed the "violation of the principle of equal rights and independence" and the "mechanical copying" of Soviet methods without regard to national characteristics. He considered the 1956 "counterrevolution" in Hungary and its aftermath as important lessons in the interaction of national and international factors, since the reorganized and renewed HSWP drew lessons from its past mistakes, reevaluating both in theory and practice the relationship between the general laws of communism and Hungary's particular social and economic characteristics and traditions. In his opinion, Hungary's experience proved that "opportunities and circumstances did not automatically coincide" and that "politics and the art of political leadership consisted in making good use of the existing interaction between national and international possibilities." Szürös ascribed to the "tragedy of 1956" HSWP's awareness of circumstances which guided its foreign policy as it tried to harmonize the "general laws of socialism" with its national needs and aspirations.

A Changing View of the Common Interest In the period when the Communist International functioned as an international decision-making center, the common interest necessarily coincided with the interests of the only communist state then in existence, the Soviet Union. Following the dissolution of its indirect successor, the Cominform, between 1957 and 1969 the alleged international interests and resulting strategy of communist states were determined at the communist parties' world conferences, but each country's relationship with the Soviet Union remained the primary element of this "proletarian internationalism." Szürös claimed that as the world system of communist nations developed further, there was no organized forum for determining these common international interests and strategy. In his opinion, however, conditions were not conducive to convening a new world conference of communist parties.

According to Szürös, the difficulties in harmonizing the different national interests were especially evident in the bilateral economic relations of the communist states within the framework of the CMEA. Since there was no final arbiter, he believed that the parties would need "trust, patience, and great circumspection" in order to reach a "mutually acceptable consensus based on voluntarism."

More Diversity Needed Szürös wrote that both the practice of communism and the roads leading to its construction had become more "multi-hued," but that this diversity of forms alongside basically common features

had not gone without debate and tension among communist states. He implied that the resulting "reservations and suspicions" were exacerbated by those who adamantly presented their methods as the only correct model. According to Szürös, such problems had occurred during the previous twenty-five years between Hungary and certain communist states and had "intensified after virtually every important new step."² But diversity had increased the need that communist states understand each other's experiences and methods, so that each could learn from the mistakes and failures of the others. He quoted Andropov's statement of June 15, 1983, that "cooperation among the socialist states will continue to develop by taking into account the particularities of the [given] situation and the particular interests of the countries involved."

The similarity in content and diversity of form also applied to foreign policy, Szürös indicated, listing the basic common foreign policy goals of the communist states as the preservation of peace, the limitation of the arms race, and the policy of peaceful coexistence. Even though these goals required a joint stand, he suggested that this did not exclude individual communist countries from taking advantage of the specific opportunities open to them, making it possible to develop relations between a given communist and a given capitalist country at a time of deteriorating East-West relations and decreasing contacts. Such a foreign policy allegedly would not contradict the requirements of the alliance system, or, at most, only "the earlier schematic interpretation of a unified foreign policy."

The Hungarian Variant Hungary's communism was a "relatively acceptable variant" in Western view, according to Szürös. However, he rejected the thesis that "if the class enemy praises, we must obviously have erred somewhere." Even though Hungary did not object to the West's recognition of the success of its policies of the previous twenty-five years, he insisted that this had been done exclusively for the Hungarian people and not to win anyone's good will.

Szürös outlined as the basic aim of the NSWP's foreign policy cooperation with the communist states and solidarity with developing countries. At the same time Hungary wanted mutually beneficial relations based on peaceful coexistence with all countries with different social systems, asking only that its own social system and alliance obligations be respected. Szürös thus made the not entirely new claim that unity with other communist states and national diversity in both economic and foreign policies were not mutually exclusive, but rather advantageous and even indispensable for helping the communist countries solve their domestic and international problems.³ His article constituted a clear reaffirmation of the Kádár regime's policy that continued the gradual economic reform begun in 1968

and maintained Hungary as an "open" country within the framework of a united communist bloc.

More Attention to National Characteristics Needed Szürös emphasized the need to pay more attention to national characteristics of communist countries when formulating common international interests, in contrast to the old approach whereby the meaning of the concept of proletarian internationalism had been primarily interpreted by the USSR. In his opinion, the communist movement required a new approach on bilateral relations. His repeated references to the Soviet declaration to Hungary on October 30, 1956,⁴ were particularly significant in this regard. The HSWP rejected all schematic and extreme approaches to creation of a unified front in favor of one that would pay more attention to each communist country's national characteristics and endowments.

A Call for Greater Autonomy in Foreign Policy Another significant point in the Szürös article was its clear message that Hungary and other communist states were entitled to conduct their own foreign policies within the limits set by their common alliance obligations. Elaborating on this in a ninety-minute radio interview, Szürös reiterated that in spite of the leading role of the two superpowers, the role of small and medium-size countries was increasingly important in promoting the East-West dialogue and the establishment of "mutually acceptable and rational compromises."

According to Szürös, the HSWP's foreign policy took into account Hungary's alliance obligations as well as its national endowment and international conditions. For him, participation in communist states' international activities, promoted rather than violated Hungary's independence since it allowed the country to maintain its basic foreign policy goals while fostering détente and political contacts. Hungarian initiatives in this respect included the maintenance of open channels of communication with all Western and nonaligned states and the expansion of relations with them on the basis of mutual advantage whenever possible. For instance, Hungary strongly endorsed the European security conference in Stockholm and agreed to act as host to the cultural forum of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in 1985. It managed to avoid the installation of new medium-range Soviet nuclear missiles on its territory, which it obviously did not favor. It also continued to strive to improve and modernize the CMEA and to keep it open to world trade at a time when some other members would like to see it reduce its "dependence" on the West and perhaps even harbor thoughts of a return to autarky, firmly rejected by the HSWP as "harmful." Hungary joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1982 and upgraded its interstate and economic ties with China in 1983.

Ties with the GDR Following Kádár's brief, largely symbolic visit in East Berlin on November 30, 1983, East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph paid an official visit to Budapest on March 21–22, 1984. During the official discussions, the two parties took note of the "dynamic" development of their bilateral relations, primarily in the sphere of economic cooperation. East Germany was Hungary's third largest overall trading partner after the Soviet Union and West Germany, and Hungary ranked fourth on the GDR's list. The total value of their trade for the 1981–1985 five-year plan period was an impressive 740,000 million rubles.⁵

The distinctive aspects of the Stoph visit, the substance of which was clearly focused on bilateral economic cooperation and trade, was the fact that the Hungarian media used it to publicize, as *Népszabadság* put it, the "active part" played by both Hungarian and East German diplomacy in attempts to revive détente and improve the international climate. According to the semiofficial *Magyar Hírlap*,⁶ a "similarity of ideas, aims, and interests" bound the two countries in their domestic and foreign policies. The Hungarian media commentaries noted that Hungary and the GDR, while giving priority in their foreign policy to their Warsaw Pact ties, and "agreeing on the importance of the communist countries' unified foreign policy,"⁷ would be "particularly active" with respect to the amelioration of the international situation.

The two countries' interest in cultivating contacts with the West was evident in the February visit of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Burt to both Budapest and East Berlin, and the March visit of a West German delegation headed by Bundestag President Rainer Barzel to Hungary.

Hungary evidently saw its diplomatic overtures to the West in the same light as the GDR's political moves to preserve its special relationship with the FRG during an alarmingly low point in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Nevertheless, Hungary and East Germany obviously were not willing to subordinate their respective national interests to the common interests of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact despite their protests to the contrary.

Prague Diehards Attack Deviations Two Communist party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS) CC officials sternly criticized what they called national deviations in some East European parties and countries. The critical article in *Rudé právo* of March 30, 1984, was written by Michal Štefanák,⁸ deputy head of the CC's international department, and Ivan Hlivka, a staff member of the same unit, entitled "The National and the International in CPCS Policy."

According to the article, the imperialists were seeking to drive a wedge

between the countries of the Soviet bloc by praising those that pursued reforms and by condemning those that rejected new departures from their previous policies. Without unity, disorientation and doubts set in. Even though national interests need not dovetail absolutely, such differences as may exist must be viewed as temporary and nonantagonistic, the article proclaimed. The national and the international aspects of a state's policy must not be regarded as two separate phenomena; true national interests could only be understood within the international framework of the joint interests of the socialist community as a whole. "Collective reason always counts more than separatism," according to the authors.

Implicitly criticizing Romania, Hungary, and possibly even the German Democratic Republic,⁹ Štefanák and Hlivka subsumed six theories and policies under the heading of "particularism": the weakening of the bloc's joint international strategies and foreign policies, the attempts to obtain "one-sided" advantages from capitalist governments and financial institutions, the adoption of "narrow" national attitudes in the face of temporary economic aggravation, the division of states into "large" and "small" rather than by class criteria, the twin offense of extolling one's own "model" while waxing inordinately suspicious of proposals put forward by other fraternal parties, and claims that "the hierarchic ranking" of national and international interests had recently changed in favor of the national ones.

The deliberate vagueness of the accusations was likely to offend almost equally readers in Bucharest, Budapest, and East Berlin. The reference to "independence" in foreign policy may have been aimed at the Romanians; the distinction between small and large states at both the Romanians and the Hungarians; and the accusation of striving for "one-sided advantage" from the capitalists at the GDR as well as the other two. Budapest saw the *Rudé Právo* outburst as unwarranted criticism, especially since some of its formulations were lifted without much camouflage from the Szürös article.¹⁰ Szürös himself did not wait long to pick up the gauntlet and, still observing the principle of anonymity, responded in kind.¹¹

HSWP Defends Its Foreign Policy Initiatives Hungary's party and government leadership chose the 39th anniversary of the Soviet forces' "liberation" of Hungary to defend their latest foreign policy initiatives. In a lengthy interview in *Magyar Hirlap* Szürös stressed five major points:¹²

1. In spite of the deterioration of the international climate, the military balance had been preserved and there was no direct danger of war. Hungary thus still believed that the "historical competition" between the communist and capitalist world systems must continue to be waged by peaceful and political means.

2. Europe would continue to support détente. The small and medium-

sized countries of the two alliance systems, through dialogue and constructive relations, could exercise a beneficial influence on the international climate and open the way to improved Soviet-American relations.

3. Hungary supported the Warsaw Pact's foreign policy proposals, but at the same time, it attempted to promote its own national interests through "independent initiatives" oriented toward peace, security, and peaceful co-existence. According to Szürös, this foreign policy "activism," with goals identical to those of the Warsaw Pact's common initiatives, had increased Hungary's international prestige and made it both a "reliable ally and friend" in the communist bloc and a "correct partner" for the West and the noncommunist world in general.

4. The joint harmonized interests of communist states encompassed national interests and thus could not conflict with these interests but instead promoted them. Foreign policy interests were consolidated within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and economic interests within that of the CMEA.

5. The multifaceted Hungarian-Soviet relations were improving, with each side using the experience of the other to find practical solutions to problems.

Indirectly responding to the Czechoslovak criticism, Szürös said that the necessity to harmonize common communist goals with national objectives stemmed from the increasingly complex political and economic situation. In the then-existing stage of "socialism," however, common interests could not be forged and fulfilled unless the communist countries' basic national interests were taken into account. This meant that any one Warsaw Pact country's foreign policy could not conflict with common objectives, but instead promoted them. The "multihued" nature of national interests among the Warsaw Pact countries was not conducive to their harmonization, Szürös admitted, but neither did it make such harmonization impossible. Communist parties were not only showing "greater understanding for each other's solutions but were also paying greater attention to the possibility of applying each other's experience."

He pointed out that among both communist and Western countries there were varying degrees of interest in promoting better relations. Austria, Finland, and the FRG, for example, had more active relations with Hungary than with other Warsaw Pact states; the same applied to Bulgaria's relations with its neighbors Greece and Turkey, to Cuba's relations with Spain, and to the GDR's relations with the FRG.

Emphasizing that Hungarian-Soviet relations based on "direct and open internationalism" were extremely important, Szürös wrote that their future development would be characterized by greater cooperation and

mutual advice: "An attempt at mutual respect and understanding has become the norm for Hungarian-Soviet relations and the guarantee for their further development."

Defending Hungary's International Role Deputy Foreign Minister Ferenc Esztergályos, a former ambassador to Washington (1975-1981), wrote that Hungary had built up a broad system of international contacts and wished to continue doing so. Although it was a small country, it considered it both its "duty and service" to contribute to the promotion of political dialogue and economic and cultural cooperation, rather than confrontation, in East-West relations.

Imre Tatar wrote in *Magyar Nemzet* that unlike in the past, Hungary had more friends than enemies, especially among its neighbors, both communist and capitalist [Austria]. He explained that as international relations grew more complex and alternated between tension and détente, Hungary had to choose its own foreign policy objectives. Moreover, as a small country, it was dependent on international cooperation and therefore more sensitive to increased tension between East and West.

Tatar wrote that on the one hand, Budapest's foreign policy was "predictable." Hungary was a faithful Warsaw Pact ally and committed to the cause of socialism. On the other hand, he echoed Szűrös's remarks that Hungary's foreign policy should equally serve its national interests and its international commitments. Hungarian foreign policy, while representing the common goals of the Warsaw Pact, considered other viewpoints condemning them abruptly. Thus, the fact that Mrs. Thatcher was welcome in Budapest was not an indication of "a separate Hungarian way" but rather, reinforcement of Warsaw Pact interests, since her visit led the British prime minister to reconsider some of her prejudices against communist countries before going on to Iurii Andropov's funeral.

Gromyko Takes Tough Position in Budapest Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid an official "friendly" visit to Hungary from April 17 to 18, 1984. According to Radio Budapest, Prime Minister Lázár during a meeting with Gromyko stressed Hungary's "fruitful cooperation" with the Soviet Union and expressed his conviction that the deterioration of the international situation could be halted.¹³ The radio reported that Gromyko emphasized the importance of friendship and cooperation between the two countries and asserted that the Soviet Union, together with other communist states, had taken the necessary measures to reestablish a balance in military forces allegedly threatened by an American quest for superiority. The TASS account of the meeting, on the other hand, clearly showed the contrast between Lázár's relatively moderate address and Gromyko's uncompromising tirade against the United States and NATO, which made up

over half of his speech. The final communiqué was a restatement of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact position on the Euromissiles and nuclear arms control talks, which ascribed all the blame for the failure of the latter to the United States and NATO. This sharp definition of the current international situation, obviously formulated by the Soviets, was in contrast to Hungary's recent conciliatory foreign policy initiatives.

On the eve of Gromyko's arrival in Budapest, Géza Kotai, deputy head of the HSWP CC's Foreign Relations Department, mentioned the differences in size and resources between Hungary and the Soviet Union and the resulting "methodological differences." Kotai also spoke of the "rich experiences" gained by the HSWP in the past forty years, some of which (for example, in agriculture) could also be of use to the Soviet Union. In foreign policy, he indicated, the communist states could also put to good use their own individual characteristics and endowments. As specific examples, Kotai mentioned Bulgaria's promotion of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, the "patient" policy of the GDR in maintaining a dialogue with the FRG, and Hungary's special relations with Austria, Finland, Italy, and the FRG, based on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and serving the interests of both Hungary and the entire "socialist" community.

Also on April 18 Radio Budapest released a summary of a statement on foreign policy adopted the day before by the HSWP CC on the basis of a report submitted by Szürös.¹⁴ The party stated that in the unfavorable international situation it wanted to pursue, together with its allies, a policy of peace and maintain and expand its relations with countries of different social systems in order to reduce tension. Once again, it expressed support for the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union and for the Soviet arms reduction proposals. It also noted that broader cooperation between Hungary and the other communist states was "well served" by such recent visits as that of Kádár to Yugoslavia and those of Czechoslovak Premier Lubomír Štrougal and GDR Premier Willi Stoph to Budapest.

This position, taken by the entire Central Committee of the HSWP, meant that the Kádár regime, while displaying "internationalist" loyalty and support for the Soviet Union's global foreign policy objectives, reaffirmed its own particular initiatives aimed at advancing Hungary's national interests. A Hungarian radio commentator pointed out that Hungary belonged to Europe, even though many in the West forgot this when terming Hungary an East European country and limiting Europe to the members of the EEC.¹⁵ Hungary thus used the Gromyko visit to stress both the "complete identity of views" between Moscow and Budapest and the need to pursue East-West dialogue.¹⁶

XI East Germany on a New Road?

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Rapprochement with Bonn

Ronald D. Asmus

Following the collapse in the fall of 1982 of the ruling SPD/FDP coalition under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and the formation of a new coalition composed of the CDU/CSU and the FDP, considerable attention was devoted to the possible implications for the future of relations between the FRG and the GDR. The prospects of change did not seem unlikely, given the CDU/CSU's past vocal criticism of the SPD's *Deutschlandpolitik*, as well as the self-proclaimed "turning point" promised by new Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Indeed, a mini-debate about "change" and "continuity" broke out in the West German press while West German officials reiterated the government's pledge to respect existing treaties and agreements with the GDR but also to try a fresh new approach in areas where they found past policy deficient.

For several years, inter-German relations had been increasingly influenced by crises in East-West relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had threatened to plunge the relations between Bonn and East Berlin into a major crisis. The eruption of social unrest in Poland in the summer of 1980 and the emergence of Solidarity had led to a distinct chill in inter-German relations as well. Finally, the SED attempted to link Bonn's position on Euromissiles to the future of East-West German relations. For its part, Bonn maintained its support for the NATO dual-track decision while simultaneously emphasizing its desire to continue relations regardless of the outcome of U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva. To the surprise of many outside observers, relations between the two German states not only survived the crises, but started to flourish under Kohl.

A Rough Start Initially, a great deal of nervousness was evident on the part of the SED leadership. However, by early spring of 1983, East Berlin clearly indicated its willingness to continue relations, above all in the

economic realm, where the GDR had been reaping considerable benefits from its "special relationship" with the FRG.

This brief period of tranquility was soon broken, however, by the minor crisis caused by the deaths of two West German citizens from heart failure while being questioned by East German customs officials in connection with alleged transit and currency violations in April. The press storm in West Germany led SED Secretary-General Erich Honecker to cancel his planned visit there. Shortly thereafter, however, Honecker announced that his visit had merely been postponed and not canceled. In official commentaries, the SED made it clear that it remained interested in good "normal" relations. Again, inter-German relations appeared headed on a forward, if somewhat unsteady, course with negotiations planned or resumed on a new postal agreement, the Berlin S-Bahn municipal train system, a cultural treaty, and environmental agreements.

In late June 1983 came the stunning announcement that a DM 1 billion banking credit had been granted by a West German bank consortium to the GDR and guaranteed by the West German government. The GDR had apparently turned to the FRG after having unsuccessfully courted Swiss and Austrian financial circles. A major role in arranging the deal was played by Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, in itself quite a sensation given his past criticism of too lax a policy toward the GDR and his insistence on the principle of *quid pro quo*. Moreover, government officials conceded that they had received no specific promises from the GDR on any humanitarian issues. They maintained that a "wish list" had been presented and was accepted by the SED.

Though a welcome bonus for the heavily indebted East German leadership, the loan could by no means solve the GDR's debt problems—the likely reason West German officials were quite confident that the GDR would eventually respond with gestures in the humanitarian area to keep open the possibility of additional loans in the future.

West German officials also conceded that one important factor behind the credit deal was the desire to "signal" the GDR that the FRG was interested in maintaining relations regardless of the outcome of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva. The GDR's vague hints that the West German position on the INF issue could have a negative impact on future relations had been a cause of concern in Bonn. The FRG therefore attempted to make clear to both the East German population and the SED that it was not in the interests of either side to allow relations to deteriorate.

The East German Response On September 27, 1983, the GDR abolished the minimum exchange requirement for visitors to the GDR for

children below the age of fourteen.¹ A second "concession" concerned "regulations on questions of family reunions and marriages between East German citizens and foreigners." West Germans and West Berliners had been considered foreigners under East German law, and the new decree raised the possibility of allowing East Germans to more readily marry foreigners or move to the West. Western press also reported that the GDR had started dismantling some of the estimated 54,000 automatic shooting devices along the East-West German border.

West German officials attempted to present these moves in a positive light as concessions that the previous government had been unable to obtain. Chancellor Kohl's office also emphasized that the GDR had introduced a more flexible and tolerant policy on border checks and controls along the transit routes to West Berlin and that, in addition, a more co-operative East German attitude had been discernible on the sensitive issue of purchasing political prisoners from the GDR. This positive appraisal, however, was also qualified by statements indicating that such moves were considered inadequate and that they had not met West German expectations.

In the ensuing months, it became increasingly clear that the SED was willing to remain in contact with Bonn despite the stalemate in Geneva. All the previous warnings about a possible "ice-age" in inter-German ties or ominous Soviet statements about the erection of a palisade of missiles between the two Germanies had little apparent effect on East-West German negotiations. In late November, when the USSR broke off the arms control negotiations in Geneva, East-West German negotiations continued in some fourteen different forums. Speaking a few days after the start of the INF deployment in the FRG, Honecker adopted a surprisingly moderate tone calling for the need to limit any damage resulting from this decision and leaving open the possibility of a return to détente.² Although he insisted that the West German agreement to the start of deployment had changed the basis of relations between the two German states, it was evident that the GDR was also committed to preserving its "special relationship" with Bonn.

The GDR in 1983: New Issues to the Fore

Ronald D. Asmus

For the GDR 1983 was a year dominated by the theme of peace. This was in part due to external circumstances, particularly the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. The GDR was not only fully integrated into the Warsaw Pact campaign against the deployment but also played a key role in attempts to influence the domestic dialogue over security in the West, above all in the FRG.

Throughout 1983 it often appeared that East German foreign policy toward the West was gradually becoming reduced to the single goal of preventing the deployment of NATO missiles. In attempting to further that goal, the GDR came up with a number of initiatives, including Honecker's appeal for a nuclear-free zone to cover the territory of the GDR and a corresponding portion of the FRG; the welcome reception of antimissile groups such as a West German "Green" delegation in East Berlin; and Honecker's surprising appeal "in the name of the German people" to all forces opposing deployment, contained in an open letter to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In several ways the SED attempted to appeal to broader German sentiments through the use of phrases such as a "community of responsibility" between the GDR and the FRG.¹

Peace The prominence given to the peace issue was also part of a conscious domestic strategy, with the party agitprop apparatus transforming "peace" into not only the leitmotif of East German domestic and foreign policy but even into the *raison d'être* of the GDR itself. The SED's intellectual acrobatics entailed the proposition that whatever serves the cause of socialism, as defined by the Soviet Union, inherently serves the cause of peace. If some of the actions taken in the name of defending socialism appeared unpeaceful by Western standards, this was attributed by East Berlin to Western inability to comprehend dialectical thinking. Under the rubric of preserving peace, the SED attempted to legitimize "peaceful" actions ranging from the building of the Berlin Wall to mandatory military education and paramilitary training in the school system.

The "implacable hatred of the class enemy"—especially the FRG—thus became a goal of the educational system in the name of preserving peace. The systematic militarization of society in the GDR had existed for some time, beginning with kindergarten, toys, and books, extending throughout the school system and the draft, and concluding with military reserve

commitments for all East Germans until they reached retirement age. Militarization may have been even more ubiquitous and inescapable under "normal" East German conditions than in Poland under martial law. It reached new heights in 1983 with the implementation of the new law on military conscription, originally passed in March 1982; the calling up of women for mobilization on an experimental basis; and the campaigns sponsored by the official youth organization FDJ calling on young East Germans to make their personal contribution to peace by committing themselves to an extra eighteen months or more of military service. The militarization of East German society could be viewed as a response to perceived internal threats, the corrosive effects of détente, and real or imagined effects from the unsettling developments in Poland. In 1983, the effects also constituted an attempt to combat pacifist tendencies among East German youth.

In the economic realm, the party used the slogan of peace as a cover for mobilization plans. Individual East Germans concerned about the world situation and the preservation of peace were urged to do their personal part by sacrificing extra hours or weekends to work. In some factories special "peace shifts" were introduced to increase production under the motto "The stronger socialism is, the more secure peace is."

Throughout the course of 1983 East German society was bombarded with peace appeals by countless organizations in the country expressing their support for the "peace policy" of the GDR and the Soviet Union. Yet the gulf between the party's claims and reality remained apparent as independent peace activists continued to speak out against the militarization of society and for disarmament in both East and West. The survival of such independent peace groups throughout the year could be attributed largely to the moral support and protection of the churches, especially the Evangelical Church, which continued its active involvement in the unofficial peace debate. Throughout the year one synod after another reconfirmed the Church's commitment to its peace work, issuing statements which at times led to strains in Church-state relations. The Church attempted to play the role of a mediator in the peace debate. The SED's consistent intransigence, however, at times threatened to undermine the Church's position in the longer term, calling into question the purpose of a dialogue that remained a monologue.

As 1983 came to a close, rising alarm and concern over the implications of the official security policy became apparent. In many ways this reaction was itself a product of the SED's own propaganda. After months of railing about the dangers that West European countries were bringing on themselves by allowing new medium-range missiles on their soil, the SED found itself faced with a series of protests and dismay following the

announcement in late October that additional Soviet nuclear missiles would be stationed on East German soil, allegedly in response to NATO's deployment. Such concerns were articulated primarily in Church circles, but the anxiety also reflected the realization that the "countermeasures" would constitute an additional economic burden at a time of economic austerity. To their shock, many East Germans probably became aware for the first time that Soviet nuclear missiles were stationed in the GDR. In an unprecedented show of concern, the party allowed the publication of several dissenting Church voices in the pages of *Neues Deutschland*. Yet any hopes that these might lead to a real dialogue over security issues proved premature. The sometimes surprising tolerance exhibited by the party was suggestive of a desire not to undermine the Warsaw Pact's own peace campaign and not to overburden Church-state ties. But the authorities encouraged or forced particularly fervent peace activists to emigrate to West Germany, took steps to prevent Western peace activists from traveling to the GDR, and even resorted to harassment and imprisonment.

The Luther Year Despite continuing differences and irritations, both the Evangelical Church and the state celebrated in a grandiose fashion the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther. For the Church, the anniversary presented a unique opportunity not only to spread Luther's teachings but also to consolidate and enhance its own presence within East German society as an independent institution. A series of seven Church congresses were held that attracted some 200,000 people and discussed issues ranging from peace and disarmament, environmental problems, to social issues such as alcoholism, suicide, homosexuality, and the problems of Christians in a socialist society. The expanding role of the church within society was emphasized.

For the state, the purpose was the celebration of Luther as an important historical and social figure and even as a German revolutionary. As Honacker pointed out in an interview in November, the Luther year celebrations could serve as a model for Church-state relations in the future. Yet the SED's elevation of Luther, the former "princes' lackey" and "betrayers of the peasants," into the socialist pantheon as "one of the greatest sons of the German people" was but the most recent step in a much broader process of the SED's historical revisionism aimed at establishing a new basis of historical legitimacy for the East German state. Having apparently realized that theories of proletarian and socialist internationalism did not suffice, the party had been slowly moving away from its past position that the GDR represented a break with the German past, instead presenting it as the culmination of all the "progressive" traditions in German history. The definition of "progressive" became increasingly elastic, allowing for

the inclusion of figures such as Frederick the Great, Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Goethe, and even Bismarck. Criticized or ignored for years, they were to foster a national consciousness in line with the party's theories of separate socialist and capitalist German nations.²

Foreign Policy The relations between the GDR and FRG remained on an even keel and, in some ways, even improved.³ In interviews in late 1983 Kohl indicated satisfaction with the developments of the year and even viewed inter-German relations as a foreign policy success; and Honecker stated that relations had developed better than expected.⁴

Within the Soviet bloc the GDR continued to play a prominent role in 1983 in keeping a watchful eye on developments in neighboring Poland. In mid-August Honecker led the first delegation from a Warsaw Pact country to visit Warsaw since formation of Solidarity in the summer of 1980. Since then, there had been a multitude of contacts between the two fraternal parties, focusing on the issues of ideological and cadre work, military and youth education, and questions of "societal control." Perhaps the single most important event in interbloc relations in 1983 was the removal of Petr Andreevich Abrasimov as Soviet ambassador in East Berlin. Abrasimov had often used his considerable influence to dominate East German domestics in a fashion somewhat reminiscent of an imperial viceroy, at times to the irritation of the SED leadership. His removal symbolically marked a new phase in Soviet-East German relations as the GDR continued to evolve from an occupied satellite to a partner, however junior.

The Economy As the GDR headed into 1984, its economy continued to perform remarkably well by Soviet bloc standards, achieving overall growth rates that many of its bloc neighbors could only envy. At the same time the GDR had been forced to lower its original overly ambitious plan figures for the 1981-1985 period. Increased energy costs (along with decreased Soviet oil supplies), large debts in both the West and the East, and continuing problems in the agricultural sector continued to impose considerable restraints on growth. Although the GDR had registered some success in its foreign trade performance in the last three years, this had been achieved through a domestic austerity program that included large cutbacks in imports of technology, stagnation in the standard of living, and decreased investment, none of which improved the long-term prospects for sustained economic growth. At the seventh cc plenum the Politburo report merely noted that it had been possible to maintain existing consumption levels and fulfill basic consumer needs. The days of a steadily increasing standard of living appeared to be part of the past.

Although the budget was based on an assumed overall growth rate of 4.4 percent in gross material product, national income and internal trade

turnover were scheduled to increase by a mere 2.2 percent, a likely indication of continued stagnation in real consumption levels. The priorities of the party leadership were evident from the scheduled increase in the official defense budget from 5.5 to 7.7 percent. Official state subsidies for basic goods and wages were to increase by more than 50 percent, a reflection of the fact that the producer price increases were not complemented by increases in consumer prices. That such a policy was becoming more and more expensive must have been apparent to all; at the same time, a shift away from the commitment to low commodity prices would have entailed a major revision of the premises upon which the SED had based its social policy for more than a decade.

Throughout the 1970s the regime had endeavored to increase the supply of both consumer durables and luxury imports while holding prices for basic commodities at steady and very low levels. Approaching the mid-1980s, however, the SED found itself in a position where luxury imports were scarce, consumer durables in shorter supply, and the subsidies necessary to maintain the prices of basic commodities rising dramatically. Moreover, the growth of the 1970s had been due at least in part to the large Western loans that now had to be repaid under more difficult circumstances. However, although the GDR was far from the crises of either Poland or Romania, the underlying problems were similar, and the SED had to cope with them successfully if it were to maintain its reputation as model of economic success in the Soviet bloc.

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The Policy of Damage Limitation

Ronald D. Asmus

When the West German Bundestag, meeting in special session on November 21–22, 1983, voted in favor of INF deployment on West German soil, it was not immediately evident that this would set the background and help spawn signs of dissent within the regimes of Eastern Europe as well. Just as the FRG became the focal point of the Euromissile debate in Western Europe, the GDR's attempts to preserve its "special relationship" with Bonn at a time of severe East-West crisis set the stage for yet another possible rift within the Soviet bloc.

The factors that facilitated this development were largely independent

of the INF controversy and could instead be found in the decline of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe resulting from a sustained succession crisis in the Kremlin. Although Moscow's absolute power position remained unchanged, its ability to articulate and implement a coherent bloc strategy and to impose bloc discipline appeared considerably weakened, thus enabling Eastern European leaders, if they so chose, to articulate and defend what they themselves perceived as their "national" interests.

At issue were two questions, transcending in significance bilateral East-West German relations and the differences between Moscow and East Berlin over the inter-German dialogue. The first involved the right of a fraternal communist party to determine its own policies in light of its own historical experience, the second the proper foreign policy course of the Warsaw Pact in the aftermath of the INF deployment.

The controversy over Euromissiles represented from the outset a litmus test for the viability of the "special relationship" so carefully nurtured by Bonn and grudgingly accepted by East Berlin in the course of the 1970s. Despite radically different long-term goals and many different interests, both states had nonetheless managed to establish a *modus vivendi* sturdy enough to survive such an international crisis as Afghanistan or Poland. The INF controversy threatened, however, to have repercussions of another magnitude after the Soviets and East Germans themselves had attempted, openly and unsuccessfully, to use the future of inter-German relations to pressure Bonn. In a key speech immediately following the West German deployment decision, Honecker in late November 1983 claimed that this had changed the basis of relations but argued that the key task now was to "limit the damage" and that the past treaties remained the basis for future ties. His statement seemed to disavow past Soviet and East German claims that deployment would constitute a violation of the "East-ern treaties" of the 1970s and implied that East Berlin's countermeasures would be limited to those military steps already announced while the vital political and economic ties would remain unaffected. Whereas the Soviets used the start of deployment as a pretext for breaking off arms control talks in Geneva, Bonn and East Berlin continued to negotiate in some fourteen forums.

In an interview on January 6 with the French communist daily *Révolution* Honecker adopted a surprisingly optimistic note on the question of a possible resumption of arms control negotiations, emphasizing that "sooner or later there will be negotiations on a new basis which will make a practical solution possible"—this at a time when Moscow was vocally demanding a reversal of INF deployment as a precondition for the resumption of any negotiations.¹ Nuances of differences between the SED and CPSU lead-

erships were hinted at during the visit in early January of GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer to Moscow for talks with his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko. In contrast to Honecker's optimism on resuming arms control negotiations, Gromyko harshly attacked the West, reiterating the Soviet preconditions for a resumption of arms control negotiations. For his part, Fischer issued a subtle reminder that responsible politics in the current situation required the restriction of "predictability" in East-West relations to preserve and expand the "laboriously achieved" fruits of the *détente* of the 1970s.² A mere two days after the official Soviet announcement of the death of Iurii Andropov on February 10 Honecker delivered a major speech at a gathering of district party leaders in which he returned to the theme of the special responsibility of the two German states for peace in Europe. He called on them to "use every possibility so that reason and realism will prevail, so that cooperation instead of confrontation will come to fore, and so that disarmament will proceed and the process of *détente* based on the principle of equality and equal security will be revived."³

To underline the principle of common responsibility, a quick solution was found in January 1984 that allowed the emigration to the West of several groups of East-German citizens who had taken refuge at the American embassy and the West German diplomatic mission in East Berlin.⁴ In early February the West German automobile manufacturer Volkswagenwerk announced tentative agreement on a DM 600 million joint-production and barter project with the GDR.⁵ In mid-February Honecker and Kohl met for over two hours of talks at the Andropov funeral in Moscow, after which they proclaimed the "existential importance" of avoiding nuclear war and of using "common sense" to prevent "the course of international affairs from getting out of control." Kohl also used the occasion to reconfirm Honecker's invitation to visit the FRG.⁶ In late February in what was generally viewed as a delayed response to the June 1983 credit deal, the SED initiated an officially sanctioned emigration of over 25,000 persons—a figure which by late May more than tripled the 1983 legal emigration from the GDR.⁷ The visit by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt to East Berlin in late February and a string of prominent Western visitors, including Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, to the spring Leipzig fair testified to Western attention to Honecker's policy.

By insulating the FRG's relations with the GDR from the INF controversy and negotiating a series of specific agreements in a relatively short period of time, Chancellor Kohl's coalition government not only enhanced its domestic standing, but also preempted accusations from the SPD oppo-

sition that Atlantic fidelity would come at the expense of special "German interests." Indeed a broadly based consensus among the major West German political parties emerged over *Deutschlandpolitik* at a time when the past consensus over West German security policy appeared to be crumbling.⁸ The passionate debates of a decade past over relations with the East had been overtaken by an equally heated discussion over deterrence, security, and defense policy.

In the case of the SED, economic considerations were undoubtedly a prime factor in East Berlin's efforts to preserve its "special relationship" with Bonn. Despite marked progress in reducing its Western debt, the GDR remained interested in expanding economic and financial cooperation not only for future debt management, but also to obtain the funds and technology needed to modernize East German industry in the 1980s. The special West German role in this context was underlined by Bonn's role in the two major credit deals as well as the fact that East Berlin had been receiving about DM 1 billion annually from the FRG for an array of services rendered. Western estimates of the GDR's total annual intake—including visa fees, minimum exchange rate payments, private contributions, and other items—referred to over DM 2.5 billion, not including the effect of the East German tariff-free access to the West European market.⁹ To save hard currency, East Berlin had been increasingly turning to its trade with West Germany to obtain goods previously purchased elsewhere.¹⁰

But the SED's economic interests coincided with its primary political goal of insuring the stability of its regime in view of the possible further deterioration in East-West affairs. A January 1984 commentary by the Polish daily *Trybuna Ludu*, reprinted in *Neues Deutschland*, asserted that Honecker's cultivation of ties with Bonn was motivated by the desire to insure against the emergence of an even more dangerous situation in Europe, and that it is in this context that one should view "the engagement of the GDR in the search for points of reference that offer hope . . . for the recovery of a peaceful atmosphere in the heart of Europe." Furthermore, according to *Trybuna Ludu*, the SED was attempting to encourage those voices of reason within the Western alliance which remained interested in cooperating with the East and "to bring about a return by Bonn and its allies to a policy of arms control negotiations."¹¹ In the spring of 1984, the same point was made by an East German official to several Western journalists visiting East Berlin: "If we Germans don't talk now to each other about the future, we may find ourselves talking to each other in Valhalla. . . . We don't have to love each other, but reason and realism tell us that the only way for both of us to live is in peaceful coexistence."¹²

Without doubt, Honecker's policy not only enhanced East Berlin's international prestige, as reflected by the string of Western visitors to East Berlin, but was very popular domestically as well. The temporary convergence of popular sentiments with government policies was used by the SED to cultivate an image of Honecker as an elder statesman devoted to peace and dialogue with the West, a sort of East German Kádár trying to do the best for his country at a most difficult time in Europe.¹⁸

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Discord with Moscow

Ronald D. Asmus, Vladimir V. Kusin,
Sallie Wise, and Slobodan Stankovic

Although clear differences of emphasis distinguished East German statements and harsher Soviet proclamations on East-West affairs in the early months of 1984, few Western observers attached any great significance to such nuances. Most simply attributed the East German interest in "a return to détente" and the moderate tones emanating from East Berlin to a division of labor within the Warsaw Pact, with East Berlin using its ties with Bonn to encourage West German opposition to INF deployment and to exert additional pressure on Bonn. Meeting with Chernenko during the funeral ceremonies for Andropov in mid-February, Honecker appeared to have received a "green light" from the Kremlin to continue his policy of rapprochement with the FRG. In a symbolic display of East German-Soviet solidarity a high-ranking GDR military delegation visited Moscow in late February. The talks between SED Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann and Chernenko were reported to have "reached full agreement on the military-political situation that has developed in Europe and questions pertaining to the future of relations between the USSR and the GDR."¹ In choosing Hoffmann, an SED Politburo member, East Berlin could hardly have sent a more sturdy symbol of Soviet-East German friendship; this aspect was accentuated by the juxtaposition of the visit with an article in *Pravda* by Hoffmann's fellow Politburo member Horst Dohlfus tailored specifically for a Soviet audience.² While the GDR had clearly gained in

Ronald D. Asmus was responsible for the East German material, Vladimir V. Kusin for the Czechoslovak material, Sallie Wise for the Russian, and Slobodan Stankovic for the Yugoslav.

stature within the Warsaw Pact, it remained difficult to imagine that a discord could develop between the supremely loyal and traditionally orthodox SED and Moscow, particularly on such a key issue as relations with the FRG.

East Germany Sides with Hungary The situation appeared in a different light after the publication in late March of the article in the Czechoslovak party daily *Rudé právo*³ critical of "national deviations" in unnamed East European countries. While no offenders were named, criticism of Hungary, Romania, and the GDR was implied. The reference was particularly to the article published in January by Hungarian cc Secretary for Foreign Relations Mátyás Szűrös defending the right of fraternal parties to pursue an autonomous foreign policy in light of their own experiences and historical ties and Szűrös's subsequent interview in which he reaffirmed his views.⁴ Apparently stung by the Czechoslovak criticism, *Neues Deutschland* on April 12 chose to reprint the text of the interview. On April 17 *Neues Deutschland* followed this up with an ADN dispatch from Budapest containing excerpts of an interview with János Kádár, which had originally appeared in the American news magazine *Leaders* and had been reprinted in the Budapest weekly *Magyarország*. In the interview, Kádár also reconfirmed the Hungarian position.⁵ The fact that *Neues Deutschland* made no reference to the *Rudé právo* article while giving prominent display to the Szűrös interview as well as excerpts of Kádár's statements implied clearly where the SED leadership's sympathies lie.

The GDR and Czechoslovakia had traditionally been viewed, particularly throughout the 1970s, as two of the most loyal and most orthodox of Soviet allies in Eastern Europe; the GDR had had closer relations with Czechoslovakia than with any other East European neighbor. In contrast, while maintaining good relations with Hungary on an official level, the SED had never hidden its lack of enthusiasm about Hungarian reform initiatives; and relations with the Hungarians had never been as cordial as those with Czechoslovakia.

The essential message of the original *Rudé právo* article was that the block must remain united, regardless of changes in the international situation, and that it must be on guard against Western imperialist efforts to split or divide the fraternal allies by encouraging "national interests." The authors attacked "elements of particularism" that weaken the bloc's joint international strategies and foreign policies. What was generally interpreted as also applying to the GDR were attacks on alleged attempts to obtain "one-sided" advantages from capitalist governments and their financial institutions—in the case of the GDR, its close economic and financial ties with the FRG. Others speculated that critical references to countries trying to "demonstrate" a kind of "independence" in foreign policy or to the

aspirations of small states attempting to assist the "great powers" in coming to agreements might have been aimed at the blossoming of contacts between the two German states.

Particularly relevant for an East German audience were Szűrös's examples of the revival of diplomatic activity between East and West, including talks between Honecker and Kohl at Andropov's funeral and West German Social Democratic parliamentary floor leader Hans-Jochen Vogel's visit to Moscow, along with the visits of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to Eastern Europe. Equally pertinent for the GDR may have been Szűrös's justification of the types of "special relationships" that have developed between certain East and West European states.

The excerpts from the Kádár interview carried by the ADN dispatch of April 17 began with his introductory comments noting Kádár's image in the West as a pragmatic politician and the prospects of stability in post-Kádár Hungary. Most of the article, however, was devoted to quotations on relations between the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe and the current state of affairs between the United States and the USSR. With regard to Soviet-East European relations, *Neues Deutschland* quoted Kádár as saying that the basic common interests and mutual understanding that had developed between these countries and the USSR had naturally led to a high degree of joint cooperation in all fields; however, "there was a mistaken view that the experiences gained in the construction of a new society could be transferred in their entirety into the practice of Hungary or other countries."

An edited and shortened version of the *Rudé právo* article appeared in Moscow in *Novoe vremia*,⁶ a semiofficial foreign policy publication in eight languages with a worldwide, communist-sponsored distribution.⁷ The *Novoe vremia* version was about three-quarters of the length of the *Rudé právo* article and was shortened by leaving out sections of the original—enough to amount to an expurgation. The *Rudé právo* attack was harsher than its *Novoe vremia* version in Russian,⁸ although the content and thrust of the criticism had been preserved.

Novoe vremia omitted *Rudé právo*'s claim that the imperialists were "injecting elements of alienation and divergence into the world socialist community." Also left out was the criticism of countries that, "if the domestic situation gets worse for this or that reason," sought to solve problems "by way of various national institutions that sometimes approach things from narrow angles." The following sentence was also deleted: "Experience shows that opportunism very often hides beneath a mask of recognition of the national and the international as two mutually independent elements."

The *Rudé právo* authors railed against "all aspects of particularism" in the bloc, but in *Novoe vremia's* version this came out as "practicism"—an entirely different expression in Marxist jargon that stands for underestimation of theory. Where *Rudé právo* objected to "some people" changing the "hierarchic order" (in this case, the order of priorities) between the national and the international interests of a country, *Novoe vremia* left the "hierarchic" out altogether and translated the alleged deviation simply as changing "the relationship" between the two kinds of interest.

Soviet Position Stated A Soviet theoretical journal, *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, published in its April issue an article assailing certain unnamed East European countries for letting national interests, rather than "the principles of socialist internationalism," determine their policies.⁹ The author of the article, which was written under the pseudonym O. V. Borisov, was Oleg Borisovich Rakhmanin,¹⁰ first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, and a reputed hard-liner. His message was that socialism was under siege, and no cracks, in the form of national differences, must be allowed to appear in its fortifications. He admitted that the socialist world was diverse and complex. It was not free from divergences and different approaches to particular questions. In Rakhmanin's view, however, divergences could very easily get out of hand.

Rakhmanin condemned the policy of "differentiation" as articulated by U.S. Vice President Bush and criticized Beijing as well for conducting a policy that differentiated between socialist countries. He warned that "the class adversary" was trying to "substantiate the 'incompatibility' of internationalism with national interests."

He described "rightist opportunists" who "refute" the existence of general laws of socialist construction and "leftists" who, "under cover of ultrarevolutionary phrases," also ignore those laws. Both propound the ostensible necessity of every country to have its own "model" disregarding the experience of the USSR and other "fraternal states." For Rakhmanin, the concept of "models" of socialism implied a dangerous preoccupation with the particular over the general.

To bolster his argument, Rakhmanin cited a 1968 speech by Kádár, presumably one of the principal targets of his article. "Now and in the future our party must constantly remember the most important requirement of Marxism-Leninism: *to put into practice the general laws of socialist construction, as well as to take into account the concrete conditions, the historical and national peculiarities of our countries.* Ignoring the general laws of socialism, as well as forgetting national peculiarities and conditions, disrupts development, leads to crises [and] to a dead end."¹¹ Having presented

Kádár's remarks as a *defense* of the "correct" balance of the international and the national, Rakhmanin proceeded to denounce as "bankrupt" one of Hungary's "independent initiatives" (without naming Hungary)—"attempts to define the role of large and small countries outside the context of class struggle and the fundamental contradiction between socialism and imperialism." Such attempts, according to Rakhmanin, lead to "an artificial division between large and small countries" whereby smaller countries—independently of their "class affiliation"—concentrate only on the "positive functions" in international relations such as overcoming conflicts, working out reasonable compromises, and facilitating East-West dialogue.

Rakhmanin's article undoubtedly was a signal that influential circles within the CPSU apparatus were scrutinizing East European policies more closely and that they were far from pleased with what they saw.

Yugoslav Assessment of Differences within the Soviet Bloc According to Slavoljub Djukić, correspondent for the Belgrade daily *Politika*, the East European leaders had done their best to conceal their differences, thereby giving the impression of harmony in the communist bloc. Yet each new step taken in the various countries had been met with suspicion by other members of the bloc. "We have here two parallel processes: on the one hand, efforts are made to preserve the status quo; on the other, one's own roads [to socialism] are rigorously scrutinized. . . . In order to march painlessly along 'one's own road' [to socialism], it is necessary to insist on the unity of the socialist community."

Djukić found the Rakhmanin article remarkable for the author's efforts to support the Czechoslovak stand without offending the Hungarians.¹² Even its title, "Alliance of a New Type," deserved special attention.

Quoting János Kádár's views, expressed fifteen years ago, can be seen as yet another example of the desire to alleviate differences of opinion. But if different socialist practices exist, it is quite natural that different views must also exist. Past experiences in the East, however, show that it is much easier to introduce "one's own practice" than to admit publicly that such a practice actually exists. The same is true of debate. One gains the impression that different views are more readily tolerated than permitted to be discussed publicly; in the latter case the unity of the "socialist community" would be considered weakened.

While the Czechoslovaks were irritated after Vice President Bush had listed them among the "bad" communists, the Hungarians were unhappy when he called them "good." "Anything but separation!"—this is the prevailing slogan. Djukić wrote that in Eastern Europe there had, in fact, been less talk of differences than differences themselves. Different views

could be tolerated but "partition within the 'socialist community [could] not,'" because it might turn "into something quite different." This was the reason why efforts were being made to alleviate any possible bad consequences of various debates.

East German Attempt at Striking Balance East Germany's attempt to balance its interest in dialogue with the West with the requirements of bloc solidarity was illustrated in mid-May when TASS announced the stationing of "additional" Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the GDR in response to continued INF deployment by NATO. When *Neues Deutschland* carried the TASS announcement on its front page on May 15, it carefully balanced this statement by printing the full text of a Honecker letter to a group of French resistance fighters in which the SED Secretary General cited the importance of dialogue with "all forces of reason" and praised the Helsinki Final Act as having established a "code of international behavior" based upon "peaceful coexistence."¹³

In late May, the Eighth SED CC plenum defended the party's "forward-looking and mobilizing-for-peace" policy, reconfirmed its "damage limitation" approach, and reaffirmed the importance of an "offensive peace engagement and continuation of political dialogue." In justifying its foreign policy, the Politburo report insisted that East German actions had been guided by the twin goals of maintaining the strategic balance and the political purpose of "winning over and bringing together" all peace-loving forces in East and West as part of the agreed policy of the Pact aimed at defeating the "course of confrontation and rearmament of the USA and NATO."¹⁴

In a shift in Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet media launched in early May a major campaign against the alleged dangers of German "revanchism." On July 10, the Soviets officially protested the decision by the West European Union, meeting in Paris in late June, to lift old restrictions on West German production of strategic bombers and long-range missiles. The GDR's response was both limited and guarded; the Western decision elicited eight days later a mildly critical brief commentary in *Neues Deutschland*.¹⁵ The SED was maintaining its commitment to pursue dialogue with "realistic-thinking" circles in Bonn and other West European countries. In late June and early July, East Berlin received visits by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu, and Italian Premier Bettino Craxi.¹⁶

The Fruits of Détente In early summer, an article in the leading East German journal of international affairs, *Horizont*, summarized a round table discussion by prominent East German academics on the consequences for the GDR and the Warsaw Pact of the INF deployment in

Western Europe.¹⁷ Three essential points in this "debate" supported the SED's course of "damage limitation." First, the participants noted that although the start of deployment had led to a new and very dangerous situation in Europe, they asserted that this was not "irreversible" as the increased tension had had the dialectical effect of further strengthening the consciousness of all "peace-loving forces." Second, the contributors underlined the need to differentiate between imperialist countries and between factions within them, recognizing the existence of "realistically minded" circles. Special emphasis was placed on the possibility of exploiting differences between the FRG and the United States. The third point emphasized the positive effects of détente for Europe in the 1970s, which demonstrated that fundamental political arrangements were possible between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The participants reaffirmed the need both to maintain the strategic balance of power and to exploit all opportunities of political dialogue with "sober-minded" circles in the West to help foster a return to détente. In this context, they posited the GDR's growing political and economic role in Europe and the special tasks and responsibilities falling on the two German states because of their location on the East-West divide and the burden of German history.

The debate highlighted the differing priorities of East Berlin and Moscow. Following the start of Euromissile deployment, Moscow asserted that bloc unity was the top priority, thus leaving less room for such policy initiatives as East Berlin was pursuing toward Bonn. In contrast, the SED claimed that precisely because of the severity of the international situation, efforts at seeking "political dialogue" with realistically thinking Western circles had become more important than ever. To defend its views, the SED was essentially using past Soviet arguments and relying on the "green light" that Honecker had presumably received for this policy from Moscow in the past.

Elaborating on the debate about the relationship between "national" and "international" interests, *Horizont* in the summer of 1984 claimed that it was "natural" that differences of opinion would emerge between and within fraternal parties over this issue and that such differences had to be recognized and discussed in "comradely discussion."¹⁸ The solutions to today's complicated tasks, according to *Horizont*, had to be developed in light of the particular experiences and achievements of each fraternal party and its own class struggles, as the international communist movement was ostensibly a "voluntary militant community of equal and independent parties." Although the latter view echoed what had already been more forcefully and eloquently formulated by Szűrös, it was not so much the

Hungarian words as the East German actions that prompted response from Moscow.

Discord On July 25, 1984, West German State Secretary Philip Jenninger announced that Bonn had agreed to guarantee a DM 950 million credit for the GDR. While carefully attempting to avoid any direct linkage, Jenninger added that on 1 August East Berlin would begin implementing a series of eleven measures alleviating travel restrictions between the two German states.¹⁹ On July 27 *Pravda* carried a long article by Lev Bezymenskii entitled "In the Shadow of American Missiles" which harshly criticized relations between Bonn and East Berlin.²⁰ While attacking the FRG's allegedly new and aggressive policies toward the East, the article singled out Bonn's relations with East Berlin as the proof. Accusing Bonn of using "both economic and political levers" to "solicit concessions on matters of principle that affect the GDR's sovereignty," *Pravda* claimed that West German cultivation of ties with East Berlin was part of a co-ordinated American-West German effort at destabilizing the GDR and revising the postwar European status quo.

In indirect criticism of East Berlin's own *Deutschlandpolitik*, *Pravda* dredged up quotations from Honecker's hard-line speech delivered in Gera in October 1980. It also criticized formulations such as a "security partnership" between the two Germanies, which it attributed to Kohl, whereas in reality the terminology was Honecker's.²¹ The key passage of the article emphasized that relations between East Berlin and Bonn could not be viewed in isolation from the broader international context. It recalled Honecker's statement from 1981 that "good neighborly relations cannot flourish in the shadow of first strike nuclear missiles."

Although *Neues Deutschland* reprinted the full text of the *Pravda* article the following day, it followed with an article from the Hungarian trade union daily *Nepszava* on July 30 that cast an entirely different light on the subject. The *Nepszava* article, published under arresting title "GDR Diplomacy—a Sense of Responsibility and Activity," lauded Honecker for his cultivations of ties not only with the FRG, but with Western Europe as a whole, emphasizing the importance of ties between the two German states for Europe as a whole and implicitly supporting Honecker's planned visit to West Germany.

An even stronger statement appeared in *Neues Deutschland* on August 1 in the form of an editorial commemorating the ninth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Signed with the initials A. Z., this authoritative statement implicitly defended East German diplomacy from the *Pravda* attack. Whereas Soviet press commentary on the Helsinki anniversary was

largely negative, focusing on the political-military implications of the agreement and their ostensible violation through Euromissile deployment, *Neues Deutschland* asserted that "The Final Act has borne fruit." In replying to *Pravda*'s criticism, the editorial stated that the GDR's policies, governed by an overriding interest in peace and détente, had been a stabilizing factor in Europe. While noting that the start of INF deployment had indeed created a new and dangerous situation, the editorial maintained that the GDR had loyally fulfilled its alliance obligations in the form of Warsaw Pact "countermeasures." Although it concurred with Soviet assessments on the gravity of the international situation the editorial thus came to different conclusions. In response to Soviet charges about West German attempts to destabilize the GDR, *Neues Deutschland* simply noted that "both sides are independent in their internal and external affairs."

On August 2 *Pravda* escalated its charges with an unsigned editorial entitled "On the Wrong Track."²² It directly criticized the recently concluded credit deal between Bonn and East Berlin as proof of vigorous West German efforts to destabilize the GDR; East Berlin's concessions on travel restrictions were termed new opportunities for Bonn to exert its political and ideological influence. Even more striking was *Pravda*'s attack against what it termed the "pharisaical logic" of a cynical West German policy of "limiting the damage." Here *Pravda* again attributed to Kohl the formulation by Honecker which had become the SED's code word for pursuing dialogue with Bonn. *Pravda* thus issued a serious warning to the SED leadership.

Whereas *Neues Deutschland* had reprinted the initial *Pravda* article in full the following day, the second *Pravda* attack went unmentioned in the official East German media. Instead, *Neues Deutschland* carried in its edition of August 4/5 a TASS commentary by Soviet CC member Lev Tolkunov, former editor-in-chief of *Izvestiia* and chairman of the Soviet Committee on European Security and Cooperation, implicitly supporting East Berlin's position about the existence of "sober-minded" circles in the West and the mutual benefits of "peaceful coexistence." The Tolkunov commentary seemed suggestive of differences within the Soviet leadership over contacts with the West.²³

Although it remained difficult to identify what, if any, circles in Moscow might favor a more differentiated policy toward the West, the assumption of such differences or simply the lack of any definitive Soviet Politburo decision on this key issue could explain the SED's continued defiance of the *Pravda* criticism. With the technical details for an upcoming Honecker visit to the FRG more or less completed, the SED continued to advocate the virtues of dialogue following meetings of Politburo member and East Ber-

lin's leading expert on relations with the FRG Herbert Häber with Armando Cossutta, a well-known pro-Soviet figure on the Executive Committee of the Italian Communist party, and of Politburo member Egon Krenz, ostensibly Honecker's "Crown Prince," during talks with Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu.²⁴ Additional support for East Berlin's position continued to come from Budapest as well as from the Yugoslavs and the Italian Communist party. Whereas most West European communist parties ignored this very newsworthy story that posed political problems for them, *l'Unità's* correspondents in Bonn and Moscow supported East Berlin in noting with approval that a natural process of differentiation was taking place in Eastern Europe. The Italian party daily observed that "from the time of the Polish crisis until now there has not been recorded such explicit and harsh criticism by the Kremlin of the leaders of a fraternal country."²⁵

XII Balkan Sources of International Instability

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The Diplomatic Scene

Patrick Moore

Bulgarian State Council President Todor Zhivkov paid an official visit to Turkey from June 6–9, 1983, spending his time in Ankara and Izmir as the guest of Turkish President Kenan Evren. The attention of outside observers was focused on questions of Balkan cooperation, especially the project to declare the region a nuclear-free zone, as well as a host of preliminary bilateral issues, such as transportation, territorial demarcation, emigration, and smuggling.

On the proposed nuclear-free zone, the two sides held quite differing views.¹ Sofia supported the idea, but Ankara regarded it as a Soviet-inspired ploy to oust NATO nuclear weapons from Turkey and Greece. It also viewed the proposal as unrealistic from the outset as long as missiles in the USSR were capable of reaching the Balkans. Turkey preferred to stress multilateral regional cooperation in all spheres, which, however, Bulgaria shunned in favor of bilateral ties, allowing for multilateral relations only in sports, culture, and some economic areas. Sofia had above all been avoiding multilateral political arrangements, allegedly because the presence of members of two different alliance systems and of nonaligned countries as well as the existence of a variety of unsolved problems on the peninsula made the idea “unrealistic.”² This had not, however, prevented *Rabotnichesko Delo* from singing a somewhat different tune on the effect on the region’s political differences of establishing a nuclear-free zone, stating that such “contradictions . . . are not insurmountable.”³

The discrepancies between the two countries’ standpoints were reflected in Zhivkov’s and Evren’s formal toasts on June 6. The Bulgarian leader mentioned the proposed zone and hailed it as the Balkans’ contribution to peace and security in Europe. His Turkish counterpart avoided any direct references to the proposal but noted the presence of intercontinental

missiles that could reach distant targets. The final communiqué made no reference to the nuclear-free zone; and, while it mentioned multilateral cooperation in the Balkans, a presumably Bulgarian qualifier limiting it to "concrete questions" was added.⁴ Both countries had replied positively to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's May 16 letter calling for a series of meetings to discuss the zone.⁵ Ankara and the equally skeptical Belgrade had, however, made it clear that positive and practical results had to be assured before they would commit themselves too far. Some observers thought that Turkey and Yugoslavia would attend such gatherings in order not to be left out and to make their doubts better known.

More practical matters figuring in the Zhivkov-Evren talks involved longstanding bilateral issues.⁶ The communiqué noted that economic relations were "developing successfully" but added that their level did "not correspond" to the existing possibilities. "Satisfaction" was registered in the key area of transportation. However, the issues of delimitation of the waters of the continental shelf in the Black Sea as well as the two countries' common borders at the Rezvaya River were discussed in separate negotiations between June 14 and 17 from which no concrete results emerged.

The communiqué also failed to touch on the subjects of emigration of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey or smuggling. Sofia claimed that since the bilateral agreement on the matter, in its opinion, had expired on November 30, 1978, it was under no further legal obligation to allow an exodus of ethnic Turks. Ankara disagreed. It had been concerned about alleged discrimination against Moslems (Turks, Gypsies, Pomaks) in Bulgaria, but did not press the issue in view of the Turkish economy's inability to absorb large numbers of new arrivals. As far as smuggling was concerned, even though the Western press had given wide play to Bulgaria's supposed role in a variety of shady affairs, including a drugs-for-arms connection with Turkish terrorists, ever since the arrest in Italy of a Bulgarian airline official in November 1982 in connection with the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II, the two heads of state gave no public hints of the smuggling issue.

During his visit to Turkey in June 1983, Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs and prominent veteran politician Stane Dolanc discussed "the illegal traffic in drugs on the international route across Yugoslavia, which connects Turkey with Western Europe."⁷ Bulgaria was on this path as well, and Dolanc subsequently made a stop in Sofia.

Drugs may well have been the main topic there, too; but the presence in Dolanc's party of Secretary of Internal Affairs of Macedonia Ljubomir Varoslija fueled suspicions that matters bearing more directly on Yugoslav domestic politics could have been involved, since the main smuggling route

through Bulgaria to Western Europe crossed Serbia, rather than Macedonia. For months the diplomatic rumor mill had been suggesting that there was a drugs-for-arms connection that allegedly ran from Albanians in Turkey, via Bulgaria, to Albanians in Yugoslavia, with a center in the Macedonian town of Kičevo. This alleged connection presumably prompted the Belgrade authorities, who had long suspected a Bulgarian hand in their own Albanian problems, to investigate thoroughly the possibility of such links.

In October, Ceaușescu and Zhivkov met, and the Romanian leader subsequently made a five-country tour of the Middle East and the Mediterranean, including Cyprus. The results of that visit were mixed, since he, predictably, did not make the anti-Ankara statements before his Greek Cypriot hosts that they would have liked to hear. Cypriot President Spiro Kyprianou, convinced that only Washington could influence Turkey to compromise, failed to accord Ceaușescu the coveted status of an international problem-solver.

Papandreou's "unofficial friendly visit" to Bulgaria on November 11-13 was widely linked to the remarks made in mid-October by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov to Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias that Sofia would "react directly, almost automatically," should NATO station new medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, especially since both Bulgaria and Greece publicly supported the idea of making the Balkans a nuclear-free zone. During the latest contact, both sides went to great pains to demonstrate friendliness and harmony,⁸ but Zhivkov's remarks at the press conference indicated that while he remained pledged to the project, he would make no promises about Bulgaria's actions should NATO's new medium-range missiles be installed and a "qualitatively different situation" arise.

An old Romanian project dating back to 1957 in conjunction with the subsequent Rapacki Plan and various Soviet-inspired moves, the idea of a nuclear-free zone had been dusted off by Zhivkov in October 1981 after Papandreou's electoral victory, following a campaign in which the Greek leader called for the removal of American nuclear weapons from Greece, even unilaterally. The zone project was one-sided, since only the NATO Balkan states, Greece and Turkey, admitted to having such weapons on their territory, and most versions of the project did not include the southern USSR, where nuclear missiles capable of reaching the Balkans were located.⁹

Papandreou, who had backed off from the nuclear-free zone project in the spring of 1982 amid reports that missile launching pads were already stationed in Bulgaria, seemed to have pragmatic advantages in mind in his

stated support for it: the opportunity to please the pro-disarmament and anti-NATO Left at home and to point out once again to Greece's allies that he intended to go his own way in foreign policy. Ceaușescu attempted to derive similar political dividends from the idea, but he used it mainly to appear to Western countries as peace-loving and to distract his home audience from the miserable state of the domestic economy. Albania rejected the idea of the zone outright as impractical as long as regional states were linked to the major powers.

Papandreou said openly and repeatedly that he regarded Turkey, rather than the Warsaw Pact, as the most likely source of an attack on Greece. As his relations with Greece's NATO partners remained consequently strained, there was a considerable warming in Athens' relations with Moscow and its allies. Papandreou had top-level contacts with Kádár, Zhivkov, Ceaușescu, and even Jaruzelski, generally regarded as a pariah in the West. Important meetings were staged with other East European leaders, and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov visited Greece in February 1983. Various economic agreements were signed; the official Greek line was that "we do not feel ourselves threatened from the north."¹⁰

An issue of military as well as political importance was the use of work-starved Greek shipyards by Soviet vessels for repairs. Although a previously negotiated agreement had been allowed to lapse under NATO pressure, in January 1982 the Greek government announced its intention to revive it. Freighters were repaired at Piraeus, where the Greek navy also had its main installations; supply ships from the Mediterranean fleet were being serviced at the Neorion Shipyards on the island of Syros. Finally, in a further move that hardly went down well in NATO, Greek Merchant Marine Minister Georgios Katsifaras journeyed to Moscow in July 1983 to receive pledges from the Soviets that they would make greater use of Greek repair facilities.

In September 1983 Greece agreed to buy thirty Polish fire-fighting airplanes with an option on fifty more, which meant that Polish instructor teams were to fly over Greek territory. The construction of an alumina plant was under discussion with the USSR after the Soviets agreed to take two-thirds and the Bulgarians one-third of the production. A number of economically depressed Greek communities sought to have the plant located in their area. However, while Eastern Europe helped relieve pressures on the Greek economy in another way by buying surplus citrus products, it reportedly drove a very hard bargain.

The Soviets nevertheless failed to court Papandreou by such inducements as increasingly generous economic offers or a gala tour of the USSR.

They were probably wary of his mercurial ways and still regarded Ankara as the richer potential prize. Moscow apparently did not want to embrace Greece too strongly for fear of pushing Turkey into NATO's arms. All the same, the direction of Greek foreign policy opened a variety of possibilities conducive to an unstable and unpredictable situation.

Yugoslav diplomatic activities included Prime Minister Milka Planinc's trip to Greece in late October and President Mika Spiljak's meeting with Ceaușescu between November 2 and 4. Reports on Planinc's discussions with Papandreou used terms such as "mutual respect, sincerity, and openness," which meant that there were at least a few differences. They probably centered on Macedonia, since Athens claimed that the Macedonian question did not exist. Unlike the previous conservative Greek government, which had been content to skirt the Macedonian issue, Papandreou's government indicated that the inhabitants of Greek Macedonia were Greek, and that Macedonia was a purely historical and geographic term. Since Papandreou's advent to power, Yugoslavia had been criticizing a new Greek law that prohibited students from studying at foreign universities where the courses were not conducted in major international languages. This Yugoslavia saw as an attempt to prevent Greek Macedonian Slavs from attending the University of Skopje and presumably developing their "Macedonian" national consciousness. Belgrade also chastised Greek and Bulgarian historians for allegedly denying the existence of the Macedonian nation. During Planinc's talks with Papandreou, she allegedly expressed her government's concern with Macedonia, since Tanjug news agency reported¹¹ that her delegation had advanced several practical proposals to promote human and economic contacts—particularly along the two countries' border—and that this was related to "open questions," an euphemism for the Macedonian issue.

The final documents of Spiljak's visit to Romania referred to familiar problems in carrying out existing economic agreements, particularly the Iron Gates 1 and 2 hydroelectric projects. A new development was reported Yugoslav concern over the situation of Romania's Serbian minority.¹² The joint statement contained a curious juxtaposition of Romanian and Yugoslav stands on the role of the minorities in bilateral links. One passage repeated Bucharest's formula that the treatment of minorities was strictly an internal affair, while the two entries on either side of it were closer to Belgrade's position. They recalled "international norms adopted by the United Nations on the promotion and protection of the rights of national minorities" and stated that "the nationalities . . . should . . . be yet another factor in drawing [the two countries] closer together."¹³ This was reminis-

cent of the Kádár formula that minorities should serve as bridges, a formula which Romania had firmly rejected as interference in its internal affairs.

Romania and Yugoslavia, linked by a common geopolitical interest in curbing Soviet influence in the Balkans, had reportedly concluded a secret defense pact in the wake of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The two partners presumably were concerned about each other. However, both had considerable economic problems; the Yugoslav collective leadership must have appeared shaky to the autocratic Ceaușescu, while the latter's personality cult prompted some sarcastic commentary in the Yugoslav press. Their common ground remained, but presumably both had doubts about the other's reliability in the long run.

Yugoslavia's problems with Albania continued to make news.¹⁴ The Kosovo problem continued to simmer, with reports on Serbian and Montenegrin migration from the province, the "differentiation"—meaning purge—of Albanian nationalists in the Yugoslav Communist party and other official organizations, and manifestations of Albanian nationalism, including a soccer cheer "E-Ho, E-Ho," which allegedly stood for "Enver Hoxha" chanted by Pristina fans when playing against Serbian teams.¹⁵ Furthermore, Albania's refusal in late August to send observers to the Yugoslav military exercises "Jedinstvo 83," regarded by Tirana as "directed against Albania,"¹⁶ received tacit support from Bulgaria's army daily.¹⁷ This in turn resurrected the seldom dormant Yugoslav suspicions of collusion between Tirana and Sofia.¹⁸

The visit of Seraphim, the Orthodox Archbishop of Athens, to Belgrade had political implications in Albania, despite its self-description as "the world's first atheist state" and its adoption of the slogan proclaiming that Albanian religion was Albania.¹⁹ The Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs were almost exclusively Orthodox but the Albanians were divided among Moslems (about 70 percent), Orthodox (20 percent), and Roman Catholics (10 percent), with a long tradition of mutual mistrust. Although each group had amply contributed to the pantheon of national heroes, the Catholics had been regarded by the others as serving Austro-Hungarian, Italian, or Vatican interests; the Orthodox had been suspect because of alleged pro-Greek proclivities; while the Moslems had been credited with seeking to translate their numerical superiority into political domination. Both King Zog of the interwar period and Enver Hoxha, along with the bulk of the communist leadership, were of Moslem origin.

Seraphim's trip set off suspicions in Tirana, since he had personal links to the Greek-Albanian border area and, according to the Albanians, to Greek organizations that regarded southern Albania as unredeemed Greek

territory. The party daily published a sharp attack on Seraphim, stating that he was a "killer with the cross of Christ around his neck and that of Hitler in his heart" and that "behind the religious cloth a completely political visit is hidden," which allegedly meant that "the Greater Serbs of Belgrade want to divert the attention of world public opinion from the events in Kosovo."²⁰ As proof, the Tirana newspaper noted Seraphim's contacts with Serbian political as well as ecclesiastical figures. Curiously for militantly atheistic Albania, the daily implied that other religious groups were not treated as well as the Orthodox in Yugoslavia: "What need is there for all this display of love between the Great Serb leaders and the Greek Archbishop, while at the same time there is no visit by the Pope of the Vatican to his believers in Croatia and Slovenia or by some renowned Ayatollah to the believers of Bosnia and Herzegovina?"

This was a bit too much for the Greeks, and Seraphim's spokesman described Tirana's attack as "malicious,"²¹ while the Greek Foreign Ministry made a formal protest, referring to an "immoral attack . . . [that] openly conflicted with official Albanian announcements calling for an improvement and strengthening of relations between the two neighboring countries."²²

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Recentralization in Yugoslavia? Slobodan Stankovic and Zdenko Antic

The tenth plenum of the Yugoslav Central Committee, held in Belgrade on October 25, 1983, seemed to indicate the sincere desire of party leaders throughout the country to combine their forces in the struggle for "economic stabilization." At the same time it also showed a serious lack of agreement on how unity should be achieved. A speaker at the plenum, Dušan Popović of Vojvodina, spoke of "two fronts" in the party.¹

Slovenia's party leader France Popit rejected any form of centralization, while his Serbian colleague, Petar Stambolić, spoke of the "alleged dangers of centralism and unitarism."² Given the weak federal government, demands for recentralization were becoming ever louder. But the question was whether recentralization was possible, and if so, to what extent. Its success would have depended on the strength of the opposition to recen-

Zdenko Antic was responsible for the material about the congress of sociologists.

tralization and the willingness to compromise, politically or economically.

For years Yugoslavia had been a confederation of autonomously centralized regions. The regional leaders had become too strong, while the central government in Belgrade had become too weak. The powerful regional leaders, for instance, had raised huge foreign currency loans abroad that the weak central government then was obliged to repay.

Consequently, proponents of recentralization on the federal level that would have given full power to the central government would have had to rigorously decentralize the regional level. There did not seem to be any individuals or groups capable of initiating such a move without creating a revolutionary atmosphere. For positive economic and political reforms to be introduced, the central government would have to be strengthened. This would have meant that the regional (republican, provincial, and even communal) governments would have lost much of their power. Western banks would have liked to see an authoritative government in Belgrade that could repay the debts; the "centralists" in the Yugoslav party and state apparatus wanted a strong government in order to forestall "anarchical developments" at the regional level and to create far-reaching changes not only in the country's labor law, but also in its constitution.

The Slovenes and Croats, supported by a significant number of Serbs, had been strongly opposing any recentralization. They insisted that rather than changing the constitution, the existing laws and regulations should be properly implemented. If these regulations had been so implemented, however, they could have shaken the very foundations of the regime that had proclaimed them. The central party apparatus could have easily ordered recentralization without being able to carry it out. The economic measures of July 1983 had not been implemented properly, which meant, as several speakers at the cc plenum of 1983 admitted, that the Yugoslavs "returned to where [they] were two years ago."

The double nature of Yugoslavia's political system had made it difficult to find correct remedies for the country's economic difficulties. Moreover, it was this system itself that had provoked such difficulties. It allegedly was based on socialist democracy embodied in self-management and associated labor on the one hand and on the dictatorship of the proletariat on the other. These two opposing elements required contradictory organizational structures: the former had to be based on decentralization, the latter on centralization. Thus, mere recentralization was not possible; such a move might have produced, at the most, emergency measures lasting only a short period of time, depending on the strength of the internal forces fighting for their survival over the question of centralization and decentralization.

A poll also revealed that the share of Yugoslav citizens expressing confidence in the party had dropped from 64 percent in 1974 to 38 percent in 1983.³ Miloš Minić, a leading Serbian party leader, asked at the cc plenum of 1983 whether the party was at all capable of fulfilling its role, given that people were doubting the party's capability "in a situation deteriorating both in the country and abroad." Foreign observers were generally surprised by the fact that, despite the difficulties in the country, there had been no serious violence in Yugoslavia. Professor Josip Županov of Zagreb warned that the lack of violence should not be overemphasized, since Yugoslav workers were using means other than strikes to demonstrate their dissatisfaction. According to official statistics, about 700,000 workers were absent every day because of illness; each day some 600,000 were on vacation; and 400,000 a day were attending various conferences that kept them from work. With all this taken into consideration, the average Yugoslav worker was working "only three hours and six minutes a day."⁴

About 250 Yugoslav sociologists gathered from November 9 to 12 in the Slovenian tourist resort of Portoroz to discuss the country's critical economic and political situation. The tenor of the conference was that the country was in a state of dangerous disintegration, the causes of which could be found in the political and institutional spheres. Professor Županov said: "In Yugoslav society the dominant spheres are the political and institutional ones; the principal aims of sociological survey must therefore be these nontechnological and noneconomic factors."⁵

Vladimir Goati from Belgrade argued that the party—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)—had started the process of the country's disintegration.⁶ Contrary to the party statutes, Goati said, senior LCY officials were being selected by the republican and provincial party organizations, while the LCY Congress, consisting of delegates sent by all party members, merely gave formal approval to the selections. Consequently, "parts of the LCY republican and provincial organizations had been directing economic development regardless of the needs of the whole country."

Professor Radomir Lukić from Belgrade added that in spite of the official view that the constitutional status of Yugoslavia should not be changed, "the wish to change it has been strongly expressed; one group wants to increase decentralization in the direction of a confederation, while the other believes that there is already too much federalism in Yugoslavia. . . . Indeed, in practice the prerogatives of the republics and provinces have grown beyond the provisions of the constitution."⁷

Another participant, Professor Vojislav Seselj, said bluntly that the 1974 constitution, which had granted sovereign rights to the republics, was responsible for Yugoslavia's troubles.

Professor Ivan Kuvačić from Zagreb warned: "The state is losing its coordinating and planning functions, while its repressive function is growing, particularly at the republican level. [In the republics] there are centers of power; they are opposing each other and joining forces when their particular rights, on their own territory, are at stake. . . ."⁸

Professor Rudi Supek from Zagreb, a leading Yugoslav sociologist and former editor-in-chief of the philosophical magazine *Praxis*, summarized much of this criticism by saying that there was in Yugoslavia "the total bureaucratization of a socialist society and, as a result, mistakes in the selection of people: it is not the best people who are selected for responsible positions but, as a rule, the worst and most incapable."⁹

In addition to the clearly expressed suggestion for more centralization of the party and state system and the recommendation that the 1974 constitution be revised accordingly, the great majority of sociologists said that the democratization of political and social life was an absolute prerequisite for any solid and long-term solution to the political and economic crisis. Professor Svetozar Stojanović's report offered the most comprehensive outline for reform, and it was apparently supported by many of the other participants.¹⁰

In Stojanović's opinion, social or economic reform did not make any sense, since the main characteristic of the Yugoslav political system was "the total dominance of politics" over every other aspect of the nation's life. For this reason the causes of the Yugoslav crisis had to be sought in the political sphere. In Yugoslavia, however, Stojanović continued, "there is no chance of any revolutionary change, only of a democratic, socialist evolution and reform." Stojanović proposed reform in the direction of democratic socialism based on political pluralism but admitted that "an organization of new political parties is not possible at present. The ruling party would never allow it . . . a new socialist alliance and the labor union, if democratized, could create the necessary political environment."

Stojanović's concept of democratization entailed the following steps: First, the internal democratization of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, including free, direct, and secret balloting to elect the leading party bodies and the opportunity to create factions and groups within the party. The second step was to be a new socialist alliance, a free association of individuals and organizations acting in cooperation with the League of Communists and accepting its leading political role, provided that it would have become democratized. The third proposal was for the full democratization of the labor unions, which, together with the socialist alliance, were to become the basis of a grass-roots democracy. Their political program was to be based on self-management principles and include the public owner-

ship of strategic, key industries (but not others), the federal organization of the state, and an independent, nonaligned foreign policy. Finally, Yugoslavia was to remain fully decentralized as far as administration and cultural life were concerned. Various federal agencies could even be transferred from Belgrade to other cities. Indispensable for the proper functioning of the federation, however, were a completely united and integrated economy and market: "There is no salvation for Yugoslavia unless, in addition to an administrative and cultural federalism, an integrated economy is also functioning."¹¹

In Stojanović's opinion, such a reform was indispensable if the League of Communists of Yugoslavia were to retain its legitimacy. Not only did the majority of sociologists at the meeting support Stojanović's view, but also most newspapers published his main points, thus adding impetus to a new debate about Yugoslavia's future development.

47

Greater Albania?

Louis Zanga

Population Explosion For ten years preceding 1983 the Albanian population (in Albania proper and in neighboring Yugoslavia) had the highest growth rate in Europe, with an annual increase of 100,000 people. In Albania, with a current total population of 2,800,000, the annual population growth was 54,000 (2.2 percent a year).¹ The annual population growth of Yugoslavia's Autonomous Socialist Province of Kosovo (with some 1,500,000 Albanian inhabitants) was 39,000—2.6 percent a year.² If one took into account the growth in the population of the approximately 400,000 Albanians living in the republics of Macedonia and Montenegro, then the total annual increase reached the 100,000 mark.

The demographic structure of the Albanians in the Balkans had a potential effect on international relations in a region where sovereign, "Stalinist" Albania and Kosovo, an autonomous province of "Titoist" Yugoslavia, competed for ethnic Albanian loyalties. Further complicating factors were the official, nationalistic claim of the Tirana leaders that theirs was the motherland of all Albanians; Kosovo's Serb-Albanian antagonisms; and the question of preventing the formation of a pure Albanian ethnic bloc in Kosovo. The 1971 census showed the Albanians' numerical preponderance

in Kosovo to be 73.6 percent. This preponderance remained unchallenged and was growing because of the high birthrate of the Albanians and the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the province.

Albanian Fadil Hoxha (no relation to Tirana's Hoxha), Kosovo's representative on Yugoslavia's collective state presidency, made the startling revelation that in Kosovo, which was one-third as large as Serbia, the population increase in 1983 was 39,000, whereas in Serbia it was merely 30,000.³ He then suggested to his audience to pay some attention to the problem of growth, though he added quickly that he was not recommending birth control.

In contrast, in Albania the attitude was "the more the better." According to an article in the theoretical monthly *Rruga e Partisë*, the annual increase of 54,000 people during the past twelve years had been four times higher than the average annual increases in other European countries.⁴ During the same period the urban population had grown annually by 22,000 and the rural population by 32,000, in accordance, therefore, with the established policy of proportional population growth. Through a strict control of domestic emigration and by curbing deruralization, Tirana managed to keep unemployment under control. The article predicted a population of 4,000,000 in Albania by the year 2000.

The Kosovo Problem Yugoslavia maintained that following the riots of 1981 and the subsequent disturbances, the political situation in the province was well under control and that nationalist "excesses" had been greatly reduced. Indeed, compared with some disturbances in the past, they were milder and less frequent. Yet the Pristina daily *Rilindja* carried a report about continued "excesses."⁵ It wrote that the Christian and Moslem clergy identified religion with nationality and acted as representatives of nations and nationalities, thereby causing religious and national hatred. Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church were accused of inciting anti-Albanianism by speaking in the name of the Serbian nation and "Serbian Kosovo," while the Moslem clergy was denounced for anti-Serbian, anti-Turkish, and anti-Montenegrin behavior.

The same Kosovar daily also took issue recently with various Yugoslav publications for their allegedly hostile and tendentious reporting about the province's nationality problems.⁶ Tanjug news agency and *Politika* and *Borba* were criticized for their distorted commentaries after the Albanian nationalist demonstrations at the football match in Belgrade between Crvena Zvezda and Pristina on October 16, when "E-Ho, E-Ho" calls (short for Enver Hoxha) were heard. Yugoslav commentators and political cartoonists were accused of identifying the chant "E-Ho" and the two-headed eagle of the Albanian flag with Albanian irredentism. The *Rilindja*

commentary retorted that the Albanian flag was the symbol of all Albanians and not of a few people. A striking fact about these polemics was that they were being waged between the various news media of the country along nationality lines, rather than simply between the authorities and hostile "nationalist" and "irredentist" elements.

In an interview in *Rilindja*,⁷ the head of the provincial presidency, Shefqet Jashari, accused the Albanian leadership of continuing to incite the "irredentists" in Kosovo. He termed it "gross" interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, allegedly obstructing the development of cooperation in science, technology, sports, and other areas. In fact, the much discussed railroad link between the two countries was far behind its construction schedule in Yugoslavia while construction on the Albanian side was supposed to be proceeding according to schedule.

Confirming the Albanian hard-line position, Central Committee member Vito Kapo, the widow of the late third-ranking leader Hysni Kapo, said with regard to Yugoslav-Albanian relations:

We have always struggled for good neighborliness and cooperation with the Balkan countries. We have also, however, never reduced nor will reduce the ideological struggle against our opponents; we have never allowed nor will allow anyone to violate in the slightest the interests of our people. We consider the legitimate and undeniable demands of the Albanian population in Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia to be fully justified and denounce the savage oppression to which they are subjected by the Greater-Serbian chauvinists.⁸

Spokesman for the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Svetolan Vujović, said at a press conference that the unfriendly remarks from Tirana were irreconcilable with the "needs of peace" in the Balkans and with "stability" in Europe.⁹

"*Greater Albania?*" Senior Kosovar officials launched a campaign charging Enver Hoxha with pursuing a "Greater Albania" policy in collusion with various "reactionary" exile groups abroad. This was intended to imply that there was no difference between Hoxha's "megalomaniacal-irredentist behavior" and that of Albania during World War II when it, with the support of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, created a "Greater Albania" through the incorporation of Kosovo and other districts of southwestern Yugoslavia.

Sinan Hasani, a member of the Kosovar presidency of the League of Communists, claimed in an interview that Enver Hoxha's wish to create a "Greater Albania" was the best evidence of his betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. As the alleged evidence for this "treachery" Hasani mentioned

Hoxha's pledge made in 1936 before the grave of the Albanian patriot Bajo Topulli in Gjirokaster that he would "fight for the true union of the nation" and a picture showing Hoxha embracing Deme ali Pozhari—an alleged wartime political criminal from Kosovo—on the one hundredth anniversary of the League of Prizren, celebrated in Tirana in June 1978. According to Hasani, this proved that the ideological differences among Albanians, as far as their common objective of creating a "Greater Albania" was concerned, had been resolved.

Hasani's allegations were taken a step further by Kosovar journalist Rexhep Hajrullah, who claimed:

Enver Hoxha is fanatically motivated by the pledge made "for the creation of a true nation," the founding of the great ethnic Albania, based on the model formulated by the fascist Italo-German alliance, which "coincides" with the concept of Lek Zogu, the son of the former King of Albania who is in emigration, as well as on the model of other reactionary profascist organizations in emigration, for a greater ethnic Albania, which has even been claimed by a map printed in Tirana.¹⁰

The allegations were a result of the shift in irredentist activities from Kosovo mainly to Western Europe and the United States. Dragolub Moračić, a Serbian official from Kosovo, gave the following data about the "hostile" forces abroad:¹¹

Twenty thousand Albanian émigrés are operating in twenty organizations against our social order. They are to be found in the United States, Canada, Australia, Belgium, and so forth. Of these, 4,000 are Albanians from Yugoslavia. They belong to different organizations—monarchist and so-called Marxist-Leninist ones. The main parties are Balli Kometar and the Kosovar League for the Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia (the former Red Front). The latter has its headquarters in Switzerland and branches in other West European countries. At present, it is the most dangerous organization. It tries, among other things, to disrupt the work of the Yugoslav clubs abroad, to indoctrinate workers of Albanian nationality, and so on. The activities of some clubs are being financed by the security services of the United States and of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. Their aim is to detach Kosovo from Yugoslavia and to create a greater Albania, either under Enver Hoxha (the leftist road) or on a bourgeois model (monarchist).

(The Red Front referred to the pro-Albanian, "Marxist-Leninist" party

that operated illegally in Kosovo prior to and following the 1981 nationalist riots. After it had been discovered and banned by the Yugoslav authorities, the organization shifted its field of operations abroad, to the approximately 40,000 Kosovars temporarily employed in Western countries. The clubs mentioned above referred to the social and political associations established for Yugoslav workers temporarily employed abroad; these were intended as a means of protecting the workers from foreign political pressures.)

In another related matter, Mehmet Maliqi, the head of the Kosovar security services, accused Albania of placing huge resources at the disposal of anti-Yugoslav groups abroad. There could have been some truth in this charge, considering the announcement that during the May Day festivities in Tirana, a group of Kosovar Albanians who had emigrated to the United States were among the invited foreign guests.¹²

Tirana's International Relations In accordance with its long-established policy of shunning multilateral conferences, Tirana decided not to attend the Stockholm Conference on Security and Disarmament in Europe. The central core of Albanian foreign policy remained the rejection of any international gathering in which the two superpowers allegedly had a direct or even indirect influence.

In mid-January 1984, Yugoslavia criticized Albania for staying away from the Athens meeting that was to examine the proposal for a Balkan nuclear-free zone, claiming that Tirana's ideological conduct was a cloak for "territorial claims" against Yugoslavia.¹³ This was followed by a commentary in the Yugoslav party weekly *Kommunist*, which reacted along similar lines but in a much harsher tone to Albania's absence from the Stockholm conference. Calling Albanian behavior "Stalinism" practiced by the Tirana "tyrant" Enver Hoxha, the journal argued that the Albanian leader's belief in an "ethnically pure and greater" Albania caused it not to take part in international gatherings, since otherwise it would have had to assume international obligations "guaranteeing the inviolability of the present state borders and the protection of basic human rights."¹⁴

As an evidence that Tirana had been stung by Belgrade's criticism, the Albanian news agency ATA published a small item attacking Yugoslav arms sales abroad, saying that the arms traffickers did not refrain from making demagogic statements on peace and the denuclearization of the Balkans and even from charging that "Albania constitutes a danger to peace."¹⁵ The editorial—unsigned, which normally implied authorship by a top official such as Hoxha himself—made another indirect dig at Yugoslavia and Romania, and possibly also Greece, by making a distinction between "genuine" and "false" neutral countries.

Tirana subsequently launched a new round of polemics with Greece and Yugoslavia and directed new invective against the Vatican, at a time when its relations with other neighbors such as Italy and Turkey were witnessing something of a renaissance. That there was some correlation between these two contrasting developments was made clear by an anti-Greek, anti-Yugoslav, and anti-Vatican editorial in *Zeri i Popullit*.¹⁶

The editorial focused on two points of contention in Greek-Albanian relations: territorial claims made by some Greeks on the so-called Northern Epirus, and Athens' concern about the human rights of the Greek minority in Albania (estimated at 30,000 to 40,000). As in the past, the Tirana daily denounced the territorial claims as "reactionary" and "provocative" and as a useless effort to revive a dead problem. With regard to the human rights issue, the editorial rejected as groundless the claims by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou during a recent visit to the northern city of Ioannina that the Greeks living in Albania were "in a grave situation" and that the Greek government would "strive for their personal rights." This had been the first time in some years that a top Greek official had complained publicly about the situation of the Greek minority in Albania.

In a friendly gesture toward Tirana, Papandreou said that the borders in the Balkan Peninsula were "an established fact and this is confirmed by the Helsinki Final Act; this matter ended a long time ago and the boundaries of our country are a fait accompli."¹⁷ This was followed by a statement by a government spokesman indicating Greece's desire for a "dialogue" with Tirana about various outstanding issues, such as the Greek minority in Albania, trade, and a peace treaty to end formally the state of war that had existed since 1940 and to which Tirana had repeatedly referred as an abnormal situation calling for remedy. Athens also neglected to show displeasure at the marked improvement in Albanian-Turkish relations, which included an agreement on air transport and other types of co-operation and exchanges.

Zeri i Popullit attacked the Vatican for allegedly sabotaging Tirana's improving relations with Italy. According to the Albanian article, twice within three years the Pope had appeared on the coast of Apulia, directly across the Adriatic from Albania, to curse the "irreligious" Albanians, "something unusual in the thousand-year long [*sic*] history of the Popes of Rome."

Among the various contacts between the two neighboring countries, Tirana mentioned that a delegation of the Chamber of Commerce, led by the deputy mayor of the port city of Durres (across from Apulia), paid a visit to the Italian province at the invitation of the mayor's Italian counter-

part; they discussed the possibilities of expanding transport and trade relations between the two countries.¹⁸

The Belgrade daily *Borba* referred to Tirana's policy toward Italy as a "double game," citing an Albanian attack against the Italian Eurocommunists as being in sharp contrast to the official Albanian line of an "exchange of smiles" with Rome.¹⁹ *Borba* then described this policy of "friendly smiles" through numerous quotations from the Italian press. The Rome daily *La Repubblica*, for example, was cited as saying that it was paradoxical that the current Italian-Albanian rapprochement should be taking place at a time when it had become difficult to carry out dialogues in the "old" Europe. According to *Borba*, other Italian papers also continued to report on the rapid increase of cooperation in many fields with Albania. There were more and more articles about Italy's "discovery" of Albania, and they expressed surprise that the "exchange of smiles" had occurred so suddenly. *La Repubblica* was then cited as speculating about the alleged "Albanian card" that Rome was playing:

This small country on the shores of the Adriatic has an important strategic place, something that the Soviet fleet, which still dreams about the Vlora port, is well aware of. A neutral Albania, even during the post-Hoxha era, would be an important factor in the future, more important than we think today. This explains the significance of the "Albanian card" being played by Andreotti, who, of all the top diplomats of Western Europe, enjoys the greatest respect in Albania.

The Turin daily *La Stampa* was quoted by the Yugoslav daily as saying that these were the initial steps of a "mysterious and sophisticated game" that might have "great repercussions."

For Tirana, the Italian connection was of crucial importance as a means of lowering its isolationist barriers, something that had to be done without giving the impression that the country's rigid ideological principles were being compromised. For Rome, playing the "Albanian card" was simply a way to return to its traditional role as a special patron to the small but strategically located neighbor across the Adriatic. Belgrade's overly sensitive behavior could be explained by its constant concern about which direction, East or West, Tirana's present or future foreign political course would take. Athens' policy was affected by various internal party pressures from the left and the right. Regarding Turkey, Albania apparently did not play a strategic role, despite historical associations and the large number of Albanian residents, mainly Kosovars, in Turkey, and therefore there did not seem to be any worry about relations between Ankara and Tirana.

XIII Faltering Economies, Deteriorating Environment

48

The Soviet Economic Performance in 1983 Philip Hanson

An impression that Soviet economic performance in 1983 was somewhat better than in 1982 arose chiefly because figures for industrial output, the only ones reported on a monthly basis throughout the year, showed a markedly higher rate of growth than in 1982.¹ Cumulatively, growth of industrial output in 1983 amounted to 4.0 percent as compared with 2.8 percent for 1982.² Figures for agricultural output and national income (net material product) were reported only later,³ and the growth of national income (utilized)—the most all-inclusive Soviet official measure of the flow of goods available for final consumption, investment, and defense uses—was less than in 1982. The same was true for agricultural output.

The overall picture that could be obtained by comparing the plan fulfillment report for 1983 with the 1982 figures in the annual statistical handbook posed some problems.⁴ The trouble was that some of the figures for major aggregates in the national economy—*Narkhoz*—series were calculated on a different basis from the figures cited in the annual plan fulfillment reports⁵ (see table 1).

The disparities between *Narkhoz* and plan fulfillment report claims for Soviet growth were striking, so far as national income utilized and gross agricultural output were concerned. In the case of industrial gross output, the two sources corresponded (see table 2).

The trouble seemed to be in the supposedly "constant price" (real output) series. The statements in the plan fulfillment reports about national income utilized in current prices (*v fakticheskikh tsenakh*) are hard to reconcile with anything. They appear to conflict each year with the previous year's report; they were far below (in growth rates) the *Narkhoz* current-price series; and they implied that the price index for national in-

Table 1 Soviet Official Growth-Rate Measures, 1980 to 1983
(percent of increase over previous year)

	1980	1981	1982	1983
National Income Utilized, Current Prices				
<i>Narkhoz</i>	5.4	5.2	7.2	
Plan fulfillment reports	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.8
National Income Utilized, Constant Prices				
<i>Narkhoz</i> (1973 prices)	3.9	3.2	3.5	
Plan fulfillment reports (unspecified prices)	3.8	3.2	2.6	3.1
Gross Industrial Output, Constant Prices				
<i>Narkhoz</i> (1975 enterprise prices through 1981, then 1982 enterprise prices)	3.6	3.4	(2.8)	
Plan fulfillment reports (1975 enterprise prices through 1981, then 1982 enterprise prices)	3.6	3.4	2.8	4.0
Gross Agricultural Output, Constant Prices				
<i>Narkhoz</i> (1973 prices)	-1.1	-1.1	5.6	
Plan fulfillment reports (unspecified prices)	-3	-2	4	5.0

Sources: *Narkhoz* 79, pp. 39, 406; *ibid.* 22-82, pp. 65, 418; *ibid.* 82, pp. 112, 189, 378-379; *Pravda*, 24 January 1981 and 29 January 1984. The figure in brackets is really accurate only to the nearest whole number.

come as a whole (the net-material-product-utilized deflator) had been falling over time, while the *Narkhoz* series implies a rising price level.

For the industrial sector the physical output numbers (tons, square meters, etc.) for individual industrial products supported the general impression of improved performance in 1983. These physical-output figures are among the more reliable Soviet published data. In agriculture, the product data did not show such a clear improvement and were missing. But the 1982 grain harvest, though not particularly good, appeared to be substantially above the 1981 harvest.⁶ The figures for 1982 showed a strong recovery for temperate-zone crops; a recovery, moreover, that was understated in the plan report for the year.

The improvement in crop production in 1982—which was not per-

Table 2 Changes in Physical Output Levels of Individual Products in Soviet Industry, 1982 and 1983
(percent of changes from previous year)

	1982	1983
Number of products for which output declines were reported	14	5
Number for which output growth was 0.0 to 3.0 percent	28	21
Number for which increases of more than 3 percent were reported	13	23
Total for which physical output levels were given	55	49

Sources: *Pravda*, 23 January and 29 January 1984. The count is of products and product groups excluding the subcategories reported within a product group (*e.g.*, all TVs are included but not color TVs as a separate item).

ceived by most Western commentators at the time—was likely to be significant in its impact on agricultural performance in 1982. (*Narkhoz* 82 reported a 5.6 percent increase in total agricultural output between 1981 and 1982, well above the 4 percent growth reported earlier in the Soviet press.) By the same token, it was likely that the improved availability of fodder in 1982–1983 boosted the performance of the livestock sector in 1983. If, however, further gains in 1983 crop production were less than in 1982, as the available figures suggested, it was possible that total agricultural output had grown faster in 1982 than in 1983 (see table 3).

Table 3 Changes in Physical Output Levels of Agricultural Products, 1982 and 1983
(percent of change over previous year)

	1982		1983
	Plan Fulfillment Report	<i>Narkhoz</i>	Plan Fulfillment Report
Cotton	−3.7	−3.7	−1.0
Sugar beet	16.8	17.6	15.0
Potatoes	8.2	8.5	6.0
Green vegetables	7.0	10.7	−3.0
Meat	1.3	2.3	5.9
Eggs	1.7	2.1	3.2
Wool	−2.2	−1.7	0.4

Sources: *Pravda*, 23 January 1983 and 29 January 1984; *Narkhoz* 82, p. 189.

From the tangle of conflicting figures, the following conclusions could be drawn. First, unless a great many detailed physical-output figures were deliberately falsified by the central authorities, the industrial sector really did do better in 1983 than in 1982; true, industrial output (allowing for concealed inflation) probably increased by some 2 to 2.5 percent, or at least 1 percent faster than the population. Second, the improvement in agricultural performance probably dated back to 1982 and may even have slowed in 1983. Third, from the available figures it was not certain that national income growth was better in 1983 than in 1982. Finally, it was possible though not certain that in early 1983, the agricultural output and national income figures for Brezhnev's last year were pushed back somewhat in order to show an increase at the end of the first year of Andropov's administration.

In a speech on April 25 Chernenko alluded to the delicate subject of economic competition between the Soviet Union and the West.⁷ Addressing the commission charged with revising the official Party Program, he reasserted the well-known claim that the Soviet economy would overtake and surpass the economies of the Western world. But he cautioned the compilers of the revised program against naming a date for this event.

The Party Program under revision dated from the era of Khrushchev, when Soviet economic growth was faster than that of most Western nations. Adopted in 1961, the program specifically envisaged the overtaking of the U.S. economy by 1970 and the USSR's entry into the era of full communism—an age of unlimited material abundance—by 1980.

Unfortunately for Khrushchev's successors, Soviet economic growth had lost momentum. The production targets for 1980 announced in 1961 remained far beyond what was achieved in 1984. The reality was that of sluggish economic growth at levels of prosperity and per capita production that were still considerably below those of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The troubles of the economy of the Western world over the last decade should have provided a golden opportunity for the Soviet Union to catch up. As a net exporter of energy, the USSR was not harmed in any direct way by the oil-price shocks of the 1970s. Just as the Western world's postwar period of rapid growth with full employment was coming to an end, however, the Soviet economy's growth was already slowing down for rather different reasons.

According to Western estimates, total output of the USSR per head of population rose from just over a third of the U.S. level in 1965 to almost a half in 1975. Since then, however, it tended to fall further behind that of the United States.⁸ This same picture of a widening gap between

the economies of the two countries could be deduced even from official Soviet statistics.⁹

The Soviet economy's performance had been hampered by two influences beyond the control of the planners—demography and geography. Under the first was the slowing growth of the labor force. Under the second was the depletion of the essential resources in the European part of the country and the rising costs associated with obtaining an ever larger share of them from less accessible places east of the Urals.

Moreover, the centrally administered economy proved to be slow, once an industrial base had been created, in introducing new technologies. Growth of productivity had therefore also been slow. Since the 1970s cynicism, apathy, and black-market activities seem to have spread among the Soviet population—a tendency exacerbated by a series of harvest failures at the end of the decade that led to the introduction of food rationing in many Soviet cities.¹⁰

In the 1980s, Soviet real GNP began to grow at about only 2 percent per year. Growth of the labor force was bound to slow down further, and growth of investment slackened. Even the Soviet defense effort, long an overriding priority, was estimated by the CIA to have been held back by the economic slowdown. Yet serious economic reform remained remote.

Meanwhile, the major Western economies for all their fluctuations and large-scale unemployment managed to expand production as fast as, or slightly faster than, their main ideological rival. If Soviet leaders were to continue to proclaim faith in the ultimate economic victory of socialism, as their ideology dictates, it was an elementary precaution not to specify a date when the famous "catching up and overtaking" was actually to take place.

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Bulgaria's Ineffective Reform

Henry Spetter

Problems of Economic Development and Foreign Trade The problems relating to economic development in Bulgaria were similar to those of the other East European countries—due allowance being made for its relatively lower level of industrial development. Although the country still had one

of the highest economic growth rates in Eastern Europe, since the mid-1970s the pace of its economic development had slowed considerably. The economy was faced with an increasing number of obstacles in the process of intensification. Production was inefficient, and the country continued to lag behind the West in productivity and technological progress. Forced industrialization and high rates of accumulation, although in a somewhat milder form, were still the rule. As a result, the rate of consumption and the living standard of the population remained relatively low. Moreover, there were serious imbalances and disparities between the structure of supply and demand and between the rates of growth in industry and agriculture. These imbalances manifested themselves in an inflationary rise in prices, balance of payments deficits, and shortages of foodstuffs and consumer goods. Another major problem was the inefficiency of investments, which was evidenced by the numerous unfinished industrial projects, the underutilization of production capacities, and the use of obsolete machinery and equipment.

Foreign trade was inefficient and unprofitable. Owing to the lack of material interest, technical inventions and innovations were being introduced reluctantly and with long delays. Other characteristic deficiencies were the disparity between domestic and foreign trade prices and the lack of competition among the enterprises. Therefore, export products were frequently sold at very low prices, the losses being covered by the state budget. Bilateralism and the inconvertibility of the national currency created another serious problem. The overvalued official exchange rate of the Bulgarian lev against the dollar and other hard currencies made a realistic calculation of the efficiency of foreign trade extremely difficult, despite the introduction of various shadow foreign exchange coefficients.

Admittedly, Bulgaria also suffered from the unfavorable aspects of the world economy, such as the "explosion" in the price of oil, the Western recession, worldwide inflation, and monetary instability. One indication of this was the constant deterioration in Bulgaria's trade index. According to UN statistics, in 1975 it was 98; in 1977 it dropped to 89; and in 1979, to 85 (1974=100). In this respect Bulgaria was in a worse position than the other CMEA countries.¹

Increased Sovietization of the Economy Bulgaria became closely linked to the process of "socialist economic integration" within the framework of the CMEA. It became more and more economically dependent on the Soviet Union, its major trading partner and supplier. In fact, almost all its fuels (crude oil and natural gas), raw materials, and machinery and equipment came from the Soviet Union. In return, the USSR provided a

guaranteed market for Bulgarian exports—agricultural products and foodstuffs, machinery, and other manufactured products. The economic potential of the country was harnessed to the requirements of the Soviet military and industrial complex. In this respect, in fact, Bulgaria had gone further than the other East European countries. In 1980 72.6 percent of its foreign trade was carried out with the other socialist countries, and trade with the Soviet Union accounted for 53.5 percent of the total foreign trade turnover. At the same time Bulgaria ranked last among the Eastern bloc countries in trade with the developed Western countries: 16.5 percent of its exports in 1980. Since the end of the 1940s over 350 major industrial enterprises and complexes had been built with Soviet aid (e.g., the metallurgical plant in Kremikovtzi, the petrochemical combine near Burga, and the nuclear power station in Kozloduy). Of the plants and equipment in existence in the country some 8 to 10 percent were financed by Soviet credits. Within the framework of the CMEA Bulgaria specialized in the production of forklift trucks, certain machine tools, agricultural machinery, shipbuilding, and the production of electrical appliances, electronic constituents, and certain chemicals. In 1979 the government signed a long-term agreement with the Soviet Union providing for specialization in production until 1990. Over sixty Soviet and twenty Bulgarian branch ministries coordinated their plans.²

The New Economic Reform Faced with increasing difficulties and an impending economic crisis, the Bulgarian political leadership was forced to introduce certain changes in the centralized system of planning. At a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist party in July 1976 and at the national party conference in 1978 the so-called "complex" and "multiplier" approaches to economic policy were recommended; and the need for a new technique in planning and for improvement of the socialist organization of labor was stressed.

It turned out, however, that these new "recipes" were of no avail; plans were not fulfilled, the waste of raw materials and energy in production persisted, and the system of centrally allocating materials continued to be defective.

The regime was again faced with the dilemma of how to improve poor economic performance by making certain changes in the economic mechanism without carrying out a radical structural transformation of the economy. It was decided to embark upon a new reform of a more consistent and encompassing nature, the basic principles of which had been discussed as far back as 1977 under the designation "New Economic Approach." This "New Economic Mechanism" (NEM) was considered an instrument

with which to implement the "New Economic Approach." It was drawn up and tested in 1979 and, as of January 1, 1982, was officially put into effect.

The New Foreign Trade Reform In regard to foreign economic relations, closer economic ties were established between production and foreign trade, including a direct link between national production and the international market. It was emphasized that the producer should be directly "confronted" with the domestic and international market and must bear direct material, financial, and "moral" responsibility for the sale of his output. This should result in increased efficiency in foreign economic relations and in the entire economy.

Second, the status and role of the foreign trade organization had been changed. This body was made to work on a commission basis and take an active part in production. In cases of overfulfillment of plan targets, it received a supplementary profit, but in case of nonfulfillment, it became liable for the loss within the limits of its funds. It was assumed that this would eliminate friction between the producer and the foreign trade organization, since such a system promoted a concurrence of interest. Moreover, the economic organizations were now entitled to establish their own foreign trade organizations and part of the foreign exchange earnings from exports was allowed to be retained by the economic organizations for their own needs.

Third, a certain degree of decentralization of planning and management in foreign trade activities was envisaged. The compulsory plan targets were reduced to the following: exports of the products of major industries, expressed in physical terms; allotment of foreign exchange earnings according to groups of countries; limitations on foreign exchange expenditure on imports from the developed capitalist countries; and limitations on wages and official travel expenses. Also, quotas were introduced for imports of primary commodities, materials, fuels, energy, and machinery and equipment in short supply. Within the limits of their freedom to determine production the economic organizations were allowed to set the quantities of the various commodities they produced and exported above the plan targets. The fulfillment of plan indicators was regulated mainly through economic incentives and restrictions. Such economic regulators in the foreign trade sector were tariffs, planned foreign trade prices, a maximum on commissions to foreign trade organizations, and the allocation of export subsidies and export bonuses. Foreign trade organizations were also supposed to participate actively in all stages of planning.

Fourth, the NEM was related to changes in the principles and practice

of price setting. The domestic prices of import and export commodities had to be fixed on the basis of the actual import and export prices. It was claimed that this would establish a direct relationship between foreign trade and domestic prices and would strengthen the impact of the world market on domestic production.

Several types of foreign trade organizations (FTOs) were envisaged: those attached to economic organizations; autonomous FTOs, operating on behalf of several economic organizations; and another sort at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, operating on its own behalf in the sphere of transit and re-export transactions. A number of FTOs have been established with engineering activities (Agrokomplekt, Bulgargeomin, Technoexport, etc.). The FTOs as well as the economic organizations that were directly subordinated to the relevant ministries were allowed to establish consortia for the joint implementation of large-scale projects or other kinds of economic activity.

The central administrative bodies in the field of foreign trade were to restrict themselves to supervising the activities of the FTOs, and were entitled to intervene only in exceptional, strictly defined, cases. Nevertheless, the centralized hierarchical system of planning in the foreign trade sector had not been abandoned. The State Planning Committee and the branch ministries fix the targets of the export plan for the economic organizations, which in their turn assign the tasks to the FTOs. All personnel policies in the sphere of foreign trade were placed in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which thus became mainly a functional ministry overseeing the entire foreign trade activity of the country.³

Conclusions Partial similarity of Bulgaria's NEM and the Hungarian economic reform gave evidence of a certain amount of pragmatism within the Bulgarian party leadership otherwise notorious for its absolute loyalty to Moscow. The goal of the new Bulgarian reform was "a gradual transition to a system of profitability and material interest in enterprises and their greater independence. Market laws should be allowed to operate more freely; i.e., greater 'economic democracy' should be introduced."⁴

Nevertheless, there was a marked difference between the economic reform in Hungary and that in Bulgaria. The latter did not provide for complete abandonment of compulsory, centrally administered plan targets; it merely stipulated a reduction in the scope of central planning and greater autonomy for economic enterprises. Furthermore, there was much less emphasis in Bulgaria on a revival of competition and on more flexible orientation of production toward the world market. The bureaucratic administrative machinery was preserved. The state monopoly over foreign trade and foreign currency had not been abolished, although its role and scope

had been diminished. Moreover, it appeared that the resistance of the conservative and dogmatic party and government bureaucracy to the reform was much stronger in Bulgaria than in Hungary.

There was no substantial evidence of improvement in the efficiency of foreign trade. The Bulgarian press reported numerous instances of superfluous machinery and technical equipment being imported, as well as of bureaucratic negligence and indifference in the conduct of foreign trade operations. Nor was there any indication of improvement in the competitiveness of Bulgarian products on world markets; they still suffered from poor quality and packaging, a lack of spare parts, and inadequate after-sale service. This was the case, for example, of the electrical appliance and electronic industries, whose output amounted to 16 percent of the total value of Bulgarian exports. It was officially admitted that most of the products of these industries still fell below the world technological level, that their research and development were inefficient and their marketing practices outdated—all of which accounted for the difficulty they encountered in selling their output abroad.

The Bulgarian economy was at a crossroads. Bulgaria's economic situation was still relatively better than in such other East European countries as Poland and Romania. The basic reasons for the deterioration in the economic situation, however, had not yet been removed. The economy was caught in a vicious circle of a bureaucratic system, lack of material interest, inefficient foreign trade, and a low living standard.

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Creeping Capitalism in Hungary?

Ralph Kinnear

Introduction The issuance on March 15, 1983, of investment bonds by the State Development Bank and the Hungarian Petroleum and Gas Industry Trust attracted a good deal of attention in the press. While there was anxiety in a number of Western accounts to represent it as a return to capitalism, the Hungarian press was equally anxious to distinguish these Hungarian bonds from stocks and shares in a capitalist economy. The earlier issue of "communal bonds" in 1982¹ in ten towns and villages, although not attracting similar attention in the West, was widely discussed in Hungary. These two experiments were followed by two more bond is-

sues, one for industrial development and one using the gas bonds bought by local authorities. These tentative steps were good examples of the general process of reform and its implementation in Hungary. The two important aspects of the issuance of bonds were the immediate practical benefits of decentralizing investment, and the place of such experiments in the broader context of economic reform.

The Gas Bonds The gas bonds were issued to partly finance a new gas pipeline. Originally, 40 percent of its cost was to come from central funds. The remainder was to be raised by selling 200 million forint worth of bonds in 1,000, 10,000, and 50,000 forint denominations. These bonds received interest at 11.5 percent a year and expired after ten years. The nominal value of the bonds, however, was to be paid back in five equal installments during their five years—from 1989 to 1993—and during this period the interest was to be paid on the declining balance.²

These bonds were only for sale to financial institutions or economic organizations, not to private individuals,³ unless they were foreigners.⁴ Since their inception, another 200 million forint set of bonds was issued, as the original issue was oversubscribed by some 70 million forint.⁵ Nearly 400 enterprises, cooperatives, and institutions were reported to have subscribed to the bonds, in amounts ranging from 50,000 to 14 million forint.⁶ Almost 80 percent of the subscribers to the original issue had a close local interest in the project.

The bond issues were a loan to the Petroleum and Gas Trust from the State Development Bank, which guaranteed the fixed rate of interest. The trust, for its part, gave bondholders a guarantee that the pipeline would be finished. The latest reports put the finishing date at 1986, after which the trust hoped to pay off the loan from increased sales of gas.⁷ The bonds could be sold, with profits on the sales exempt from tax.⁸

Communal Bonds The second type of bond, instituted in 1981 and organized on a local administrative rather than an industrial basis, was the communal bond. Communal bonds were issued by local councils in conjunction with the National Savings Bank; they were sold to private individuals in the area, tied to specific projects, and were limited to ten towns and villages. The local council was responsible for supervising the project and the National Savings Bank guaranteed the bonds and the interest. According to one article, the experiment was only partly successful, because the rate of interest was below that given on some savings accounts.⁹

Latest Developments Two additional experiments with bonds included the floating of development bonds by the Brick and Pipe Industry Trust to finance the building of a new insulating material factory,¹⁰ and a cautious attempt to make higher value development bonds available to

private individuals. One of the problems in making bonds that paid an interest rate of 10 or 11 percent per annum available to the general public in Hungary was the National Savings Bank's annual interest of around 5 percent on longer term deposits. This meant that general issue of bonds bearing interest higher than that would lead to "disintermediation": lenders bypassing savings institutions in order to lend their money directly to the users—industry or the government. The great difference between interest rates could have meant a loss of future deposits substantial enough to endanger the bank's liquidity.¹¹ To test public participation, without threatening savings deposits on a large scale, the government designated only three locations for the issue of communal gas bonds to the inhabitants.¹²

Developments in Investment Policy With respect to investment in Hungary, there was a difference between what was intended and what was actually happening. The knowledge of the latter was hampered by the lack of empirical data. Only the intentions could be deduced from official pronouncements and press coverage. Besides "official" investment, there existed a large informal network of investment on which the return might have been either financial or intangible—such as security or welfare. This included loans within families, loans between friends, illegal personal loans, and, increasingly, loans to small businesses. Most such transfers of fund involved little or no interest, although a "usurer's" market, with interest sometimes as high as 20 percent, did exist. All such transactions were illegal—and untaxed.

This type of investment impinged on the semilegalized sphere in two main areas: housing and loans to small enterprises. Traditionally, Hungarians were officially allowed to do three things with their money: spend it, invest it in housing, or speculate with it—hence the great popularity of the national lottery and art collecting. It might be argued that the savings bank had always been a fourth option, but three-quarters of their deposits, however, had been lent back to the population in the form of housing credits at the low interest rate of 3 percent. These savings accounts constituted another way of investing in housing or other types of personal consumption.

Investment in industry traditionally had been the province of the state, or of enterprises using their own profits to expand. Since the reforms of 1981, however, individuals had been allowed to invest a limited amount of their own money in small enterprises or cooperatives.¹³ It is likely that these regulations were often circumvented. There were no reported cases of prosecution for overinvestment in a small enterprise.

Investment by enterprises and cooperatives of medium to large size firmly belonged to the category of officially sanctioned investment. The

very size of most of these undertakings often compounded the problems of investment, such as the tying up of large amounts of capital in superfluous investment because the enterprise managers were allowed to invest only in their own enterprises.¹⁴

Reforms attempted to free previously unproductive capital and put it into productive use. Before November 1982 enterprises could transfer their "developmental resources" to another enterprise,¹⁵ but this was permanent only when the transferring enterprise was at a disadvantage in its relationship with its partner. If the transfer was temporary, the interest was limited to the maximum rate paid by the National Savings Bank. The decrees of November allowed both enterprises to agree freely on the rate of interest and on a share of the return on the investment for the transferring enterprise if the transfer were permanent. For a temporary transfer the transferring enterprise was allowed to charge for the use of its capital assets, without any time limit.

The government presented the issuance of bonds as a way of efficiently utilizing temporarily idle resources. In the official sphere of investment development bonds were clearly an advance in this direction. The success of the first gas bonds was a good indication that they would work. The first issue was, however, a special case. Enterprises were in effect transferring the risk of the capital investment to the government. The construction of the pipeline itself meant that most of the interested parties gained a double benefit because four-fifths of those who bought the first issue were enterprises and local authorities with a vested interest in the project. The important factor was that the rate of interest on a development bond was high enough to be attractive.

In the unofficial and plainly illegal spheres of investment the situation was less clear. First, it was not certain whether there was as much idle capital as the government believed. Second, it was not possible for the government to offer too favorable a rate of interest on communal bonds. It was not even clear whether it could offer a favorable rate higher than that of the savings bank at all, and it seemed unwilling to make development bonds available directly to the public. Third, it was not certain whether the population would perceive communal bonds as a suitable form of investment. Individuals may still feel more secure investing their money in property, or even in a business from which immediate returns could be gained, regardless of the government guarantees of the bonds.

The issuance of communal bonds was an attempt by the state to regain control over areas of the complementary economy. Savings schemes that attempted to persuade people to invest their money where the state could use it had been introduced.¹⁶

The problem of ownership arose in selling communal bonds to the general public. Theoretically, local people were being sold a stake in a project that was to benefit them—an appeal to “local patriotism.”¹⁷ There was little doubt that most people in Hungary did not see it this way. Their lack of concern about local matters may have partly accounted for the limited success of the first issue of communal bonds.

The Place of the Bonds in the General Reform Hungarian reform ideas were far from homogeneous. Small groups of economists, often with very different ideas, were working in relative isolation except for contact during debates, seminars, and personal conversations. The debates frequently took place under the auspices of the party, and various committees with the function of transmitting ideas to decision makers existed within party-controlled organizations. Consequently, the most important opposition in Hungary apparently had been subsumed within the party itself.

One of the more influential groups of reformers seemed to be the Economic Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences led by Rezső Nyers. The members of this team concerned themselves with the reform of the investment system, and one of the most vocal in this respect had been Márton Tardos. Tardos proposed the creation of what he called “capital-holding enterprises”¹⁸ as a way of overcoming the dependence of state enterprises and cooperatives on the conventional state administration—in his view a major obstacle to economic efficiency. These organizations were to redistribute capital according to the profit principle. The managers of the capital-holding enterprises were to be appointed by the legislature and were to be relatively independent from the ministries.

Tardos and others¹⁹ detailed the restrictions and regulations that were to govern these holding enterprises. One of these requirements was that the holding enterprise keep a certain part of its assets in government bonds. The main feature of this program, however, was the creation of shares rather than bonds.

The capital-holding enterprises were to hold the part of the enterprise's profits that would normally be used for reinvestment as stocks, limited to not more than 20–30 percent of any one enterprise's stock. Its use was to be carefully regulated in order to avoid any great withdrawal of an enterprise's resources.

Sándor Kopátsy based his theory of holding-enterprise operation on the management of Western pension funds rather than on the personal management of stock. In his view the operation of the capital-holding enterprise was to be run by a manager and a managerial team, appointed by a proprietary board of appointed officials and representatives of “appro-

priate social institutions," probably including trade unions. Their tenure was to be governed by their success or failure on the market.

Both Kopátsy and Tardos wanted to break the monopoly of the Hungarian National Bank, which they saw as another constraint on the efficient use of credit. This monopoly prevented enterprises from investing on any large scale in projects outside their own domain because this would have resulted in too great a dependence on one source of credit. If "business banks" were created in competition with one another, leaving the Hungarian National Bank with the job of looking after the money supply, then enterprises could invest more without fear of losing their independence.

The transitional ideas formulated by Kopátsy may have been more realistic. He envisaged the formation of a "Control Board" that would take over the "ownership functions of the enterprise, leaving the operational side to the managers." He proposed that these boards should be made up of appointees. It may be that the creation of "industrial central offices" at Csepel and at Volan was an experiment with such a separation of operational and proprietary functions, although this was never mentioned specifically, and press reports emphasized the connection between the newly decentralized enterprises and the central office.

The issuance of bonds was not an ad hoc policy, however expedient it may have been for Hungary's investment difficulties. The course of the reform was such that one change was likely to demand another if the government were to avoid even worse problems. The bond scheme was a necessary first step to free the movement of capital, the immobility of which was accentuated by earlier decentralization of decision-making.

Is It Capitalism? An essential difference between a capitalist and a communist system concerns ownership of the means of production. In a capitalist system these are predominantly privately owned, in a communist system they are owned by the state, theoretically the agent of the working class. The issuance of bonds in communist Hungary could have been regarded as a step toward capitalism if it had transferred ownership from the state to the individual, but it did not. It was a shift from a system of centrally planned resource allocation to a more market-based one. However, identifying the market exclusively with capitalism is false.

The bond market implies a system where the allocation of investment resources is governed by individuals' perceptions of where their funds are likely to obtain the best return. In the West this movement of stocks and shares has traditionally involved the duties of ownership. There was every indication that in Hungary the management of these funds was to be offi-

cially separated from ownership. It had been decreed that only economic organizations could hold development bonds. Communal bonds were another way of using savings, and scarcely conferred any rights over production.

With communal bonds the government increased private control of capital, insofar as it added to the options for investment. It was possible to utilize these options illegally to widen private ownership. However, this hardly touched the main functions of the economy, where ownership remained either with the state or in cooperative hands.

Conclusions The development bonds, those for the gas pipeline and those for the Brick and Pipe Industry Trust, continued a pattern of decentralization and could be seen as an attempt to free more capital for productive investment. Communal bonds, on the other hand, were more of an attempt by the government to regularize, and even profit from, capital movements that probably existed in spite of it. They constituted a way of mobilizing private savings for infrastructural projects.

Did the bonds represent creeping capitalism, as suggested in the Western press? They were not yet shares. They certainly represented a decentralizing move. Their purchase was voluntary and both types were negotiable, so their movement was not controlled by any direct government action. Their introduction was motivated by the hope that purchases would be directed by the profit motive and, hence, make investment more efficient.

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The Fate of CMEA's Comprehensive Program Cam Hudson

In late April 1969 the party leaders of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries attended the twenty-third CMEA Council Session in Moscow to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the CMEA and to evaluate the system of "socialist economic cooperation and integration" that had developed over that period. For the CMEA countries, the 1960s had proved to be a time of declining rates of economic growth and frustrated hopes for "catching up" with the advanced Western economies. On occasion the relatively moderate economic growth had given way to stagnation (and even, in the case of Czechoslovakia, to economic decline). How, then, to obtain economic growth without risking political

instability through "dangerous" economic (and political) reforms? Now that the party leaders had decided to develop a new program for economic cooperation to last until 1990, there were grounds for believing that there might be some chance for market-oriented reforms.

What the "Comprehensive Program" Could Not Resolve It took two years before the initiative promised at the 1969 summit saw the light of day. The program was finally adopted at the twenty-fifth CMEA Council Session held in Bucharest in 1971 and was called the "Comprehensive Program for Further Intensifying and Improving Cooperation and for Developing the Economic Integration of CMEA Member Nations through 1990."

The Comprehensive Program envisaged the development of limited market relations between member countries and market initiatives within the planning system. No attempt was made to reconcile the use of these apparently contradictory instruments. Thus, convertibility of the transferable ruble became an explicit goal of the CMEA for the first time. The fact that no attempt was made to resolve the apparent contradiction between this goal (and the more general commitment to the development of market relations) and the commitment to central planning was one of the fundamental flaws of the new integration schema. Little more than lip service was paid to decentralizing the system of intrabloc trade.

Perhaps the major lasting consequence of the Comprehensive Program was the decision to develop a series of new CMEA institutions. The 1969 summit had decided to establish the International Investment Bank to finance joint investment projects. This was to be only the first of a large number of new institutions—committees, coordination centers, joint enterprises, and branch-oriented cooperation schemes (including "target programs" and "joint investment projects")—that were to blossom in the 1970s.

But although all these institutional initiatives created the impression of great activity, they did not address themselves to the structural problems of the CMEA economic system. As far as the individual countries of the region were concerned, it was apparent that they suffered from chronic problems of low levels of productivity, low levels of innovation, and difficulties in coordinating domestic economic policies. As far as international trade was concerned, the fact that the CMEA countries had a barter system with each other but were confronted with a market system in their trade with the rest of the world had always been the factor determining the long-term balance of payments problems of these countries. Put simply, there were strong incentives in the intrabloc trading system to sell shoddy goods to CMEA partners in return for raw materials that had become expensive on world markets. At the same time, there were incentives for enterprise managers to purchase investment goods from the West (preferably paid for

with credits administered on the one hand by bureaucrats in the East and on the other by bankers in the West, who knew very little about the realities of these economies), but few incentives for them to sell goods to the West. This was a recipe for a lasting balance of payments problem.

Uncorrected Shortcomings During the 1960s the intrabloc trading system of "multilateral bilateralism" had come under increasing criticism, the most significant criticism being that it acted as a barrier against trade expansion. Thus, a number of East European economists had noted that there were problems associated with a trading system that required that annual bilateral deliveries of goods be in balance (i.e., where Country A's exports to country B must equal its imports from country B). Most important, they argued that if every country must balance its trade with every other country in the system, then the trade between two countries was limited by the capacity of the smaller partner and there was little opportunity for individual countries to specialize in the trade of those goods that they could produce most efficiently.

With regard to the first point, the CMEA critics of the intrabloc trading system noted that if a country fell short on its export plans, the importing country had the alternative of either reducing its own exports to the defaulting country or of granting implicit credits that it could not readily hope to redeem. Normally, the most likely outcome would be a reduction in trade, an outcome that is likely to compound the defaulting country's economic problems. This analysis is as true of the intrabloc trading system of the 1960s as it is of today's system. Thus, the economic crisis in Poland caused that country to reduce its exports to the other CMEA countries. Owing perhaps to strategic considerations, the Soviet Union responded by granting credits (of unknown volume, but apparently to the tune of some 4,000 million rubles). However, the other CMEA countries responded by reducing their trade with Poland, despite their chorus about "socialist brotherhood."

Perhaps the best illustration of the second point, the lack of scope for specialization, was the contrary example of Japan's economic growth. Under a bilateral trading system it was unlikely that the Japanese "economic miracle" would have occurred, since the Western system of multilateral settlement (in which total trade balances were important, and balances with individual countries were unimportant) was a fundamental element in that country's development. Japan secured economic growth in the postwar period by running large and continued trade deficits with countries exporting raw materials (e.g., Australia, Brazil, and South Africa), and financing these through trade surpluses with other countries that imported Japanese industrial products.

Inflexibility in the Face of Problems These problems were widely recognized by the CMEA in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, the Comprehensive Program was, at best, halfhearted in addressing these issues. Moreover, there were grounds for believing that the administrative initiatives envisaged in the Comprehensive Program were at least partially counterproductive. While the main stated goal of most of the new institutions after 1971 was to coordinate development plans, the increasing complexity of the CMEA's administrative structure made this more difficult to achieve. Also the complexity of the CMEA's organizational structure was an important factor in encouraging ad hoc decision-making within the CMEA; indeed, such decisions became so pronounced that no further summit took place until 1984. In view of the scale of the economic problems of the CMEA countries, it was nothing less than astounding that for fifteen years the party leaders did not see it fit to meet to discuss them.

When the summit finally did take place in Moscow from June 12-14, 1984, the results proved disappointing. The communiqués¹ issued on June 15 merely confirmed that the leaders were not prepared to reform the inflexible, bureaucratic superstructure of intrabloc cooperation nor were they even prepared to undertake the necessary domestic economic reforms that would be a prerequisite for this. In place of a reform, they produced two communiqués.

The first, the "political" communiqué, was a statement on East-West political issues, predictably claiming that current East-West tension had been generated entirely by the "aggressive forces of imperialism."

The second, the "economic" communiqué, tended to confirm that the party heads did not have much to agree upon as far as economic issues are concerned. It claimed impressive successes for socialist economic cooperation and integration, and maintained that the "economic and social progress of the CMEA member countries is in sharp contrast with the crisis situation in capitalist countries." No mention was made of the fact that in the postwar period no "crisis-ridden" capitalist nation had witnessed the sort of economic decline experienced in Poland since 1979 and the population of no European capitalist country had been forced to accept the kind of economic deprivation that Romanians faced on a daily basis.

The communiqué did make oblique references to economic problems but these had all been addressed already in the Comprehensive Program of 1971. Just as in the Comprehensive Program, the communiqué argued that "the task of organically combining cooperation in the field of plan activity with the active utilization of commodity-money relations [the market] retains its topicality."

One might add that the very "topicality" of this issue was to be found

in the fact that since 1971 there had been remarkably little progress in developing market relations between member countries. The contradiction between the goal of developing market relations and the context of a bureaucratically planned system had not disappeared. Indeed, the proposed initiatives outlined in the communiqué closely corresponded to those outlined in the Comprehensive Program, despite the fact that many commentaries in the economic press of the CMEA countries had noted that the Comprehensive Program had served its purpose and should be replaced with a new program of cooperation.

The communiqué did claim that a new element of future cooperation would involve the coordination of economic policies between member countries and the development of direct relations between enterprises. It asserted that the primary element of such coordination would be the coordination of national plans. To reflect this, national plans were now to contain a specific section on integration measures. However, it had been a time-honored practice in the bloc to attempt to coordinate national plans, and most countries already had sections in their plans for integration measures; the communiqué made no attempt to explain how coordination of "economic policies" was to differ from the process of plan coordination. Nor did the communiqué explain how enterprises bound by national plan targets could take any independent initiative to develop relations with enterprises in other countries which were similarly bound by national plan commitments.

At a press conference held immediately after the end of the meeting, Boris Gostov, a deputy head of the Economic Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, announced that there would be a change in the formula used to determine the price paid by CMEA countries for Soviet oil purchased on a long-term contract. Since the mid-1970s, the price of Soviet oil had been set according to a five-year moving average of world market prices. This formula meant that as world prices have risen, the price paid by CMEA members for Soviet oil lagged behind world prices. As a result, in the 1970s East European importers of Soviet oil received large implicit subsidies from the Soviet Union. It appeared that the Soviet Union was no longer prepared in the longer term to subsidize East European oil consumption.

Of the remaining proposals, the only striking one was a commitment to develop a "Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technological Progress" to run for fifteen to twenty years. Although the communiqué did not provide any details the program appeared designed to suppress the symptoms of technical backwardness in the centrally planned economies but not the causes.

The CMEA summit meeting fulfilled the expectations of the pessimists by confirming the failure of existing economic policies without presenting any alternatives. The only consolation the people of these countries could find in the summit was that despite the blustering of the "political" communiqué, there would be no attempt to divert trade away from the West. The optimists could look forward to more regular summit meetings in the future in the hope that circumstances would eventually force the party leaders to undertake the reforms they so feared.

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The Plight of the Yugoslav Economy

Slobodan Stankovic

At an eighteen-hour closed session of the Yugoslav National Assembly, which started on July 2 and ended on July 3, 1983, Prime Minister Milka Planinc made a passionate appeal to the population in general and to the delegates in particular to approve a radical new economic policy designed to save the country from the approaching economic collapse.¹ She presented a picture of its economic situation with such openness and eloquence that both the assembly delegates and the population at large "were terrified."²

The new law on foreign currency was designed to prevent Yugoslav enterprises and other "legally sanctioned public corporations" from taking out and using foreign loans when there was no possibility of repaying them.³ Central control through the National Bank of Yugoslavia was to insure that foreign debts be repaid on time. This had been one of the important provisions demanded by Western governments and banks willing to give Yugoslavia new credits.

Planinc's Bleak Picture According to Mrs. Planinc, unnecessary investments had been made by using foreign credits. As a result, Yugoslavia had "about \$19,000 million" in foreign debts with no possibility of repaying them, least of all through increased exports.

Mrs. Planinc revealed for the first time that Yugoslavia's economy operated with a "mere 16 percent of its own working capital," with various taxes "and other burdens weighing heavily on the economy, whose contribution to the distribution of income had been reduced to only some 59 percent [of the total]." A "long-term program of economic stabiliza-

tion" had been prepared but several years would be needed to improve things, although, as she stressed, not even the new measures nor new foreign credits were a guarantee that things would really move in the anticipated direction.

Yugoslavia's most important trade partner in the East had been the Soviet Union. During his visit to Yugoslavia in March 1983, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov agreed with his Yugoslav partners on a "long-term program of economic cooperation." Mrs. Planinc said that Yugoslavia had encountered understanding and support in Moscow.

With regard to Western countries, the situation was quite different. Yugoslavia had received credits which it now had to repay by increasing its exports to these hard-currency countries. As Mrs. Planinc said, "we have exhausted ourselves in repaying our debts . . . in 1982 we paid back some \$4,500 million of our foreign debts . . . our deficit at the end of 1982 was higher than planned, and . . . we have had to carry over rather substantial obligations from last year to this. Furthermore, the reserves of the National Bank of Yugoslavia have been largely exhausted."

Two Alternatives According to Mrs. Planinc, at the beginning of 1983 it was clear that Yugoslavia "would not be able, even with the greatest efforts, to repay the debts falling due in 1983." Yugoslavia's Western partners, she said, showed their readiness to help the country so "that we may avoid a moratorium and general rescheduling." As a result, an "interdependent package" had been worked out involving fifteen West European countries, the United States, Japan, and "more than five-hundred Western banks,"⁴ supported by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. She talked of "harsh and difficult conditions" but did not give any details except to say that such conditions had also been applied to other countries. She also admitted that "we had to accept the provision that the National Bank of Yugoslavia should be not merely a guarantor but also the direct debtor and that the SFRY [Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia] should guarantee all the credits it received."

The first alternative, therefore, had been to proclaim a moratorium, which would have had to be done as early as the beginning of 1983 and would have led "to a considerable drop in production" and the collapse of entire industries, leading to a very high unemployment rate (currently 18 percent). The second alternative was to accept the package offered "regardless of how difficult the conditions were." This second solution was to make it possible to increase production, to increase exports by 20 percent, and to insure a much smaller decline in the living standard than with the first solution.

A Strong Government Needed In order to carry out these radical measures "and enforce those harsh, strict, and most difficult clauses," a strong government was needed. Mrs. Planinc warned that there could be no delay in adopting "a package of laws" that would guide Yugoslavia's economic relations with foreign countries in the future. One of the most important provisions was that no delay in repaying foreign debts should be more than fifteen days or, in cases involving the state, a month. The republics, provinces, and communes were not going to be happy about accepting especially the measures with regard to taxes, which would be collected in the future by the federation rather than by regional authorities.

Five Ways of Repaying Foreign Debts It was reported on July 3 that the Yugoslav federal government suggested "a special mechanism" for the repayment of foreign debts. First, republics and provinces that had fewer foreign debts than other republics and provinces "should help them repay their debts." They would, of course, have to be repaid with the money they pay out for poor republics and provinces. If an enterprise had to repay debts but had no money to do so, it would apply to the higher organization under which it operated. If this higher organization also had no money, the bank involved in financing the enterprise as a whole would have to pay. Should "the coffers of the banks also be empty," the united bank supported by a republic or province would have to help. The final authority would be the central government through the National Bank of Yugoslavia.⁵

The National Bank would therefore be empowered "simply to expropriate foreign currency from any Yugoslav bank in the country or abroad." All the money borrowed from the National Bank would have to be returned, along "with all the differences in exchange rates and expenses burdening the agency that took out the foreign loan but has no means to repay it." In addition, the National Bank would have controllers everywhere authorized to approve or disapprove all payments.

No Alternative Seven days before the session of the National Assembly, a Slovene journalist said that "our mistake was not to have incurred debts abroad" but rather that \$20 billion—"not necessarily too high a sum if the money were profitably invested—[had been] spent without making Yugoslavia's economy fit to take part in work competition." He complained that instead "Yugoslavia's national property has been put on sale at a very cheap price."⁶

An important point that nobody dared elaborate or even mention was that it was Tito who was chiefly to blame for the crisis because of the errors he committed in political and economic affairs, especially during the last ten years of his rule (1970 to 1980).

The inevitable reform was, as a Zagreb weekly commented, like a surgical operation without anesthesia.⁷ The July 3 decisions were only the beginning, not even an extremely difficult one, although they reportedly alarmed many people in Yugoslavia. The real reforms were still to come. They would be based on a report prepared by the Kraigher Commission (Sergej Kraigher was a top Slovenian party leader). Kiro Gligorov from Macedonia, one of the members of the Kraigher Commission and its most prominent economist, said: "The changes will be very serious and will touch on the position of every individual. The implementation of the program will require a completely different manner of working and doing business. Problems will arise in the organizations of associated labor [i.e., in enterprises] but also throughout the superstructure. The changes will extend to all aspects of society."⁸

To their credit, the majority of Tito's successors were no longer willing to play the old communist tune that everything was all right. Two days after the July 3 decisions, a front-page article in *Borba* admitted: "There is no doubt any more: our country is passing through a serious crisis! Moreover, there is no longer any dilemma: the last hour was struck to reveal this full truth to the whole working class of this country, to tell this to everyone, to the people as a whole."⁹

Who Was Responsible? The author of the *Borba* article, Dara Vučinić, also wrote that unity existed in order to achieve everything planned. She also raised the question of responsibility, adding that people who "alone or in formal or informal agreement with other people signed this or that foreign debt document" or were responsible for "this or that bad investment" should be held responsible. She then continued: "It is the complete and honest truth that all members of the present federal government were once deputies and delegates in the National Assembly, or vice versa. Also, no one should forget that the present officials in the federation [i.e., in the central administration in Belgrade] were officials in the republics and provinces; or vice versa, and that all the party, trade union, and other responsible functionaries also occupied those posts in the past."

However, in a country in which everyone is to blame for everything, nobody is actually to blame. For, in all fairness to Tito's successors, some of them really could not be blamed for some of the things that happened during Tito's lifetime and even after his death.

"The Second Act of the Drama Begins" This was the title of a front-page article by Zvonko Logar in the Belgrade daily *Politika*.¹⁰ Stressing that "Yugoslavia's property abroad will be confiscated" should any Yugoslav enterprise, any institution, or the state itself not repay its debts in time,

Logar said that this was why "a strong regime" in controlling the contracting and repaying of foreign debts had to be introduced.

Zvone Dragan, deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs, informed the delegates to the National Assembly that in 1983 the country had to repay "almost \$5,000 million" in foreign debts. He expected that Yugoslavia would get an additional \$4.2 billion in new credits, which would be used for the "refinancing of the obligations." Part of the new loan would be used for the importation of necessary goods. He said that the new loan had to be taken out because the Yugoslav National Bank reserves had been "seriously diminished" by buying oil and other raw materials.¹¹

The "second act of the drama" began on July 3. Logar wrote that the current Yugoslav crisis was "not only an economic crisis but—in a certain sense—a social crisis." In his opinion, in the course of the implementation of the new measures "all the sore points in our political practice will appear."

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Setbacks in the Soviet Nuclear Plant Program

Keith Bush and Allan Kroncher

In July 1983 the Soviet media carried several indications that severe shortcomings had been uncovered in nuclear power plant construction. From the phrasing employed, it could even be inferred that a severe accident had occurred or had been narrowly averted.

At its regular meeting the Politburo asserted that it was necessary "to raise the dependability and safety" of nuclear power plants and recommended that an appropriate safety committee be established. The ruling body also heard a report by the Party Control Committee on gross violations of state discipline by ministries and other official agencies in productive and nonproductive construction in the city of Volgodonsk, the site of the giant Atomash plant that had been producing the new generation of nuclear reactors. Proposals on additional measures to raise the dependability and safety of power stations were also approved.¹ With commendable alacrity the creation of a state committee for the supervision of safety regulations in nuclear power engineering was announced a few days later.²

On July 18, no lesser a dignitary than the Central Committee secretary in charge of heavy industry, Vladimir Dolgikh, traveled to Volgodonsk to discuss with the city party officials measures to eliminate what was delicately termed "a complex situation" in the construction and expansion of the Atommash factory. Unspecified measures to resolve this "complex situation" are reported to have been taken.³

Then, on July 20, *Sovetskaia Rossiia* called for an improvement in the safety clothing for the builders of the Balakovo nuclear power plant. On the same day, TASS announced the retirement "at his own request" of Ignatii Novikov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Construction Affairs (Gostroi). Novikov was a career power engineer and a protégé of Brezhnev.

At Volgodonsk, the Party *aktiv* convened by Dolgikh examined measures to accelerate and improve construction work at Atommash and discussed the decree of the Politburo that had noted violations of state discipline in the course of the building of the plant.⁴ Delays in the construction of the important Atommash project seemed to be threatening the implementation of extensive plans for the development of nuclear power generation both in the USSR and in Comecon as a whole.

Atommash had been designed to manufacture giant (1,000 MW) nuclear reactors and the ancillary equipment. At full design capacity, it was to have the capability to produce eight reactors and the ancillary equipment each year. The first reactor was to be completed in 1978, and thereafter the output of the plant was to rise to four reactors a year. Construction of the second stage of the plant was scheduled to begin before 1980.⁵

Almost since the construction of the plant began, however, reports about poor organization and the resulting delays had been appearing in the Soviet press. At first, it was stated that construction was being held up by the lack of the necessary documents.⁶ Later an editorial in *Pravda* accused the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification of not using funds allocated for construction to the best effect.⁷ Warnings were issued to the heads of the ministries responsible for the situation on this priority project and to the Rostov Oblast Party Committee.

The construction of the first stage of Atommash was completed in December 1979.⁸ In October 1980 Valerii Pershin, the director of the plant, told Western journalists that the first reactor would be completed in February of the following year and the second not earlier than December 1981.⁹ This meant that the annual output would be slightly more than one reactor instead of the four scheduled to be produced, and that considerable delay would accompany the completion of the first.

Subsequent items that appeared in the Soviet press only reinforced

these forebodings. It was reported that 1980 deadlines for construction work on the second stage of Atommash had in most cases not been met¹⁰ and would not be met even in 1981.¹¹ Construction was suffering from an acute shortage of manpower and transportation and from irregular supplies of building materials. Already available production capacity could not be utilized fully because of inadequate supplies of raw materials, principally steel.¹² There were also reports of uncoordinated and ill-conceived production plans and of failures to insure the necessary technical preparations for starting production.¹³

The situation on site during the second stage of plant construction appeared so alarming that improvement in the near future seemed unlikely. The construction teams were frequently standing idle, labor productivity was low, in many cases the organization was in a state of complete confusion, and the levels of labor turnover and absenteeism were exceptionally high: in the first quarter of 1981, 5,000 new personnel arrived on the site, and 3,000 left; absenteeism accounted for the loss of more than 7,000 man-days.¹⁴

In 1982 reports started appearing in the press complaining that Atommash was behind schedule with deliveries of equipment for nuclear power stations under construction.¹⁵ At all events, the threat to plans for the development of nuclear power in the European USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe resulting from the situation at Atommash seemed to have exhausted the patience of the Politburo. Hence the decree and the visit to Volgodonsk of Dolgikh and a number of other important personages.

Some specific events might have prompted the adoption of these long overdue measures. The article in *Pravda* reporting the proceedings of the Volgodonsk party *aktiv* mentioned a host of shortcomings: gross violations of state discipline in planning, construction, and operation of facilities in town; systematic disregard of technical standards and building regulations; deviations from plans, work left unfinished; serious mistakes and miscalculations in planning documentation; and failure by the management of Atommash to insure the trouble-free operation of utilities.¹⁶ References to severe penalties imposed on persons guilty of these violations and to the fact that adoption of measures to eliminate the consequences of errors in the design and construction of industrial and consumer service facilities in Volgodonsk was necessary, combined with urging to draw "serious and profound conclusions," suggested that there had been some major mishap either at the plant itself or, more probably, within the infrastructure, perhaps in the buildings to accommodate workers.

It was possible that there had been a number of such mishaps, leading to disturbances among workers, construction teams, and the residents of

the town. Disturbances might also have been triggered by the continual disregard of the everyday needs of personnel working on the site rather than by accidents. The Soviet press revealed, for instance, that the workers building the plant often had "to be moved to places where living conditions are more worthy of modern man."¹⁷ All this might have created such an unbearable atmosphere at the plant and in its vicinity that dissatisfaction, perhaps intensified by an extraordinary event or events, developed into something more serious. Dissatisfaction among the workers could well have led to a deterioration in the quality of equipment produced at Atom mash. This was indirectly intimated by the comment in *Pravda* that "the trade name Atom mash should be a guarantee of the irreproachable quality and reliability of the goods produced."

The possibility that something extraordinary had happened at or near Atom mash might explain the composition of the high-powered government commission dispatched to Volgodonsk. It was prominently reported that Dolgikh "looked around new buildings and communal and consumer service facilities in the town, chatted with workers, and took an interest in matters pertaining to their work and day-to-day lives."¹⁸

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Environmental Deterioration in Czechoslovakia

Frank Pohl

Legislation The principle of environmental care and improvement was incorporated into the Czechoslovak Constitution, and a number of protective laws and regulations were passed. But the federal and national procurators—who monitored observance of laws—concluded in 1979 that "the responsible agencies do not protect the interests of society in environmental matters adequately, and they make little use of the legal instruments that enable punishment of those infracting their legal obligations in the field of ecological care." Two years later they recognized that next to economic and technical obstacles to effective environmental protection, the failure to use or to properly maintain pollutant-separating and purification apparatus presented the greatest handicap.¹

Economic planning procedures also appeared to differ substantially from the environmental consideration of the Law of 1966 in their early stages. According to the Bratislava newspaper *Pravda*, "The state of the

environment does not constitute a plan target; the economic plan forces the enterprises to produce a certain volume and assortment of goods, with no regard for environmental concerns." There was no adherence to the upper limits of toxic effluence and emission, beyond which production programs should, in fact, be suspended pending the introduction of counter-measures.² This led some economists to propose in 1982 the inclusion of ecological damage in the calculations of the gross material product and the national net material product.³

A law of 1967 established the State Technical Inspectorate Against Air Pollution (STIAP) with the right to impell the local authorities to levy fines. In the first ten years of its existence, however, the ridiculously low sum of 55 million Kčs was collected.⁴ Factories were better off paying fines than building expensive antipollution apparatus.

The five-year plan of 1976-1980 was the first to include a separate chapter on environmental protection and to provide certain quantified targets in this field.⁵ The same source complained about the absence of standard quantification methods for determining environmental losses and damage. No uniform classification scheme existed. Available were only findings from several partial surveys and estimates of the main damage inflicted on public health, agriculture, forestry, and other areas. Economists called for a clarification of the correlates between industrial production, technological processes, and emissions and effluents. The system of damage indicators needed to be elaborated and complemented so that it could serve as a workable standard for uniform assessment and action.⁶

Air Pollution Czechoslovakia came to rank near the top of the European list of air polluting countries and, with respect to the North Bohemian region, it occupied first place. Over 6,000 square kilometers of the Czech lands were permanently exposed to excessive concentrations of pollutants. Some three million people lived in this area; if incoming commuters were taken into account, this figure represented about 40 percent of all the inhabitants of the Czech lands.⁷

The situation was getting worse. Whereas Czechoslovak airspace was contaminated with 2,500,000 tons of sulfur dioxide at the start of the 1960s,⁸ the amount reached 3,200,000 for all gaseous emissions, 90 percent of which was sulfur dioxide, in 1980.⁹ The Czech lands suffered more from this particular substance than Slovakia. Official sources often disagreed, but it appeared that considerably more than 2,000,000 tons of sulfur dioxide were falling on the Czech part of the country in 1983.¹⁰ Data on financial damage arising from polluted air also diverged; one source reported it as 3-4 billion Kčs annually for the entire country,¹¹ while another mentioned the sum 4-5 billion for the Czech part only.¹²

In 1983 studies by experts suggested that solid emissions—dust and cinders—were to be reduced to roughly 50 percent in the Czech lands and 43 percent in Slovakia by 1990, but past experience did not make this projection credible. More credible was the prediction that the more dangerous gaseous emissions were to climb by 25 percent in the Czech lands while decreasing to 93 percent of “the present level” in Slovakia.¹³

The quality of air over Czechoslovakia would not have deteriorated so much had it not been for the forcible reorientation of the country's industrial structure toward heavy manufacturing based on low-quality domestic coal as the principal source of fuel. The energy-intensive “iron and steel concept” necessitated a multiple increase in power generation, from 4.1 billion kwh in 1937 to 73.5 billion kwh in 1981. Of the latter figure, 64.1 billion kwh were derived from thermal power plants using low-quality soft coal with a high sulfur content.¹⁴ As a result, Czechoslovakia exuded almost the same amount of sulfur dioxide into the air as the economically far superior and much larger West Germany.¹⁵

The separation of sulfur dioxide had not been attempted in Czechoslovakia: first, because the technological solution allegedly was not available; and second, because the apparatus was allegedly too large, complicated, and costly.¹⁶ The first and probably only filtering system was to be built using Soviet blueprints in the Tušimice II Thermal Power Plant before the end of the 1981–1985 five-year plan.¹⁷ A cheaper and more ingenious method of desulfurization apparently was invented and developed in Czechoslovakia by a team under Dr. Emerich Erdős. Nine advanced countries, including the United States, Great Britain, France, and Canada, were said to have granted patents for it, but according to Erdős, conditions for a smooth transfer of new scientific findings into the production process did not exist in Czechoslovakia.¹⁸

Attempts to install devices for the separation of cinders and dust had a similar result, with the difference that the process was relatively simple and inexpensive. And yet, 50 percent of all separators were older than fifteen years in 1975, and only a third of the demand for modernization and reconstruction of the apparatus was being met in 1982.¹⁹ Nevertheless, there was a factory manufacturing separators of solids as well as electrofilters in Czechoslovakia apparently using a British license.²⁰ Instead of expanding production when the demand was growing, the factory was overburdened with other commitments—such as producing dairy-plant equipment for the USSR.

Water Pollution Whereas 5,000 kilometers of the total of 100,000 kilometers of all rivers and streams were polluted in excess of admissible levels in the early 1960s,²¹ over 7,000 kilometers of the combined length

of the major rivers (25,000 kilometers) were classified in the worst-polluted categories in the early 1980s. These were the categories of flowing water which would not generally support fish and, insofar as they did, the fish were inedible.²² According to another source, "most" of the main rivers had the lower thirds of their streams contaminated to the extent that their water could not be used.²³ Measurements revealed about 600,000 tons of effluent²⁴ in surface waters in 1971—including 400,000 tons deriving from agricultural activities—and up to 760,000 tons in 1983.²⁵ These measurements did not register heavy metal, some organic compounds, detergents, and other substances, the dangerous potential of which increased in large quantities.²⁶

Water from public mains was not harmless either. Based on samples of tap water taken in West Slovakia in 1981, more than 21 percent were contaminated; in Central Slovakia, more than 15 percent; and in East Slovakia, more than 29 percent. Well water fared even worse: polluted percentages amounted to 78.6 percent of samples taken in West Slovakia, 71.5 percent in Central Slovakia, and 81.4 percent in East Slovakia. Polluted water caused epidemics of dysentery, jaundice, and virus-based hepatitis.²⁷ One could surmise that the purity of potable water in the Czech lands was better because more people drew it from the mains than from wells.²⁸

Accidental, one-time pollution of both surface and subterranean water, as opposed to persistent contamination, was often caused by carelessness and negligence among those who handled potential contaminants, especially oil derivatives. The incidence of such "accidents" had been growing: whereas 142 cases of accidental water pollution were recorded in the Czech lands in 1970, the number grew to 184 in 1980, including 91 that involved oil.²⁹

Large quantities of aircraft fuel had been leaking from underground depots at Prague's Ruzyně Airport since at least 1966, sometimes as much as 250,000 liters at one time, on account of "the bad state of the fuel-storage arrangements" and "irresponsibility." In 1974 a particularly large quantity "escaped," resulting in contamination of both surface and underground water in two adjoining villages. For the following nine years, water had been delivered to the public in mobile cisterns. The provision of a replacement water source was being planned in 1983. The original sources presumably were lost for good.³⁰

In Slovakia the Slovnaft Chemical Works in Bratislava exuded some 40,000 tons of sulfur dioxide into the air every year and oozed oil-based effluent into the surrounding water systems. For many years throughout the 1970s the enterprise had been officially allowed, in an exception to the law, to release fifteen tons of oily substances into the Danube and up to

twenty tons into the Little Danube daily.³¹ As a result of an "accident" in 1974, 100,000 cubic meters of oil derivatives leaked over an underground area of 20 square kilometers.³² Not far from the Slovnaft complex, at the Žitný Ostrov, the huge natural reservoir of subterranean water was suddenly in danger of becoming totally polluted. Contaminated water was therefore expensively drained by means of several hundred holes drilled in the ground with the aim of creating an underground hydraulic barrier to prevent further spreading in the direction of the Žitný Ostrov. Both contaminated and pure water was pumped out, resulting in a general sinking of underground water levels in the region, which meant that forests along the Danube began to die.³³

Only in 1977—after years of systematic contamination—did the Slovak Ministry of Industry endorse the building of a water-purifying station for Slovnaft.³⁴ "Important ecological projects" that would "contribute in a major way to the sanitation of the air and, above all, the rivers" in this area³⁵ were to be completed between 1981 and 1985.

It was questionable whether a general improvement in water quality could be attained considering that in 1982 37 percent of all the 950 purifying stations in Slovakia did not "meet the requisite standards."³⁶ Moreover, a great number of factories throughout Czechoslovakia were licensed to release noxious waste or effluent-water mix into adjoining rivers. Even large industrial agglomerations, such as Hradec Králové, Ústí nad Labem, Pardubice, Nymburk, Kolín, Poděbrady, Jičín, Mikulov, and others, did not have any purifying plants at all, discharging all liquid waste into rivers. The purifying capacity of many other towns was too small to contain the flood of destructive liquids. Despite the fact that 900 purifying plants were built between 1957 and 1970,³⁷ the authorities had to issue over 2,300 "exceptions" to localities and factories, entitling them to bypass the clean water legislation.³⁸

Next to the reckless drive for production increases at any cost, the ecological predicament was aggravated by the situation where "virtually every purification plant project requires foreign-made equipment, for the purchase of which, especially from the capitalist countries, there is a shortage of funds."³⁹ Estimates of the total cost of all the required purification systems spoke of 40 billion Kčs by the year 2000, an unthinkable expenditure. Industrially advanced Czechoslovakia, with its reputation as a great power in engineering, was well capable of polluting its waters but incapable of manufacturing remedial equipment.

Forests Czechoslovakia lies on the European water divide, so that most waters flow out of the country. It must retain as much precipitation as possible, and keep it clean for use. The Czech lands in particular are

surrounded by wooded mountainous ranges forming a kind of natural water reservoir. The health of the trees, especially conifers, serves as a sensitive yardstick for air pollution. Humans can absorb without much ill-effect about 0.15 milligrams of sulfur dioxide for every cubic meter of air, according to one report, whereas firs and pines begin to wilt after a mere third of that dose.⁴⁰ According to another report, for conifers, 0.06 milligrams of sulfur dioxide spell death.⁴¹

Three-quarters of all emissions in Czechoslovakia derived from burning, and 90 percent of all gaseous emissions consisted of sulfur dioxide. This substance escaped into the air wherever low-calorie sulfur-rich brown coal was burned. One-third of all the forested area in the Czech lands—some 700,000 hectares of woods—reportedly either had already perished or had reached the first stages of demise.⁴²

The Czech part of the country was affected worse than Slovakia because more brown coal was burned and because about 56 percent of all forests in the Czech lands are coniferous compared with 29 percent in Slovakia.⁴³ About two-thirds of the Czechoslovak power output in 1982 was based on sulfur-rich coal mined in North Bohemia, with one-third of all the country's gigantic thermal power plants situated near the coal deposits in that region.⁴⁴ This accounted for the heavy concentration of air pollution and forest destruction in that area. Virtually all forests along the Czech borders were affected to some extent. Pollutants even attacked areas declared national parks. Industrial concentrations adversely affected several wooded areas in the hinterland as well.⁴⁵ To the losses resulting from direct killing of full-grown forests must be added those caused by arrested growth as the result of long-term exposure to poisonous substances, estimated as affecting 1,700,000 cubic meters of forests in 1982, with the prospect of increasing by about 50 percent by 1990.⁴⁶

In 1923 Professor Jiří Stoklasa, a Czech scientist, published a paper "On Damage to Vegetation by Smoke Gases and Factory Exhalations and On the Hygiene of the Air." In another paper, dated 1932, he investigated damage to forests in particular and warned not only against sulfur dioxide, already then a household name among pollutants, but also against the exceptionally adverse toxicity of chloride and fluoride. He discovered that conifers suffered chronic damage even with a very low concentration of sulfur dioxide. The Czechoslovak Agricultural Academy, founded in December 1924, also spoke out against air pollution very early.⁴⁷ The first instances of tree deaths were observed in Jezeří in North Bohemia in 1947, and at the beginning of the 1960s the first large-scale destruction of forests was reported.

Trees weakened by the intake of air saturated with injurious chemicals

fell easily to gales, snow, and pests, so that they had to be cleared away, often at a loss, or treated with more chemicals. Pesticides were liberally air-sprayed over the forests of Jizerské Hory, Krkonoše, and Krušné Hory in 1979 and again in 1980.⁴⁸ Another kind of pest appeared in 1982, this time affecting foliaceous trees, and yet another pest epidemic spread between 1979 and 1982 to the extent that aircraft spraying of countersubstances became necessary.⁴⁹

Whereas the government did not do enough to minimize the effect of cinders in the air, let alone to combat sulfur dioxide, foresters embarked on the slow road of replacing the ill-resistant varieties of trees with stouter and sturdier ones, especially conifers with deciduous trees. Seeds of promising qualities with respect to growth had been imported from North America, but found wanting.⁵⁰

If deciduous trees are substituted for conifers, water-distribution conditions are likely to change, with a rise in the top flow volumes. Major flooding would probably be 20–60 percent above the accustomed levels. Land would probably be eroded, and the general biological climate would alter. Other predictions included smaller tree yields; weakening of the function of forests as barriers to emissions, which would then affect fauna and humans even more; decrease of mean temperatures; an increase in wind velocity and impact; faster extinction of wood animals; a change in local climates; and the diminution of the recreative capacity of forests.⁵¹

Agriculture Farming in Czechoslovakia suffered from air pollution but, at the same time, was the greatest pollutant of water.⁵² It was said that harmful emissions lowered plant yields by 15–20 percent.⁵³ In the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1971–1975), overall damage caused by air pollution to agriculture was estimated at 1.1 billion Kčs in the Czech lands alone.⁵⁴ More recent data indicated that this damage increased by about two-thirds in the 1976–1980 period.⁵⁵ Under the five-year plan of 1981–1985 it was likely to amount to 2.8 billion Kčs for the whole country. The average precipitation of 268 kilograms of sulfur dioxide per hectare of land rated among the highest in Europe. The area of dangerous contamination grew from 300,000 hectares in 1957 to 1,240,000 hectares in 1980. It appears that close to 10 percent of all agricultural land was adversely affected in 1980.⁵⁶

Fifty percent of all water pollution was attributed to the use of chemicals in crop cultivation.⁵⁷ The aggrandizing tendencies of collective farming as well as the efforts to make the country self-sufficient in agricultural production led to indiscriminate application of fertilizer. About 260 kilograms per hectare were used in 1980, compared with 13 kilograms in 1937. The success was visible but inherently dangerous: even though grain yields

increased from 1.67 tons per hectare in the 1934-1938 period to 3.88 tons in 1977-1981,⁵⁸ agricultural land then refused to absorb any more chemical boosting. With the continual regeneration of the soil disrupted, its nutrient quality had deteriorated. Because the humus content of soil was low, some 25 percent of fertilizer passed through it without boosting its fertility, while acting as a water pollutant as it reached adjoining streams.⁵⁹ Hence the stagnating yields, difficult to stimulate again unless large tracts of soil were left untilled and chemically untended for several years—something that the Czechoslovak state could not afford.

The residual content of herbicides and pesticides in farm produce and feeds was not being tested systematically, and the long-term consequences of these substances accumulated in soil and food could only be guessed at rather than determined with any degree of certainty.⁶⁰ The effects of the highly toxic 8 million tons of liquid manure produced annually also were mainly due to inadequate processing and inexperienced application.⁶¹ Dung-water from cowsheds and pigsties, frequently housing hundreds and even thousands of animals, was often released into streams or fields near a collective farm in order to save diesel fuel and effort. Cases of manure contaminating subterranean water with anthrax, foot and mouth disease, and other diseases were on record.⁶²

Other forms of pollution included biological gases escaping from large-scale pig-breeding "factories," careless air spraying, inadequate retention of silage liquids, the release of lubricants and diesel oil from agricultural machinery into rivers and streams or soil, or washing tractors with detergents in natural water.

Human Health According to the official newspaper *Rudé právo*, "The environment is more and more the topic of discussion among the public; society must attend to the consequences of a bad environment whether it wants to or not because they are reflected in the population's state of health."⁶³ This statement neglected to mention that public concern had existed for a long time. In 1966 "these questions were approached from all possible angles at every large meeting" in Ústí nad Labem, the major town of the most exposed North Bohemian region.⁶⁴ The Teplice district in the same region recorded the highest death rate in the country caused by the polluted environment, mainly from sulfur dioxide and arsenic substances, in 1960 to 1963.⁶⁵ The first cases of silicosis in children—a disease that had been thought to affect only miners—were reported in Prague at about the same time. A survey of blood counts in Ústí nad Labem showed that its inhabitants were less resistant to the epidemic-style spreading of disease than elsewhere in the country.⁶⁶

Public pressure apparently increased about 1982 and the mass media

had to counter "rumors" about "defective meat, milk, and other foods," denying that they had any substance.⁶⁷ A reader objected to this. *Rudé právo* replied some weeks later that it did not want to claim that the problem of chemical residuals in food did not exist at all but that things were under control.⁶⁸ Information was generally scarce. Occasionally specialized journals mentioned a specific problem, such as "the new risk factor" of mycotoxin, a poisonous mold in food. The harmful effects supposedly rose.⁶⁹ A survey of lead content in food in 1974, made public only in 1982, claimed that it amounted to only half the permitted level in the Czech lands. However, the survey concentrated on lead content in food alone and did not take into account lead contained in the air, water, and medicine.⁷⁰

Special privileges, such as holidays abroad and in more salutary corners of Czechoslovakia, were granted to people, particularly children, from the badly affected North Bohemian region.⁷¹ It was found that children in polluted areas had fewer red corpuscles and less hemoglobin than their peers elsewhere. After three weeks in relatively pure air both values increased, but on return to the polluted areas the decline resumed after one to three months. Nucleolar counts and respiratory measurements showed a similar trend.⁷²

The amount of nitrates in water is a major risk factor. The limit of tolerance is set at 15 milligrams for infants and 50 milligrams for adults per liter of water. A survey in the Mže River basin (West Bohemia) discovered 10 milligrams in 1974 and a subsequent rapid increase to over 25 milligrams and more in some places, so that by the early 1980s only 5 percent of the water from public sources in the area was suitable for infants and about one-third for adults.⁷³ Water in the Želivka Reservoir used in Prague had a nitrate content so high that only bottled mineral water was recommended for mixing baby food in the Czechoslovak capital.⁷⁴ Soviet research suggested that the contamination of potable water sources with nitrates may be carcinogenic.⁷⁵ Czechoslovak scientists noted the harmful effects of vegetables grown on land where too much nitrogenous fertilizer was applied.⁷⁶

The number of deaths from malignant growths increased steadily between 1950 and 1980, from about 18,000 to 35,000 per annum.⁷⁷ An official ordinance of January 1982 expressly forbade the publication of overall surveys of environmental pollution and retarded development of children in highly polluted areas.⁷⁸

Conclusions Environmental degeneration in Czechoslovakia reached dangerous proportions mainly because of neglect by the authorities. The Czechoslovak state controls both the economy and environmental legislation. The conjunction of its legislative and economic powers almost always

overrode environmental desiderata. Neither was the Czechoslovak leadership too worried by environmental lobbies among the public.⁷⁹ Czechoslovakia's economic depression required ruthless exploitation of the resources that were among the prime causes of pollution, such as brown coal deposits. Thus the country proved unable to attend simultaneously to its economic and its ecological predicaments. As a Czechoslovak newspaper put it: "To use the term 'ecological catastrophe' is in this instance not just a turn of phrase; it can really happen here if radical measures are not taken to countervail it."⁸⁰

XIV Ethnic and Social Tensions

55

The "Merger" of Soviet Nationalities

Roman Solchanyk

Soon after assuming power, Soviet Party Secretary Iurii Andropov indicated that in the question of nationalities policy, he was taking a somewhat sterner line than his predecessor Leonid Brezhnev. In his very first speech on nationalities policy, on January 12, 1983, Andropov started his remarks with a bold statement that the party's goal was "in Lenin's words, not only the drawing together of nations but their merger (*sliianie*)."

When Khrushchev gave the concept currency in the early 1960s, the non-Russian nationalities reacted with considerable alarm, and evidently as a result of this Brezhnev always refrained from spelling out that the merger of nations was the party's goal. Andropov presumably thought otherwise.

The April 1983 issue of *Kommunist* carried an article by Iulian V. Bromlei, director of the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences, devoted to contemporary ethnic processes in the USSR with a view toward the merger of nations.¹ Bromlei distinguished two fundamental components of "national phenomena": ethnic and socioeconomic. According to him, it is the latter that plays the determining role in ethnosocial (i.e., national) processes. At the same time, however, social and economic differences between nations are subject to a faster rate of attrition than the so-called national-specific distinctions. The ethnic characteristics of the nations of the USSR—national culture, customs and traditions, norms of behavior, psychological characteristics and value orientations, and national consciousness—were quite a different matter. In Bromlei's words, they "stand out, as we know, by their greater stability (*ustoichivost*)."

These specific national features and how they were holding up under the impact of assimilationist processes formed the substance of his article.

Bromlei singled out three kinds of assimilation: ethnic consolidation, ethnic assimilation, and interethnic integration. The first of these was "the

merging (*sliianie*) of several linguistically and culturally related ethnic entities" or ethnographic groups with an already existing nation or nationality. Bromlei maintained that many Central Asian nations (particularly the Turkmen) and nations of Siberia were formed as a result of such consolidation. Moreover, he noted that the process of ethnic consolidation had tapered off, having reached the stage of highest intensity in the earlier years of Soviet rule. Thus, there had been an insignificant change in the number of nations registered by the 1970 and 1979 censuses, as compared with the 1926 and 1979 censuses, which listed 194 and 101 nations respectively.

Ethnic assimilation—i.e., "the dissolution (*rastvorenie*) of individual groups (or individual representatives) of one people within another" was viewed as an ongoing phenomenon in all multinational and polyethnic countries of the world. In the Soviet Union, asserted Bromlei, the distinguishing characteristic of this process was that it was "natural." In the absence of any element of force or coercion, so the argument went, ethnic assimilation in the Soviet context was both inevitable and progressive. The natural or voluntary basis of ethnic assimilation in the Soviet Union was substantiated, according to the author, by the fact that the main vehicle for this process was intermarriage between representatives of different nations. Whereas in 1925 only every fortieth marriage in the USSR was between members of different nationalities, by the end of the 1950s it was every tenth marriage. In 1959, 10.2 percent of all families were of mixed nationality; in 1970, 13.5 percent; and in 1979, almost 15 percent. The highest proportion of mixed marriages was in Latvia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, ranging between 14 and 16 percent in 1959 and 20 and 21 percent in 1970. The choice of nationality by the progeny of mixed marriages also varied in different parts of the USSR. In the Baltic republics, for example, approximately one-half of the children of parents, one of whom is Russian and the other a member of the indigenous nationality, opted for Russian nationality. In the Chuvash ASSR, the majority of children of Russian-Chuvash parents chose Russian nationality, while in the Turkmen republic the prevailing tendency was for children of Russian-Turkmen parents to register as Turkmen.²

"The main line along which ethnic interaction of the peoples of the USSR takes place," Bromlei wrote, "is not assimilation, but interethnic integration." This was a much less tangible form of assimilation reflected in "the drawing together (*sblizhenie*) of their culture and the formation of a cultural layer that is one in terms of content but diversified in form as well as common characteristics of life-style." According to Bromlei "interethnic integration" is, above all, a political category. He noted that "international and interethnic integration runs parallel to the process of the

emergence and development of a new historical community—the Soviet people.” It was a phenomenon planned and administered by the CPSU in various areas of cultural life. Bromlei provided several examples of how this process functioned. One very general area was that of “material culture”—i.e., traditional designs, architecture, costumes, foods, and the like, the “archaic and primitive elements” of which were supplanted by “Soviet” variants. Other areas subjected to integration included national art, music, and literature. Perhaps the most important was language, with the primary emphasis placed on bilingualism. This was also one of the aspects of integration deemed not altogether satisfactory by Soviet planners. Bromlei noted that between 1970 and 1979 the percentage of Soviet citizens with command of Russian increased from 76 to 82. However, regional variations continued to exist. Among Moldavians knowledge of Russian climbed from 36.1 percent to 47.4 percent during the period between the two censuses, and for Lithuanians the corresponding figures were 35.9 percent and 52.1 percent. On the other hand, the percentage of Georgians with Russian-language facility increased only slightly—from 21.3 percent to 26.7 percent. Overall, approximately 40 percent of the non-Russian population of the USSR had no facility in Russian. Moreover, there were disconcerting signs on the horizon. According to Bromlei, “it should be noted that in a number of cases it can be observed that the number of individuals being taught in Russian is not keeping pace with the overall increase in the number of schoolgoers.” In some republics, he argued, young people had a poorer knowledge of Russian than members of the middle generation.

On May 27, 1983, *Pravda* announced that the Politburo had discussed further measures to improve the teaching of Russian to non-Russians. Rightly or wrongly, non-Russians had long been suspecting that Moscow’s efforts to improve their knowledge of Russian had as their goal linguistic, and ultimately ethnic, assimilation. The two chief reasons for the increasing importance of a knowledge of Russian given in the announcement from the Politburo were the needs of the economy and the role of Russian in advancing the friendship among peoples. The party appeared to be convinced, or was at least clinging to the hope, that a common language would inevitably promote mutual understanding between, and the further drawing together of, all the nations and nationalities that populated the Soviet Union. On the economic plane one of the urgent priorities was to persuade the surplus manpower available in the southern republics to migrate to the labor-short areas in the north, and it was hoped that knowledge of Russian would both remove one of the barriers to such migration and reduce the likelihood of ethnic frictions if such migration were to take place.

The Politburo announcement did not, however, mention another major and probably more immediate reason for its preoccupation with improving the teaching of Russian, namely the requirements of the armed forces. Because of demographic shifts, non-Slavs, particularly the Central Asian and Caucasian nationalities, were providing an increasing share of the conscript pool. By the late 1980s ethnic Muslims were expected to constitute some 25 percent of the young men liable for military service, and this proportion was expected to continue rising for the foreseeable future. There was plenty of evidence in the Soviet press that the Ministry of Defense was worried about the inadequate knowledge of Russian among conscripts from the southern republics. An editorial on improving military and patriotic education in *Pravda* on June 4, 1983, referred to the necessity of "perfecting the study of the Russian language . . . which makes it possible to understand army terminology better and quickly master modern, difficult military technology."³

As a result of the declining birthrate of the Russians and the very high rates of natural increase of the Central Asian peoples since the 1950s, the Russians came to constitute little more than half the population and were about to become a minority (though still very much the largest nationality group) in the foreseeable future. The knowledge that their share of the population was declining was putting the Russians on the defensive and contributing to the growth of Russian nationalism. Conversely, the Central Asians were becoming more self-confident and assertive as their own numbers burgeoned. Concern over the low birthrate of the Russians and other European nationalities and the high birthrate of the ethnic Muslims gave rise to a lively and inconclusive debate—with occasional overt racial overtones—on the advisability of introducing a so-called differentiated demographic policy—that is, one that actively encourages the birthrate where it is low and actively discourages it where it is high.

Another consequence of the demographic trends had been the emergence of large and growing labor surpluses in the rural areas of Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus. The regime had been trying for a considerable time to persuade the surplus manpower to migrate to the labor-deficit areas of the RSFSR or to move to the local cities, which were chronically short of skilled labor. Its efforts had been singularly unsuccessful.

The party's motives for encouraging the migration of rural Central Asians were not solely economic, however. Discussing the need for the indigenous nationalities to be more fully represented in the working class in certain republics, Andropov said in his speech in December 1982 that this matter was also of political importance. He argued that multinational workers collectives played a very positive role in strengthening the friend-

ship of the peoples of the USSR. Expressed in more prosaic terms, the party was anxious to wean the Central Asians away from their traditional, native way of life and integrate them more into the mainstream of Soviet society. As Mikhail Kulichenko, one of the leading Soviet experts on the nationality question, wrote, as long as the Central Asians remained in the rural areas "the national in the life of the toilers of the village is, as it were, artificially preserved and is subjected relatively little to interaction with the international."⁴

Perhaps the most interesting of the outstanding problems was the need for due representation in party and soviet organs of all nationalities living in a given republic. The call for due representation, first made by Brezhnev at the Twenty-sixth Party Congress and reiterated by Andropov in his speech of December 21, 1982, seemed to provide further evidence that Russians were on the defensive, at least in certain republics. Essentially, it was a demand for an end to the affirmative action programs that put the titular nationality of a republic in an advantageous position in regard to job opportunities at the higher levels and access to higher education. These programs always caused a certain amount of resentment among the Russians and other nonindigenous nationalities. But in Estonia, for instance, and in the Caucasus, considerable overrepresentation of the titular nationality in the top party and government organs had long been tacitly accepted. What made the practice less acceptable now seemed to be an increasing assertiveness on the part of members of the titular nationality in republics such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. With the indigenous population in such republics increasing at a rapid rate and its members assuming more and more of the responsible positions in the administration and the economy, some of the Russian population evidently decided that they had no future there and began to leave. Such a development was obviously not welcomed by Moscow. But to persuade the titular nationality to yield up its privileged position in "its" republic was not going to be easy.

Ethnic Tensions in Georgia

Elizabeth Fuller

Tensions between different nationalities in the Georgian SSR and their alleged exploitation for propaganda purposes by hostile centers abroad figured prominently on the agenda of the Fourteenth plenum of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist party in July 1983. The published proceedings, in conjunction with materials from the Georgian press, indicated that in addition to the well-documented mutual hostility in Abkhazia between the Georgians and the indigenous Abkhaz, who constituted a minority within their own autonomous republic,¹ and the resentment felt by certain Georgians toward the Russians, whom they regarded as the personification of a policy of repression of their native language and culture, there also had been ethnic tensions or disturbances of some kind in at least two of the four southern Georgian *raions* that had a large Azeri population.

The Abkhaz Tension in Abkhazia came to a head in the spring of 1978 when a considerable percentage of the Abkhaz population, resentful about alleged discrimination against their language and culture, raised the question of secession from the Georgian SSR and incorporation into the RSFSR. The Abkhaz won considerable economic and cultural concessions at the time, but Ivan Kapitonov, a secretary of the CPSU who was dispatched to Georgia and Abkhazia to defuse the situation, made it clear that there could be no question of secession.² Lengthy articles stressing the centuries-old friendship between the Georgian and Abkhaz peoples that appeared in *Pravda* and in both the Russian and native-language press of Georgia in the late summer and autumn of 1980 suggested that relations between the two nationalities were still less than harmonious.³ A samizdat document subsequently received in the West reported that in April 1980, Georgians living in Abkhazia had signed a petition complaining that they were oppressed by the Abkhaz. In January 1981 a similar petition signed by hundreds of Georgian intellectuals was addressed to Eduard Shevardnadze, the first secretary of the Communist party of Georgia, and to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.⁴ The Abkhaz question was allegedly also raised at one, or possibly two, of the five demonstrations reported in Georgia in 1981.⁵ With characteristic frankness, Shevardnadze alluded to the unrest in Abkhazia in his report to the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Georgian Communist party in January 1981, as did Abkhaz Obkom First Secretary Boris

Adleiba, who admitted that failures in the political-education work in the autonomous republic had resulted in "unhealthy phenomena."⁶

Adleiba's speech at the July plenum of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist party left little doubt that problems of nationality relations continued to occupy a prominent place in the work of the Abkhaz Party organization. He declared: "The communists of Abkhazia have consistently intensified their relentless struggle against those who out of careerist, narrowly nationalist, and chauvinistic considerations are inflicting damage on our common cause."

The Russians Anti-Russian sentiment appeared, predictably, to be strongest or at least most visible among students and the intelligentsia, and centered on the perceived threat posed to Georgian language and culture by attempts at cultural russification.⁷ In the most frequently cited manifestation of concern over russification, a crowd estimated to number between several hundred and several thousand people took to the streets of Tbilisi in April 1978 to protest the replacement in the new republican draft constitution of the clause stipulating that Georgian was the state language of the republic by a new formulation allowing for the parallel use of languages spoken by other nationalities represented in the republic's population.⁸

While both students and members of the intelligentsia were among the participants in two further demonstrations in defense of the Georgian language in March 1981, the students apparently took an increasingly active role in the organization of three subsequent demonstrations against russification in April, May, and October of that year.⁹ It was presumably the proportional increase of student participation in such demonstrations that prompted Shevardnadze to address twice and at some length the concept of Soviet patriotism and internationalism in his traditional homily at the Komsomol New Year's Eve Ball. The first such occasion was on December 31, 1981, about three weeks after a number of the participants in the demonstration of October of that year had been publicly reprimanded at a meeting of the Georgian student *aktiv*.¹⁰

Twelve months later, Shevardnadze directed his remarks to the preparations for the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Treaty of Georgievsk, under the terms of which Georgia became a protectorate of tsarist Russia. The official interpretation of the treaty—namely, that it constituted the "union" of Georgia with Russia and was "dictated by the wishes of the Georgian and Russian peoples"¹¹—conveniently overlooked the fact that the territory involved—the kingdom of Kartli and Kakheti—represented only a part of the historical kingdom of Georgia, while West-

ern Georgia or Imereti remained an independent kingdom until 1804.¹² Moreover, the population of Kartli-Kakheti included a large proportion of Armenians and Azeris. Its claim that "the Georgian and Russian peoples" were the prime movers in proposing the "union" discounted the fact that the population of Georgia was unaware of the planned treaty until after it was signed. In order to demonstrate the "progressive" nature of the "union" with Russia, one Georgian scholar argued that only after 1783 was Georgia able, through Russia, to gain access to contemporary Western ideas.¹³

It was apparent from various protests that at least a part of the Georgian population considered this interpretation tasteless, if not an insult to national sensibilities. In the early summer of 1982, a new Georgian-language samizdat journal, *Sakartvelo* (Georgia),¹⁴ devoted the bulk of its first issue to writings by eminent Georgian historians refuting the official interpretation of the treaty, prefaced by an anonymous article marked by extreme anti-Russian sentiment and a tendency to oversimplify the events surrounding the signing of the treaty. In the context of the propaganda campaign surrounding the 200th anniversary of the treaty it should be considered as a direct reaction to it.

It was subsequently reported that two young Georgians had been arrested in Tbilisi on June 15 for printing and distributing leaflets advocating a boycott of the official jubilee celebration, terming the treaty "a tragedy" since it "became the basis for the annexation of Georgia by Russia."¹⁵ A demonstration by about one hundred people in Tbilisi on July 11 calling for the release of the two men (one of whom had been involved previously in dissident activities) resulted in five further arrests.¹⁶

Shevardnadze, addressing a plenum of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist party, referred to "alternative" versions of the significance of the Georgievsk Treaty as propagated, among others, by foreign radio stations:

In the days of preparation for the jubilee the enemy is alert. What have our ideological opponents abroad not dredged up from their yellowing files? There are ancient territorial claims that came to nothing, there are reactionary Pan-Turkic ideas. The Voice of America and Free Europe are playing their worn-out Menshevik tapes for the umpteenth time. On the eve of the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the Treaty of Georgievsk bourgeois propaganda is undertaking an attack on us that is unprecedented in its scope and intensity, a sort of informational-propaganda intervention, if you like. Anything goes that is capable of instilling into the consciousness of the Soviet population the fabricated theory of so-called russification.¹⁷

The Azeris At the time of the Soviet census of 1979, the Azeri population of the Georgian SSR numbered 256,000, or some 5.1 percent of the total population of the republic.¹⁸ Of the entire Azeri population of Georgia, 12,852—or 5 percent—were residing in Tbilisi.¹⁹ The remainder were concentrated mainly in the four *raions* in southeastern Georgia—Marneuli, Bolnisi, Gardabani, and Dmanisi.²⁰ Circumstantial evidence seemed to point to an official campaign to defuse tensions and to play down their significance.

The two *raions* where some kind of trouble apparently occurred were Marneuli and Dmanisi. Each had been the subject of a lengthy article by Candidate of Philological Sciences Kakha Dzidziguri, focused on the economic achievements over the past decade and stressing that the population of the given *raion* was multinational, encompassing Georgians, Russians, Azeris, Greeks, and others. In his article on Dmanisi, Dzidziguri stated that “in the *raion* Party Committee they make no secret of the fact that if the problem [of nationality relations] disappears from sight even for one moment, it is futile to speak of the effectiveness of ideological work.”²¹ While the article on Marneuli did not contain any analogous reference to inter-nationality friction, Dzidziguri conceded that economic success had brought problems in its wake: the inhabitants’ newly acquired prosperity and concomitant material and spiritual requirements were not adequately served by the existing network of consumer and medical services and cultural and recreational facilities. Marneuli *Raikom* First Secretary K. S. Mamedov in an interview with *Zaria Vostoka* said that “labor and social passivity of a certain section of the population . . . serves as a favorable breeding ground for the spreading of all kinds of negative phenomena.”²²

The published materials of the Georgian Party Central Committee plenum in July featured, under the rubric “Internationalism is the Style of Our Life,” an eloquent argument by the chairman of the Marneuli *Raion* soviet at that time, Z. A. Imanova, that the measures to improve internationalist upbringing should be combined with a broadly based program to expand the economic potential and social amenities of the nationality-inhabited regions.²³ Imanova’s “enthusiastic and convincing” exposition of the achievements purportedly resulting from “the friendly cooperation of people of different nationalities, concern for the development of each region and of the republic as a whole, bearing in mind the labor and cultural traditions and the national features of the republic’s population” was singled out for special mention by Shevardnadze in his closing speech to the plenum.²⁴

The lower level of economic investment and cultural facilities allocated to the Abkhaz SSR in comparison with the rest of Georgia figured

among the grievances voiced by the Abkhaz in 1978, as did the charge that the Abkhaz cadres were not adequately represented in the Georgian party organization. Dzidziguri and Imanova made it clear that steps had been taken, if belatedly, to counter charges of underinvestment in the Azeri-populated areas of the republic and to cater to the cultural demands of the Azeris. According to Imanova's successor, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist party created two special commissions to plan the further socioeconomic development of the *raion*, and to prepare local cadres for various branches of the economy.²⁵ The issue of minority representation in the local party organization and the local soviet might have had some bearing on the decision of July 1983 to divide Marneuli *Raion* administratively between *raion* and city party committees and two local soviets.

The disturbances that presumably occurred in Marneuli and Dmanisi could not be compared in their scale and seriousness with the events in Abkhazia in 1978. Yet they served as a reminder of the danger that any concessions to or preferential treatment of one minority group could encourage similar demands from others. It was possible that Armenians, Ossetians, Kurds, and Greeks also considered themselves discriminated against by the Georgians. Instruction in Greek, introduced in 1981 in some forty-six Georgian schools, was either in response to lobbying by the Greek community or a prophylactic measure.²⁶ The impossibility of ever achieving absolute evenhandedness on the part of the authorities was likely to engender further tensions, given the limited funds available.

The magnitude of the problems was acknowledged by Shevardnadze at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist party in July. Shevardnadze once again reiterated that neglect of the interests of the minority nationalities had in the past proved to be a serious mistake, as the events of 1978 had indicated, and insisted that "in future we must show greater concern for the development of nationality languages, nationality cultures, and for the training of teaching cadres. The slightest negligence in this field will immediately show results. And then considerably greater efforts will be necessary in order to stabilize the ideological situation, and neutralize unhealthy sentiments."²⁷

Hungarian Minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia

Judith Pataki, Vladimir V. Kusin,
and Sonja A. Winter

Romania Samizdat writings remained the main source of information about the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. One such samizdat publication, the sporadically published periodical *Ellenpontok* (Counterpoints), ceased appearing after its publishers had been dispersed; a few were allowed to emigrate to Hungary. The samizdat agency Hungarian Press of Transylvania (HPT) had been sending out reports with some regularity since May 1983.

Some of the reports registered complaints about the standard of living, which were common throughout Romania. Other grievances centered around the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, which had originally been a Hungarian university (Bolyai) and had been merged with the Romanian Babeş University in 1959. According to HPT's report of April 5, 1984, a Romanian ministerial decree, dated April 4, changed the name to the University of Cluj-Napoca. HPT expressed the fear that the change of name might be a sign of imminent measures restricting Hungarian language instruction.

The Times, quoting émigré sources in Vienna, claimed that the new decree limited the number of Hungarian-speaking students to 5 percent.¹ According to the July 15, 1984, issue of HPT, students with Hungarian majors must accept any job offered them. They were usually sent to areas beyond the Carpathian Mountains where few Hungarians lived, and they were forced to teach their students in some language other than Hungarian. This policy left many Hungarian-inhabited areas without Hungarian teachers.

Reports also complained about forced retirements and arrests of prominent Hungarian professors. István Tökés, a professor of Hungarian theology at the Cluj Seminary, for example, was forced to retire three years early. Béla Paul, a professor of mathematics, criticized the measures taken against the Babeş-Bolyai University and Hungarian language instruction. He was subsequently confined in a sanatorium for nervous disorders and

Judith Pataki was responsible for material from Romania, Vladimir V. Kusin and Sonja A. Winter for material from Czechoslovakia.

then forced to retire.² On April 30 he was reportedly taken from his home in the middle of the night and was imprisoned somewhere in Bucharest.

Several reports described measures taken against Hungarian cultural institutions, the Hungarian media, and Hungarian publishing houses. Many editors of Hungarian origin were forced to retire; in most cases they were not replaced.³ The director of the Hungarian-language television program, Pál Bodor, for example, had retired five years earlier; but no permanent replacement had been appointed. In addition, the length of Hungarian-language broadcast was reduced from 180 to 55 minutes a week.

A large-scale investigation was launched against the *Kriterion* Publishing House, whose publications appeared in eight languages. Although a large share of what the house did involved Hungarian material, not one of the investigators was an expert in Hungarian affairs. The head of the investigating committee was a Romanian party functionary who did not speak or understand Hungarian.

The action against *Kriterion* seemed to be directed partly at Géza Domokos, who was sent to the West in order to demonstrate the "fairness" of the Ceaușescu regime's nationality policy. Domokos had allegedly wanted to expand the volume of *Kriterion's* publishings, something that was held against him. HPT pointed out that the volume of Hungarian publications had declined steadily in the last years. Compared with thirty-five years earlier, only a third as many books were being published in Hungarian. On the average, only one Hungarian book per capita was printed in Romania in the course of a year. A Hungarian reader in Romania could select from only 200 titles, while in Hungary there were 7,000 to 8,000 titles to choose from every year. Of the two hundred books available to ethnic Hungarians, most of them were translations into Hungarian of propaganda publications.

Religious persecution was another problem. Hungarian parish priest Géza Pálfi in his Christmas sermon had reminded his Hungarian congregation of the fact that Christmas was a holy day in Hungary, whereas it was a workday in Romania, something he regarded as an act of religious repression. Immediately after the sermon he was arrested and beaten for four hours by the Romanian security police. He suffered serious injury to his liver and kidneys and was taken to the prison hospital in Tîrgu Mureș where he died of kidney failure in February.⁴

During the past two years three books whose content greatly upset the Hungarian minority appeared on the Romanian book market. Two books by Ion Lăncrănjan and one by Romulus Zaharia provoked sharp criticism in Hungary.⁵ The historian and dramatist György Száraz explicitly stated that Lăncrănjan's books were rejected not only because of their falsification of history but because these falsifications threatened the existence of the

Hungarian minority.⁶ They were falsifications with a definite political motive. Száraz showed that Lăncrănjan had used sources made available to him by the Romanian emigrant Iosif Constantin Drăgan, who lived in Rome and had considerable political influence. Lăncrănjan, in fact, used the same translation of Hungarian material that appeared in Drăgan's anti-Hungarian book *Transilvania Ultima Prigoană Maghiară* [Transylvania, the Last Hungarian Persecution].⁷

According to the Hungarian party daily *Népszabadság*,

A stance that insults socialist norms only harms any substantial intentions of rapprochement . . . Post-world-war peace treaty's provisions that are unfavorable for Hungarians . . . can only be transcended by unfolding genuinely socialist comprehensive cooperation between the socialist countries and, in the ultimate analysis, through the "spiritualization" of the existing frontiers.⁸

The situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania was the more difficult since no political power acted as a mediator on their behalf. Officially, Hungary refrained from intervening in the minority question, since in principle the question should have been solved long ago according to "Leninist principles."

Czechoslovakia Miklós Duray, a forty-year-old geologist from Bratislava and the proponent of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia who appended his name to Charter 77, was arrested in November 1982, extensively interrogated, and put on trial at the end of February 1983. The Hungarian party and government interceded on his behalf with the Czechoslovak authorities, thus joining a wave of protests not only in the West but also by other Hungarian intellectuals in Hungary itself and by Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia.⁹ No verdict was given at the trial, and Duray was released, but on May 10, 1984, he was re-arrested.

The incarceration was justified by charges of "harming state interests abroad" and "spreading alarmist reports." VONS, the dissident Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted in Czechoslovakia, reported that Duray has been accused of "publishing a book abroad, the content of which was hostile to the socialist system, thereby disparaging the state's good name abroad and its international status [as well as] disseminating documents in Czechoslovakia designed to provoke alarm among citizens of the Hungarian community."¹⁰

Duray's real offense was his ceaseless effort to promote the language

and culture of the 600,000 Hungarians living mainly in Slovakia, where they accounted for more than 11 percent of the population. Holding that "the temples of the mother tongue, the schools, become the first victim" of systematic ethnic oppression, Duray vigorously protested radical school reforms enacted in March 1984, which contained a clause permitting the curtailment of minority language teaching in schools.¹¹ Subsequently, as a result of unusually strong and widespread opposition, reportedly involving thousands of members of the Hungarian community, Slovak authorities modified the offending stipulation and postponed its implementation.¹² In the eyes of the regime, Duray was probably held to be mainly responsible for this setback, which was particularly irksome because of persistent nationwide popular concern over the educational reforms in general.

Demonstrating his recognition that the Hungarian minority's grievances were an aspect of the violation of human rights throughout Czechoslovakia, in August 1983¹³ Duray joined the Charter 77 group, which was the chief target of brutal persecution.

In a "message to foreign parts" dated August 1983, sent from Bratislava and published in a Czechoslovak exile publication in Paris,¹⁴ Duray wrote:

I did not set out to defend the rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia only because I am a Hungarian but above all because it is my firm conviction that every violation of man's rights gives birth to unlawfulness and can fuel thoughts of revenge. . . . I would be glad if the Hungarian exile groups and associations . . . in Western Europe and overseas found it possible to shake hands with the Slovak and Czech emigrations. . . . My persecution was not caused by the regime in this country alone but, among other reasons, by the fact that so far hands have not been sincerely shaken by the nations involved.¹⁵

Moslem Nationalists Sentenced in Yugoslavia

Slobodan Stankovic

A trial of thirteen Moslem nationalists and "counterrevolutionaries" began in Sarajevo on July 18, 1983. The defendants¹ were accused of trying to separate the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia in order to create a "pure Moslem state."

The Islamic Declaration The court considered a fifty-page *Islamic Declaration* to be one of the Moslems' offenses. In the party weekly *Kommunist*² Hamza Bakšić, also a Moslem, wrote that the motto of the *Islamic Declaration* was: "Our goal is the Islamization of the Moslem; our motto is to believe and to fight." For Bakšić the crucial question was whether the word "Moslem" was written with an initial capital (meaning Moslems as an ethnic group) or with a lowercase initial (meaning moslems as a religious group). In the *Islamic Declaration* the uppercase initial was used, which meant, as Bakšić said, that "they addressed the Moslems as a nation rather than as believers, adherents of Islam, the moslems."

Bakšić stated that the most incriminating part of the document was "the penultimate sentence in the declaration," saying that the message was addressed "to all Moslems throughout the world," telling them that "we clearly emphasize the fact that no promised land exists; there are no miracle workers or Mahdis—there is only a road of work, struggle, and sacrifice."

Against "Islamistan" Professor Fuad Muhić, a Moslem communist from Sarajevo, also criticized the accused, saying that two events in particular had encouraged the Moslem nationalists: the events in Iran since 1979 and the "counterrevolution in Kosovo" since 1981. The Kosovo Albanians had demanded "an ethnically pure Kosovo republic," which prompted the nationalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina to begin dreaming about an ethnically pure Moslem republic there.³

Muhić condemned the Teheran daily *Azadegan*, which had published an editorial claiming that "in Tito's lifetime attempts were made to stop the spread of religious ideas, especially Islamic ideas, by means of guns and corruption." The Yugoslav leaders were warned by the Iran daily that they should finally grasp "that Islam is not an idea that can be uprooted by oppression and arrests."

Sentences On August 20, eleven of the "Moslem nationalists" were condemned to a total of ninety years in prison; the twelfth defendant, a

woman, was sentenced to six months on probation and immediately released⁴; the thirteenth defendant, Rushid Abid Priguda, was excused from the trial because of bad health.⁵ The Sarajevo district court proclaimed the condemned Moslems guilty of "hostile activities and counterrevolutionary threats to Yugoslavia's social order" and of "criminal association intended to spread hostile propaganda." The most severe sentences were given to Omer Mustafa Behmens—fifteen years—and Alia Mustafa Izetbegović—fourteen years. The judge, Rizah Hadžić, also an ethnic Moslem but an atheist, said that "it is neither religious conviction nor believers who had been on trial here, but rather proven and cunning Moslem nationalists who have been fighting for the Islamization of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

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Hungary's New Rich Edith Markos

Commenting on a debate organized by the Hungarian Television Science Club about Hungarian society in the 1980s, a viewer said: "Money reigns in Hungary."¹ The popular weekly *Ország-Világ* defined the Hungarian millionaire as a person with savings or income amounting to more than a million forint. Although the lack of statistical data made it difficult to estimate the number of millionaires in the country, the magazine suggested that "today there is a considerable number of people in the millionaires' camp who walk among us anonymously."² *Ország-Világ* mentioned the biggest taxpayer in the country, Dezső Koszo, whose worth was estimated as between ten and fifteen million forint. No information was available about the origin of his wealth.

In view of the declining rate of growth in Hungary's economy, the simultaneous differentiation of incomes and the accumulation of wealth in certain segments of society were new phenomena. While the standard of living in some segments of society declined or stagnated, it rose for about one-third of the population.³

As a result of the rapid rise in standard of living for some people, accumulation of assets became common in the 1970s. In general those items that ultimately influenced the financial situation and living standard of their owners were considered assets.⁴ Savings, real estate, jewelry, works of

art, and antiques were included. The pursuit of wealth was accepted as long as it involved honest work, according to the official daily *Népszabadság*, which cautioned: "At the same time part of the population is sensitive to the accumulation of wealth and reacts to it with resentment, especially now when the growth of real income is slow."⁵

An air of secrecy surrounded the wealthy. Two of the millionaires interviewed by *Ország-Világ* insisted on anonymity. The interviews revealed that one person had become wealthy through inheritance while two artisans owed their affluence to their business instinct and hard work. One of those interviewed, an electrical engineer, became wealthy through inventions; his regular earnings were less than those of a skilled worker.⁶

In 1982 a case without precedent in a communist country was reported in the Hungarian press.⁷ A seventy-eight-year-old man, whose wealth was estimated to be ten million forint, offered his millions for the building of a public swimming pool in Obuda, a suburb of Budapest. In an interview with Radio Budapest the unnamed millionaire said that he had acquired his wealth by honest means, mostly through investments and by "saving every penny." Claiming that he wished to "leave something for posterity," he explained that he did not want to give his wealth to relatives because he favored "self-acquired gain." His gesture met with widespread public amazement.

Sources of Wealth The wealthiest families were usually those with the highest incomes, but because of different spending habits, high income did not necessarily lead to the accumulation of assets. Inheritance had a considerable influence on wealth. The *Népszabadság* article admitted that no data were available on the distribution of wealth in Hungary because of the "delicate" nature of the subject and claimed that wealth was "not restricted to certain classes or social groups in Hungary." This was true "even if doctors, artists, and agricultural workers in favorable material circumstances [mostly private farmers] were presumably found in greater numbers among the wealthy strata. . . ."⁸ Furthermore, the article pointed out that there was greater inequality in the distribution of income in Hungary than in other countries. The dubious but widespread practice of giving "gratuities" to doctors contributed considerably to their affluence.⁹ Private farmers also enjoyed prosperity on account of production levels described as miraculous. Almost 30 percent of the gross production in agriculture derived from private plots.¹⁰

The most common form of assets was savings. Although the interest on long-term deposits had been raised several times, prices were rising faster, making it increasingly difficult to save for expensive durable goods.

For example, the rise in the cost of building and construction materials prevented many Hungarians from closing the gap between their savings and the price of a new house.¹¹

Inherited wealth was particularly advantageous because many types of family assets rapidly increased in value. Inequality in the distribution of inherited valuables such as precious metals, jewelry, works of art, and real estate tended to be greater than in income distribution. With the constant increase in prices there was a growing tendency to invest savings in assets that retained or increased their value.¹²

Change in Income Distribution According to a deputy department head of the Central Statistical Office, the sixfold difference between the highest and lowest incomes of the 1960s became only fourfold in the early 1980s. Also, in the 1960s those with the highest incomes, one-tenth of the population, possessed 20.7 percent of all personal income, while the same ratio in the 1980s was down to between 18 and 19 percent.¹³

In the early 1960s disposable income was spent mainly on food and household items, which remained in the home and thus were not conspicuous. Later, consumption patterns changed: purchase of a car or a country house and travel abroad became the main objects of spending. However, conspicuous consumption made apparent income inequality, leading to a growing resentment toward the rich. In a study conducted by the Social Institute of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party that examined the "social consciousness of equality and inequality" in Hungarian society, 10 percent of all the respondents denied the existence of affluence; 4 percent associated wealth with inheritance, family background, or social origin; and 14 percent attributed acquisition of wealth to illegal means.¹⁴ Some of the respondents defined wealth by certain material acquisitions such as a car or a weekend house. A substantial part of all the groups questioned believed that higher incomes stemmed either from a higher status resulting from a position of influence (14.8 percent) or from the gains made in the second economy (24 percent).

While the decrease in the gap between the highest and the lowest earnings had been praised as "socialist achievement," Hungarians realized that income leveling did not provide effective incentive for the improvement of work performance but instead undermined morale. It became apparent that only correspondence between the amount of work accomplished and pay was an incentive for better work.

Suggestions to this effect raised suspicions that the "socialist" principle of equality was adjusting to reality. With the increasing stress on efficiency, private small-scale industry was encouraged, in spite of cases of spectacular wealth among artisans in private industry.¹⁵

The modified income-tax law that took effect on January 1, 1984, provided further incentives for artisans and private entrepreneurs. With the new tax law, the highest tax rate, applicable to the portion of individual incomes in excess of 600,000 forint, was 65 percent. Under the previous system, artisans and private retailers with an income of more than 200,000 forint had to pay a tax rate of 75 percent on the excess; as a result, a considerable number of them closed shop for several months, reasoning that the results of their work would be swallowed by taxes, which were considerably higher than those of writers, artists, and other self-employed professionals. The new law created uniform tax rates; it did not differentiate between types of work, taking only the amount of income into account.¹⁶

The number of shops selling Western luxury goods for Hungarian currency rose considerably. Their popularity and success indicated that significant segments of Hungarian society were immune to the country's economic crisis. A new shop selling high-quality West German china was flourishing in spite of its extravagant prices—39,000 forint, or eight times the average monthly salary, for a 24-piece dinner service.¹⁷

An article in the literary and political weekly *Elet es Irodalom* expressed doubts whether the newly opened luxury shops were compatible with the "socialist" way of life.¹⁸ According to the article, the problem was that the "overpaid occupations" of private tradesmen contributed to the depreciation of the professions which were already underpaid. While improvements in work quality and individual achievement were increasingly receiving less recognition, the market for less socially important items—material acquisitions—continued to grow. The article then proposed measures to halt the proliferating luxury consumption so that society would escape unjust inequality and reach a more "equitable inequality."¹⁹

A Second Look at Socialist Economic Principles The stagnation or slow increase of real incomes and the decline in the living standards of the poorest segments of the population indicated that the general accumulation of assets would not directly benefit disadvantaged groups. Yet under Hungary's economic conditions, the significance of asset accumulation was likely to increase. Increased savings were especially important for obtaining an apartment and for complementing the benefits provided by the Hungarian social security system in case of sickness, disability, or retirement. It was predicted that "the overall increase in the standard of living will be slower and the increase in wealth will be more differentiated than in the past. Under the present economic circumstances these factors increase the risk of social conflicts."²⁰

Nevertheless, the official view held that the accumulation of assets should not be restricted:

The accumulation of assets, should be supported and encouraged, because material well-being does not exist and cannot exist without adequate family wealth. Opportunities to accumulate assets should always be available to those with high incomes in order to prevent the prodigal spending that would necessarily follow if they did not have the chance to invest their money. The public would be less likely to tolerate a flagrantly lavish lifestyle than scarcely perceptible differences in assets. Thus, the accumulation of assets should be encouraged through attractive possibilities for monetary investment, something as useful for the individual as it is for the family and society.²¹

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High Life Soviet Style

Vladimir Tolz

"The problem of pretentiousness and snobbism among some young people" became increasingly disturbing to Soviet ideological authorities and certain groups in Soviet society, particularly teachers and youth as a whole. In a discussion on the pages of *Komsomolskaia pravda*, the "problem of pretentiousness and snobbery among some young people" emerged primarily as one of the social and cultural exclusiveness of the children of the Soviet elite.¹ In its overt manifestations, this phenomenon was negatively regarded not only by other segments of the population but even by the older generation of the Soviet elite itself, which for a number of reasons was quite apprehensive about the clanlike behavior of its offspring.

Soviet authors appeared incapable of explaining the origin of the cultural values of the "highlifeists"—a slang expression that comes from the English term "high life." In a story exploring the conflict between the children of the Soviet elite and their parents, the author attempted to attribute these values to shortcomings in education and to alien influences.² Such attempts threw some light on the problem of social differences in Soviet society, and provided material for a study of the workings of ideological influences and trends.

In one of her articles Elena Losoto, who had led the discussion in *Komsomolskaia pravda*, moved away from her earlier thesis positing a connection between the exclusiveness of the young elite and the system of

values of their "nouveaux riches" parents.³ Examining the question from a new angle, she wrote about "young people whose world outlook is orientated toward the West."⁴ The material manifestations of the clanlike exclusiveness of the young elite, to which considerable attention had been devoted in earlier articles, came to be considered only the tip of the iceberg. Of more fundamental importance, in Losoto's opinion, was their "unquestioning acceptance of Western values and rejection of their own." In adopting a Western outlook the young, according to Losoto, acquired a cynical view of life and turned away from traditional national values that Losoto described as "Soviet Russian": "We taught the world to respect labor. We put the collective interest before the personal. We taught the world the meaning of culture. . . . We were the first to liberate women. The Russian woman plays a leading role in world literature and in the world's social life. We created Russian literature—the best classical literature in the world. No other people has such riches."

The journalist attributed the spread of "highlifeism" to the proliferation of highly prestigious special English schools. She cited a novel by Evgenii Evtushenko as a literary model for the clanlike exclusiveness of the young elite.⁵ Igor Seleznev—one of the novel's negative characters—personified the unpleasant characteristics of the children of the "ruling class." With his knowledge of English—acquired at the special school—he was able to keep contact with people outside his own social group to a minimum, joining his peers in dismissing such people as "pebs."

Losoto reported that her newspaper received a lengthy telegram from R. Romanov,⁶ the Tomsk Oblast Committee secretary, concerning a special meeting in response to her article. Romanov said that the local Kom-somol committee had passed a special resolution stipulating that "the parents and the family" be held responsible for their children's misdemeanors and for shortcomings in their upbringing.

Why did articles, which did not criticize the people of Tomsk directly, provoke such a serious reaction at the highest party level in a region where the percentage of members of the young elite was probably no greater than anywhere else?

A clue may be found in an incident that took place less than two weeks previously in Georgia (November 18, 1983), when a group of armed young people, also members of the young elite, tried to hijack a plane to Turkey—with tragic consequences.⁷ The telegram from Romanov was suggestive of an attempt to prevent such "negative phenomena."

Local official reaction to the tragic incident in Georgia offered its own explanation of the young elite: "It is no rare occurrence that from cultured,

educated families, spiritually crippled young people emerge, criminals and drug addicts. It was young people of this kind who committed this terrible, outrageous crime on November 18 last year."⁸

Whereas Romanov believed that the primary responsibility for suppressing tendencies toward extravagant tastes, overdependency, and a materialistic mentality lay with the schools and the teachers, the authors of the letter from Georgia, where an unfavorable ideological climate had existed for some time in educational institutions, tried to play down the recurrent sharp manifestations of this problem by shifting responsibility to the family relations.

A general meeting of the Georgian Academy of Sciences declared the key factors in a child's upbringing to be "the personal example set by the parents and their attitude to things in general, to their obligations, and to the values of our society. In short, the family environment and family discipline." The authors of the letter asserted that some members of the educated elite lost their authority over their children because they did not practice what they preached. Their behavior was then often copied by their children.⁹

The Georgian letter attributed the origins of the behavior of the young elite to the same conditions as had *Komsomolskaia pravda*: "In such families, the children grow up in an environment of excessive luxury, where there is absolutely no control, and where they are allowed to do whatever they like. The parents indulge every whim and watch out for their children's interests to the point of buying favors."

The latter phrase was intended to remind Georgian readers of the famous affair at the Tbilisi Medical Institute in which members of the elite secured places for their children by means of bribery and influence-peddling.¹⁰

On another point, however, the Georgian interpretation of the behavior of the young elite was completely different from the Moscow interpretation. Whereas *Komsomolskaia pravda* saw it as stemming from a pro-Western ideological orientation and antipatriotism, the authors of the Georgian letter suggested that "there are some parents among us who instill their children with pseudopatriotic views and give them the idea that they are somehow exceptional."

This was probably a reference to K. Tsereteli,¹¹ a corresponding member of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, who was mentioned in the Georgian letter, and who was supposed to have made some "regrettable mistakes" in his son's upbringing. The names of the participants of the hijacking incident had not been published in the Soviet press, but it was

rumored that Tsereteli's son was among those involved, together with several other young people from families of the Georgian elite.

Tsereteli's son Irakli was given a suspended sentence of five years in 1982 for taking part in a demonstration in Mtskheta. He was subsequently arrested in June 1983 for distributing leaflets calling for a boycott of the celebration of 200 years of the Georgian Treaty. He was later sentenced to four years for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."¹²

Neither Irakli Tsereteli nor any other dissident children of the Georgian elite could be accused of antipatriotism. In Soviet terminology their activities might have been labeled as "nationalist." In the context of this letter, however, the authors chose not to use this term, which had definite political connotations.

As a possible method of correcting the behavior of the young elite the letter recommended vigilance: "We have to find out in what milieu and in what way they spend their free time, and who their friends are."¹³

The emergence of the idea that the collective should take responsibility for the education of the children of the elite and the example cited in the letter about K. Tsereteli, who was "forced to give up" the title of professor and resign from his post as director of studies at Tbilisi University, indicated that a new, more radical, method of discouraging the behavior of the young elite was adopted: punishing their parents at their place of work. Despite initial restraining directives from above,¹⁴ the campaign against the clannish isolation of the young elite was no longer confined to the young "aristocrats" themselves, but had spread to their parents' generation.

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Daily Living in East Germany

Ronald D. Asmus

Day-to-day problems of living under "real socialism" in the GDR had usually been discussed in the East German press only after they had allegedly been resolved or when a solution to the problem was supposedly imminent. However, in 1984 an issue of *Sinn und Form*, a journal published by the East German Academy of Arts, contained a candid article about the frustrations and problems of many East German citizens.¹ It conveyed the

opinions of Hans, age fifty-nine, and his wife Inge, age fifty-eight, both employees of a fruit-producing agricultural cooperative east of Berlin. Hans was a manager at the cooperative and Inge the chairwoman of an associated garden cooperative. Both were devout communists—Hans had joined the party in 1945—and both were presented as loyal and in many ways typical citizens. The same could be assumed about their complaints and about the issues that they raised.

Problems on the Farm Most of Hans's comments dealt with his experiences while working his way up the ladder to become the manager. He recalled the numerous occasions when either he, his wife, or his colleagues attempted to make constructive suggestions for improving the organization or work style of the cooperative that were almost always rejected or ignored by academics or state planning authorities as examples of either "capitalist" or "Chinese" working methods. He referred to the problems caused by frequent agricultural reorganizations or reforms, technical errors, and the difficulties in explicating the state's concepts to workers. The list continued with comments about poor labor discipline, resentment resulting from wage scales and tax regulations for different categories of employees, condemnation of individuals who concentrated on their private plots at the expense of the cooperative—through stealing material, doing private work during the day, or simply slacking off in order to be fit for later moonlighting. Hans also noted how poor planning and coordination had often led to overproduction, a problem that in his eyes could be solved through skillful "diplomacy" with other regional cooperatives—the swapping of goods outside official channels.

Hans claimed to be satisfied with the progress of his own cooperative, noting that the members were working better, since "they know what they are working for." He related, however, a story about the employees of a factory in Berlin whose bond with

the cooperative has been destroyed by economic regulations . . . I think that one reason for the supply problems we have lies in the fact that the existing [spirit of] initiative is [fettered], because too much is regulated, prescribed, and planned by people who are not directly connected with the cooperative. One says that the worker decides jointly [with the management], but what influence does he have over the goods he produces?

Hans decried the lack of honest criticism of the system's shortcomings: "If I understand Marx correctly, then criticism and self-criticism are the revolutionary elements in the development of our society. But, for example, when there is a forum—a party meeting, a youth forum, whatever—

the questions that are raised have all been written up four weeks in advance. They are simply sorted and corrected and what is left at the end?" . . .

Inge noted that a number of factories here are simply too big and too poorly organized. One knows nothing about the other people, but a worker simply sees that the others work poorly and thinks, I can work poorly, too. A lot of people no longer have any sense of commitment, no common interest, no responsibility.

Family and Friends Both Hans and Inge openly discussed problems in their personal relationships, difficulties in raising their children, and the attitudes of a new generation of East German youth, prone to question the values, priorities, and attitudes of their parents. Inge talked about the problems of women and the double burden of working and raising a family. Her most traumatic experience, however, concerned her oldest son, who left home at an early age and "no longer lives in the GDR"; while serving with the border guards, he was arrested for carrying a radio while on duty and imprisoned.

An officer always kept an eye on him. They soon realized: he wants out to the West. He talks differently than he really thinks. We visited him once, talked with him, and thought that everything would be all right. Then they suddenly brought us his belongings. For me it was as if he had been killed during the war and they were bringing me his urn. The fact that we can no longer see each other is a wound that will never heal.

Inge reflected on the importance of personal friends and contacts in surmounting the daily pressures of life: "We aren't concerned enough about people's souls. We are concerned about everything, even about our physical condition, but what the pastor used to do is missing today. No one is responsible for the spirit anymore." For Hans, on the other hand, the greatest disappointment was not being able to travel where he wanted. He noted how he once helped a Kenyan woman living in the GDR find a hospital after she became seriously ill. As a sign of gratitude, the woman's father came to the GDR from Kenya to thank him and to give Hans an official invitation to visit Kenya with a promise to take care of the necessary formalities there. According to Hans, "I tried everything possible to obtain permission to travel there but achieved nothing. That is something that can discourage you. You would think that they would realize that with my fifty-nine years and secure situation here that I am not going to think of. . . ."

Hans clearly meant he would not flee to the West. In conclusion, he pointedly asked: "Is the mistrust greater than the trust?"

The article was suggestive of a greater willingness on the part of the authorities to recognize the true sentiments within East German society. It appeared at a time when thousands of East Germans were being allowed to emigrate and it was reported that the issue of *Sinn und Form* carrying the article was quickly sold out.

XV New Patterns of Repression and Resistance

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“Pressure Cells” in Soviet Prisons Julia Wishnevsky

The so-called “pressure cell” (*press-kamera*) or “pressure hut” (*press-khata*) became widely used in Soviet prisons. On the instructions of investigators or supervisors, prisoners would inflict pain or physical mutilation on other prisoners with the aim of forcing them to make a confession or admit guilt, give information concerning others, renounce their beliefs, or otherwise change their behavior.

Thanks to a collection of samizdat documents, Georgia was the first Soviet republic from which reports of “pressure cells” emerged.¹ That collection included a detailed deposition by Iurii Tsirekidze, a criminal also serving as an agent of the KGB and MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), who reported exactly the manner in which he tortured prisoners in Tbilisi’s investigatory prison and on whose instructions;² a statement by one of Tsirekidze’s many victims, Karlo Kallistratovich Tsulaia, formerly chairman of the People’s Control Committee of Georgia’s Tsalendzhikh Raion;³ and a short account of the trial of Iurii Tsirekidze and of another thug, Valiko Usupian.⁴

Tsirekidze and Usupian confessed that while they were in prison they acted as agents. Tsirekidze reported having spent three years between 1970 and 1973 in a cell with prisoners undergoing investigation, where he beat and otherwise tortured them on the orders of the KGB, the MVD, and the Procuracy. By such means he “exposed” over two hundred “crimes,” of which some were political. Tsirekidze wrote that in return he and other agents received narcotics and alcohol, were allowed visits and parcels . . . were promised their freedom. . . .”⁵

Tsulaia had been arrested on March 30, 1973, found guilty of bribe-taking, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. In his samizdat com-

plaint he asserted that he was innocent, but that he had been forced to incriminate himself as a result of torture carried out by Tsirekidze on official instructions:

Tsirekidze began to torture me from the very first day. He beat me so hard that I was unconscious for several hours, and the warders had to run for medical help. Then they prodded me with iron rods, hit me over the head with a chair, stubbed lighted cigarettes out on the skin of my hands, and swore that they'd kill me unless I wrote a deposition confessing my guilt. . . . When I refused, they beat me so hard that I was unconscious for two to three hours. They called the doctors, who brought me round again.⁶

Tsirekidze reported that on a number of occasions he had been ordered to rape his cellmates. His victim, Tsulaia, testified: "The butcher Tsirekidze tortured another prisoner, Michitashvili, in front of my very eyes, and even committed sodomy with him in all kinds of sophisticated ways. In May 1973, he had to be taken to the hospital more dead than alive."⁷

Homosexual rape, or the threat of it, "was almost always mentioned in descriptions of "pressure cells." In Soviet prison camps, a man who had once played the passive role in a homosexual act—even only once and against his will—became an outcast to be humiliated in every way possible.⁸

Following the report about the "pressure cells" in Georgia, their existence was reported in other parts of the Soviet Union, including Talinn (Estonia), Ulan Ude (Buryat ASSR), Andizhan (Uzbekistan), Lipetsk (RSFSR), Irkutsk Oblast (RSFSR), Leningrad, and Moscow.

References to "pressure cells" in samizdat materials of the 1970s and 1980s were far more frequent than reports of physical coercion carried out by the investigators or prison guards themselves. This method of punishment seemed to be favored particularly by middle-ranking Soviet officials, unwilling to take direct responsibility for their actions.

New Soviet Law on Re-sentencing

Julia Wishnevsky

On October 1, 1983, a new law was added to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR that stipulated: Malicious disobedience of lawful demands made by the administration of a corrective labor institution, or any other opposition to the administration in the execution of its functions, committed by a person serving a sentence in a place of deprivation of freedom, if this person has, in the course of the past year, received punishment in the form of confinement in cell-type premises (solitary confinement) or been transferred to a prison, is to be punished with deprivation of freedom for a term of up to three years. The same actions committed by an especially dangerous recidivist or a person convicted of a grave crime are to be punished with deprivation of freedom for a term of one to five years.¹

The law meant that all prisoners in Soviet penal institutions were placed at the mercy of the camp directors, who had the power to extend a prisoner's sentence. A practice from the Stalin era—bringing new charges against a political prisoner or a political exile shortly before he had finished serving his term on his previous sentence—had once more become customary in the Soviet Union.² This practice, which remained relatively rare in the 1960s and 1970s, had since become so widespread that it was unusual for a Soviet political prisoner to be released upon the expiration of his term without having to sign a statement of repentance or a promise to refrain from all further human rights activities.

Before the law on "malicious disobedience" was proclaimed, the legal form in which an additional penalty could be imposed on political prisoners near the end of their terms consisted of either the fabrication of criminal charges employed in the case of political exiles or the pressing of charges of "dissemination of knowingly false fabrications discrediting the Soviet political and social system" among the inmates of a prison camp.³ The latter method required that the fellow inmates of the prospective victim be recruited to act as witnesses at his trial. Even though usually criminal inmates performed this service, on several occasions the lack of cooperation from a witness would halt the proceedings.

It became possible for political prisoners in Soviet camps to be arbitrarily transferred to solitary confinement cells of the prisons for activities that enabled the authorities to add another five years to the terms of those convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

In 1983 an unknown proportion of the Soviet prison population, estimated to number between two and four million,⁴ faced a threat of resentencing as a result of the new article in the RSFSR Criminal Code.

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A Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee

Howard Spier

On April 1, 1983, eight Jews holding various positions in Soviet life appealed through the Soviet press for the creation of an "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public."¹ They were G. L. Bondarevskii, a professor and historian; Colonel General David A. Dragunskii; G. B. Gofman, a writer; Academician M. I. Kabachnik; Iurii A. Kolesnikov, an author of anti-Zionist novels; B. S. Sheinin, a filmmaker; G. O. Zimanas, editor of *Kommunistas* and deputy to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet; and Samuil L. Zivs, a legal scholar.

Most of the signatories had acted before as apologists for the regime's policies on Jews—Dragunskii, Zivs, and Zimanas most frequently so. The eight addressed their appeal to Soviet citizens "of various nationalities" and described the purpose of the proposed organization as the intensification of the struggle against Zionism.

Following an "enthusiastic" public response to the appeal, the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public, or AKSO (its Russian acronym), was founded on April 21, 1983.²

A committee of thirty-seven members and a presidium of thirteen were chosen.³ Dragunskii became chairman, Zivs became first deputy chairman, and three deputy chairmen were chosen: Kolesnikov; Mark Krupkin, deputy director of Novosti publishing house; and Igor Beliaev, a non-Jewish specialist on Middle Eastern affairs who headed the foreign affairs section of *Literaturnaia gazeta*.

Other presidium members included deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet V. V. Pushkarev, a Moscow factory worker and apparently not a Jew, while other committee members included: Matvei Blanter, a composer of popular songs during World War II; Andrei Dementev, editor of the journal *Iunist*; G. P. Golubeva, identified as "a poultry farmer"; Vladimir Kudriavtsev, a political correspondent for *Izvestiia*; and Tsezar Solodar, a veteran anti-Zionist polemicist.

The Soviet authorities apparently intended that the new organization have a composition as representative of Soviet society as possible. The core of the organization, however, was distinctly Jewish.

In an interview in early May with the newspaper *Sovetskaia Litva*,⁴ Dragunskii and Zivs said that branches of the committee were to be set up in each Union republic, with additional branches in Moscow, Leningrad, and Novosibirsk (cities with large Jewish populations), and Birobidzhan, which is symbolically a Jewish city. Links were to be established with "progressive" organizations abroad. Scholarly, artistic, and literary works, films, plays, paintings, and journalistic writing were to be produced for the committee. In addition, it was noted in the article, candidates for state prizes in the field of anti-Zionism were to be proposed and a working group of specialists in Zionism formed.

By the first week of June, the Anti-Zionist Committee had acquired an address—Frunzenskaia naberezhnaia 46—and a booklet with details about the enthusiastic public response to the committee was in preparation.⁵

On June 6—the anniversary of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon—AKSO held a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists. Its three principal topics were ideology and propaganda, emigration, and relations between the USSR and Israel.⁶

As for ideology and propaganda, the committee referred to "the psychological war" being waged by the Reagan administration. "International Zionism"—a term frequently employed in Soviet propaganda to denote bipolar Jewish political power in Israel and the United States—was said to play a highly important role in an alleged global assault on the USSR and the socialist community.

On emigration Zivs said that "the considerable decrease" in the number of people emigrating from the USSR in recent times was the result of the process of family reunification following World War II having now been "basically completed." He claimed that fewer people than before were leaving the Soviet Union under the influence of Zionist propaganda, and he denied that the Soviet authorities were in any way restricting emigration.

Echoing the line adopted by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a press conference in Moscow in April of 1983, Zivs and Beliaev were at pains to emphasize that the USSR recognized Israel's right to exist but condemned its "aggressive and adventurist" policies. The restoration of diplomatic ties, they noted, was not envisaged at the present time.

An unexpected development at the press conference was a sharp difference of opinion between Zivs and Kolesnikov over Soviet propaganda alleging Nazi-Zionist collaboration. Kolesnikov, the author of several novels

on the subject of collaboration,⁷ bitterly castigated the Zionists, claiming that they had not only failed to protect Jews but "on the contrary, had betrayed them by conspiring with the Gestapo and ss leaders." Eichmann, he added, was executed by the Israelis merely to prevent "the sacred secrets" of Nazi-Zionist collaboration from becoming public.

Zivs sought to distance himself from allegations of Nazi-Zionist collaboration published recently by the prolific anti-Semitic writer Lev Korneev. He declared that AKSO would "struggle against improper expositions in the booklets that do appear." Neither Zivs's remark nor Kolesnikov's reference to Eichmann was carried by the Soviet media.

Korneev,⁸ born in 1930, was a journalist who worked on the radio for a number of years, edited the Soviet monthly *Asia and Africa Today*, and became a staff member of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Oriental Institute. In at least three publications that appeared in 1982 he raised a new aspect of alleged Zionist-Nazi collaboration. Writing in the periodical *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (no. 6, 1982), he claimed that "the figure of six million Jews allegedly murdered during World War II could not be considered scientifically based."⁹ The Zionists thus not only assisted the Nazis to implement the Final Solution but also exaggerated the number of victims for their own cynical ends.

In his book, *The Class Essence of Zionism*, Korneev repeated the charge. Quoting the Jewish leader Nahum Goldmann to the effect that the State of Israel would not have been established had it not been for the six million victims of Nazism, Korneev commented that "this figure cannot be considered reliable."¹⁰ He continued that "The Zionists not only keep silent about the many millions of victims from among other people in the struggle against fascism; they have also significantly exaggerated—to six million—the number of Jews who perished in World War II."¹¹ As far as Korneev was concerned, the Zionists should not only be held responsible for the Jewish deaths: "The Nazi genocide of the 'inferior' Slavs, Jews, Gypsies, and other 'races' was insane. But were it not for the Zionist-Nazi alliance, the number of victims, including Jews, in World War II would of course have been smaller."¹²

In a third publication, the forty-five-page booklet *On the Path of Aggression and Racism*, Korneev was even more precise. He contended that the Zionists inflated the figure of Holocaust victims "at least twofold or threefold."¹³ In order to explain the origin of the figure of six million, Korneev quoted from a speech made by the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann in 1937. In the tragic circumstances of the time, Weizmann, concluding that it was impossible to send the six million Jews of Europe to Palestine, suggested that efforts be concentrated on saving two million of

the young people. Taking Weizmann's speech out of its context and ascribing to it a sinister character it did not have—"One may ask: how could the venerable Chaim have known in 1937 that the depths of tragedy would occur?"¹⁴—Korneev argued that the figure of six million European Jews to which Weizmann referred in 1937 "later also became the basis of the legend of 'the total destruction' of the Jews of Europe by the Nazis."¹⁵

The appearance of the Anti-Zionist Committee to the accompaniment of much fanfare in the Soviet media seemed to have formalized the end of the large-scale Jewish emigration of the 1970s. The Jewish movement—indeed, the human rights movement in general—had been crushed. Soviet Jews were in effect being asked to "stand up and be counted."

In the first months of its existence, references to the committee increased rapidly in the Soviet media; the committee was regularly invoked as a yardstick of political and ideological orthodoxy by anti-Israel and anti-Zionist writers and propagandists. A major function of the committee—to act as a kind of Soviet Jewish rubber stamp for the USSR's Middle East policies—became apparent. Thus, the committee issued a number of statements condemning Israeli actions in Lebanon and the occupied territories,¹⁶ and leading members of it published prominently displayed articles condemning Israel and Zionism in the Soviet media.¹⁷ At the end of August and the beginning of September, the committee brought out two attractively packaged brochures—one mainly devoted to the press conference in June¹⁸ and the other a collection of letters illustrating the nationwide support said to have been received for the establishment of the Anti-Zionist Committee.¹⁹

Since then, however, the activities of the committee declined markedly. At the beginning of November, it was reported in the West that local branches of the Anti-Zionist Committee had been set up in the Latvian cities of Riga and Daugavpils, each branch apparently composed principally of Jewish lawyers.²⁰ Another Western report described an attempt by First Deputy Chairman Zivs to set up branches of the Anti-Zionist Committee in Lithuania.²¹ No corroboration of these reports has, however, turned up in the Soviet media.

Two activities of the Anti-Zionist Committee were more or less routinely reported by the Soviet media at the beginning of 1984. The first, on January 19, was a press conference; the second, on February 28, was a meeting of the presidium. The nature of these activities and the somewhat perfunctory way in which they were reported seemed, though, only to emphasize the committee's continuing decline.

The stated purpose of the press conference held in January was to condemn the United States and Israel for "barbarous aggression" in Leba-

non. Yet no indication was given why this particular moment had been chosen to make such a condemnation, and nothing was said about the situation that had not been said on numerous previous occasions by Jews and non-Jews alike. The impression left was that the purpose of the exercise amounted to no more than an effort to show that the Anti-Zionist Committee was still in existence and functioning.²²

The meeting of the presidium in February was given even less coverage. Devoted principally to the preparations in the USSR for the 125th anniversary of the birth of the great Yiddish writer, Sholem Aleichem, the meeting also condemned an alleged Jewish Defense League attack on the Soviet mission to the United Nations.²³ The Soviet coverage of the press conference and the presidium meeting did not mention anything about the Anti-Zionist Committee's organizational plans, which were announced with such fanfare at the time of the committee's formation in the spring of 1983.

The seemingly more restricted role of the Anti-Zionist Committee was underlined in an important ideological article by Vladimir Bolshakov that appeared in *Pravda* in mid-January. In sharp contrast with the Soviet authorities' projection of the Anti-Zionist Committee as an organization for the entire Soviet public, regardless of nationality, Bolshakov almost off-handedly stressed only the Jewish aspect of it.²⁴ Moreover, as far as known, the committee did not add its voice to a single joint statement or declaration with other Soviet "public" organizations, either in relation to the Middle East or any other international issue. At the same time, the Soviet media continued to pay no more than lip service to the existence of the committee.

Toward the end of October 1983, Dragunskii in an interview with Radio Damascus²⁵ stated that the committee was "now preparing an appeal to the Jews of the United States, exposing Israeli genocide actions against the Arabs." There was, however, no indication that this appeal ever materialized. What did materialize was an "Open Letter" on November 10 to Jews in the United States from "Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality."²⁶ The letter was signed by fifty-three Jews from varying walks of life, many of them associated with the Anti-Zionist Committee. No mention was made of the committee itself. Among signatories of the letter were L. B. Shapiro, first secretary of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast of Birobidzhan and a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Aron Vergelis, editor of the Moscow-based Yiddish literary monthly *Sovetish Heymland*. Neither of these relatively prominent Jewish figures had played any role in the committee.

The theme of the "Open Letter" was the overriding need to prevent nuclear war. Its basic message to Jews was that détente and the improve-

ment of U.S.-Soviet relations must be given priority over the question of Soviet Jewry which only exacerbated relations between the superpowers. This line contrasted sharply with the essentially ideological approach of the Anti-Zionist Committee.

A further indication of the possible causes of the eclipse of the Anti-Zionist Committee was an article by Vergelis in the issue of *Sovetish Heymland* for December.²⁷ He condemned the raising of the issue of Soviet Jewry on the international arena, and particularly at the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as part of a policy of obstruction conducted by the Reagan administration. Max Kampelman, the leader of the U.S. delegation at the conference, was trying, according to Vergelis, "to drag Jewish issues into the conflict between the great powers." These and other remarks by Vergelis were suggestive of hardening of his previously moderate line. He had been an advocate of dialogue between Western and Soviet Jewry (especially of a dialogue conducted through himself).

There were two likely reasons for the decline of the Anti-Zionist Committee. First, the badly deteriorating relations between the United States and the USSR may have led to a decision by the Soviet authorities not only to formalize the curtailment of the emigration of Soviet Jews—at which stage the committee emerged—but also to attempt to remove the question of Soviet Jewry from the international agenda entirely. A second possible reason for the apparent downgrading of the committee may have been a perception on the part of the Soviet authorities that, though an instrument of their own creation, it may come to rebound on them. Those Soviet officials with longer memories might have apprehensively recalled that the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, founded by Stalin to gain Western Jewry's support for the war drive, eventually became, to a certain extent, an institutional "address" for Soviet Jews. (Stalin solved the problem after the war in his typical fashion: the Anti-Fascist Committee's leaders were summarily executed.) Thus, at a time when the Soviet authorities preferred to remove the Soviet Jewish issue from the international agenda once and for all, the establishment of the Anti-Zionist Committee—at least in its original form—was possibly a miscalculation.

A Religious Revival

Introduction A religious awakening in Eastern Europe and parts of the Soviet Union, especially the Baltic states, opened up the possibility of renewal in at least a few countries. An increasing number of individuals were turning toward religion, mostly to Catholicism but also to the Protestant churches, seeking guidance that the official ideology failed to provide. Often, probably, they were simply attracted to the atmosphere of togetherness, sincerity, and intimacy of the religious gatherings which allowed them to openly discuss their problems and uncertainties. The solemnity of religious services also provided a spiritual relief in the grayness of daily life under communism.

Since the late 1970s, an upswing in religious activities contrasted with the previous long period of oppression and stagnation, and continued despite fresh attempts to suppress it. Most of the religious activists were young people—students, workers, and intellectuals—willing to admit publicly their Church affiliation, religious orientation, or positive interest in the Christian message, even at clear risk to their personal security. This contrasted with the older generation which tended to avoid open contact with churches for fear of political reprisals, preferring to travel long distances to have their children secretly christened rather than risking the disclosure of their religious devotion in their vicinity. Secretive and conditional practice of religion had often been attributed to the mentality of the whole population; however, the new religious activism contradicted this theory.

It ranged from the small inward-looking “basic communities” in Hungary, through “peace activists” of the nationwide movement in the GDR, to a suddenly rejuvenated Church in Poland. Among the diverse factors that elicited and maintained the broadening interest in religion were the failure of the Marxist-Leninist ideology to provide answers to the problems of modern life and the concomitant dissatisfaction, especially among the young, with the communist value system; involvement in the peace movements; the influence of Western charismatic movements; escapism; attempts to revive national religious traditions; and a Polish Pope.

Many religious activists were connected to dissident movements, giving Church leaders ground for concern about additional complications in their own relations with state authorities. If not a manifestation of something deeper, at least in some cases, active practice of religion became a

substitute for political protest. The communist regimes were perplexed by the sudden resurfacing of religion as a social force, particularly since most of the activists were members of the generation educated under communism. The guardians of the official ideology were unable to respond to the challenge. Repression met with little success in most countries. The Hungarian authorities, more relaxed, envisaged a long era of unavoidable co-existence between religion and atheism, and attempted to cooperate with religious institutions to strengthen public morale and family life. However, elimination of religion from society remained the ultimate goal.

Albania / Louis Zanga

Since November 1944, when the communists assumed total control of Albania, religion had been facing the problem of survival. The antireligious campaign reached a peak in 1967 with the abolition of institutionalized religion. Within a few months, 2,035 churches, including 740 mosques, 608 Orthodox churches and monasteries, and 157 Catholic churches, were closed. Since then, the Albanian leaders claimed that institutionalized religion had been eradicated, and they continued to maintain that simply closing places of worship could eliminate deep-seated religious feelings.

Although Albania's Catholic community had always been relatively small compared with the Moslem and Orthodox ones, Tirana encountered greater active opposition from the Catholic clergy. The Albanian Catholic Church in exile and the Vatican had also been more vocal than the Moslems and Orthodox in reactions against religious oppression in Albania.

Nevertheless, influential Church and rightist circles in Greece expressed alarm about the fate of the Orthodox Church in Albania. The Greek aspect of this issue was made more complex by Greece's former territorial claims to parts of Albania and allegations that the policies against religion in Albania were inspired by an anti-Greek sentiment. However, the position of the Moslem communities abroad to Tirana's official war against religion, waged just as rigorously against the country's large Moslem community as against the others, was seldom expressed and remained ambivalent. Friendly relations developed between Albania, a suppressor of Islam, and Iran, its fanatical supporter. An editorial in the theoretical monthly *Rruga e Partisë*¹ stated: "In practice, the party's demands are sometimes ignored, which leads to an overestimation of progress . . . as if everyone behaved like a fully convinced atheist. This explains why some communists from Kruja, Lezhe, and Shkoder [centers of Catholicism] act as if they did not notice those people who continue holding deep beliefs and [maintaining] religious customs. . . ." Many believers in Albania evidently overcame

the initial shock of the fanatical antireligious campaign of the late 1960s and 1970s.

Unlike Albania, Yugoslavia allowed almost total freedom of religion to its large Albanian minority of 2 million. Thousands of Albanian Moslems from Yugoslavia were able to make annual pilgrimages to Mecca, and the approximately 60,000 Albanian Roman Catholics living in Yugoslavia erected strikingly modernistic churches next to the border with atheist Albania. In Kosovo religion apparently acted as a deterrent to unity among the various national groups rather than as a unifying force. Kosovar officials and the press complained that the Moslem—mainly Albanian in nationality—and Christian—Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic—clergy fomented religious and national hatred. Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church had been accused of inciting anti-Albanian feelings by speaking in the name of the Serbian nation and “Serbian Kosovo,” while the Moslem clergy had been denounced for being anti-Serbian, anti-Turkish, and anti-Montenegrin.

A provincial leader in Kosovo complained that the proportion of the general public attending religious services had decreased, while the number of League of Communists members, intellectuals, and officials attending services was rising.² He blamed this “false solidarity” on “religious-nationalist and antisocialist resistance.” Praising Kosovo’s religious communities for their proper political behavior, he charged “nationalist” clergymen with turning their churches and mosques into “antisocialist” and “anticommunist” centers.

However, the Yugoslav authorities were not inclined to introduce hard-line methods similar to Albanian ones against the churches in Kosovo. In an effort to counter Tirana’s ideological offensive, Pristina officials stressed the “inhuman” nature of the Albanian atheist model: “In Albania, churches and mosques are being destroyed through political measures; priests and the Moslem clergy have been executed or forced to flee the country. Through such methods, however, religious beliefs, coupled with the material and spiritual backwardness inherited from and deepened through inhuman Stalinism, can only be strengthened.”³

Bulgaria / Patrick Moore

Bulgaria had traditionally been almost totally Orthodox, although some Protestant groups had historically played a role out of proportion to their numbers. Both Protestantism and Orthodoxy thus benefited from the new interest in religion stemming from the bankruptcy of official ideology.

In 1976 and 1977 reports reached the West of a heightened interest in

religion, particularly among the youth. A sociological survey in 1962 revealed that 35.1 percent of the population reported ties to religion,¹ and religious devotion had always been strong in the countryside.² According to one source: "From the communist takeover in 1944 until mid-1976 the churches seemed to be stagnating and void of any signs of the revival that was taking place in some other East European countries. Since early 1977 this situation has altered radically. There are constant reports of a revival in all churches, including the Orthodox, where some groups are experiencing charismatic renewal."³

The developments seemed to apply to both the official and unofficial churches. The latter attracted particular interest on the part of the population since the former were regarded as compromised by their apparent passivity before the authorities. The underground groups, like all public groups outside party control, together with active elements of the official churches, attracted the attention of the ideological watchdogs and the security apparatus. The escalation of official pressure provided indirect evidence of a renewed interest in religion. Harassment and arrests were standard, usually through charges of illegal possession of foreign currency or goods. Prominent spiritual figures seemed to be singled out; and in 1979 a wave of house searches and arrests led to the trial and sentencing of five Pentecostals to prison terms of three to six years and stiff fines.⁴ In addition to these measures, the "traditional" forms of administrative obstruction hindered the training of new pastors or the publication and dissemination of religious literature, the ban on religious instruction, and militia-sponsored provocations that provided an excuse for limiting attendance at official churches.

The most likely reason for the revival, particularly among urban youth, was disenchantment with the party ideology. Alienation was also evident in the renewed popular interest in yoga and various forms of occultism.⁵ The Orthodox Church, moreover, might have received unintended benefits from the massive official campaigns (associated with Ludmila Zhivkova), to promote historical awareness and patriotism. In them religious art and the Church's role in preserving Bulgarian culture under the Turks figured prominently. The popularity of underground and charismatic movements suggested, however, the play of forces more religious than cultural or national.

Czechoslovakia / Vladimir V. Kusin

In 1981 Karel Hrůza, the director of the Czechoslovak State Secretariat for Church Affairs, told an American reporter: "In the old days you would only see grandmothers in churches, but now there are young churchgoers

too."¹ Both articles in the official press and unofficial reports subsequently confirmed that religious beliefs were an important component of the younger generation's existential and political attitudes.²

The Numbers Frequently cited official figures admitted that 10 percent of the younger generation were religious.³ While it would probably be wrong to overestimate the surge of religious attitudes among the young, the official figure was almost certainly too low. Regime sources based on opinion surveys in 1980 estimated the overall share of religious believers in Czechoslovakia at 36 percent of the total population aged fifteen and over, including 30 percent in the Czech lands and 51 percent in Slovakia.⁴ Considering that all polls on sensitive topics produce distorted results in a communist country, the reasonable consensus among Western observers placed the figure at a good 50 percent of all the population, with Slovakia leading the Czech lands, possibly by a ratio of 1.5 to 1 or even 2 to 1.

A breakdown of the amorphous concept of "religious belief" into more specific indicators produced the following results:

Specific Value Orientations (Religion) in the 15-19 Age Group
(Czech Lands, 1980)

Attitude	Affirmative (%)
Comprehensive religious outlook	4
Children should receive religious education	4
Religion plays a positive role for man under socialism	13
Respondent said prayers (regularly or infrequently)	10*
Moral education on religious rather than other principles ought to be preferred	19
God exists (or his existence is possible)	27
Respondent believed religion was important for him	38
Marriages should be concluded with the Church's blessing	40
Burials should have the form of a Church rite	60
Religion under socialism should be accepted	78

* Nearly one-fifth of all respondents prayed "occasionally."

Source: Zdenka Podveská, "On Some Aspects of Value Orientations among the Younger Generation," *Ateizmus*, no. 1, 1983, pp. 59-62.

In an opinion poll conducted by young people among their peers fifteen out of sixty-three respondents—whose average age was twenty-one—said they believed in God. A twenty-year-old woman said: "I believe in goodness as God and in God as goodness." A twenty-two-year-old woman

replied to a question about whom she looked up to as an example: "The Christians. But only those who take it seriously."⁵

There were other signs that religion had some significance for many children and young people. In 1981 over 70 percent of the children in Slovakia were baptized;⁶ and despite considerable pressure on parents, legal restrictions, and threat of career blockage, about 15 percent of children were still being sent to religious classes, with the percentage far higher in some rural districts.⁷ In the Bardejov district, for example, 24.2 percent of the children frequented religious classes, while 33 percent attended Mass regularly and 42 percent occasionally in 1981-1982.⁸ Even party members were religious. A party member from the Martin district in Slovakia complained that "some party members travel to attend Mass in remote districts and let their children and grandchildren be baptized with the parish priests' approval in such a way that their names do not appear in the registers of christening."⁹

Manifestations of religious attitudes extended from growing attendance at open religious services and pilgrimages to participation in private prayer, meditation sessions, and philosophical discussion groups. Not all religious life in the country was in the public eye. The regime claimed that a "secret" or "underground" Church existed, with privately ordained priests and even bishops, for the purpose of creating an organizational base for future antistate activities. The counterargument from the Catholics was that the Church was indivisible. They did not deny, however, that some of its functions impeded by the authorities were performed without the government's license. There were about five hundred priests without a state permit, but they were, nevertheless, still priests. Moreover, it was said that the Church had to make provisions for the future in the event that the virulently atheistic state decided to increase religious oppression. The Church believed that it must not submit to extinction without resistance; hence the "secret" clerics, many of whom apparently were young people.¹⁰

By all indications, a great many people, including the young, who did not practice religion themselves felt the utmost tolerance and even sympathy toward their religious fellow citizens. Atheism, especially in its militant and combative forms, remained an artificial creation of the communist regime isolated from the public at large. An official said: "In between the religious believers and the convinced atheists a sizable mass of the population has emerged who do not claim a confession but do not accept atheistic views either. They often consider atheism and religion to be equal forms of a worldview, with each having positive and negative features."¹¹ The Institute for Public Opinion Research suggested that next to religion widespread liberal tendencies, which it described as "abstract humanism, false

democracy, and pacifism,"¹² had a major impact on public attitudes. It is possible for religion to easily coexist with democratic attitudes and the road to a confluence of noncommunist ideas was therefore open.

Existential and Ritual Religion Informed observers, basing their opinions on extensive conversations with and reports from dissident or otherwise unofficial sources, believed that the increase in religious attitudes among Czech and Slovak youth expressed itself in two different, but by no means antagonistic, forms: one traditional, ecclesiastically and liturgically oriented, and the other consisting of a search for a philosophy of life divorced from both Marxist-Leninist dogma and cynical consumerism pervasive in large sections of society. Both organized religion and religion in the form of man's personal relationship to God, either in complement or in opposition to each other, have often marked religious faith. Moreover, Czech Catholicism traditionally had a tendency to reject the identification of religion or God with the state, while Slovak Catholicism tended to generally view religion and politics as naturally complementary. Consequently, there probably was more existential searching in the Czech lands and more conventional ritualism in Slovakia, but one would be ill-advised to counterpose these two manifestations of religion. Communism, the great leveler, was bent on opposing and eradicating both. The true ecumenism of Czechoslovak conditions lay in the awareness of the followers of both religious manifestations that they had much in common with each other, as they resisted a challenge aimed at the ideological fabric that united them.¹³

The Motivations Opinion research makes it possible to identify the spectrum of motivations of young believers. Why did young Slovak Catholics gather signatures to a petition begging Pope John Paul II to visit Czechoslovakia next year,¹⁴ or why did they carry religious literature from Poland into their homeland?¹⁵ Why did a young priest, clandestinely ordained, undertake pastoral work among young Gypsies?¹⁶

A motivational explanation would have to deal with the inadequacy of answers that young people in Czechoslovakia received to their existential questions. A regime writer concurs: "Young people are not being given proper answers to questions of interest to them. No wonder that under the influence of increased religious propaganda interest in religion and a non-critical attitude toward it are being revived among part of the younger generation."¹⁷

Official accusations of foreign religious propaganda usually attempted to lay the blame for youth's disdain of Marxist-Leninist tenets to alien agents. Nevertheless, one need not always dismiss such charges as ludicrous. The fact that there was a Polish Pope and that Poland's striving for freedom was so demonstrably associated with religion could not but have

an influence on the Czechoslovak religious scene and on the regime's suppressive tactics. Some direct contacts between believers and possibly priests in the two countries have been noted.¹⁸ Above all, the stance of the Czech and Slovak Catholic hierarchies became stronger and tougher since John Paul assumed the pontificate.

Another reason for the enhanced interest in religion may perhaps be sought in the younger generation's natural oppositional attitude. They showed their disaffection and even disgust at official practices in many different ways. With the exception of political dissent (Charter 77), all the forms of alienation available to the young were either negative in that they rejected programs but created no new ones, such as "alternative" or "underground" rock music and a general "opting out" of the socialist rat race, or led to socially and individually deviant pursuits, such as vandalism or drug abuse. Along with Charter 77, religion offered a positive way for young people to project their anxieties, concerns, and aspirations. It was supremely moral in an environment that the young considered deeply immoral.

There must also have been an echo of the Western religious scene, including the link between religion and the peace movement. Charter 77 first postulated the tenet of the indivisibility of peace and human rights; František Cardinal Tomášek, in accepting it, endowed it with a Christian dimension. While there was no independent peace movement in Czechoslovakia as such, in spite of individual initiatives for peace and against deployment of Soviet missiles in the country, a distinct symbiosis between peace, human rights, and assertion of religion emerged. This combination must have appeared attractive to a number of young people. Finally, one must not underrate the role of tradition, especially in Slovakia.

The thoughtful and critical samizdat author of the essay on the future of Czech Catholicism cited earlier believed that "young blood" could take the religious upsurge further.¹⁹ The future, according to him, depended on how they would tackle a dilemma: "Shall we tread the path of defense of all those who are subjected to unjust persecution, regardless of their world view, or are we going to repeat our old mistake of fighting 'only for the rights of the Church,' while taking no interest in the rights of those who are 'outside'?"

This question presented an important challenge to religious activists, for the communist environment made religion into a phenomenon of dissent. The Church may not have liked that role, but it could not shed it.

German Democratic Republic / Ronald D. Asmus

In the GDR both Evangelical and Catholic churches began to experience a renaissance.¹ This was particularly so among East German youth, drawn in large numbers to church-sponsored activities. Dating back to the mid-1970s the trend became particularly pronounced in the 1980s as the churches, above all the Evangelical Church, became increasingly involved in an array of social and political issues. Despite a continuing decline in overall church membership, the churches continued to play a visible and significant role in East German society.

Several Unique Factors First, the GDR was the only communist country in which the key religious influence in historical terms had always been overwhelmingly Protestant. In 1950, for example, 80 percent of the East German population was Protestant and only 11 percent Roman Catholic. Although official membership fell considerably under communist rule, the eight regional Evangelical Churches in the GDR continued to have a combined membership of some 47 percent of the total population, whereas the membership of the Roman Catholic Church remained fairly stable at around 8 percent. In the rest of Eastern Europe the Protestant churches represented significantly smaller minorities.

Second, the churches in the GDR were the sole institutions free from direct or indirect communist control. They had resources at their disposal—property, publications, employment possibilities—that gave them a unique position in East German society. Their organization offered a stark contrast to the Leninist principles of democratic centralism that dominated all other social institutions. Despite intense periods of harassment by the regime in the 1950s and 1960s and its attempts to limit their influence and control their activities, the churches managed to retain full autonomy in their internal affairs. With the one obvious exception of the powerful Roman Catholic Church in Poland, the churches in the GDR probably preserved more freedom and autonomy than any other church in the Eastern bloc.

Third, the situation of the churches in the GDR was unique with respect to their historical role. Neither the Catholic nor the Protestant Church in the GDR could aspire to the special status enjoyed by the Catholic Church due to its key role in Polish history as the spiritual and cultural guardian of the Polish national consciousness.

A fourth factor was the East German Evangelical Church's perception of itself as a "Church under socialism." This acceptance of the political status quo had to be understood against the background of the Church-state rapprochement during the 1970s.

A "*Church under Socialism*" Whereas the Catholic Church in the GDR traditionally had not involved itself with the state, largely viewing social and political issues as beyond the realm of the Church's direct responsibility, the Evangelical Church had been more inclined to concern itself with such issues and less hesitant to deal with the state.

In 1981 East German State Secretary for Church Affairs Klaus Gysi termed the attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* between church and state a great "historical experiment." At the same time, he made the SED's political calculations quite clear: "Our real intention is to make the Church feel at home in our republic and gradually to win over its support for the stable development of our republic and for our policy of peace." For the Evangelical Church, on the other hand, the rapprochement was an attempt to avoid a ghetto existence. Bishop Albert Schönherr announced the new approach with the famous statement: "We don't want to be a Church against socialism, nor a Church alongside socialism, but a Church in socialism." While recognizing the existing distribution of power and the dominant role of the party in society, church officials also claimed a right to "critical solidarity," insisting that they would continue to speak out and criticize regime policies when they disagreed with them. The Church also was granted several important concessions on the building of new churches, limited access to the state controlled media, state support in organizing large-scale events, and official recognition of its extensive role in the areas of health care and social welfare. However, the attempt to reach a limited accord between the two institutions did not eliminate any of the major issues of conflict—education, military training in schools, or professional discrimination against Christians. Nevertheless, despite recurring problems, both sides were aware of their progress and insisted that there was no other alternative.²

A More Open Policy The Church-state rapprochement of the 1970s did not inhibit the Church leadership in speaking out on social and political issues; indeed, one might argue that this was one of the factors contributing to the growing openness of the Church and its willingness to get involved in controversial political and social issues. On issues both of domestic and foreign policy, the Church spoke out with increased candidness, at times to the undisguised irritation of the SED. Whether it was foreign policy issues such as Poland, Afghanistan, East-West German relations, and questions of peace and disarmament, or domestic issues such as militarization in schools, alcoholism, crime, and youth problems, the unrestrained voice of the Evangelical Church on these and other issues enhanced its standing in society and led to an increased interest in its pronouncements. In many cases the outspokenness of the Church was encouraged by pres-

sure from "base" communities, in which priests, administrators, and lay organizations would call upon the regional and national leadership for guidance and assistance.

The greater interest in the Church on the part of society was not solely the result of the increased outspokenness of the Church; it could be also attributed to the failure of official policy to satisfy the intellectual, moral, and emotional needs of young East Germans. Consequently, many of them turned to the Church as the only alternative to the highly regimented discipline of official youth organizations. In the Church they discovered a place where otherwise taboo themes and problems, ignored or denied in the official press, could be openly discussed in an atmosphere of tolerance. Due to the lack of alternative institutions that would permit open discussion, the Church was becoming a forum for airing issues that the authorities refused to address.

Limitations and Opportunities The role that the Evangelical Church adopted was not an easy one. On one hand, the Church remained open to all those in need or in conflict with the state. By its involvement in these issues the Church gained a stronger standing among East German youth. The fact that demands for Church involvement often emerged from local communities meant that the Church hierarchy's commitment to its flock could be clearly tested. At the same time, active and open support for those in conflict with the state involved the risk of confrontation with the authorities and the loss of prerogatives and concessions painfully won over the years. Church officials were well aware of the limits of their influence and the risk involved for individuals. Moreover, the Church hierarchy could not neglect the needs and interests of its traditional membership. Officials insisted that the Church was not political opposition and that they would not allow it to be exploited for political purposes or to be a gathering place for the discontented and alienated. The result was an attempt to balance the various views within the Church with both the demands placed upon its hierarchy from below and the prudence dictated by the harsh realities of political life in the GDR.

The Church's attempts to assume the role of a mediator in conflicts can be illustrated by three examples. The first was its handling of the debate on peace and disarmament in the GDR accompanied by the emergence of independent peace groups both within and outside the Church. Their emergence within local Church communities and the subsequent support provided to them by the Church leadership were a clear response to fears and concerns within society.³ The Church's moral support, intervention on behalf of individuals coming into conflict with the state because of their independent peace activism, and ability to break the regime's monopoly of

information by providing independent sources and studies were the key factors in the viability, albeit tentative, of such groups. At the same time, the Church had never questioned the regime's commitment to peace and arms control and continued to call for an open discussion with the regime on those issues.

Another example of the Church's response to the interests and concerns of society was in the area of environmental protection. Although environmental problems in the GDR had long since reached the stage where their existence was a matter of common knowledge, the topic continued to be largely taboo in the official press. In response to the obvious interest of young East Germans to become involved in this area, Church communities organized a variety of small-scale projects and also established research centers for environmental studies.

The third example of the Church's increasing involvement in society was its sponsorship of the 1983 Luther celebrations. A series of seven regional Church congresses attracted more than 200,000 people. Although their focal point was the Luther anniversary, the discussion groups set up during them covered a range of social issues such as the breakdown of family life, generational conflicts, divorce, suicide, alcoholism, crime, juvenile delinquency, homosexuality, pacifism, and the lack of travel opportunities.

The Future In many ways the churches in the GDR continued to present a contradictory picture. On the one hand, it was quite clear that for a number of years interest by society in the Church and its message had been rising, above all among young people. On the other hand, traditional indices of church activity continued to paint a somewhat different picture; although membership in the Catholic Church had remained more or less constant throughout the postwar period, figures for the Evangelical churches continued to decline, with the figures for active membership remaining much lower than those for total membership. The numbers of baptisms and confirmations remained very low and in many cases had been declining for years. A shortage of priests had long been a serious problem; and were it not for the considerable financial help of West German churches, there would also have been serious financial problems. There also were considerable regional differences as well as differences between urban and rural areas. In some areas the Church remained a thriving institution and a center of social activity, while in other communities it played a very marginal role.

These declining figures could be reconciled with other evidence suggesting that the importance of the Church was growing. The Evangelical churches in the GDR could no longer claim the status of a *Volkskirche*. Nevertheless, increased spiritual strength may have compensated for its decline in numbers. The challenge for the Church leadership was the degree

to which it would be able to retain the interest of young people and turn it into a long-term commitment. Many young people who were not regular churchgoers or even Christians had been attracted to the Church while searching for answers to their problems and needs. For some it apparently filled the spiritual vacuum left by a Marxist-Leninist ideology: an article in an official East German journal openly discussed the lack of any spiritual guidance coming from the party.⁴

Other signs of increased interest in the Church included well-attended Church-sponsored youth activities for the first time in years, and a surplus of applicants for the available spaces in the theology departments of both state and church colleges. This trend, if it were to continue, could ease the chronic shortage of priests.⁵ In some parts of the GDR there had been reports of a leveling off in the decline in the number of baptisms; some churches had even reported slight increases. Although it may not be possible to speak of a religious revival in the traditional sense, the churches in the GDR were showing signs of a renaissance.

Hungary / Alfred Reisch

Religious resurgence affecting all segments of the population was recognized by the head of the Hungarian State Office for Church Affairs, State Secretary Imre Miklós, on several occasions in 1982–1983.¹ The failure of atheistic Marxist-Leninist ideology to make decisive inroads into Hungarian society was perhaps the most important reason for this development. Even though many people had stopped actively practicing their religion for years, their faith apparently remained unshaken and possibly was strengthened by trying times. Miklós himself admitted that the communists were to blame for Hungarians' attachment to religion on account of their inability to provide a compelling alternative.

Since the end of the 1970s mounting economic and social problems created a growing social malaise with the potential of leading to general destabilization. With national unity, as perceived by the party, endangered, the authorities had no alternative but to turn to the churches for support.

The churches, for their part, had been successfully pressing for a more active social role and offered their help in solving many of the pressing human problems confronting the country. Fields of common concern to Church and state included the mounting rates of divorce, abortion, suicide, alcoholism, and criminality, coinciding with the decrease of the country's birthrate and the fragmentation of family life.²

As in other periods of history, many believers for a number of reasons had turned away from organized religion to seek deeper, more personal

faith in the so-called basic communities. Thousands of small prayer and meditation groups sprung up since the 1970s, each usually with a small number of members, many of them young people. Some of those groups had doctrinal differences with the Catholic Church hierarchy, prompting the Church to suspend one of their leaders, the Piarist Father György Bulányi. Moreover, some basic community members refused to bear arms as conscientious objectors and thus came into conflict with communist state laws. The state, in turn, asked the Catholic Church to police its own members, including some younger, more vocal priests. The end result was a conflict brewing between the Church and some of the basic communities.

Church-state relations in Hungary had to be viewed in light of the Kádár regime's first priority: maintaining and strengthening "national unity" in very difficult times, even if this meant more concessions to religious sentiments. The Easter Sunday of 1984 provided a vivid illustration of this official attitude: Hungarian media for the first time stressed the religious aspect of a formerly important Christian holiday in Hungary, and praised the present "positive" trend in Church-state relations in the country.³ Even the party daily *Népszabadság* devoted an entire page to the place of Easter in the history of religion.⁴ Of the four major Budapest papers, only the labor union paper *Népszava* did not write about Easter.

Progress in the reintegration of religious institutions into Hungarian life remained to be made in several areas. Religious instruction for children still needed to be freed of some of the restrictions imposed upon it, and some religious orders were still officially forbidden. However, in the wake of the visit to Hungary by the Vatican's special representative, Archbishop Luigi Poggi, it was announced that the government had agreed to the establishment of a women's religious order, a longstanding request on the part of the Catholic Church. In addition, religious classes were permitted to meet in parish halls wherever existing church buildings proved inadequate. Another problem involved the thinning ranks of the clergy, countered by the growing involvement of lay persons.

Church members were offered a new opportunity to fulfill an increasingly important role as social workers. For years, the clergy had been aiding the old, the sick, and the mentally retarded in homes and health care centers, which finally received long-overdue recognition and publicity. The same could be said about Church efforts to combat alcoholism, divorce, abortion, and juvenile delinquency. On a broader plane the churches were expanding their efforts to prevent a further deterioration of traditional family life. Where the communist ideology and education had failed, the churches were given an opportunity to join the rescue operation.

Poland / Ewa Celt

Four decades of communist rule added depth and commitment to popular religious feelings. Despite official attempts to reduce the Church's functions to purely religious ones, its role in society, where it came to be widely perceived as a leading moral and spiritual force, was strengthened as it received added responsibilities. Even party theoreticians admitted the "increased importance of the Catholic Church in the life of Polish society, especially with regard to the molding of social awareness, the propagating of a religious world outlook, and the influencing of popular behavior and attitudes."¹

Popular Interest in Religion Karol Cardinal Wojtyła's ascent to the papacy provided a powerful impulse to the revival of faith. Mass pilgrimages to Rome soon became standard features of Polish religious life, and the first papal homecoming trip in 1979 turned the whole country into one great festival of faith and hope, sparking off a popular movement to be known later as Solidarity. Another mass manifestation of popular attachment to the Church and its leaders was the funeral in May 1981 of Poland's Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, an event that attracted hundreds of thousands of mourners from throughout the country, including high-ranking state officials.

Even though it appears difficult to estimate, some of the aspects of the Polish religious phenomenon were clearly measurable. On the exclusively religious side, there was an increase in the number of priests and seminarians: between 1970 and 1983 the number of parish priests grew from 18,000 to 21,600 and that of seminarians from 4,300 to nearly 7,800. As a result of "overproduction" of priests, the bishops agreed that at least 1 percent were to be "exported" annually to other countries where there was a dearth of priests. Owing to strong popular pressure on the authorities, the number of building permits granted by the government for the construction and renovation of religious buildings showed a similar upward trend. The growing number of people wanting to become priests necessitated an increase in the number of seminaries, and there were plans to add several new ones. All the constructions were financed exclusively from Church funds and private donations; state aid was strictly limited to buildings classified as historic monuments.

Growth in the number of Catholic publications also illustrated both the lively popular interest in religion and the regime's yielding to public pressure. According to statistics published in 1982,² the Catholic Church in Poland had at its disposal more than twenty publishing ventures printing eighty-nine papers and periodicals with an overall circulation of 1,400,000

copies.³ After some initial difficulties, the monthly Polish edition of *L'Osservatore Romano* kept arriving in tens of thousands for distribution by Church offices. Moreover, Sunday Masses had been transmitted by Polish radio from Warsaw and Gdańsk without interruption, despite all the vicissitudes of martial law, since September 1980.

New Fields of Pastoral Work Alongside these advances, the Church assumed a much more widely based and better coordinated social role. Its work reached practically all social groups and ages, and different specialized pastoral services were established under the guidance of bishops.⁴

The Church's special attention was focused on the young generation. The Pastoral Service to Students involved thousands of Catholic youth activists in all academic centers; their work included—besides religious and educational projects—assistance to students expelled from universities for their commitment to Solidarity, as well as help for families of political prisoners. High-school students were organized in the so-called Oases, or "Light-Life Movement,"⁵ a Catholic, semi-institutionalized youth movement started in 1954. Even though officially in disgrace, the movement remained active and claimed a wide cross-section of more than 200,000 young people as members. The students' attachment to religious symbols and to the Church in general was demonstrated during the "war of the crosses."⁶

The youth's growing interest in spiritual matters was officially recognized as a fact of Polish life. Reporting on the findings of a public opinion poll organized between 1977 and 1980 among some 14,000 high school students and graduates, the atheists' weekly journal *Argumenty* disclosed⁷ that the number of those professing a religious rather than a materialistic world outlook had grown during that time from 62.3 percent to 74.8 percent. Moreover, the number of those declaring themselves Catholics had increased by 8.6 percent, and of those regularly practicing by 13.6 percent. In 1977 only 44.8 percent of respondents thought that education should be based on religious principles; that figure had grown to 56 percent three years later. The poll also noted a marked trend toward the mass participation of young people in religious celebrations and festivals. The majority of respondents called for a greater "role and significance" for the Church in social and political life, and were appreciative of the Church's activity aimed at the democratization and "humanization" of the socialist system.

Predominance of Catholicism To reverse this trend, the regime devised a comprehensive plan of action for the post-martial law era that took into account the undeniable facts about the Church's position in Poland: the overwhelming predominance of Catholicism—97 percent of all the believers, while the remaining 3 percent were distributed among thirty-six other denominations and religions; the longstanding Polish tradition of

linking religion with social and political activity; and the general admiration and devotion accorded to the "Polish Pope." Faced with these facts, the regime attempted to counteract them. The official media launched an information campaign in 1983 about other religions and sects, implying that the Catholic Church was not unique among such institutions. To limit Church influence in public life, there were frequent official warnings for the Church to confine itself to purely religious work and abstain from any broader social and political involvement. Critical remarks about the Pope and his activities were extremely rare in the Polish media, but seemed to be surreptitiously encouraged, along with occasional reprints of criticism from other communist countries' newspapers.

Both the late Cardinal Wyszyński and his successor, Józef Cardinal Glemp, repeatedly warned against "triumphalism" in religious feeling, pointing out that in order to be durable the religious revival had to be matched simultaneously by a moral and ethical renewal. With so much enthusiasm on the part of the youth and such widely based support, however, the Church in Poland could look forward with confidence to its approaching second millennium.

Romania / Vladimir Socor

For more than a decade Romania had been experiencing a traumatic economic and moral crisis brought about by the policies of the Ceaușescu regime. Material deprivation, social demoralization, and official corruption reached unprecedented levels. Perhaps nowhere in Eastern Europe did the utopian promise of communism as a substitute for religion prove more unmitigated a failure than in Romania; the situation in Poland provided an obvious analogy in this respect. The stage was thus set for a reassertion of the perennial religious values that the regime's discredited ideology had sought to displace in Romanian society.

Even though historical experience suggests that societies confronted with material or political crises tend to look for spiritual outlets, this process had been slow to develop in Romania. In its incipient stage it was marked by a steadily rising church attendance and growing interest in spiritual matters throughout society, but it lacked a mass nature, articulate expression, and structured form. The reasons for this slow development lay both in the regime's unrelenting restrictions on religious life on the one hand, and, on the other, in the failure of the country's largest religious institution, the Orthodox Church, to assert itself in its relationship with the state.

The Orthodox Church and the State The Orthodox Church, by far

Romania's single largest denomination, claimed about 16 million members or roughly 70 percent of the country's population. Partially purged during the communist takeover and packed with the regime's nominees, the Church hierarchy was quickly induced to conform to the regime's policies, wholly abandoning its historical tradition of upholding fundamental spiritual values in society and its own institutional autonomy within the political system.

The Romanian Church hierarchy's quiescence was diametrically opposite to the stance of the Polish Catholic hierarchy. Even as the latter was vigorously taking up the issue of permits for church-building with the communist authorities, the Orthodox hierarchy in Bucharest remained silent as more church buildings were destroyed. Consistently passive in the face of the regime's attacks on the most basic religious values and rights, the Orthodox hierarchy in Bucharest insisted against all evidence that it was functioning under conditions of religious freedom, repeatedly cooperating with the authorities in silencing those clergymen who took issue with its submissive attitude. The hierarchy also lent a semblance of religious endorsement to the officially atheist state and its policies by participating in the propaganda activities of the Front for Socialist Democracy and Unity.

While the hierarchy had failed completely to provide the leadership that would be required for a reassertion of religious values in Romanian society, there were opposite stirrings among the lower Orthodox clergy. Father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasă, arrested in 1979, was given a ten-year prison term after delivering a series of sermons addressed to Romania's young people urging them to break through the barriers of atheistic indoctrination and turn to the teachings of Christianity for spiritual guidance. The sermons attracted unprecedentedly large audiences in Bucharest, and their texts continued to circulate even after their author had been jailed.¹ The intense response evoked by the sermons illustrated the appeal of Christianity for young Romanians, despite their constant exposure to antireligious propaganda, as well as the authorities' swift reaction in silencing Father Calciu, who in the past had provided spiritual guidance to a group of workers and intellectuals that had attempted to found the "Free Trade Union of Working People in Romania" in 1979.²

Other Churches Romanian Uniates from both Romania and the West published appeals for the reestablishment of the Uniate Church, officially merged with the Orthodox Church in 1948. In 1981 the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid received a letter from the three underground Uniate bishops resident in Romania who, in addition to demanding the reestablishment of their Church, presented a comprehensive critique of restrictions imposed by the

regime on all religious denominations. This tendency to transcend denominational issues and join hands with other churches was demonstrated also by the activist Orthodox clergymen who supported the reestablishment of the Uniate Church. This generous ecumenical stance contrasted with the position of the Orthodox hierarchy, which has publicly denounced in vituperative language the initiatives undertaken on behalf of the Uniate Church.

The Roman Catholic Church in Romania had 1,200,000 members, the great majority of whom were ethnic Hungarians and Germans. Even though the Roman Catholic Church had been deprived of its former legal status and rights, religious observance remained strong among Roman Catholics in Romania, for most of whom religious affiliation was connected to ethnic identity. The Roman Catholic communities' morale received a boost in 1983 when two previously vacant bishops' seats were filled on an interim basis and when for the first time a Roman Catholic from Romania was beatified by the Vatican. The beatification ceremonies provided the occasion for the first pilgrimage by Roman Catholics from Romania to Rome since World War II.

The great majority of the almost one million Protestants in Romania also were either ethnic Hungarians or Germans with cohesive, culturally insulated, and inward-looking communities.

Perhaps the most spectacular development on the Romanian religious scene was the rapid growth of fundamentalist denominations, with a membership larger than in all other East European countries combined, estimated in 1983 to number at least 300,000 members—some 200,000 of whom were Baptist. Most of their adherents had left the Orthodox Church, as observers generally agreed, on account of its incapability to provide religious fulfillment. Their sense of mission and their determination in resisting regime pressures made the Baptists' visibility and impact on the Romanian religious scene far greater than their numbers might suggest. Especially active in proselytizing and disseminating throughout the country Bibles received from abroad, they were also engaged in a constant tug of war with the authorities for permission to acquire or build prayer houses and churches. The Baptists also managed to set up a community-based relief network, which to some extent shielded members faced with the threat of job dismissal.

The authorities, working in some cases through the official Baptist Union, which sought to mediate between the Baptist communities and the state, applied a variety of repressive measures against the Baptists, including evictions from churches and prayer houses, attempts to remove elected community leaders, the imposition of heavy fines on congregations, and the arrest and imprisonment of activists. Some of the most outspoken activists

had been either allowed or forced to emigrate. These tactics failed to intimidate the Baptists but they almost certainly slowed down the growth of their membership. On the other hand, the tactic of allowing the most capable Baptist leaders to emigrate seemed to have backfired, as these leaders had been increasingly effective in the United States in mobilization of religious and political support for their brethren in Romania.

Outlook Religious beliefs and observance clearly were returning to Romanian society, and there was increasing evidence of a growing interest in religious values among broad strata of the population. This development coincided with a new assertiveness in probing the outer limits of the restrictions imposed by the regime on religious life. The regime responded with an intense antireligious campaign in the propaganda media and through the party and communist youth indoctrination apparatus, but there was no indication that this effort was achieving the intended effect. On the contrary, reluctant admissions to the effect that the number of believers and the pull of religious ideas continued to increase had surfaced in the course of this campaign.

The symptoms of a religious revival were more visible among minority denominations, particularly among the Baptists, but discernible among the Orthodox as well. Owing to Romania's denominational structure, any religious revival that did not encompass the Orthodox population was bound to remain marginal. The potential for a religious revival among the Orthodox was hampered by the lack of an effective leadership, and the prospects for such a development depended to a large extent on the abilities and dedication of the lower clergy.

Yugoslavia / Zdenko Antic

A plethora of articles in the official Yugoslav press and a number of public meetings and discussions devoted to religious problems testified to a nationwide religious revival. Estimates of the number of "believers" (not necessarily active Church members) within Yugoslavia's three main religious denominations included about four million Moslems, seven million Roman Catholics, and nine million Serbian Orthodox.¹ Among the factors responsible for the role of churches and religion in Yugoslavia was Yugoslavia's unique position as an East European communist country outside the Soviet bloc, which gave it more elbow room in its domestic affairs, including official tolerance of religion to a degree. A strong connection remained between the Roman Catholic Church and the Slovenes and Croats; between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbs and Macedonians; and between the Moslem faith and the "Moslem nation" in Bosnia. In

each case, attachment to a particular denomination was often inextricably bound to nationalistic feelings.

Each of the twenty-three Catholic dioceses and some larger parishes had their own papers. Altogether, there were 127 religious papers and bulletins published in the Croatian language. The publishing house of the Catholic Theological Association was among the largest of its kind in Europe and published history, art, and social science books in addition to religious literature. There also was intensive reconstruction of new churches; for example, in Croatia alone (where about 60 percent of the country's Catholics live) some 1,250 churches were reconstructed and 273 new ones built during the postwar period, and 89 were still under construction in the 1980s. The Church also was active in organizing kindergartens and social and teaching programs for young people, caring for disabled and old people, raising funds for the unemployed and the poor, and trying to extend its social assistance in those areas where the state was not making any progress. These trends pointed to a renewed interest among Yugoslav Catholics in their religious affiliation.

Although the clergymen of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Moslem community were not as well educated as their Catholic counterparts and did not enjoy the level of international support afforded to the Roman Catholic Church, the adherents of these faith managed to survive the vagaries of a communist state. Both groups had increased the number of schools for the education of priests and published a weekly journal. The Serbian Orthodox *Pravoslavlje* (The Orthodoxy) had a circulation of 50,000 while the Moslem *Preporod* (The Renewal) had 30,000 copies. Perhaps in order to secure their position at home, both groups cultivated contacts among religious communities abroad. The Serbian Orthodox Church maintained close contacts with the East European Orthodox Churches and with the Church of England and other Protestant denominations, while the Yugoslav Moslems were seeking close ties to Cairo, Baghdad, and Mecca (over 1,000 hadjis a year made pilgrimages to Mecca).

The election of a Polish Pope, his spectacular trips to Poland, and his particular interest in Slavs had tremendously encouraged Yugoslavia's Catholic and Orthodox population. The Pope's appeal was so great among Christian believers in Yugoslavia that communist officials feared that Polish events would be repeated in Yugoslavia. At the same time, the renewal of Islamic fundamentalism in the world stimulated religious interest among Yugoslav Moslems, particularly in Bosnia. The Yugoslav communist leaders were afraid of an eventual fundamentalist revival, which would have inevitably added to the nationality conflicts in the areas where Moslems represented a large portion of the population. A trial of thirteen Moslems

in Sarajevo² was the most striking evidence of the state's concern about the possibility of an Islamic resurgence.

The Serbian Orthodox Church's revival exhibited strong nationalistic overtones. Events such as the exodus of the Serbian population from Kosovo, the harassment of Orthodox priests and bishops, and the burning—allegedly by Albanians—of the old seat of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate in Dečani, Kosovo, convinced the Serbs that the state was no longer willing or able to protect their interests and their cultural heritage. In search of support, they gathered, as in the past, around their Church.

The communist regime could not but tolerate this growing interest in religion. Although a religious person in Yugoslavia, as in other communist countries, suffered disadvantages in that he was excluded from all important official positions, the communist leadership had not been able to stem the tide of growing interest in religious groups. There had been attempts to intimidate Church members, press campaigns against individual bishops and priests, and even incidents of persecution of priests and believers. The state had accused all churches of using their religious role as a veil for their nationalistic activism—but therein lay the basis of their popular support. Even though several priests and believers of all denominations had been indicted and sentenced to long prison terms, this failed to reverse the rising trend of religious activism. Even the dismissal of a number of believers from the party or from their jobs did little to discourage religious faith; often it proved counterproductive insofar as it strengthened the faith of both Church officials and believers.

Lithuania / Kestutis K. Girmius

In 1984 Catholics in Lithuania could look back on the previous fifteen years with a considerable degree of pride and satisfaction in their accomplishments. While even at that time the Church's position had remained unenviable, it was better than it had been at the end of the 1960s, when its condition had bordered on the catastrophic: the number of Catholics in the republic had declined precipitously, the one bishop allowed to carry out his duties had been intimidated into submission by the authorities, the number of seminarians had been drastically curtailed, and many of the clergy had been affected by Stalinist terror and the frequent campaigns of atheist indoctrination fostered by zealous local myrmidons. Moreover, the public had tended to disregard the plight of the Church, because many Lithuanians apparently believed that there was a possibility of improvement in the future. During the 1960s there had been relative intellectual freedom, the economy was growing at a steady pace, and measures had

been taken to promote prosperity in the countryside. It had been widely thought that the party's comparatively benign attitude toward further liberalization could be jeopardized by demands for more comprehensive improvement.

Catholic Counteroffensive Faced with such a situation, the more militant Catholic priests became convinced that continued silence in the face of repression would inevitably lead to the emasculation, if not the demise, of Catholicism in Lithuania. They launched a remarkably effective counteroffensive, which began with the submission of mass petitions to various Soviet officials with the request that the widespread violation of religious rights and discrimination against Catholics be redressed. When no positive response was forthcoming, the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania* and other samizdat journals began to be published in order to call attention to the plight of Catholics, and the Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers, founded in 1978, became a public and vocal spokesman. As Catholics became more assertive, their unity and their confidence increased. Almost 5 percent of the total population of the republic signed a petition requesting that an illegally confiscated church in Klaipeda be restored to its religious purpose, and almost three-quarters of the republic's priests signed statements announcing that they would disregard those government regulations contrary to canon law.

The struggle between the Church and the government focused on two main areas: the Church's demand for freedom to regulate its internal affairs, and its desire that it be allowed to carry out its evangelical mission. Catholics had been eminently successful in minimizing the interference of the civil authorities in internal Church matters: they had blocked the appointment of known collaborators or overly pliant individuals as bishops, successfully pressured the regime into substantially increasing the number of seminary admissions, and subverted to some degree the government's attempt to introduce a system of parish committees that would have taken most religious and financial matters out of the hands of priests. Although Catholics had little success in their attempt to allow the Church to carry out its evangelical mission unhindered, they still believed that it was in the midst of a major spiritual renewal. Even the editors of the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania*, whose usually pessimistic statements suggested a siege mentality, noted that the Church had regenerated and improved in its quality. All available data suggested that the earlier decline of religion had ceased and almost half of the population retained enough residual religious faith to believe that marriage or the birth of children should be consecrated by the Church.

Church Strategy The strategy of the Church was straightforward. Fearing the appointment as bishops of servile individuals who might compromise the Church from within, the editors of the *Chronicle* and the more militant priests constantly stressed the importance of insuring the reinstatement of two bishops removed by the Soviets from their duties in 1958 and 1961. However, such a move would have constituted a substantial concession on the Kremlin's part. At other times the *Chronicle* had published unfavorable information about priests considered candidates for promotion as bishops and had even publicly requested the Vatican not to appoint to responsible positions individuals not trusted by the majority of Lithuanian Catholics. In 1984 the situation in regard to the Church hierarchy was the most normal to date under Soviet rule, and due to certain decisions taken by the Vatican, most Lithuanian priests were pleased with their bishops. When government restrictions on the number of entrants to the seminary caused a critical shortage of priests, an underground seminary was founded. Since its establishment, the government had allowed the number of seminarians to increase sharply, probably because it was easier to control registered priests than unregistered ones. The *Chronicle* had lifted the veil of silence that shrouded repression of and discrimination against Catholics sponsored by the government, and the party press occasionally responded with an article denying a particular charge. Without the *Chronicle* there would have been no need for such apologetic articles.

The unknown editors of the *Chronicle*, the founders of the underground seminary, and the members of the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers, not officially sanctioned by the Church, were the major parties responsible for the Catholic renaissance in Lithuania. They, rather than the bishops or other members of the hierarchy, fueled the protest movement. Yet the militants had no schismatic tendencies, being fully aware of the great strength that they drew from the Catholic Church as an institution. Even during the darkest years of Stalinist terror, the Church retained some independence from the dictates of the Kremlin. Although its members were persecuted and its rights were transgressed, the Church functioned uninterruptedly and was never considered illegal. It remained the only important institution in Lithuania not subject to direct party control; it also retained genuine historical traditions and ties to Lithuania's noncommunist past. Although Catholic militants tended at times to be excessively critical of their bishops, they also were aware of the degree of pressure that could be brought to bear upon their superiors. Attempts were made to place intermediaries between the militants and the

authorities. The most important of these were the councils of priests, elected in all six dioceses of Lithuania in 1981, that could assume certain functions as spokesmen for the Catholic Church. The fate of the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers, which seems to have been dispersed in 1983, served as a reminder that the party could easily dispose of even the most respected priests, when they acted in a capacity not covered by the formal organizational structure of the Church.

No Polish Parallels The Church was far better off in 1984 than it had been in 1961. Yet the predilection of Western journalists toward comparing the position of the Church in Lithuania to that in Poland was fundamentally misguided. The invocation of a common past may have conjured visions of a similar present, but in reality the Church in Lithuania had far more in common with its harried counterpart in Czechoslovakia. The regime remained an implacable enemy, begrudging every compromise and determined to prevail. A determined crackdown by the authorities could have paralyzed the activity of the Church. But it was in a better position to withstand such an onslaught because of a relatively novel and rather unexpected development: a reassessment of the Catholic Church. Many Lithuanians, including most dissidents, recognized the Church's exceptional role in preserving the Lithuanian national identity and cultural heritage.

Facile comparisons with the situation in Poland obscured the novelty of this development. The Catholic Church had not always been a unifying factor in Lithuanian life, nor had its role vis-à-vis Lithuanian nationalism been unequivocal. Many priests, in particular the Church hierarchy, were bitterly opposed to the Lithuanian national renaissance of the second half of the nineteenth century, fearing that a separate national identity, based to a large extent upon a conscious opposition to Polish influences, would lead to a weakening of Catholicism. For many of the older and thoroughly Polonized priests, Catholicism and a pro-Polish orientation were virtually the same, and renunciation of Polish influence was tantamount to apostasy. The liberal wing of the national renaissance movement generally espoused a materialistic philosophy, believing that the nation could flourish only after being freed from "religious superstition." During the years of Lithuanian independence (1918-1940), the most bitter political struggles concerned the role of the Church in national life. The suspicions and divisiveness thus generated were so great that even during the Nazi occupation resistance organizations were divided along these ideological lines, while communist agents who had infiltrated the postwar partisan movement tried to weaken it by reviving the old ideological discords.

Guardian of the National Heritage The reasons leading to the re-assessment of the role of Catholicism in Lithuanian life were manifold. Some of them even were the unintended effect of government repression. It was a matter of the utmost importance, however, for the Church and Lithuanian nationalists, whether practicing Catholics or not, to have similar views about the particular aspects of Soviet policy which could be construed as constituting a threat to Lithuanian national and cultural identity and the ways of resisting such policies. Both Catholics and Lithuanian nationalists were united in opposing linguistic russification, the destruction of national and historical consciousness, and the weakening of the biological foundations of the nation, although perhaps for different reasons.

The Church's ability to portray itself as the guardian of the national heritage insured for it the sympathy, if not support, of many nonbelievers, who were convinced that the Church was the primary public institution fostering national aspirations. In a people as devoted to nationalism as Lithuanians, such a perception of the Church guaranteed it a large pool of potential supporters or converts. The fostering of such a perception may be the major achievement of the Catholic dissident movement.

Ukraine / Ivan Hvat

In a letter to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist party, Ukrainian human rights activist Iosyf Terelya announced the formation of an "Action Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church" in the Ukraine.¹ In a second document members of the group proposed to the Ukrainian government the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.² Terelya also wrote the president of the Central Committee of German Catholics, Professor Hans Maier, describing the illegal existence of the Catholic Church in the Ukraine.³

The Action Group was formed at an unidentified location in the Ukraine on September 9, 1982. According to Terelya, it "was a response by Ukrainian Catholics to increasingly repressive measures against our Church. From now on, all information about the Ukrainian Catholic Church will be made available for worldwide public scrutiny. Catholics the world over must know and remember under what conditions we exist. We have a single goal—legalization."

The same desire for legalization was expressed in the appeal by members of the Action Group to the Ukrainian government. The appeal emphasizes that the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church at the Lvov "Synod" in 1946 was an illegal act in which representatives not only

of the Russian Orthodox Church but also of the Soviet authorities were actively involved.⁴ But even after the liquidation, the activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church did not cease but continued underground.

In order to rectify the present situation, the authors of the appeal formulated their proposals under nine points. As a start, free elections were to be held in all the dioceses of the Western Ukraine:

In those dioceses where the majority of the parishioners profess the Greek-Catholic faith, churches, monasteries, and chapels should be transferred to them (Point 1).

Where Catholic parishioners are in a minority compared with other groups of believers, they should be allowed to build prayer houses (Point 2).

The appeal also wished to see Catholic seminaries opened in Lvov and Uzhgorod. The authors of the appeal provided an assurance that, in the event of the Ukrainian Catholic Church being legalized, the Church "pledges to observe all precepts and laws of the state and instruct its parishioners to do likewise" (Point 8), but since the sovereign head of the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church was the Pope, "no subordination to the Soviet authorities is possible." The law on the separation of Church and state should be observed (Point 9).

Both the declaration by the group's leader and the appeal by the whole group aimed at making the authorities aware of their existence and to emphasize the legality and openness of their activities. In December 1980 Reuters reported a statement by Isidor Boretsky, a Ukrainian Catholic bishop in Toronto, claiming that the Soviet Union was indicating that the Ukrainian Catholic Church might be legalized.⁵ Yet the subsequent Soviet policy failed to suggest any real change. There had been instances of the Soviet authorities promising to register Ukrainian Uniate congregations on condition that they renounce the jurisdiction of the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Metropolitan Iosyf Slipyi of Lvov. Such cunning ploys, however, proved unsuccessful.⁶

Terelya, born in 1943, spent eighteen of his forty years in labor camps and psychiatric hospitals.⁷ In the autumn of 1981, he was released after serving a further term of confinement in a psychiatric hospital⁸ but was once again arrested toward the end of 1982.

"Religious Extremists" in the Soviet Union / Oxana Antic

A pamphlet on "The Social and Ideological Nature of Extremism"¹ by Eduard Filimonov, deputy director of the Institute of Scientific Atheism

of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, was directed against all churches, groups, and religious denominations that operated outside the framework of religious legislation and also against active members of the officially recognized churches such as the Orthodox priests Gleb Iakunin and Dmitrii Dudko.

Filimonov's negative portrayals of believers included that of Nikolai Kunitsa, a Pentecostal presbyter and the father of fourteen children who, together with his wife, three daughters, and two fellow believers, spent five years (from June 1978 to April 1983) in the American embassy in Moscow.² The pamphlet named a number of other Pentecostals who "work actively to stir up the desire to emigrate among their fellow believers."

Filimonov wrote in much detail about the unofficial Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, the former secretary of which, Georgii Vins, was allowed to leave the Soviet Union in 1979 with his family. According to Filimonov,

The extremist faction in the Baptist Church that calls itself the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists organizes instruction of minors in various circles and schools, allows adolescents of fourteen to sixteen to be baptized, encourages all kinds of "youth communities," and urges young believers to preach the Gospel "with singing and music" in workers' recreation centers, in trains, and on buses. Children are imbued with the idea that they must suffer for Christ.³

In a critical analysis of Dudko's activities, Filimonov cited one of the most powerful passages from his sermons:

In our time, one can only be an atheist from lack of understanding. . . . An atheist is always lacking either in mind, or in morals, or in will. . . . Atheism is the split atom of evil. There is moral, familial, and social decay. Not only do they not believe in God, they do not believe one another. In undermining belief in God, atheism has undermined the entire foundations of social life. The ruined churches in our land that are world treasures, immorality, the decay of the family, crime and hooliganism: all these are the fruit of atheism.

Soviet newspapers also carried scattered reports of young people, especially young women, carrying crosses, singing religious songs, or playing cassettes of psalms in buses, of believers discussing religious themes with passersby, and of "holy letters" circulating literally all over the Soviet Union. *Izvestiia*, for example, published a letter from an indignant reader complaining about the sale on trains of pictures depicting religious scenes.⁴

Doubtless these phenomena could partially be attributed to a desire to appear fashionable or to an interest in commercial gain, but religious motivation also existed. Some believers strove to disseminate ideas about God in a country where atheism prevailed, and where religious activity was confined within the walls of the church.

Under such conditions amateur missionary activity sometimes took strange forms. Conversations about God were often struck up on park benches: one old man wrote a letter to a journal telling of how a comrade at the old people's home had explained to him that "everything comes from God"; another letter from a reader complained about a little girl of preschool age sitting on a park bench telling her friends about God, heaven, and hell. This little girl was described, as believers' children usually are in the Soviet press, as "so gloomy and somehow dejected" that she caught the attention of the author of the letter even before she began to talk about God. "An unenviable, terrible fate awaits Olenka," the letter concluded.⁵

The author of another letter, from Belgorod Oblast, to the journal *Nauka i religiia*, introduced himself as a "person concerned with atheist propaganda" and described how "three attractive, certainly not old, women" dressed in long, dark-gray garments with black scarves on their heads boarded a suburban train. The author realized that they were going several hundred kilometers on a pilgrimage. On the way they talked to children in the railway carriage about God and began handing out religious leaflets—"holy letters." When the author of the letter tried to intervene, the women allegedly abused him terribly, and a young man who was present asked sarcastically why he was pestering "God's people."⁶

A woman stoker wrote a letter of thanks, saying that the knowledge she had derived from *Nauka i religiia* had helped her to enter into a debate on the shop floor with a young Baptist worker, "who had tried very hard to turn our lads toward the 'path of righteousness.'"⁷

Some young people were selling religious pictures on trains. A reader complaint in *Izvestiia* described how a young man boarded a train and, while pretending to be deaf, distributed "various photographs of very doubtful content and authenticity and horrible in their quality of reproduction." What exactly the photographs depicted the author did not indicate but he does say that he asked the trader what kind of religious festival Candlemas was and where it was celebrated. The *Izvestiia* reader related how the hawker "looked at him maliciously and snatched the holy picture out of his hands."⁸

The publication of readers' letters about hawkers, "cross-bearers," and

the authors of "holy letters" in the newspapers was designed to arouse public indignation. In one letter to *Izvestiia*, the author appealed to train conductors and their bosses to take some kind of action against hawkers. But even after several years of persecution, the cross-bearers were continuing their activities and "holy letters" continued to be disseminated.

Notes

1. Soviet Economic Policy under Andropov

- 1 See, for example, several papers by Abram Bergson, including "Soviet Economic Slowdown," *Problems of Communism*, September–October, 1983; Jan Drewnowski (ed.), *Crisis in the East European Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1982); Philip Hanson, "Economic Constraints on Soviet Policies in the 1980s," *International Affairs*, Winter 1980/81.
- 2 RL 157/83, "Recent Development in Soviet Agriculture: A Statistical Note," 18 April 1983.
- 3 See Michael Ellman, "Did Soviet Economic Growth End in 1978?"; Peter Wiles, "The Worsening of Soviet Economic Performance"; and Alec Nove, "Soviet Economic Performance: A Comment on Wiles and Ellman"; in Drewnowski, *Crisis in the East European Economy*. See also ЕКО, no. 3, 1982; and RL 226/28, "Major Disagreements over Soviet Investment Policy," 3 June 1982.
- 4 CIA, Soviet Gross National Product in Current Prices, 1960–80, Sov 83-10037 (March 1983), p. 6, no. 14: "In this . . . and other CIA studies . . . we accept the official claim that the machinery and equipment component of the official investment data is in constant prices. This use of the official data may understate inflation in investment expenditures." It certainly does; the only question is by how much.
- 5 Quoted by Leonard Silk, "Andropov Faces Difficulties in Attempt to Revive Soviet Economy," *New York Times*, 12 June 1983.
- 6 *Pravda*, 23 November 1982.
- 7 See RL 238/83, "Andropov Putting His Mark on the New Party Program," 16 June 1983.
- 8 In his talk to workers at the Sergo Ordzhonikidze machine-tool works. *Pravda*, 14 March 1983.
- 9 *Pravda*, 23 November 1982.
- 10 Interview with the weekly *Figyelő*, Radio Budapest in English, 6 April 1983.
- 11 *Pravda*, 18 June 1983.
- 12 *Pravda*, 11 March 1983; foreshadowed in Gorbachev's speech of 9 February (*Pravda*, 10 February 1983) and elaborated in his speech on 19 February (*Pravda*, 20 February 1983).
- 13 The number of collective contracts in force apparently rose from 32,000 at the beginning of the year to 60,000 in May. Leonard Silk, "Improving Farm Production Could Be Boost for Andropov," *New York Times*, 31 May 1983. Cf. RL 106/83, "Back to Khozraschet on the Farms," 7 March 1983, and RL 210/83, "Organization of Agricultural Labor under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan," 27 May 1983.
- 14 *Pravda*, 10 February 1983.

- 15 *Pravda*, 10 April 1983 and 26 June 1983.
- 16 *Pravda*, 1 February 1983.
- 17 *Pravda*, 12 April 1983.
- 18 *Pravda*, 19 June 1983.
- 19 RL 160/83, "Draft Law on Workers' Collectives," 17 April 1983.
- 20 *Pravda*, 18 June 1983.
- 21 *Pravda* articles around the time of the publication of the draft law included one that spoke approvingly of an enterprise in Riga where workers had a veto over the appointment of foremen (5 April), and another that referred to workers' "alienation" as a phenomenon still present in Soviet society (20 April).
- 22 Alexander G. Rahr (compiler), *A Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials*, RFE-RL, 1981, p. 43.
- 23 RL 236/83, "Central Committee Plenum: More Influence for the Military-Industrial Sector?" 15 June 1983.
- 24 See his article in *Pravda*, 4 August 1981.
- 25 See RL 237/83, "Is Andropov Consolidating His Position?" 15 June 1983.
- 26 In the early 1970s, there was a retreat from the "guided market" philosophy of that reform. Since the end of 1978, however, Hungarian policy had returned to the original reform ideas, and attempts were being made to push them further.
- 27 Published in *Pravda* on 26 February, 30 March, 10 April, and 7 May, respectively.

2. Experiment in Industrial Management Reform

- 1 *Pravda*, *Izvestiia*, and *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 26 July 1983.
- 2 Over eighty implementing regulations and one amendment followed the decree of July 1979 (Gertrude Schroeder in Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects*, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1983), p. 65.
- 3 *Pravda*, 23 November 1982.
- 4 Insights kindly provided by Thane Gustafson of the Rand Corporation.
- 5 "Safety of Soviet Nuclear Power Plants Again Questioned," RL 277/83, 21 July 1983. See also chapter 53 of this volume.
- 6 Keith Bush, "An Appraisal of the Soviet Economic Reform," in Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-67* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1968), pp. 129-144.
- 7 Philip Hanson, "Success Indicators Revisited: The July 1979 Soviet Decree on Planning and Management," *Soviet Studies*, January 1983, pp. 1-13.

3. The Novosibirsk Paper

- 1 The first report by Doder appeared in the *Washington Post* of 3 August 1983. Further information was provided in a number of Western papers, with extracts being printed in the *New York Times* of 5 August 1983, and in *Die Welt* of 18-20 August 1983.
- 2 Tatiana Zaslavskaiia, *Doklad o neobkhodimosti bolee uglublennogo izucheniia v SSSR sotsialnogo mekhanizma razvitiia ekonomiki*, AS 5042, 33 pp., 26 August 1983. The title page and author's name are missing from the leaked copy; evidence

- for Zaslavskaiia's authorship is given by the editors of the *Arkhib samizdata* version.
- 3 Ibid., p. 4.
 - 4 As, for example, by a foreign trade official in a discussion in *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (EKO), no. 1, 1982, p. 58; by P. G. Bunich in EKO, no. 11, 1982, and *Pravda*, 11 March 1982; and by V. A. Volkonskii in his *Problemy sovershenstvovaniia khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma*, Moscow, 1981. The journal EKO is edited at the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk.
 - 5 See, for example, E. Rudyk, "Antimarksistskie kontseptsii upravleniia sotsialisticheskim khoziaistvom," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, no. 7, 1983, pp. 138-149; S. Starostin and G. Emdin, "Kazhdoi strokoi plana," *Pravda*, 22 July 1983. Rudyk was a member of the Institute of Economics.
 - 6 P. Ignatovskii, *Kommunist*, no. 12, 1983.
 - 7 *Pravda*, 15 June 1983. TsEMI was criticized together with the Institute of Sociological Research. As usual on such occasions, the criticism was so vague that it was impossible to make out exactly where TsEMI had gone astray.
 - 8 *Zaslavskaiia, Doklad*, p. 5.
 - 9 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
 - 10 Ibid., pp. 10-15 and 30.
 - 11 Ibid., p. 29.
 - 12 Aleksandr Zinovev, *Kommunizm kak realnost*, Lausanne, 1981.
 - 13 In a report for the *New York Times* on June 12, Leonard Silk quoted conversations with several Soviet economists and officials in the same vein. They asserted, for example, that "the fundamental thing wrong with this country" is the absence of competition, and suggested that job security would have to be sacrificed to make people work better.
 - 14 *Zaslavskaiia, Doklad*, p. 6.
 - 15 Ibid., p. 7.
 - 16 Ibid., p. 18.
 - 17 Ibid., p. 20.
 - 18 Ibid., p. 19.
 - 19 Ibid.
 - 20 Ibid., p. 5.
 - 21 For additional analysis of the Novosibirsk document, see chapter 5 of this volume.

4. Tightening Work Discipline

- 1 This had always been possible, but a worker could now be punished by being moved to do any work and not, as previously, only to another job suitable for his qualifications.
- 2 It was reported in 1981 that every second person dismissed for breaches of labor discipline at a major engineering plant in Sverdlovsk was being replaced by someone who had been sacked for the same reason from another workplace in the same area (*Pravda*, 6 February 1981).
- 3 *Kommunist*, no. 7, May 1983, pp. 117-118.
- 4 Iurii Andropov in *Kommunist*, no. 3, 1983, pp. 9-23; Konstantin Chernenko, *APN* (in English), 18 May 1983.
- 5 The only right to make wholly independent decisions that the collectives were

granted under the new law was the power to determine certain allocations—in particular, for enterprise housing construction—from the enterprise social and cultural fund.

6 As quoted in *Le Monde*, 13 October 1983.

7 See chapter 3 of this volume.

5. The Problem of Economic Reform

1 *Pravda*, 7 August 1983.

2 *Ibid.*, 19 June 1983.

3 *Ibid.*, 26 July 1983.

4 *Ibid.*, 16 August 1983.

5 *Izvestiia*, 18 August 1983.

6 See chapter 3 of this volume.

7 See, for example, Reuters, 17 August 1983; *The Times*, 25 August 1983; *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 18 August 1983.

8 *The Times*, 25 August 1983.

9 Cf. Brezhnev's speech at the Central Committee plenum of 21 October 1980: "The USSR Council of Ministers is preparing proposals for improving the organizational structure of management. This work must be completed before the congress in order to avoid dragging obsolete structure into the new five-year plan" (*Pravda*, 22 October 1980).

10 *Pravda*, 21 September 1983.

11 *Ibid.*, 23 November 1982.

12 See AS 5042, p. 1, and chapter 48 in this volume.

13 Zaslavskaja did not mention that she herself suggested that economic levers are more suited for managing workers of the first type than the second.

14 It is significant that, although Brezhnev leveled quite harsh accusations at Gosplan (see "Who Is to Blame for Setbacks in Siberia?" RL 139/78, 21 June 1978, and "Brezhnev's Speech at the July Plenum of the Central Committee," RL 157/78, 12 July 1978), he nevertheless did not proceed with its reorganization.

15 "Soviet Economic Failures: Searching Out the Culprits," RL 91/83, 23 February 1983.

16 See the discussion entitled "Nuzhna reshitelnaia perestroika," EKO, no. 8, 1983.

6. The Fate of the Management Experiment

1 *Pravda*, 2 March 1984, p. 2.

2 *Ekonomicheskaja gazeta*, no. 10, 1984, p. 8.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

4 *Ibid.*, no. 13, 1984, p. 6.

5 *Ibid.*, no. 9, 1984, p. 5.

6 *Pravda*, 2 March 1984, p. 1.

7 *Ekonomicheskaja gazeta*, no. 51, 1983, p. 7.

8 *Ibid.*, no. 4, 1984, p. 7.

9 *Ibid.*, no. 10, 1984, p. 8.

10 *Ibid.*, no. 4, 1984, p. 7.

- 11 Ibid., no. 49, 1983, p. 6.
- 12 Ibid., no. 2, 1984, p. 7.
- 13 Ibid., no. 4, 1984, p. 7.
- 14 *Pravda*, 23 November 1983, p. 2.
- 15 *Ekonomicheskaja gazeta*, no. 7, 1984, p. 12.

7. Evolution of the Soviet Response

- 1 *The Times*, 2 September 1983.
- 2 *Washington Post*, 3, 5, and 7 September 1983; *Baltimore Sun*, 11 September 1983; *Christian Science Monitor*, *Aviation Week*, and *Space Technology*, 12 September 1983.
- 3 *Pravda*, 7 September 1983.
- 4 Radio Madrid, 1431 CEST, 8 September 1983.
- 5 Reuters, 9 September 1983.
- 6 *Los Angeles Times*, 18 September 1983; *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 September 1983.
- 7 BBC, 1400 CEST, 18 September 1983.
- 8 UPI, 22 September 1983.
- 9 APN, 21 September 1983.
- 10 *Pravda*, 26 November 1982.

8. What Happened in the Politburo?

- 1 *New York Times*, 15 June 1973.
- 2 Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 24, January–February 1975, p. 29.
- 3 *Pravda*, 24 February 1981.
- 4 Ibid., 5 April 1983.
- 5 Ibid., 11 December 1982.
- 6 *The Times*, 3 September 1983; *New York Times*, 4 September 1983.

9. Soviet Citizens Learn from Western Broadcasts

- 1 See RL 371/83, *The KAL Incident: Analysis of a Soviet Propaganda Campaign*, for a detailed reconstruction of the Soviet media presentation of the airline tragedy.
- 2 See AR 3–84, *Trend Report: Radio Liberty's Audience in the USSR, January–December 1983*.
- 3 See AR 5–81, *Information Sources and the Soviet Citizen*, p. 19.
- 4 Neither the Central Asian SSRs nor Moldavia were included in table 6: Moldavia because of an extremely small sample size, Central Asia because of the presence in the regional sample of a disproportionately large number of CP members, whose uniformly pro-government views gave a decided bias to the Central Asian sample.
- 5 Responses to this part of the question were provided by 78 of the 83 respondents in the survey group.

10. Soviet Exploitation of Western Protests

- 1 The proportion of those opposing the deployment of the new cruise and Pershing II missiles ranged from 50 percent in Britain to almost 80 percent in Belgium.
- 2 *Sunday Telegraph*, 23 October 1983.
- 3 Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (eds.), *The Public and Atlantic Defense* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenheld, 1984); Richard C. Eichenberg, "The Myth of Hollanditis," *International Security*, no. 2, 1983, pp. 143-159; Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, no. 2, 1983, pp. 179-196; and "Defense and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security," *Adelphi Papers* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), Parts I, II, and III, nos. 182, 183, and 184.
- 4 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 17 August 1983, p. 10.
- 5 "An Interview with Sergei Batovnin, RL 312/83, 18 August 1983.

11. World Peace Assembly in Prague Backfires

- 1 Chief organizer Tomáš Trávníček at the final session, as reported by Radio Hvězda, 26 June 1983, 4:00 P.M. Fewer than 20 percent of the participants were from the socialist countries and 40 percent each were from Third World and Western countries.
- 2 *Ibid.*
- 3 25 June 1983, p. 1.
- 4 The quotation from John XXIII was pertinent and obviously deliberate: The Prague regime was fond of invoking the late Pope John XXIII as the alleged spiritual father of *Pacem in Terris* (which assumed its name from the Pope's encyclical) and for them a far more acceptable Pope than the Polish-born John Paul II.
- 5 On the Charter 77 approach to the World Peace Assembly, see Czechoslovak Situation Report/11, Radio Free Europe Research, 24 June 1983, item 2. Two further messages addressed to the assembly's delegates have now been made available from dissident circles: Mrs. Anna Šabatová and Mrs. Alena Lisová asked the peacemakers to intercede on behalf of their husbands held in prison for professing unconventional political views.
- 6 Virtually all the news agencies and many Western papers reported the incident on and after 23 June 1983.
- 7 See, for example, Radio Hvězda, 26 June 1983, 3:30 P.M.

12. The Peace Movement in Eastern Europe

- 1 For further details see Ronald D. Asmus, "Is There a 'Peace Movement' in the GDR?" *Orbis*, Summer 1983.
- 2 For a survey of Charter 77's views on these issues see Vilém Prečan, "Charter 77 Documents in the First Six Months of 1982," RAD Background Report/185 (Czechoslovakia), Radio Free Europe Research, 17 September 1982; and Czechoslovak Situation Report/18, RFER, 29 September 1982.
- 3 For further details on the World Assembly for Peace and Life and against Nuclear

War in Prague, along with the statements by Charter 77 and Cardinal Tomášek see chapter 11 in this volume or Czechoslovak SRS/11, 12, and 13, RFER, 24 June and 12 and 26 July 1983, items 2 in each case.

- 4 See Hungarian SR/5, RFER, 22 March 1983, item 1. For another good survey of independent peace groups in Hungary see Klaus Ehring, "Wie Schafe unter Wölfen," *Osteuropa*, no. 8, 1983, pp. 597-612.
- 5 The Hungarian Peace Group for Dialogue announced in the summer of 1983 that it was dissolving itself as a result of continuous harassment and interference by the authorities, although individual members still planned to remain active. The move reflected the harsher official line toward the activities of unofficial peace groups. See Hungarian SR/12, RFER, 20 August 1983, item 1.
- 6 See Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980-82* (London: Cape, 1983), pp. 333-337.
- 7 The two KOS statements of May 9 and 20 were addressed to CODENE (European Nuclear Disarmament Committee) in Paris.
- 8 See the interview with Gerhard Lindner, vice president of the World Peace Council and deputy chairman of the GDR's Liberal Democratic party, in *l'Unità*, 13 April 1983.

14. War Scare in the USSR

- 1 Radio Moscow, 27 January 1984.
- 2 *Ogonek*, nos. 4-8 (January-February), 1984.
- 3 *Pravda*, 27 March 1983.
- 4 Reuters, 1 October 1983; *Washington Post*, 2 October 1983.
- 5 TASS, 1 September 1983.
- 6 *Washington Post*, 31 October 1983.
- 7 *Kommunist*, no. 17, 1983, pp. 3-19.
- 8 Russian-language version in *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, no. 12, 1983, pp. 3-9.
- 9 *Washington Post*, 30 October 1983.
- 10 Radio Moscow, 22 November 1983.
- 11 *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 6-9 December 1983.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 27 December 1983.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 11 December 1981.
- 14 Moscow Television, 22 May 1982.
- 15 *Sovetskii Patriot*, 11 January 1984.
- 16 *Mainichi Shimbun*, 30 December 1983.
- 17 A full account of this survey has been published by *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research*.
- 18 Radio Moscow, 14 December 1983.
- 19 TASS, 3 February 1984.

16. Romanian Call for a Nuclear Freeze

- 1 Radio Bucharest and Agerpres, 22 August 1983; and *Scinteia*, 23 August 1983. See also chapter 19 in this volume.

- 2 AFP (Bucharest), 21 April 1983; *Le Monde*, 23 April 1983; UPI (Belgrade), 4 August 1983.
- 3 *Scinteia*, 9 September 1983.
- 4 Most recently in the communiqué of the Prague meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states, TASS (Prague), 7 April 1983; the statement of the Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact states' leaders, AP and UPI (Moscow), 28 June 1983; and the appeal by the World Peace Council-sponsored World Assembly for Peace and the Preservation of Life in Prague, Agerpres (Prague), 28 June 1983.
- 5 Reuters and AP (East Berlin), 24 August 1983.
- 6 See Romanian SRs/13 and 14, RFER, 28 July and 6 August 1983, item 2 in both cases.

17. Romanian Proposal for Balkan Denuclearization

- 1 Nicolae Ecobescu and Ion Pascu, "The Denuclearization of the Balkans—A Major Initiative of Romania," *Lumea*, nos. 12–24, 17 March to 9 June 1983. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations hereafter refer to the installments of the text published in *Lumea*. Ecobescu was a senior Foreign Ministry official specializing in European security affairs. He represented Romania at the CSCE during its preliminary stages. Immediately upon the publication of his article in *Lumea*, Ecobescu was appointed Ambassador to Greece—a timing which suggested the likely focus of his mission. Pascu was an official of Romania's National Committee for the Defense of Peace, the Romanian affiliate of the Soviet-sponsored World Peace Council. See also chapters 19 and 45 in this volume.
- 2 *Ibid.*, part I (no. 12, 17 March 1983), p. 2, and part XIII (no. 24, 8 June 1983), p. 19.
- 3 *Ibid.*, part IV (no. 15, 7 April 1983), pp. 5–6.
- 4 Randy J. Rydell and Athanassios Platias, "The Balkans: A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, no. 5, May 1982, pp. 57–59.
- 5 *Lumea*, part III (no. 14, 31 March 1983), p. 27, and part IV (no. 21, 9 May 1983), p. 21.
- 6 *Ibid.*, part VIII (no. 19, 5 May 1983), p. 14.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15; part IX (no. 20, 12 May 1983), p. 6; part X (no. 2, 19 May 1983), p. 20; part XII (no. 23, 2 June 1983), p. 23.
- 8 *Ibid.*, part IX (no. 20, 12 May 1983), p. 6.
- 9 *Ibid.*, and part VIII (no. 23, 2 June 1983), p. 23.
- 10 *Ibid.*, part IX (no. 20, 12 May 1983), p. 7.
- 11 *Ibid.*, part III (no. 14, 31 March 1983), p. 27.
- 12 *Ibid.*, part VIII (no. 19, 5 May 1983), p. 14.
- 13 *Ibid.*, part X (no. 21, 19 May 1983), p. 20.
- 14 *Ibid.*, part IX (no. 20, 12 May 1983), p. 7, and part X (no. 21, 19 May 1983), p. 20.
- 15 *Ibid.*, part X (no. 21, 19 May 1983), p. 20.
- 16 *Ibid.*, part VIII (no. 19, 5 May 1983), p. 14.
- 17 *Ibid.*, part IX (no. 20, 12 May 1983), p. 6.
- 18 *Ibid.*, part VIII (no. 19, 5 May 1983), p. 15.
- 19 *Ibid.*, part XIII (no. 24, 9 June 1983), pp. 18–19.
- 20 *Ibid.*, part XII (no. 23, 2 June 1983), p. 23.

- 21 Ibid., part III (no. 14, 31 March 1983), p. 27.
- 22 Ibid., part IV (no. 15, 7 April 1983), p. 5.
- 23 Ibid., part III (no. 14, 31 March 1983), p. 28, and part IV (no. 15, 7 April 1983), p. 5.
- 24 For a review of the Balkan states' attitudes toward denuclearization of the region and their reactions to recent Bulgarian and Romanian calls for denuclearization, see Radio Free Europe Research, Bulgarian Situation Report/4, item 3, 25 March 1983, and SR/7, item 1, 7 July 1983.
- 25 *Lumea*, part VIII (no. 19, 5 May 1983), pp. 14-15.
- 26 *Lumea*, part X (no. 21, 19 May 1983), p. 21.
- 27 *Pravda*, 31 March 1983; and Radio Moscow, 21 June 1983. See also Bulgarian SRS/4 and 7, RFER, 25 March and 7 July 1983, items 3 and 7 respectively.

18. New Soviet Missiles for Eastern Europe

- 1 The weapons characteristics and deployment dates are derived from *The Military Balance 1984-1985* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), pp. 119ff.
- 2 For reprints of the article published in *Krasnaia zvezda* on 18 and 19 January 1984, see *Neues Deutschland*, 19 and 20 January 1984.
- 3 See, for example, Czechoslovak Premier Lubomír Štrougal's comments as reported by Radio Prague, 21 February 1984.
- 4 See, for example, Honecker's comments in his interview with the French communist weekly *Révolution*, 6 January 1984. The SS-22 was a modernized and more powerful version of the SS-12 or Scaleboard missile with an estimated range of 900-1,000 kilometers. Development was reported to have been begun approximately in 1973, and it entered service in the Soviet Union approximately in 1979 or 1980. See Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces: Capabilities and Implications," *Adelphi Paper* no. 168 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983). See also RL/32/84, "The Counterdeployments in Eastern Europe, Military and Political Implications," Radio Liberty Research, 18 January 1984; and RL 37/84, "Soviet Press Hints that SS-22 Missiles Have Been Deployed in Eastern Europe," Radio Liberty Research, 20 January 1984.
- 5 AFP and AP, 25 January 1984, and UPI and Reuters, 26 January 1984. In late March U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt confirmed that the Soviet Union had begun "forward deployment" of the SS-22 in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, UPI, 27 March 1984.
- 6 TASS (in English), 14 May 1984, and ADN (in German), 14 May 1984.
- 7 See chapter 13 in this volume.
- 8 The text of the missile agreement between the Soviet and Czechoslovak governments was published in *Rudé právo*, 25 October 1983, p. 1. Radio commentator Bohumil Horák mentioned the debates without elaboration on Radio Prague, 30 October 1983, 9:30 A.M.

19. The Stockholm Conference

- 1 See Charles Andras, "Towards a New Helsinki in the Military Field?" RAD Background Report/209 (East-West), Radio Free Europe Research, 18 August 1980, pp. 3-5.

- 2 Only a few days after the Bundestag debate on the start of deployment the West German government published an article by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher under the title "Wie geht es nach der Nachrüstung weiter?" Republished in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 24, 1983, pp. D689-D694.
- 3 TASS, in English, datelined Stockholm and filed at 5 P.M. CET.
- 4 As reported in "Wenn hohe Beamte in Stockholm vielsagend nichts sagen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 January 1984.
- 5 See chapters 16 and 17 in this volume.
- 6 RFE Correspondent (Stockholm), 27 January 1984.
- 7 RFE Correspondent (Stockholm), 20 January 1984.
- 8 RFE Correspondent (Bonn), 5 August 1983.
- 9 *Era Socialista*, 10 January 1984.

20. A New Man in Power

- 1 *Pravda*, 14 February 1984.
- 2 See the interview with Wolfgang Leonhard in *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 12 February 1984.
- 3 See "Das Ende des 'Clans von Dnepropetrowsk,'" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 July 1982.
- 4 *New York Times*, 12 February 1984, and *Time*, 27 February 1984.
- 5 See "Personnel Changes at the Oblast Level," RL 478/83, 21 December 1983; "New Year Brings More Changes in the Kremlin," RL 64/84, 10 February 1984.
- 6 A. Avtorkhanov, *Sila i bessilie Brezhneva* (Frankfurt, 1979).
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 The most detailed biography of Chernenko can be found in *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia*, vol. 8.
- 9 See M. Morozov, *Leonid Brezhnev* (Stuttgart, 1973).
- 10 *Pravda*, 11 November 1982. Emphasis added.
- 11 *Pravda*, 26 November 1982.
- 12 AFP, 3 May 1983.
- 13 *Pravda*, 11 April 1983.
- 14 Ibid., 23 April and 2 May 1983.
- 15 Ibid., 15 June 1983.
- 16 *Moskovskaia Pravda*, 23 November 1983.
- 17 *Pravda*, 19 November 1983.
- 18 Ibid., 28 January 1984.
- 19 Ibid., 15 December 1983.
- 20 *Die Welt*, 2 February 1984.
- 21 *Pravda*, 14 February 1984. Emphasis added. (Brezhnev's name was hardly mentioned while Andropov was in power. The last time was on the anniversary of his death.)
- 22 Ibid.

21. The Nature of the Chernenko Leadership

- 1 In the spring of 1984, when two top-level Soviet leaders made official visits to India and Syria, they announced—in a departure from protocol—that they brought

- greetings in the name of the Soviet leadership: General Secretary Chernenko, Premier Tikhonov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko (*Pravda*, 6 and 12 March 1984).
- 2 Interview with Academician Oleg Bogomolov (*Borba*, 26 July 1984).
 - 3 *The Economist*, 19 May 1984.
 - 4 *Pravda*, 29 September 1983.
 - 5 Reuters, 10 May 1984.
 - 6 *Los Angeles Times*, 10 May 1984.
 - 7 Reuters, 10 May 1984.
 - 8 At the time the initiative was launched, Foreign Minister Gromyko signaled his lack of enthusiasm for Sino-Soviet rapprochement. An unsigned editorial in the party journal *Kommunist* (no. 18, 1982, p. 15) spoke warmly of the need for improved relations "with our great neighbor, the Chinese People's Republic"; a few pages further (p. 25), Gromyko's discussion dealing with improvement of relations with the PRC was marked by a pointed absence of friendly epithets.
 - 9 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 8 May 1984.
 - 10 Ellen Jones, "Committee Decision Making in the Soviet Union," *World Politics*, January 1984, pp. 165-188.

22. Gorbachev as the Heir Apparent

- 1 *Dagens Nyheter*, 15 March 1984.
- 2 *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 19 November 1982.
- 3 Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura* (Munich, 1980), p. 387.
- 4 See *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 17 February 1984, and article by Jerry Hough in *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1982, pp. 28-39.
- 5 For a detailed analysis of Suslov's role, see A. Avtorkhanov, *Sila i bessilie Brezhneva* (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 74-96.
- 6 See article by Hough in *Problems of Communism*.
- 7 See Jonathan Steele and Eric Abraham, *Andropov in Power* (Oxford, 1983), p. 143.
- 8 *New York Times*, 21 February 1984.
- 9 For details of Gorbachev's biography, see *A Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials*, supplement to the *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich, 1981), pp. 62-63.
- 10 See Avtorkhanov, *Sila i bessilie Brezhneva*, p. 25.
- 11 *Pravda*, 20 July 1978.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 18 July 1978.
- 13 See "Brezhnev Group Strengthened in Kremlin Leadership Shifts," *RL* 266/78, 18 November 1978.
- 14 *Stenograficheskii otchet XXVI sezda KPSS*.
- 15 Zhores Medvedev, *Andropov* (Worcester, Mass., 1983).
- 16 *Pravda*, 18 May 1983.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 25 June 1983.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 22 June 1983.
- 19 See "Supreme Soviet Nominations Indicate Kremlin Pecking Order," *RL* 72/84, 8 February 1984.
- 20 *Pravda*, 1 March 1984.

- 21 Ibid., 14 February 1984.
- 22 Ibid., 15 February 1984.
- 23 *Partiinaiia zhizn*, no. 5, 1984. The report on the plenum published in the central newspapers did not mention Gorbachev's speech.
- 24 *Pravda*, 13 November 1982 and 14 February 1984.
- 25 Radio Moscow, 11 April 1984.
- 26 *Izvestiia*, 17 June 1983.
- 27 Radio Moscow, 11 April 1984.

23. Andropov's Holding Action

- 1 *Newsweek*, 1 August 1983.
- 2 *Chicago Tribune*, 8 September 1981.
- 3 TASS, 18 March 1983.

25. Stalemate Bequeathed to Chernenko

- 1 *Pravda*, 25 January 1984.
- 2 See, for example, TASS (in English), 20 and 21 February 1984.
- 3 The three obstacles were the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet aid to Vietnam and its occupation troops in Cambodia, and Soviet troop strength on the Sino-Soviet frontier.
- 4 *Pravda*, 14 February 1984.

26. Chernenko's First Hundred Days

- 1 For an overview of the Soviet foreign policy scene at the time Chernenko took office, see chapters 24 and 25 above.
- 2 On this point, see chapter 21 above.
- 3 *Pravda*, 9 April 1984.
- 4 *New York Times*, 11 May 1984.
- 5 *Pravda*, 9 April 1984.
- 6 Ibid., 15 May 1984.
- 7 Ibid., 3 May 1984.
- 8 TASS, 23 April 1984.
- 9 Radio Moscow-2, 24 April 1984, 2:30 P.M.
- 10 *Financial Times*, 19 December 1983.
- 11 *Journal of Commerce*, 22 December 1983.
- 12 TASS, 23 April 1984.
- 13 Radio Moscow-2, 22 May 1984, 2:30 P.M.
- 14 TASS, 21 May 1984.
- 15 See the remarks by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt, UPI, 27 March 1984.
- 16 *New York Times*, 10 May 1984.

28. Who Is in Command?

- 1 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 30 November 1981; 12 December 1981; *Leningradskaia Pravda*, 8 November 1981.
- 2 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 23 January 1982; 29 March 1982; and 1 June 1982.
- 3 *Voennii entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik*, Moscow, 1983, p. 691.
- 4 *Ibid.*

29. Soviet Propaganda Campaign

- 1 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 27 December 1983.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 17 December 1983.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 1 January 1984.
- 4 *Izvestiia*, 23 December 1983.
- 5 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 31 December 1983; *Pravda Vostoka*, 11 March 1984.
- 6 *Pravda*, 1 January 1984; *Krasnaia zvezda*, 17 January 1984.
- 7 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 17 December 1983.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 28 January 1984; 2 February 1984.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 14 January 1984.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 *Ibid.*, 25 December 1983.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 8 January 1984.
- 13 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 22 February 1984.
- 14 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 17 January 1984.
- 15 *Izvestiia*, 20 December 1984; *Pravda Vostoka*, 11 March 1984.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 20 December 1983.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 18 March 1984.
- 18 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 27 December 1983.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 20 December 1983; 21 December 1983; 7 January 1984; 8 January 1983; 31 January 1984; 22 February 1984; 3 March 1984; 5 March 1984; 8 March 1984; 10 March 1984; 15 March 1984; *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 22 February 1984; *Sovetskii voïn*, no. 4, 1984, pp. 12-13.
- 20 *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, 5 February 1984.
- 21 *Krasnaia zvezda*, 17 December 1983.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 *Ibid.*, 17 January 1984.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 14 January 1984.

30. Afghanistan and Soviet Dissidents

- 1 UPI, 28 March 1984.
- 2 *Vesti iz SSSR/USSR News Brief*, no. 5-6, 1984.
- 3 RFE/RL, Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research, Research Memorandum, RM 10-83, "Comments from Soviet Citizens and Emigrants on Radio Coverage of Afghanistan, 1983."
- 4 *Arkhiv samizdata* 4756, p. 2.

- 5 Ibid., 3858.
- 6 *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*, no. 56, pp. 5-22.
- 7 *Arkhiv samizdata* 3963, 3965, 4034, 4721, 4972, 4976.
- 8 Ibid., 4976, p. 16.
- 9 Ibid., 4034, p. 2.
- 10 Ibid., 4976, p. 16.
- 11 Ibid., 3897, 4056.
- 12 Ibid., 4702.
- 13 Ibid., 4293; 4622, p. 33; 4711, p. 12; 4806, pp. 3-4, 10, and 31; 5128, p. 5; 4905, p. 41; 4973, p. 12; 4983, p. 4; 5072, p. 9; 4280, p. 4; 4769, p. 25.
- 14 See *ibid.*, 4646, p. 1; 4910, pp. 5, 15-16, and 19; 4989, p. 9; 5013, pp. 1 and 10-11; and 4872, p. 16, respectively.
- 15 Ibid., 4989, pp. 12-13.
- 16 Ibid., 4759, p. 4.
- 17 See, for example, *ibid.*, 4711, p. 12.
- 18 Ibid., 4464, p. 7.
- 19 Ibid., 4503.
- 20 Ibid., 3857.
- 21 "Lithuanian Samizdat on Soviet Casualties in Afghanistan," *RL* 299/82, 26 July 1982.

31. Eyewitness Report by a Soviet Deserter

- 1 The Persian word for enemy, used in the Soviet press to refer to Afghan freedom fighters.
- 2 A dried mushroom reputed to be a remedy for a number of illnesses.

32. Soviet Dissidents on the Lessons of Poland

- 1 *Arkhiv samizdata* 4619, 4653, 4859.
- 2 See, for example, *ibid.*, 4760, pp. 3-7; 4622, p. 2; 4718, pp. 2-6; 4728-4729; 4752, pp. 5-8; and 4806, pp. 8-16.
- 3 Ibid., 4985.
- 4 David Satter, *Financial Times*, 9 January 1981.
- 5 Before the appearance of this work, the editors of the journal *Varianty* also referred to events in Poland as "The Polish Revolution" (*ibid.*, p. 21).
- 6 For a Russian translation of the document, see *Arkhiv samizdata* 5062.
- 7 Vladimir Khlebanov, a coal-mining engineer from the Ukraine, founded the Free Trade Union of Workers in the USSR in 1977-1978. He was arrested and confined in a psychiatric hospital in February 1978.
- 8 The appeal is contained in the booklet *Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement* 1980, published as a supplement to *The Herald of Repression in the Ukraine* (New York: External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1980), p. 18.
- 9 See Nadia Svitlychna, *Iurii Lytyyn (Portrety suchasnykh)* (New York: The External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, 1980).
- 10 *Arkhiv Samizdata* 4321, p. 4.

- 11 See, for example, "Samizdat Report on Strikes in Kiev," RL 267/81, 6 July 1981.
- 12 See, for example, "Ukrainian Party Journal Raises the Specter of Poland," RL 70/81, 17 February 1983; see also "Ukrainian KGB Chief Warns of Ideological Sabotage," RL 422/81, 22 October 1981.
- 13 *Vesti iz SSSR/USSR News Brief*, no. 7, 15 April 1983, pp. 7-49.
- 14 See, for example, the statements issued by the "Democratic National Front of the Soviet Union," *Arkhiv samizdata* 4503; and the "Initiative Group for a People's Democracy," *ibid.*, 4464; also the call for an illegal organization to work among the masses, 4547; and the samizdat work "The Polish Revolution," 4904.

33. Poland's Underground Press

- 1 "Resolution on the Defense of the Labor and Independent Press and Publications against Repression," voted by the First National Congress of Solidarity Delegates; *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 23 October 1981.
- 2 Charges against Marian Zembrzusi, an employee of the Częstochowa regional Solidarity branch printing department, and Kornel Morawiecki of the Wrocław *Biuletyn Dolnośląski*, respectively.
- 3 *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 9, 6 April 1982.
- 4 *Ibid.*, no. 44, 10 March 1983; and *Kultura* (Paris), June and December 1982, and May 1983.
- 5 *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 17, 9 June 1982.
- 6 *Serwis Informacyjny RKW Małopolska*, no. 23.
- 7 "Letter from a Copier [Of Independent Literature]," *Opornik*, no. 19, 28 June 1982.
- 8 See Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Solidarity Underground: Structures and Activities," RAD Background Report/88 (Poland), Radio Free Europe Research, 21 April 1983.
- 9 *Biuletyn Informacyjny* (Paris), no. 59, 13 April 1983; and *Wolny Głos Ursusa*, no. 31, 10 February 1983.
- 10 *Tygodnik Wojenny*, no. 51, 24 February 1983.
- 11 For details, see Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Solidarity Underground."
- 12 *Hutnik*, no. 26, 26 September 1982.
- 13 *CND—Głos Wolnego Robotnika*, 30 September–10 October 1982, and 21 June 1983.
- 14 *Hutnik*, no. 35, 20 November 1982; and *Montinowiec*, no. 23.
- 15 "Positional Warfare," *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 8, 31 March 1982.
- 16 See interviews with Bujak, *ibid.*, nos. 31 and 36, 27 October and 1 December 1982; and Adam Michnik, "Letter from Białogłeka," *Aneks*, no. 28.
- 17 Jacek Kuroń, "Proposals for Solving an Insoluble Situation," "The Golden Horn Is in Your Hands Now," and "What Next?" *ibid.*, nos. 8, 13, and 21, 31 March, 12 May, and 14 July 1982.
- 18 "Remarks about a Dialogue with a Terrorist," and "Between Defeat and Victory," *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, nos. 23 and 35, 1 August and 24 November 1982.
- 19 *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 9, 6 June 1982.
- 20 *KOS*, no. 21/22, 1 January 1983; *Mysł Niezależna*, no. 13, November 1982; and *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 35, 24 November 1982.
- 21 *Ibid.*, nos. 34 and 37, 17 November and 16 December 1982.
- 22 *KOS*, no. 26, 27 February 1983.

- 23 *Tygodnik Wojeński*, nos. 14/15 and 16, April 1982.
- 24 Rafał Kwieciński, "The Propaganda Machine of Wrocław's Solidarity," *Gazeta Robotnicza*, 26 August 1982; see also *ibid.*, 11 March, 22 and 26 April 1982.
- 25 For details of trials and sentences of people involved in independent publishing, see Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "General Jaruzelski's Political Prisoners," *RAD BR/2* (Poland), *RPER*, 5 January 1983.
- 26 Minister of Internal Affairs Czesław Kiszczak in a 23 March 1983 report to the Sejm.
- 27 Maciej Rybczyński, "We Had No Political Ambitions," *Gazeta Robotnicza*, 13 January 1983.
- 28 *Biuletyn Informacyjny*, no. 65, 27 August 1982.
- 29 AP, 6 August 1982.
- 30 *Obserwator Wielkopolski*, no. 54, November 1982; no. 55, December 1982; nos. 56-58, January 1983; no. 59, February 1983.
- 31 AP, 26 February 1983.
- 32 Jan Nowak, "Poland's Resilient Underground Press," *Washington Journalism Review*, April 1983.

34. Political Diversification of the Polish Underground

- 1 *Deklaracja WSN*, 1 and 3 May 1983.
- 2 *Niepodległość* (Warsaw and Katowice), no. 4, 11 November 1982. Subsequent information cast doubt on the existence of KPN.
- 3 Kornel Morawiecki, "Who Are We? What Are We Fighting For?" *Solidarność Walcząca*, no. 9.
- 4 "Who We Are and What We Are Aiming For," *KOS*, no. 14, 28 August 1982.
- 5 *Deklaracja Polskiej Partii "Solidarność"*, Warsaw, 11 November 1982.
- 6 See *Opornik*, nos. 13, 14, and 17, 17 and 24 May 1982, and 14 June 1982.
- 7 *Niepodległość*, no. 16, April 1983. Confusion persists owing to the apparent publication of three separate journals, all bearing the name of *Niepodległość*.
- 8 H., "Frustrations and Bujak," *KOS*, no. 25, 14 March 1983.
- 9 A. Gremski, "Before and After December 13," *Solidarność w Stanie Wojennym* (Warsaw: CBN, 1982).
- 10 "Political Action: Demagoguery and Manipulation," *Solidarność Walcząca*, no. 15/45, 4 March 1983.
- 11 For example, the debates that followed the failure of Solidarity's strike in November 1982.

35. The Church's Balancing Act

- 1 See Polish Situation Report/15, Radio Free Europe Research, 12 October 1983, item 2.
- 2 See the communiqué published after the 197th Bishops' Conference on 18 November 1983.
- 3 AP (Warsaw), 5 December 1983.
- 4 *Los Angeles Times*, 25 October 1983.
- 5 *Dziennik Ludowy*, 6 September 1983.
- 6 *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 8 May 1983.

- 7 See Polish SR/7, RFER, 26 April 1983, item 1.
- 8 *Slowo Powszechnie*, 26 November 1981.
- 9 *Katolik*, 16 October 1983.
- 10 For details, see Polish SR/11, RFER, 1 July 1982, item 3.
- 11 *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 24 July 1983.
- 12 *Pismo Okólne*, no. 52, 12 to 18 December 1983. See also AP, UPI, and AFP (Warsaw), 19 December 1983; DPA and Reuters (Warsaw), 20 December 1983; and John Kifner in the *New York Times*, 20 December 1983.
- 13 Glomp spoke of the Nobel Peace Prize without mentioning its winner by name. Regarding the "return home" of those imprisoned, he said that "many" (that is, not all) of the prisoners had been released.
- 14 See Jan Krauze in *Le Monde*, 21 December 1983.

36. The Pattern of Repression

- 1 *Gazeta Robotnicza*, 9 March 1984.
- 2 "Fighting Solidarity" was established in 1982 by Kornel Morawiecki, former head of information in the clandestine Regional Strike Committee in Lower Silesia.
- 3 For details of Władysław Hardek's apparent surrender, see Polish Situation Report/14, Radio Free Europe Research, 21 September 1983, item 2.
- 4 Statement by the Interim Regional Board of Solidarity in the Wielkopolska Region, Poznań, 4 January 1983.
- 5 *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 February 1984.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 22 February 1984.
- 7 *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 63, 6 October 1983.
- 8 *Serwis Informacyjny*, no. 38, 16 August 1982.
- 9 *Informacja Solidarności*, no. 151, 26 July 1983.
- 10 *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, no. 63, 6 October 1983.
- 11 *Trybuna Ludu*, 22 February 1984.
- 12 *Serwis Informacyjny*, no. 54, 9 April 1983.
- 13 The independent NOWA publishing house in Warsaw issued several versions of a booklet on police interrogation techniques prior to the formation of Solidarity in 1980. Entitled *Obywatel a Służba Bezpieczeństwa* (The Citizen and the Security Service), it provided detailed guidelines on behavior in police stations to avoid blackmail.
- 14 *Serwis Informacyjny*, no. 62, 4 June 1983.
- 15 *Ibid.*, no. 38, 16 August 1982.
- 16 *Życie Warszawy*, 28 July 1983.
- 17 *Trybuna Ludu*, 12 December 1983.
- 18 *Perspektywy*, 16 December 1983.

37. The Party in Crisis

- 1 Radio Warsaw, 19 February 1984.
- 2 *Statistical Year Book*, 1983.
- 3 Radio Warsaw, 19 January 1984.
- 4 *Trybuna Ludu*, 19 January 1984.

- 5 Ibid., 16–17 July 1983.
- 6 Ibid., 19 January 1984.
- 7 Ibid., 27 September 1983.
- 8 *Polityka*, 17 December 1983.
- 9 *Trybuna Ludu*, 16–17 July 1983.
- 10 Ibid., 1 August 1983.
- 11 Ibid., 19 January 1984.
- 12 See Polish Situation Report/3, Radio Free Europe Research, 2 February 1983, item 3.
- 13 Radio Warsaw, 20 February 1984.
- 14 See J. B. de Weydenthal, "The Failure to Reform the Party in Poland," RAD Background Report/18 (Poland), RFER, 13 February 1984.
- 15 *Żołnierz Wolności*, 30 January 1984.
- 16 Radio Warsaw, 19 February 1984.
- 17 *Życie Warszawy*, 27 October 1983.

38. Openings to the West

- 1 The trip was first announced by the White House on 24 August 1983. Two American secretaries of state had made official visits to Budapest: William Rogers in 1972, when he signed a U.S.-Hungarian consular agreement; and Cyrus Vance in 1978, when the United States returned the crown of St. Stephen to Hungary.
- 2 *Magyar Nemzet*, 20 September 1983.
- 3 Reuters, 19 September 1983.
- 4 UPI and AP, 19 September 1983. The texts of the speeches by Bush and Lázár were not reported by either the Hungarian press or radio. On September 20 Bush gave an interview to Hungarian television (which was broadcast on September 25), in which he explained the U.S. position at the Geneva arms talks.
- 5 UPI and Reuters, 21 September 1983. At his press conference in Budapest, Bush refused to comment on any differences between Hungary and Romania.
- 6 *Népszabadság*, 17 September 1983.
- 7 24 September 1983, 10:00 A.M.
- 8 Péter Serény, "A New Europe Doctrine?" 25 September 1983.
- 9 *Népszabadság*, 21 September 1983; and UPI, 21 and 22 September 1983.
- 10 Finnish President Koivisto arrived in the United States on September 25 for an eleven-day visit during which he was to meet President Ronald Reagan and address the UN General Assembly.
- 11 Reuters, 14 November 1983. Radio Budapest announced Thatcher's forthcoming visit only on 26 January 1984.
- 12 Radio Budapest, 31 January 1984, 7:15–8:45 P.M.
- 13 *Népszabadság*, 4 February 1984.
- 14 Radio Prague, 8 February 1984, 6:30 P.M.; and *Rudé právo*, 8 February 1984.
- 15 6 February 1984. See also *Życie Warszawy*, 6 February 1984. Both articles were promptly reported by Radio Budapest, 6 February 1984, 3:00 P.M.
- 16 *Népszabadság*, 14 April 1984.
- 17 Dénes Gyapay, "Common Interest!" *Magyar Hírlap*, 14 April 1984.
- 18 *Magyarország*, 15 April 1984.
- 19 On Schmidt's visit, see *ibid.*, no. 18, 19 September 1979, item 2.

- 20 Imre Tatar, "Continuity." See also Tibor Thurzo in *Népszava*, 20 June 1984; and Ferenc Tóth in *Neueste Nachrichten* (MTI), 21 June 1984. Several provincial dailies also published positive articles about Hungarian–West German relations.
- 21 *Népszabadság*, 21 June 1984.
- 22 Ibid., 22 June 1984; and RFE correspondent (Bonn), 21 June 1984. The Hungarian media failed to report both Lázár's and Kohl's dinner speeches.
- 23 Only Yugoslavia stressed the fact that different political views should not hinder détente and that for this reason Hungary chose not to dwell too much on the stationing of U.S. missiles on West German soil (Tanjug, 22 June 1984).

39. Hungary in 1983: Rising Expectations, Declining Economy

- 1 *Népszabadság*, 20 August 1983; Radio Budapest, 6 September 1983, 1830 hours; *Statistikai Havi Közlemények* (Monthly Statistical Bulletin), no. 2/3, 1984, p. 9; MTI in English, 26 April 1984.
- 2 Hungarian Situation Reports/18 and 5, Radio Free Europe Research, 15 December 1982 and 13 April 1984, items 3 and 5, respectively; Radio Budapest, 17 December 1983, 10:00 P.M.; MTI in English, 26 April 1984.
- 3 *Journal of Commerce*, 2 and 3 November 1983; *Dunántúli Napló*, 31 January 1984; Radio Budapest, 8 February 1984.
- 4 Hungarian SRS/12, 14, 2, and 3, RFE, 23 August 1982, 17 October 1983, 6 and 25 February 1984, items 7, 4, 1, and 4, respectively; *Statistikai Havi Közlemények* no. 6, 1984, pp. 10 and 63.
- 5 Hungarian SR/6, RFE, 22 April 1983, item 7; *Journal of Commerce*, 2 and 3 November 1983 and 24 February 1984; RFE Correspondent's Report (Washington), 7 February 1984; Radio Budapest, 8 February and 20 April 1984; *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 May 1984.
- 6 Hungarian SR/14, RFE, 17 October 1983, item 4.
- 7 Ralph Kinnear, "Further Decentralization in Hungary," RAD Background Report/184 (Hungary), RFE, 3 August 1983.
- 8 Ralph Kinnear, "Bonds and Shares—Creeping Capitalism or Creeping Socialism?" RAD BR/214 (Hungary), RFE, 7 September 1983. See also chapter 50 in this volume.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Hungarian SR/14, RFE, 17 October 1983, item 5.
- 11 *Pártélet*, May 1983.
- 12 *Napló* (Veszprem), 1 May 1983.
- 13 Hungarian SR/6, RFE, 22 April 1983, item 1; Hungarian SR/7, RFE, 13 May 1983, item 2; Hungarian SR/8, RFE, 30 May 1983, item 1.
- 14 Hungarian SR/1, RFE, 12 January 1984, item 1.
- 15 Alfred Reisch, "Storm over Controversial Periodical Underlines Role of RFE," RAD BR/16 (Hungary), RFE, 3 February 1984.
- 16 Ibid., and Gyula Borbandi, "Unrest in the Hungarian Writers' Union," RAD BR/111 (Hungary), RFE, 17 May 1983.
- 17 Hungarian SR/1, RFE, 13 January 1981, item 4; Hungarian SR/2, RFE, 28 January 1981, item 2; Hungarian SR/11, RFE, 30 July 1981, item 1.
- 18 Hungarian SR/5, RFE, 22 March 1983, item 1; Hungarian SR/8, RFE, 30 May 1983; item 2; Hungarian SR/10, RFE, 11 July 1983, item 7; Hungarian SR/12,

- REFER, 30 August 1983, item 1; Hungarian SR/5, REFER, 8 November 1983, item 2.
- 19 Hungarian SR/15, REFER, 8 November 1983, item 2.
- 20 Reuters, UPI, 1 June 1983; Hungarian SR/15, REFER, 8 November 1983, item 2.
- 21 Hungarian SR/6, REFER, 22 April 1983, item 5; Hungarian SR/1, REFER, 12 January 1984, item 3.
- 22 *Pártélet*, May 1983.
- 23 *Élet és Irodalom*, 23 September 1983.
- 24 Alfred Reisch, "Kádár Policies Get Seal of Approval from New Soviet Leadership?" RAD BR/195 (Hungary), REFER, 11 August 1983.
- 25 See chapter 38 in this volume. Also see Hungarian SR/14, REFER, 17 October 1983, item 1.
- 26 Hungarian SR/5, REFER, 22 March 1983, item 3; Hungarian SR/15, REFER, 8 November 1983, item 7; Hungarian SR/16, REFER, 20 December 1983, item 4.
- 27 Alfred Reisch, "New Hungarian-Romanian Polemics over Transylvania," RAD BR/292, REFER, 30 December 1983. See chapter 57 in this volume.
- 28 See also Alfred Reisch and Judith Pataki, "Hungarian-Romanian Polemics over Transylvania Continue," RAD BR/238, REFER, 15 November 1982; Hungarian SR/18, REFER, 15 December 1982, item 7; and Romanian SR/22, REFER, 27 December 1982, item 6.

40. National Versus International Interests

- 1 "The Interaction of National and International [Factors] in the Development of Socialism in Hungary," pp. 13-21. The article was based on a lecture delivered at the 20-21 October 1983 national theoretical conference on "The Tasks of Teaching the History of the Post-Liberation [1945] Period." Szűrös, aged fifty, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union (1978-1982) and the GDR (1975-1978), became head of the HSWP cc's Foreign Affairs Department, where he served from 1965 to 1975, in June 1982. A trained foreign-affairs specialist, he had been a party member since 1951 and a cc member since April 1978.
- 2 This probably prompted party leader Kádár to defend vigorously Hungary's New Economic Mechanism during an unusual seventy-minute radio interview on 29 April 1983 in which he alluded to "a certain anxiety among the socialist countries, among our friends." See Hungarian Situation Report/7, Radio Free Europe Research, 13 May 1983, item 1.
- 3 See *ibid.*, no. 4, 2 March 1983, item 8.
- 4 In a radio interview immediately before János Kádár's July 1983 visit to the Soviet Union, Szűrös had referred to 1956 as the "third turning point" in Hungarian-Soviet relations, specifically mentioning the declaration of 30 October 1956, which, he said, had renewed these relations through the "application of Leninist principles and the reciprocal observation of [individual] interests, equality, mutual understanding, and respect" (Radio Budapest, 13 July 1983, 7:30 P.M.). (The first two turning points in Soviet-Hungarian relations were the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic under Béla Kun in 1919 and the Soviet "liberation" of Hungary in 1944-1945.)
- 5 *Heti Világgazdaság*, 24 March 1984.
- 6 *Magyar Hírlap*, 21 March 1984. See also "Allies," *Magyarország*, 25 March 1984.
- 7 Radio Budapest, 21 March 1984, 6:30 P.M. Unlike Czechoslovak Prime Minister

Štrougal, Stoph did not refer to the stationing of new medium-range Soviet nuclear missiles during his visit to Budapest.

- 8 János Nemes, "On the Same Wavelength," 19 March 1984. The Hungarian media had on the whole reported objectively and positively the intensification of the East German–West German dialogue. See also chapter 41 below.
- 9 AP, 30 March 1984; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2 April 1984; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 3 April 1984.
- 10 *Társadalmi Szémlé*, January 1984, pp. 13–21. See also Alfred Reisch, "New HSWP Interpretation of Communist National and International Interests," RAD Background Report/23 (Hungary), Radio Free Europe Research, 16 February 1984.
- 11 Rejoinders to the Czechoslovak attack by Szűrös, Deputy Foreign Minister Ferenc Esztergályos, and Imre Tatar were summarized and evaluated in Hungarian SR/5, RFER, 13 April 1984, item 4.
- 12 "Common Goals, National Interests," *Magyar Hírlap*, 4 April 1984.
- 13 Radio Budapest, 17 April and 18 April 1984, 10:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M., respectively; *Népszabadság*, 18 April 1984.
- 14 Radio Budapest, 18 April 1984, 10:00 P.M.
- 15 Ibid., 19 April 1984, 6:45 A.M. The commentator, Éva Szécsi, was the Hungarian radio's Paris correspondent from 1979 to 1983.
- 16 *Magyar Hírlap*, 19 April 1984. For further international developments, concerning the issues raised by Szűrös, see chapter 44 in this volume.

41. Rapprochement with Bonn

- 1 ADN, 27 September 1983.
- 2 See Honecker's speech in *Neues Deutschland*, 26–27 November 1983.

42. The GDR in 1983: New Issues to the Fore

- 1 *Neues Deutschland*, 10 October 1983.
- 2 See Ronald D. Asmus, "The GDR and the German Nation—Sole Heir or Socialist Sibling?" *International Affairs*, Summer 1984, pp. 403–418.
- 3 For details, see chapter 41 above.
- 4 See James Markham's interview with Kohl in the *New York Times*, 5 December 1983, and with Honecker in *Stern*, 3 November 1983.

43. The Policy of Damage Limitation

- 1 Honecker's interview in *Révolution*, 6 January 1984.
- 2 See the dinner speeches by Gromyko and Fischer in *Neues Deutschland*, 4–5 January 1984.
- 3 Honecker's speech, *ibid.*, 13 February 1984.
- 4 On January 22 a group of six East German citizens who had entered the American embassy in East Berlin and had demanded political asylum were allowed by the East German authorities to leave directly for West Berlin; two days later a group of twelve East Germans entered the West German diplomatic mission in East Berlin, also demanded political asylum, and were quietly transported to the West

as well. In late spring and early summer, following the end of the officially sanctioned emigration wave, groups of East Germans again attempted to gain access to the West via the West German diplomatic mission in East Berlin, eventually leading to the temporary closing down of the mission in a desperate attempt to solve the emerging crisis. See Ronald D. Asmus, "Crisis at the West German Diplomatic Mission in East Berlin," RAD Background Report/121 (East-West Relations), RFER, 2 July 1984. The estimated fifty-five East Germans in the mission eventually left the building and were allowed to emigrate to West Germany. Following construction work to help prevent such incidents in the future, the West German diplomatic mission reopened in late July.

- 5 VW was to provide East Germany with a Hannover motor production line along with a shipment of some 2,000 vw vans as a one-time deal, along with some 2,300 vans annually, starting in 1988. In return, vw was to receive some 100,000 motors annually from the GDR, with the remaining capacity—nearly 200,000 motors—to be used for domestic consumption. Nearly half of the DM 600 million deal was covered by West German federal credit guarantees. (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 February 1984.)
- 6 Elizabeth Pond in *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 February 1984.
- 7 In 1983 some 7,700 East Germans were allowed to legally emigrate to the FRG. For additional details see Ronald D. Asmus, "A New Wave of East German Emigration," RAD BR/45 (East-West Relations), RFER, 23 March 1984.
- 8 In mid-February the major West German political parties (with the exception of the radical-environmentalist Green party) passed a joint Bundestag resolution on the goals of West German *Deutschlandpolitik*. See Asmus, "East and West Germany: Continuity and Change," *World Today*, April 1984, p. 149.
- 9 Western figures on total East German debt varied depending upon whether solely obligations to Western banks or also supplier credits and inter-German debt were included. The GDR's known debt reported to Western banks at the end of 1983 was estimated at \$6.7 billion, a reduction of nearly one-third since the end of 1982; estimates on total debt put East Berlin's financial commitments between \$8–9 billion. See "Erfolgreiche Produktionsanstrengungen: Die Lage der DDR-Wirtschaft zur Jahresmitte 1984," *DIW Wochenbericht*, 9 August 1984.
- 10 For the effects of the debt situation on inner-German trade see Horst Lamprecht, "GDR's Western Debt Favors Inner-German Trade," *ibid.*, 10 March 1983.
- 11 *Trybuna Ludu* commentary as reprinted in *Neues Deutschland*, 30 January 1984.
- 12 As quoted in the article by Henry Tanner, *International Herald Tribune*, 20 March 1984.
- 13 The view of Honecker as a German communist with the emphasis on the word German was fostered in the books by the FRG's first two diplomatic representatives to East Berlin, Günter Gaus and Klaus Bölling. See Günter Gaus, *Wo Deutschland liegt: Eine Ortsbestimmung* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1983); and Klaus Bölling, *Die feinen Nachbarn: Erfahrungen in der DDR* (Hamburg: Gruner und Jahr, 1983).

44. Discord with Moscow

- 1 *Neues Deutschland*, 21 March 1984. Hoffmann, reportedly speaking fluent Russian, had spent over a decade in the USSR, surviving Stalin's purges in the 1930s.

- Wounds he had received in the Spanish Civil War were reported to still be treated in the Soviet Union, where Hoffmann frequently spent his vacation.
- 2 *Pravda*, 20 March 1984. See Fred Oldenburg, "Die SED und Konstantin Tscher-nenko," *Aktuelle Analysen: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und interna-tionale Studien*, no. 16, 16 March 1984.
 - 3 See the article by Michal Štefanák and Ivan Hlivka in *Rudé právo*, 30 March 1984, and Czechoslovak Situation Report/7, RFER, 18 April, item 1.
 - 4 See chapter 40 in this volume.
 - 5 *Neues Deutschland*, 17 April 1984.
 - 6 *Novoe vremia*, no. 16, 13 April 1984.
 - 7 English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Polish, and Czech.
 - 8 The *Novoe vremia* text was not a doctored version of the *Rudé právo* text in the sense that nothing had been altered (with two exceptions discussed in this chap-ter); paragraphs and sentences had simply been left out.
 - 9 O. V. Borisov, "Soiuz novogo tipa," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, April 1984, pp. 34-39.
 - 10 The authorship of the article is assumed to be that of Rakhmanin who often wrote under the pseudonym O. B. Borisov.
 - 11 The quotation is from *Mezhdunarodnoe soveshchanie kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii* (Moscow and Prague, 1969), pp. 420-421.
 - 12 Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Daily Discusses Differences within the Soviet Bloc," RAD BR/100 (Eastern Europe), RFER, 15 June 1984.
 - 13 See Ronald D. Asmus, "SED Politburo Speaks Out on East-West Relations," RAD BR/92 (East-West Relations), RFER, 6 June 1984.
 - 14 See Ronald D. Asmus, "Bonn and Moscow: Revanchism Revisited," RAD BR/138 (East-West Relations), RFER, 30 July 1984.
 - 15 *Neues Deutschland*, 18 July 1984.
 - 16 See Ronald D. Asmus, "Western Leaders Visit East Berlin," RAD BR/137 (East-West Relations), RFER, 30 July 1984.
 - 17 See the round table discussion published under the title "Die Globalität und Ag-gressivität des imperialistischen Konfrontationskurses—Möglichkeiten und Kräfte zu seiner Durchkreuzung," *IPW Bericht*, no. 6, June 1984, pp. 1-13.
 - 18 Article by Professor Harald Neubert, director of the Institute of the International Labor Movement at the GDR Academy of Social Sciences, entitled "The Topical Tasks of Communists," *Horizont*, 8, August 1984, p. 10.
 - 19 See Ronald D. Asmus, "A Second Credit for the GDR," RAD BR/142 (GDR) (East-West Relations), RFER, 3 August 1984.
 - 20 Lev Bezymenskii, "In the Shadow of American Missiles," *Pravda*, 27 July 1984; also Ronald D. Asmus, "Pravda Attacks East-West German Ties," RAD BR/145 (East-West Relations), RFER, 8 August 1984.
 - 21 The term "security partnership" was a well-known West German Social Demo-cratic phrase usually attributed to Egon Bahr, but also popularized by Helmut Schmidt, and officially rejected by the CDU.
 - 22 See Ronald D. Asmus, "Pravda Attacks Inter-German Relations Once Again," RAD BR/157 (East-West Relations), RFER, 20 August 1984.
 - 23 Speculation on factional differences over relations with the FRG were also fueled by an article in the Soviet *Literaturnaia gazeta* of 8 August 1984. The article re-viewed a book on the World War I dispute between Lenin and Trotsky about whether or not to conclude peace with the Germans. Lenin's emphasis on the need to "coexist" with the enemy and to talk with the Germans to help the revo-

lution, as well as his alleged difficulties in overcoming factional strife on this issue, could be interpreted as further evidence of factional differences within the Soviet leadership over the utility of contacts with the FRG.

- 24 See the press coverage of Häber's talks with Cossutta in *Neues Deutschland*, 10 August 1984; and on Krenz's talks in Athens with Papandreou in *Neues Deutschland*, 15 August 1984. See *Borba*, 9 August 1984, and commentary in the Yugoslav party weekly *Kommunist*, 10 August 1984.
- 25 As quoted in the article by *l'Unità's* Bonn correspondent Paolo Soldini, "Little Détente in Question," on 4 August 1984.

45. The Diplomatic Scene

- 1 See Bulgarian Situation Report/4, Radio Free Europe Research, 25 March 1983, item 3.
- 2 Tsvetan Dimitrov, ed., *Balkanite: Politichko-Ekonomicheski Spravochnik* [The Balkans: Political-Economic Handbook] (Sofia: Partizdat, 1983), pp. 105-111.
- 3 *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 27 June 1983.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 7 June 1983.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 10 June 1983.
- 6 See Bulgarian SR/3, RFER, 7 March 1983, item 2, for details.
- 7 *Vjesnik*, 23 June 1983.
- 8 See Bulgarian SR/14, RFER, 28 December 1983, item 2.
- 9 See also chapter 17 in this volume.
- 10 For example, Papandreou's interview with Budapest Television, 2 June 1983.
- 11 *Tanjug*, 24 October 1983.
- 12 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 August 1983.
- 13 *Tanjug*, 4 November 1983. See also chapter 57 in this volume.
- 14 See also chapter 47 in this volume.
- 15 *Tanjug*, 17 October 1983, is only the latest example. See also *Politika*, 28 August 1983; and *Večernje Novosti*, 21 October 1983.
- 16 Radio Tirana, 25 August 1983, 6:00 P.M.
- 17 *Narodna Armia*, 20 September 1983.
- 18 *Danas*, 8 November 1983.
- 19 RAD Background Report/88, RFER, 23 May 1984.
- 20 *Zeri i Popullit*, 5 November 1983.
- 21 AP, 7 November 1983.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 8 November 1983.

46. Recentralization in Yugoslavia?

- 1 NIN (Belgrade), 30 October 1983.
- 2 *Ibid.*
- 3 *Ibid.*
- 4 *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), 19 July 1983.
- 5 *Danas* (Zagreb), 22 November 1983.
- 6 NIN (Belgrade), 20 November 1983.
- 7 *Danas*, 22 November 1983.

- 8 *Duga* (Belgrade), 19 November 1983.
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 *Danas*, 22 November 1983.
- 11 *Die Welt*, 1 December 1983.

47. Greater Albania?

- 1 *Rilindja*, 8 October 1983.
- 2 *Ibid.*
- 3 *Ibid.*
- 4 *Rruga e Partisë*, August 1983.
- 5 *Rilindja*, 13 November 1983.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 14 November 1983.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 28, 29, and 30 November 1983.
- 8 *Zeri i Popullit*, 29 November 1983.
- 9 *Tanjug*, 8 December 1983.
- 10 *Rilindja*, 27 January 1984.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 11 May 1984.
- 12 *Zeri i Popullit*, 1 May 1984.
- 13 *Radio Zagreb*, 12 January 1984.
- 14 *Tanjug*, 26 January 1984.
- 15 *ATA*, 28 January 1984.
- 16 *Zeri i Popullit*, "The Slander and Attacks of the Enemies Do Not Intimidate or Deter the Albanian People," 1 March 1984.
- 17 *ATA*, 5 March 1984.
- 18 *Zeri i Popullit*, 3 February 1984.
- 19 *Rilindja*, 27 February 1984. For further Albanian material, see chapter 45 in this volume.

48. The Soviet Economic Performance in 1983

- 1 Attention was drawn to internal inconsistencies in the results for 1983 by RL 50/84, "Anomalies in the Economic Results for 1983," 1 February 1984.
- 2 *Pravda*, 23 January 1983.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 29 January 1984; preliminary results were given *ibid.*, 29 December 1983, but some of those figures had been revised.
- 4 *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v. 1982 g.*, Moscow 1983; henceforth *Narkhoz* 82.
- 5 Both series were quite different from the Western calculations of Soviet economic performance. Definitions of national income, industrial output, and agricultural output were different, and the Soviet "volume" or "real output" series overstated Soviet growth even in Soviet definitions because they failed to make a reasonable allowance for inflation in the padding of new-product prices. Soviet industrial output growth was probably overstated by 1.5 to 2 percent a year. "Andropov's First Year: Economic Performance," RL 407/83, 31 October 1983.
- 6 For 1982, 176 million tons, compared with 149 million tons in 1981, according to press reports of remarks made by the USSR Minister of Agriculture to his Canadian counterpart (*Financial Times*, 2 November 1982).

- 7 *Pravda*, 26 April 1984.
- 8 The relevant figures, based on GNP measures in U.S. 1981 are: in 1965, 35.3 percent; in 1975, 49.3 percent; and in 1982, 48.6 percent (CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*).
- 9 Compare the measures of Soviet net material product (NMP) (in *Narkhoz* 74, p. 100; *Narkhoz za 60 let*, p. 94; *Narkhoz* 79, p. 67; and *ibid.*, 82, p. 56) as a percentage of U.S. NMP. Soviet NMP in the early 1980s turned out to be a steady 67 percent of U.S. NMP. With the Soviet population growing at a somewhat slower rate than that of the United States, the implied Soviet estimate of per capita NMP for the USSR rose slightly, relative to that of the United States—from 57 percent in 1975 to 58 percent in 1982. But officially measured Soviet NMP utilized per head of population rose by 22 percent between 1975 and 1982 (*ibid.*, 82, pp. 5 and 38), so this Soviet official assessment entailed a widening absolute gap: from a ratio of 57 : 100 in 1975 to a ratio of 70 : 120 in 1982.
- 10 "Food Rationing in the Soviet Union," RL 321/82, 11 August 1982.

49. Bulgaria's Ineffective Reform

- 1 *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (New York: United Nations, December 1979).
- 2 Roland Schönfeld, "Bulgaria's Foreign Trade and the Role of the German Economy," *Südost-Europa*, no. 7-8, 1981.
- 3 Kosta Nikolov, "Peculiarities of the Economic Mechanism of Management of Foreign Trade during the Eighth Five-Year Plan," *Vunshna Turgoviya* (Sofia), no. 4, 1982, pp. 4-8.
- 4 *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), 29 April 1982. Quoted from Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Paper Hails Bulgaria's 'Hungarian Road,'" RAD Background Report/108 (Yugoslavia), Radio Free Europe Research, 6 May 1982.

50. Creeping Capitalism in Hungary?

- 1 Hungarian Situation Report/2, Radio Free Europe Research, 17 February 1982, item 3.
- 2 *Financial Times*, 30 March 1983; "Gas Gets Going," *Heti Világgazdaság*, 9 April 1983; and *Népszabadság*, 12 July 1983.
- 3 Council of Ministers' Decree No. 65/1982, 4 December 1982.
- 4 According to Zoltán Miklósváry, the bonds were available for sale to "foreign private individuals and domestic financial or economic organizations" (*Dunántúli Napló*, 6 May 1983).
- 5 Radio Budapest, 1 May 1983, 8:30 P.M.
- 6 *Ibid.*
- 7 *Financial Times*, 30 March 1983; MTI (in English), 12 July 1983.
- 8 *Weekly Bulletin*, 20 April 1983.
- 9 János Ráthonyi, "Bond Gives Birth to Money," *Magyarország*, 18 May 1983.
- 10 "Pipe Bonds," *Magyar Hírlap*, 16 June 1983.
- 11 "Disintermediation Hungarian Style," *Forbes Magazine*, 4 July 1983.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 Endre Ferenczi, "Mortgage Bonds Rediscovered," *Figyelő*, 10 February 1982.

- 14 The legal side of the problem is discussed in Márton Tardos, "The Role of Money: Economic Relations between the State and Enterprise in Hungary," *Acta Oeconomica*, vol. 25 (1-2), 1980, and Agnes Balázs, "More Efficient Use of Development Resources," *Figyelő*, 9 December 1982.
- 15 Minister of Finance Decrees Nos. 68 and 69, 30 November 1982.
- 16 Jenő Szirmai, "The Saving of Money by the Population," *Népszabadság*, 4 May 1983.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Sándor Kopátsy, "Shares: Public Ownership," *Figyelő*, 2 June 1982; Márton Tardos, "A Program for the Development of the System of Economic Control and Organization," *Közgazdasági Szemle*, no. 6, 1982; unsigned, "Enterprises in Need of Incentives for Technical Developments," *Figyelő*, 10 March 1983; interview with Zoltán Gál, subunit chief of the HSWP's cc, "Where Is the Organization of Councils Now? Chances of Local Autonomy," *Magyar Hírlap*, 3 March 1983; and Ferenc Nemeth, "Greater Independence, Greater Responsibilities," *Figyelő*, 29 July 1982.
- 19 *Heti Világgazdaság*, 13 August 1983; and Ralph Kinnear, "Further Decentralization in Hungary," RAD Background Report/184 (Hungary), RFER, 3 August 1983.

51. The Fate of CMEA's Comprehensive Program

- 1 TASS, 15 June 1984.

52. The Plight of the Yugoslav Economy

- 1 Tanjug, 3 July 1983.
- 2 *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 July 1983.
- 3 Radio Belgrade, 3 July 1983, 3:00 P.M.
- 4 According to Western reporters, 610 banks.
- 5 *Večernje Novosti* (Belgrade), 3 July 1983.
- 6 *Politika* (Belgrade), 26 June 1983.
- 7 *Danas* (Zagreb), 28 June 1983.
- 8 *Večernji List* (Zagreb), 25-26 June 1983.
- 9 5 July 1983.
- 10 5 July 1983.
- 11 *Večernje Novosti*, 6 July 1983.

53. Setbacks in the Soviet Nuclear Plant Program

- 1 TASS, 15 July 1983.
- 2 Radio Moscow-1, 3:00 P.M. CET, 19 July 1983.
- 3 UPI, 20 July 1983, citing *Pravda* of the same date.
- 4 Radio Moscow-2, 7:00 P.M., 19 July 1983.
- 5 *Business Week*, 2 August 1976, pp. 52-53; UPI, 10 October 1980.
- 6 *Business Week*, 2 August 1976, p. 52.
- 7 *Pravda*, 11 May 1978.

- 8 *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 30 January 1981.
- 9 UPI, 10 October 1980.
- 10 *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 30 January 1983.
- 11 *Pravda*, 12 July 1981.
- 12 *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 30 January and 24 September 1981.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 16 April 1981.
- 14 *Pravda*, 12 July 1981.
- 15 *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 16 October 1982.
- 16 *Pravda*, 20 July 1983.
- 17 *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia*, 30 January 1981; *Pravda*, 12 July 1981.
- 18 *Pravda*, 20 July 1983.

54. Environmental Deterioration in Czechoslovakia

- 1 *Životní Prostředí*, no. 6, November–December 1982, p. 332.
- 2 *Pravda* (Bratislava), 3 August 1983, p. 1.
- 3 *Plánované Hospodářství*, no. 2, 1982, p. 67.
- 4 *Rudé Právo*, 11 January 1978, p. 5.
- 5 *Politická Ekonomie*, no. 7, July 1980, p. 685.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 691.
- 7 *Hospodářské Noviny*, no. 2, 14 January 1983, p. 5.
- 8 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 4 September 1965, p. 2.
- 9 *Odborář*, no. 24, 1981, p. 26.
- 10 *Práce*, 2 July 1983, p. 3, mentioned "around 2,000,000 tons," but *Odborář*, no. 24, 1981, p. 26, referred to 2,100,000 tons in 1975. The increase is to be seen in comparison with less than 1,000,000 tons of sulfur dioxide in the 1950s (*Zemědělské Noviny*, 1 July 1982, p. 1).
- 11 *Plánované Hospodářství*, no. 2, 1982, pp. 56–68.
- 12 *Haló Sobota*, no. 11, 19 March 1983, p. 1.
- 13 *Plánované Hospodářství*, no. 2, 1982, pp. 56–68.
- 14 *Statistical Yearbook* for 1957 and 1982.
- 15 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 April 1983, p. 10, gave the volume of sulfur dioxide emitted into the air over the Federal Republic at 3,600,000 tons in 1978.
- 16 *Horník a Energetik*, 19 November 1981, p. 8.
- 17 *Rudé Právo*, 9 March 1982, p. 5; *Zemědělské Noviny*, 5 January 1982, p. 1.
- 18 *Práce*, 11 February 1982, p. 5.
- 19 *Svobodné Slovo*, 22 July 1982, p. 3.
- 20 *Czechoslovak Foreign Trade*, no. 1, 1967, pp. 23–24; *Práce*, 8 February 1978, p. 3.
- 21 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 7 May 1963, pp. 1 and 4.
- 22 *Rudé Právo*, 26 June 1982, p. 2.
- 23 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 7 January 1982, p. 3.
- 24 The amount of effluent contained in rivers is measured in *bsk* (5), the Czechoslovak abbreviation for a five-day biochemical consumption of oxygen.
- 25 *Hospodářské Noviny*, 22 October 1982, p. 4.
- 26 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 10 January 1983, p. 3. It was reported in the 1960s that Czechoslovakia was paying multimillion sums to the GDR for the pollution of the Elbe on Czechoslovak territory (*Kultúrný Život*, 17 August 1965, pp. 3–6).
- 27 *Práca*, 28 December 1982, pp. 1 and 4.

- 28 The percentage of the population served from public water mains amounted to 71.9 percent in the Czech lands and 64.2 percent in Slovakia, both in 1981, according to the *Statistical Yearbook 1982*, p. 86.
- 29 *Hospodářské Noviny*, 22 October 1982, p. 4.
- 30 *Svoboda*, 30 August 1982, p. 4.
- 31 *Práce*, 21 May 1976, p. 4.
- 32 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 25 May 1974, p. 2.
- 33 *Pravda* (Bratislava), 22 March 1983, p. 3.
- 34 *Práce*, 14 April 1977, p. 4.
- 35 *Svět Práce*, no. 5, 14 March 1983, p. 11.
- 36 *Práce*, 15 December 1982, pp. 1 and 4.
- 37 *Kontrola*, no. 9, 1982, pp. 14–16.
- 38 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 10 January 1983, p. 3.
- 39 *Rolnické Noviny*, 16 July 1982, p. 3.
- 40 *Radio Hvězda*, 15 March 1983, 5:30 P.M.
- 41 *Práce*, 2 July 1982, p. 3.
- 42 *Radio Hvězda*, 15 March 1983, 5:30 P.M.
- 43 *Věda a Život*, no. 8, 1980, p. 452.
- 44 *Tribuna*, 2 June 1982, p. 13.
- 45 The following forest zones were officially designated as affected by emissions: Krušné Hory, Lužické Hory, Jizerské Hory, Krkonoše, Orlické Hory, Šumava, Českomoravská Vysočina, Jeseníky, and Beskydy.
- 46 *Práce*, 24 April 1982, p. 10.
- 47 *Zemědělská Ekonomie*, no. 7, 1982, p. 323.
- 48 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 16 May 1981, p. 7.
- 49 For more on "chemistry from the air," see *Pravda* (Plzeň), 15 July 1982, p. 4; and *Zemědělské Noviny*, 20 September 1982, p. 3, and 1 April 1983, p. 1.
- 50 *Mladá Fronta*, 19 February 1983, p. 1.
- 51 *Památky a Příroda*, no. 9, 1982; *Haló Sobota*, 18 September 1982, p. 4.
- 52 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 10 January 1983, p. 3.
- 53 *Radio Hvězda*, 16 March 1983, 5:30 P.M.
- 54 *Plánované Hospodářství*, no. 2, 1982, p. 61.
- 55 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 23 September 1982, p. 3.
- 56 *Ibid.*
- 57 *Hospodářské Noviny*, 28 May 1982, p. 3.
- 58 *Statistical Yearbook 1982*, p. 301.
- 59 *Věda a Život*, no. 7, 1982, pp. 474–476.
- 60 *Plánované Hospodářství*, no. 2, 1982, pp. 56–68.
- 61 *Ibid.*
- 62 *Zemědělská Ekonomie*, no. 2, 1982, p. 155.
- 63 *Rudé Právo*, 10 March 1983, p. 1.
- 64 *Průboj*, 16 July 1966, p. 3. This is the North Bohemian regional daily.
- 65 *Jihočeská Pravda*, 19 December 1965, p. 3.
- 66 *Zemědělské Noviny*, 23 May 1964, p. 5.
- 67 *Rudé Právo*, 16 November 1982, p. 3.
- 68 *Ibid.*, 6 January 1983, p. 3.
- 69 *Životné Prostredie*, no. 2, 1982, p. 87.
- 70 *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- 71 See, for example, *Nové Slovo*, no. 11, 17 March 1983, p. 14.

- 72 *Životné Prostredie*, no. 2, 1982, pp. 90-91.
- 73 *Hospodárské Noviny*, 28 May 1982, p. 3.
- 74 *Věda a Život*, no. 7, 1982, pp. 474-476.
- 75 *Zemědělská Ekonomie*, no. 2, 1982, p. 155.
- 76 *Životné Prostredie*, no. 2, 1982.
- 77 Causes of death in the *Statistical Yearbooks*.
- 78 *Věstník Ministerstva Zdravotnictví*, no. 3, 1982, p. 23; see also Czechoslovak Situation Report/18, Radio Free Europe Research, 28 September 1982, item 5.
- 79 See Czechoslovak SR/7, RFER, 19 April 1983, item 3.
- 80 *Práce*, 24 April 1982, p. 10.

55. The "Merger" of Soviet Nationalities

- 1 Iulian Bromlei, "Etnicheskie protsessy v sssr," *Kommunist*, 1983, no. 5, pp. 56-64. A more detailed version of this article appeared as "Etnograficheskoe izuchenie sovremennykh natsionalnykh protsessov v sssr (K 50-letiiu ordena Druzhby narodov Instituta etnografii AN SSSR)," *Sovetskaiia etnografiia*, 1983, no. 2, March-April, pp. 4-14.
- 2 Traditionally, national affiliation in the Turkmen republic followed the paternal line, and in nearly all instances of mixed marriages in the republic the father was Turkmen.
- 3 As quoted by UPI from Moscow, 4 June 1983.
- 4 M. Kulichenko, "Na osnove ravenstva, dobrovolnosti i bratskogo sotrudnichestva," *Kommunist*, no. 16, 1981, p. 111.

56. Ethnic Tensions in Georgia

- 1 The national composition of the Abkhaz ASSR at the time of the 1979 census was as follows: Georgians, 213,322; Abkhaz, 83,097; Russians, 79,730; Armenians, 73,350; Greeks, 13,642; Ukrainians, 10,257 (*Vestnik statistiki*, 1980, no. 10, p. 68).
- 2 "Kapitonov on Nationality Relations in Georgia," RL 125/78, 1 June 1978, and "Recent Events in Abkhazia Mirror the Complexities of Nationality Relations in the USSR," RL 141/78, 26 June 1978.
- 3 "Continuing Tension in Abkhazia?" RL 294/80, 20 August 1980.
- 4 See *Arkhip samizdata* 4415.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 *Zaria Vostoka*, 25 January 1981.
- 7 Georgian anti-Russian sentiment was discussed at length by J. W. R. Parsons in "National Integration in Soviet Georgia," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 34, no. 4, October 1982, pp. 547-569.
- 8 "The Georgian Language and National Pride Prevail," RL 81/78, 18 April 1978, and "The National Languages and the New Constitutions of the Transcaucasian Republics," RL 97/78, 3 May 1978.
- 9 "New Samizdat Document Gives Details of Georgian Demonstrations," RL 360/81, 11 September 1981, and "Georgian Officials Condemn Recent Nationalist Demonstration," RL 13/82, 11 January 1982.

- 10 *Molodezh Gruzii*, 11 December 1982.
- 11 *Komunisti*, 15 April 1982.
- 12 D. M. Lang, *A Modern History of Georgia* (London, 1962), p. 41.
- 13 *Komunisti*, 15 April 1982.
- 14 For a Russian translation of the journal, see *Arkhiv samizdata* 4871.
- 15 UPI (Moscow), 19 June 1983; and AFP (Moscow), 20 June 1983.
- 16 Reuters, AFP, and UPI (Moscow), 15 July 1983.
- 17 *Zaria Vostoka*, 12 July 1983.
- 18 "Data from the Soviet Census of 1979 on the Georgians and the Georgian SSR," RL 162/80, 2 May 1980.
- 19 "Georgian Language Holds Its Own in Georgia," RL 396/81, 5 October 1981.
- 20 *Komunisti*, 16 June 1983.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 10 September 1983.
- 22 *Zaria Vostoka*, 6 September 1983.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 13 July 1983.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 15 July 1983.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 21 September 1983.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 19 July 1983.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 12 July 1983.

57. Hungarian Minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia

- 1 6 June 1984.
- 2 HTP, 30 March 1984.
- 3 The following chief editors had been replaced: János Kovács of *Muvelodes*; Zoltán Bartha of *Jobarat*; Sándor Huszár and Andor Horváth of *Het*; Pál Bodor of Hungarian and German television. Ernő Gál of *Korunk* was expected to be "retired" shortly.
- 4 HPT, 21 March 1984. See also AFP and *La Croix*, 4 May 1984.
- 5 Ion Lăncrănjan, *Cuvînt Despre Transilvania* [Statement on Transylvania] (Bucharest: Turism, 1982); and *Vocația Constructivă* [Constructive Vocation] (Bucharest: Romanian Writers' Union, 1983); Romulus Zaharia, *Ademenirea* [Temptation] (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1983).
- 6 For more information about *Word on Transylvania*, see Alfred Reisch, RAD Background Report/238 (Hungary), Radio Free Europe Research, 15 November 1982.
- 7 Rome: Edizioni Europea, 1980.
- 8 *Daily News*, 4 April 1984. For reactions to Lăncrănjan's first book, see György Száraz, "Another Strange Book Has Appeared," *Valóság*, March 1983, pp. 92-108. The original *Népszabadság* article was written by literary historian Pál Pandi. Száraz was about to publish a book about the history of Transylvania, excerpts of which had already been printed in *Népszabadság*, 7 February, 3 March, and 31 March 1984.
- 9 See Czechoslovak SR/5, RFER, 16 March 1983, item 4, as well as Hungarian SR/19, RFER, 27 December 1982, item 7.
- 10 VONS Report No. 375, dated 25 May 1984; the book by Duray mentioned in charges could be *In a Bind* [*Kutyaszorfitó*] (New York: Puski, 1983).
- 11 See Czechoslovak Situation Report/8, Radio Free Europe Research, 4 May 1984, item 5.

- 12 See Hungarian SR/6, RFER, 8 May 1984, item 7.
- 13 See Czechoslovak SR/2, RFER, 6 February 1984, item 4.
- 14 *Svědectví* (Paris), no. 70-71, 1983, pp. 577-578.
- 15 Charter 77 reported on Duray's case in its Document no. 37 of 28 December 1982, and VONS in its Communications no. 317 of 26 January 1983 and no. 327 of 1 May 1983.

58. Moslem Nationalists Sentenced in Yugoslavia

- 1 For the names of the accused people see Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Communists Versus 'Militant Islam,'" RAD Background Report/181 (Yugoslavia), Radio Free Europe Research, 1 August 1983.
- 2 *Kommunist*, 5 August 1983.
- 3 *Danas* (Zagreb), 9 August 1983.
- 4 *Večernje Novosti* (Belgrade), 21 August 1983.
- 5 *Politika* (Belgrade), 19 July 1983.

59. Hungary's New Rich

- 1 *Magyar Hírlap*, "Hungarian Society in the 1980s," 9 April 1983.
- 2 *Ország-Világ*, 12 October 1983.
- 3 Maria Zsigmondi, "Prices, Incomes, Consumption," *Hungarian Digest*, 1983/5, p. 6.
- 4 Dénes Kovacs, "Income and Wealth," *Népszabadság*, 15 February 1983.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 *Ország-Világ*, 12 October 1983.
- 7 See Hungarian SR/19, RFER, item 8.
- 8 *Népszabadság*, 12 October 1983.
- 9 *Népszava*, 10 December 1983.
- 10 *Esti Hírlap*, 24 January 1983.
- 11 *Népszabadság*, 15 February 1983.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 *Magyar Nemzet*, "Hungarian Society in the 1980s," 9 April 1983.
- 14 "The Development of the Structure of our Society II: Stratification Mobility, Inequality," Social Science Institute of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Budapest: HSWP Social Science Institute, 1979), p. 350.
- 15 Finance Minister István Hetényi emphasized the importance of the contribution of artisans to the functioning of the economy in an article about the new income tax law (*Kisiparos Újság*, 19 November 1983).
- 16 *Heti Világgazdaság*, 19 November 1983.
- 17 Reuters, 8 December 1983.
- 18 *Élet és Irodalom*, 2 December 1983.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 *Népszabadság*, 15 February 1983.
- 21 Ibid.

60. High Life Soviet Style

- 1 *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 30 August 1983, 18 September 1983, 13 November 1983, 29 November 1983, 1 December 1983, 8 January 1983.
- 2 B. Evgenev, "V poiske: Iz razmyshlenii starogo cheloveka," *Moskva*, no. 11, 1983.
- 3 See, for example, *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 30 August 1983.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 8 January 1984.
- 5 Evgenii Evtushenko, *Iagodnye mesta*, Moscow, 1981.
- 6 *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 1 December 1983.
- 7 DPA, UPI, 21 November 1983. For the first vague mention of this incident in the Soviet Union see *Zaria Vostoka*, 24 November 1983.
- 8 *Zaria Vostoka*, 6 January 1984; the "letter of the participants of the general meeting of the Georgian Academy of Sciences" was officially registered one month after the hijack attempt (20 December 1983), but it was not published until sixteen days later.
- 9 For further information, see Evtushenko, *Iagodnye mesta*, p. 80.
- 10 See *Zaria Vostoka*, 3 and 24 November 1973.
- 11 Konstantin Grigorevich Tsereteli (born 1921)—well-known Soviet Oriental specialist. For further biographical and bibliographical information, see S. D. Milibrand, *Biograficheskii slovar sovetskikh vostokovedov* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 590, 680.
- 12 UPI, 19 June 1983, 12 July 1983; AFP, 20 June 1983; *Vesti iz SSSR/USSR News Brief*, 1981, 20-27, 1983, 12-18, 23/24-25; *Prilozhenie k spisku politzakliuchennykh*, 1983, no. 6; AS 5108. See RL 129/84, "Ten Georgians Arrested for Protest-ing against Celebrating Bicentennial of Russian-Georgian Treaty," 26 March 1984.
- 13 See also Evgenev, "V poiske."
- 14 In his speech to party veterans, Andropov pointed to "the phenomenon of over-dependency" and "the dangerous mushrooming of philistinism" which had spread to the younger generation. He also emphasized, however, that "in our society there is no conflict between generations" and that "the younger generation is no worse than ours." *Pravda*, 16 August 1983.

61. Daily Living in East Germany

- 1 Gabriela Eckart, "Zwei Tonbandprotokolle aus dem 'Havelobst,'" *Sinn und Form*, no. 2, 1984.

62. "Pressure Cells" in Soviet Prisons

- 1 *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*, no. 43, p. 113.
- 2 *Arkhiv samizdata* 2220, pp. 2-30.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 2110.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 2220, pp. 1-2, 30-41.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 2110, p. 12.

- 8 See, for example, Andrei Amalrik, *Zapiski dissidenta* (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1982), pp. 187-188.

63. New Soviet Law on Re-sentencing

- 1 *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, no. 37, 1983, p. 1334.
- 2 *Arkhiv samizdata* 4155, p. 2.
- 3 See RL 121/83, "Resentencing of Political Prisoners in Soviet Camps," 17 March 1983.
- 4 *The Observer*, 20 February 1983; see also RL 351/82, "Estimates of the Prison Population of the USSR," 31 August 1982.

64. A Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee

- 1 See RL 170/83, "'Anti-Zionist Committee' Formed in the Soviet Union," 26 April 1983.
- 2 *Pravda*, 22 April 1983.
- 3 The data on the composition of the committee are taken from *Pravda*, 22 April 1983; *Sovetskaia Litva*, 6 May 1983; and *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 22 June 1983.
- 4 *Sovetskaia Litva*, 6 May 1983.
- 5 *Izvestiia*, 4 June 1983.
- 6 A slightly abridged text of the press conference appeared in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 22 June 1983.
- 7 See *The Promised Land*, Moscow, 1979; *Zanaves pripodniat* (The Curtain Is Up), Moscow, 1979.
- 8 The data on Korneev are taken from *Israel: The Reality behind the Myths* (Moscow: Novosti, 1980) and *Kursom agressii i rasizma* (On the Path of Aggression and Racism), Biblioteka Ogonek, no. 40, Moscow, 1982.
- 9 Cited by S. Tartakovskaia, "Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Press (in Recent Years)," Tel Aviv, 22 June 1983.
- 10 L. Korneev, *Klassovaia sushchnost' zionizma*, Kiev, 1982, p. 133.
- 11 *Ibid.*
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 135.
- 13 *Kursom agressii i rasizma*, p. 31.
- 14 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 *Ibid.*
- 17 See, for example, the article by David Dragunskii (in *Pravda*, 28 July 1983); Mark Krupkin (in *New Times*, no. 28, July 1983); and Tsezar Solodar (in *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 3 August 1983).
- 18 *Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet Public Opinion: Aims and Tasks*, Novosti, 1983.
- 19 *Supported by the Soviet People*, Novosti, 1983.
- 20 Nan Greifer (ed.), *Jews in the USSR*, London, 3 November 1983.
- 21 *Agence Télégraphique Juive*, Paris, 3 January 1984.
- 22 The most detailed report (as on the occasion of the press conference of 6 June 1983) appeared in *Literaturnaia gazeta* of 25 January 1984. Very brief reports also appeared in *Pravda* of 20 January 1984, and a TASS release of 19 January 1984.

- 23 *Leningradskaia pravda*, 29 February 1984; *Sovetskaia kultura*, *Pravda Ukrainy*, and *Sovetskaia Belorussia*, all of 1 March 1984; and *Literaturnaia gazeta*, no. 11, 1984.
- 24 See the issue of *Pravda* for 17 January 1984.
- 25 Radio Damascus, in Arabic, 29 October 1983.
- 26 "Open Letter to Jews in the United States," *New Times*, no. 46, November 1983.
- 27 *Sovetish Heymland*, no. 12, 1983, pp. 57-71.

65. A Religious Revival

Albania

- 1 March 1984.
- 2 *Rilindja*, 14 January 1984.
- 3 Ibid. See also chapters 45 and 47.

Bulgaria

- 1 Wolf Oschlies, "Kirche und Religiöses Leben in Bulgarien," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien*, no. 15, 1983.
- 2 *Die Welt*, 5 August 1981.
- 3 KNS, 25 January 1980.
- 4 Ibid.; *Church Times* (London), 18 May 1979; Mitko Matheeff, *Document of Darkness* (St. Catherine's, Canada: Your Neighbor in Need, 1980).
- 5 G. S., "Ideological Drive against Paraperception," RAD BR/60 (Bulgaria), RFER, 24 March 1983.

Czechoslovakia

- 1 Hruža's interview with Marvine Howe in the *New York Times*, 4 October 1981.
- 2 For previous discussions of the problem, with special reference to young people, see Czechoslovak Situation Reports/1 and 6, Radio Free Europe Research, 15 January and 26 March 1981, items 2 and 3, respectively; *ibid.*, nos. 5 and 21, 17 March and 26 November 1982, items 3 in each case; *ibid.*, no. 8, 9 May 1983, item 1; and *ibid.*, nos. 3 and 8, 16 February and 4 May 1984, items 4 and 3, respectively.
- 3 Aleš Sekot in *Tribuna*, no. 20, 18 May 1983, pp. 8-9.
- 4 Aleš Sekot in *Sociológia*, no. 1, 1984, pp. 18-19. Sekot was director of the Institute for the Investigation of Social Consciousness and Scientific Atheism attached to the Brno branch of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.
- 5 *Listy* (Rome), no. 6, December 1983, p. 11.
- 6 Karolína Halgašová in *Život Strany*, no. 24, 21 November 1983, pp. 25-26.
- 7 *Tribuna*, no. 1, 1 January 1975, p. 5. No newer data are available but one may assume that the percentage has declined somewhat.
- 8 Vladimír Osif in *Život Strany*, no. 10, 10 May 1982, p. 58. See also *Ateizmus*, no. 3, 1982, p. 342.
- 9 Mária Slácková in *Život Strany*, no. 21, 10 October 1983, pp. 57-58.
- 10 A samizdat religious writer said: "Catholics can live under socialism, but they cannot accept a planned withering away [of the Church]" (*Informance o Církví*, no. 12, December 1982, p. 6).
- 11 Ivan Hodovský in *Ateizmus*, no. 5, 1982, pp. 446-465.
- 12 *Sociologický časopis*, no. 3, 1982, pp. 377-378.

- 13 This and other issues are perspicaciously described in a samizdat essay entitled "The Future of Czech Catholicism." It is unsigned and undated but must have been written sometime in 1980.
- 14 Jozef Juráček, Oto Švec, and Jozef Sádovský were detained and interrogated in early April 1984 in connection with signature gathering (AFP and UPI, 10 April 1984).
- 15 The case has been described in VONS [Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted] Statement No. 354, 19 January 1984.
- 16 The priest, Gunther Matěj Rompf, was sentenced in September 1981 to a prison term of two years. See VONS Statement No. 278, 10 November 1981.
- 17 Pavol Prusák in *Učiteľské Noviny* (Bratislava), no. 42, 21 October 1982, pp. 1-2. Prusák was attached to the Slovak CP CC apparatus.
- 18 *Sociologický časopis*, no. 3, 1982, pp. 377-378.
- 19 See note 10 above.

German Democratic Republic

- 1 In addition to the Catholic Church in the GDR, which had about 1,200,000 members constituting 8 percent of the population, there were also eight regional Evangelical Churches. The eight regional Churches were all founding members of the all-German EKD (Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands) founded in 1968. In 1969, however, they left the EKD following intense pressure from the state authorities and formed their own separate organization, the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR. In addition, several historical institutions were retained; the five United Churches of Anhalt, Berlin-Brandenburg, Görlitz, Greifswald, and the Church Province of Saxony, for example, simultaneously coalesced into the Evangelical Union Church in the GDR (EKU). Similarly, the three Lutheran Churches of Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia make up the United Evangelical Lutheran Church (VELK). The Federation was reported to have 7,700,000 members (47 percent of the population). For the best treatment of the Evangelical Churches in the GDR, see Richard Henkys, ed., *Die Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR* [The Evangelical Churches in the GDR] (München: Kaiser, 1982).
- 2 See the interview with Erich Honecker, *Neues Deutschland*, 6 October 1983.
- 3 For further details on the independent "peace movement" in the GDR, see Ronald D. Asmus, "Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *ORBIS*, Summer 1983, pp. 301-341. See also chapters 12 and 13 in this volume.
- 4 See chapter 61 in this volume.

Hungary

- 1 On the growing interest of Hungarian youth in religion and the Churches, see Hungarian Situation Report/2, Radio Free Europe Research, 6 February 1984, item 7.
- 2 See *ibid.*, no. 5, 22 March 1983, item 7.
- 3 Dr. Tibor Bartha, "Easter Thoughts about Hope," *Magyar Nemzet*, 22 April 1984.
- 4 *Népszabadság*, 22 April 1984.

Poland

- 1 Wiesław Mysłęć, "Selected Problems of Ideological Confrontation in Crisis Conditions," *Nowe Drogi*, January-February 1982.

- 2 *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 May 1982.
- 3 According to the same source, other Churches and religious communities in Poland published twenty-one papers with a circulation of 85,000 copies.
- 4 For details, see chapter 35.
- 5 See Polish Situation Report/13, Radio Free Europe Research, 24 June 1980, item 4.
- 6 See *ibid.*, no. 8, 27 April 1984, item 3.
- 7 *Argumenty*, 20 November and 4 December 1983.

Romania

- 1 Texts of Father Calciu's sermons circulated in mimeographed form in Romania and were subsequently published in the West under the title *Sapte Cuvinte către Tineri* [Seven Statements for Youth] (Munich: Dmitru, 1979).
- 2 *Le Monde*, 28 March 1979.

Yugoslavia

- 1 Stella Alexander, *Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
- 2 See chapter 58.

Ukraine

- 1 *Arkhiv samizdata* 4897.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 4898.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 4899.
- 4 See, for example, *Diiannia soboru hreko-katolytskoi tserkvy u Lvovi 8–10 bereznia 1946*, Lvov, 1946; Dennis J. Dunn, *The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government, 1939–1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
- 5 *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 December 1980.
- 6 *Arkhiv samizdata* 4625.
- 7 *Ukrainskyi Pravozakhysnyi Rukh*, Toronto-Baltimore, 1978, pp. 31 and 111.
- 8 *Svoboda*, 7 November 1981.

Soviet Union

- 1 Eduard Filimonov, "Sotsialnaia i ideologicheskaia sushchnost religioznogo ekstremizma," in the series *Nauchnyi ateizm*, no. 8, 1983, p. 64.
- 2 The Vashchenko family left the USSR in June 1983.
- 3 Filimonov, "Sotsialnaia," 20–21.
- 4 *Izvestiia*, 4 February 1984, p. 6.
- 5 *Selskaia zhizn*, 27 January 1984.
- 6 *Nauka i religiia*, no. 8, 1980, p. 33.
- 7 *Ibid.*, no. 1, 1984, p. 14.
- 8 *Izvestiia*, 4 February 1984, p. 6.

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
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